The flaw is CVE-2026-123890. Broadcom fixed it on November 19, 2026 in security advisory VMSA-2026-0009, along with four other vulnerabilities in SDDC Manager and VMware Tools for Windows. Rapid7 describes CVE-2026-123890 as an authentication bypass using an alternate path or channel (CWE-288) in the VMware Directory Service component of vCenter. It is rated Critical, CVSS 9.8, and an attacker with network access to vCenter can gain unauthorized access, with no credentials or user interaction required.
vCenter controls your ESXi/ESX hosts, your VMs and, often, the domain controllers running inside them. An attacker with administrator access to vCenter controls a lot more than one server.
What Broadcom says, and what it doesn't
Broadcom's Q&A document for VMSA-2026-0009 treats the vCenter fix as an emergency change under ITIL. The guidance is short: install a fixed version. Updates are cumulative, so any newer build also contains the fix.
A few points from Broadcom's FAQ matter for planning:
- No official workaround. Firewall rules and other compensating controls can reduce exposure. Broadcom leaves that decision to each organization and does not treat it as a substitute for the patch.
- Enhanced Linked Mode doesn't protect you. The vCenter issue is in vCenter itself, not in Enhanced Linked Mode (ELM), and it is present whether or not you use ELM.
- The July fix doesn't cover this. CVE-2026-123890 is distinct from the vCenter authentication bypass vulnerability CVE-2026-59309 that Broadcom addressed earlier in 2026. The vendor FAQ states that all vCenter systems below the versions fixed by VMSA-2026-0009 require the new update, including systems that already received the earlier fix.
- It isn't a VM escape. Broadcom's FAQ says none of the five issues allows code execution on an ESX host from inside a VM. ESX itself is not affected by this advisory, and neither are Workstation, Fusion, NSX, VCF Operations or VCF Automation.
Broadcom's advisory does not confirm exploitation. As Cyber Kendra notes, Broadcom credits Mandiant with reporting CVE-2026-123890, but its advisory does not mention in-the-wild exploitation. The exploitation evidence comes from Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG). The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security's alert also states that open source reporting indicates that CVE-2026-123890 is exploited in the wild.
Summary: Broadcom treats this as an emergency patch with no workaround. The confirmation that attackers used it comes from Mandiant, not Broadcom.
Fixed versions at a glance
The VMSA's response matrix is the authoritative reference. These are the fixed builds reported so far:
| Product | Branch | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| vCenter | 9.1.x | 9.1.1.0200 |
| vCenter | 9.0.x | 9.0.2.0200 |
| vCenter | 8.0 | 8.0 U3m |
| vCenter | 7.0 | Extended-support customers: contact Broadcom |
| SDDC Manager | 9.1.x / 9.0.x / 5.x | 9.1.1.0200 / 9.0.2.0100 / 5.2.5 |
| VMware Tools for Windows | 13.x / 12.x and 11.x | 13.1.5.0 / 12.5.5 (12.4.10 for 32-bit Windows, included in the 12.5.5 release) |
The vCenter builds above come from Security Online's breakdown, which lists vCenter 9.1.x: fixed in 9.1.1.0200, vCenter 9.0.x: fixed in 9.0.2.0200, vCenter 8.0: fixed in 8.0 U3m. For vSphere 7, Rapid7's table lists VMware vCenter Server 7.0 — Contact Broadcom Support (extended-support customers). Broadcom's FAQ also says vSphere 7 is affected; it reached End of General Support on October 2, 2025. For vSphere 6.5 and 6.7, Broadcom says to assume they are vulnerable because it doesn't evaluate end-of-support products.
VMware Cloud Foundation 5.x customers apply vCenter 8.0 U3m through the asynchronous patching process in KB 88287 and update SDDC Manager to 5.2.5. Telco Cloud Platform and Telco Cloud Infrastructure customers have a separate KB, 463116.
