A cloud security diagram routes authenticated devices through protected network gateways to server clusters.
Azure Application Gateway now has a centralized, policy-based way to validate JWTs, and it's in public preview. A gateway can check Microsoft Entra ID tokens before a request reaches your backend. You manage the rules once instead of repeating them in every service. Microsoft's Learn documentation, updated on the day of the announcement, covers the details below. The Azure Updates listing itself loaded without its item text, so the specifics come from the documentation.

A cloud security diagram routes authenticated devices through protected network gateways to server clusters. What's new: one policy, many gateways​

Application Gateway validates JSON Web Tokens issued by Microsoft Entra ID in incoming HTTPS requests. Doing this at the edge is meant to simplify application architecture and strengthen security posture.

The "centralized" part of the title is the new element. According to the Learn documentation, you configure validation through an authentication policy. One policy can be associated with routing rules on multiple Application Gateway instances. That helps apply the same issuer, audience and unauthenticated-request behavior across applications and environments. The policy is a regional resource, so it must be in the same region as the gateways that use it.

Earlier previews exposed this as a per-gateway "JWT validation configuration". Microsoft says those older policies stay active during this public preview and won't be migrated automatically. It recommends the centralized policy for new deployments. It also says the page isn't a formal deprecation notice, and lifecycle details will come later.

What the gateway checks​

The documented checks are token signature, issuer, audience and lifetime. When validation succeeds, the gateway forwards an x-msft-entra-identity header to the backend. Its value is tenantId:oid.

The policy's unauthorized-request setting controls what happens when validation fails:

ScenarioResultIdentity header
Valid token, action Allow200Present
Invalid token, action Deny401Absent
Missing token, action Deny401Absent
Missing oid claim, action Deny403Absent

With Allow, requests that fail validation are still forwarded, just without the identity header. Microsoft says to use Allow only when your application intentionally supports anonymous requests.

Requirements and limits​

  • SKU: Standard_v2 or WAF_v2.
  • Listener: an HTTPS listener with a backend target. HTTP listeners aren't supported.
  • Routing rules: Basic rules and Advanced rules, including Advanced rules with path conditions, are supported. The separate path-based routing rule type isn't supported during the preview.
  • Network: the gateway must be able to reach the Microsoft Entra metadata endpoints over TCP 443.
  • Identity: a protected API registered in Microsoft Entra ID. You record the tenant ID, client ID, expected audience (such as the Application ID URI) and issuer URL.

For a tenant-specific v2.0 endpoint, Microsoft gives these typical formats: an issuer of [Redirecting](https://login.microsoftonline.com/)<tenant-id>/v2.0 and an audience of api://<application-client-id>. It advises using the values from your tenant's OpenID Connect metadata document where possible, rather than constructing them.

Setting it up​

  1. Register the API in Microsoft Entra ID. A single-tenant registration works, and a redirect URI isn't needed for API scenarios. Note the Application (client) ID and Directory (tenant) ID.
  2. Optionally set an Application ID URI. Defining API scopes is optional too. Microsoft says scopes are for future authorization features and aren't required for the preview.
  3. On the gateway, open Settings > Authentication policies (Preview), then choose Create > JWT validation. You can also find the page by searching for Authentication policies in the portal.
  4. On Basics, choose the subscription, resource group, name and region. Set the policy for Application Gateway (regional) and the policy type to JWT validation.
  5. On Authentication method, choose Microsoft Entra ID. Enter the exact issuer expected in the token's iss claim, the audience, the client ID and the unauthorized-request action.
  6. On Association, add the gateway and select the HTTPS routing rules to protect. Repeat for any other gateways that should share the policy.
  7. Review and create. Then create or edit the routing rule, using an HTTPS listener and a backend pool, and associate it with the policy.

Clients must send a token for the configured audience in the Authorization: Bearer header on every request. Microsoft specifically warns against putting tokens in URLs, because URLs can end up in browser history, proxy logs and diagnostics.

Troubleshooting 401s​

Microsoft's checklist for a 401 is short:

  • The request has exactly one Authorization header using the Bearer scheme.
  • The token isn't expired, and its nbf claim isn't in the future.
  • iss matches the configured issuer exactly.
  • aud matches the configured audience.
  • The signing key named by the token's kid is available from the JWKS endpoint.
  • The policy is associated with the routing rule that actually handled the request.

If a valid request hits the wrong policy, check the listener, host name, path match, rule priority and associations. Each request is evaluated by the policy tied to the rule it selects. Because a shared policy applies to every associated rule, review all associations before you change it.

Analysis: what this does and doesn't do​

This is a gateway-level authentication check for API, service-to-service and machine-to-machine traffic. It is not an interactive sign-in system. Clients still get tokens from Entra ID, and the gateway only validates them.

It also doesn't replace authorization. The sibling Containers documentation says the identity provider issues tokens and the application decides on roles, permissions or resource ownership. The standard Application Gateway documentation describes validation and identity propagation only. So backends still need their own permission logic.

A practical caution is my own inference, not a Microsoft statement. The identity header is only meaningful if requests can't bypass the gateway or spoof the header. Restrict direct network access to the backend.

Two scope notes:

  • Preview status: Microsoft says the preview has no service-level agreement and isn't recommended for production workloads.
  • Different product: Application Gateway for Containers has its own, separate JWT validation preview. It uses a Kubernetes custom resource named AuthPolicy. That feature uses a JWKS endpoint, supports third-party identity providers, and works only with Gateway API. Don't mix its constraints up with the standard gateway's. As reported by third-party trackers, it was announced in early November 2026.

Bottom line​

Teams running Standard_v2 or WAF_v2 gateways in front of Entra-protected APIs can now define token validation once and attach it to many routes and gateways. Try it in test environments first. Plan a migration for any older per-gateway JWT configurations, and keep authorization in your applications.

 

References

  1. (In preview) Public Preview: Centralized user authentication + JWT validation for Azure Application Gateway Azure Updates 2026-11-17T20:00:32Z
  2. JSON Web Token (JWT) Validation in Azure Application Gateway (Preview) - Azure Application Gateway learn.microsoft.com
  3. JWT validation for Application Gateway for Containers | Microsoft Learn learn.microsoft.com