How ARMORY CASTLE got to vCenter
GTIG attributes the activity to ARMORY CASTLE, formerly tracked as UNC5221. It describes the group as a suspected PRC-nexus espionage actor. Attribution is an analytic judgment, so treat it that way. The group is known for exploiting edge appliances such as Citrix NetScaler and Ivanti Connect Secure.
vCenter was not the first target in this intrusion. On October 15, Mandiant reported that ARMORY CASTLE exploited CVE-2026-102764, a BeyondTrust Remote Support zero-day, in late August 2026. Its new report covers what happened next, in the same campaign:
- Pivot to Linux. From the compromised BeyondTrust appliance, the attackers moved to internal Linux appliances that had no EDR. They dropped the SLIMSAVAGE command webshell and the CAGEMATCH file-upload webshell. They then got root by setting SUID permissions on
/bin/envwith the GNU Debugger. - Scan for VMware. They used nmap to look for VMware-specific ports, including 2012. Mandiant says port 2012 is the control-interface RPC for vCenter Single Sign-On and is central to the exploit.
- Exploit vCenter with BONESAW. This custom Go tool abuses a flaw that Mandiant says involves predictable UUIDv1 timestamp generation in vmdir's SRP authentication interface. The flaw exposes the SRP session key without any password. The result is a session as
[email][email protected][/email]. With it, BONESAW can create an SSO admin account, stream thedata.mdbdirectory database, steal the STS SAML signing key, forge SAML assertions and grant Global Administrator on the vCenter root folder. - Forge tokens with SAWSNAKE. This Go port of a public vCenter SAML login tool enabled Golden SAML attacks. Forged tokens bypass MFA and let the attackers impersonate any user.
- Take over the hypervisors. The attackers installed BEARBONES, a modified Dropbear SSH server with a backdoor. They created a local vCenter admin, enabled SSH through the VAMI API, and stole the vCenter master crypto key and PostgreSQL credentials. Then they switched SSH off again. They moved on to ESXi as
vpxuserand root. - Steal data from VM disks. On ESXi, they browsed VMFS volumes with a Python toolkit and staged archives in a hidden
.adirectory. Mandiant says they extracted files from virtual machine disks, including Windows Active Directory database and registry files.
They also deployed LAZYBONES, a Slack-based backdoor that Mandiant had seen in an earlier ARMORY CASTLE campaign.
The timeline is also worrying. Mandiant says the recovered BONESAW binary has a build timestamp of July 13, 2026, while cautioning that Go build metadata can be altered. In early September the tool was used against a vCenter server that was already patched for CVE-2026-59309. That suggests the attackers had this bug ready before Broadcom's July disclosure of the other vCenter flaw.
Summary: The attackers went from an edge appliance to Linux to vCenter to ESXi, and finally to the AD database inside a Windows VM. This is why Windows administrators need to care about a vCenter bug.
Patching without breaking your upgrade plans
Before you start, Broadcom's FAQ flags several practical details:
- Workloads keep running. The vSphere Client and other management tools go offline briefly during the update. VMs, vSphere HA and vSAN keep working. New encryption operations and key rotations against a Standard Key Provider are unavailable while vCenter is down.
- Quick Patch is not available. Broadcom lists no workaround, and the patches cannot be applied using vCenter Quick Patch. You can still use the VAMI or your normal update tools.
- Watch for a "Back-in-Time" problem. vCenter 8.0 U3m and 9.0.2.0200 block upgrades to VCF 9.1.1, and Broadcom advises waiting for 9.1.2. If you're in the middle of an upgrade, Broadcom suggests two options. You can upgrade vCenter to 9.1.1 first and patch there, since it can still manage older ESX hosts. Or you can patch now and wait for 9.1.2.
- Check interoperability. Run your vCenter, ESX and vSAN versions through Broadcom's Product Interoperability Matrix.
- Engineered systems such as VxRail or SimpliVity should follow guidance from their own vendor.
To check your vCenter build, look at the Summary tab in the vSphere Client. In PowerCLI, run Connect-VIServer and then read $global:DefaultVIServer.Build and $global:DefaultVIServer.Version.
The Windows angle: VMware Tools CVE-2026-123894
The same advisory fixes CVE-2026-123894, a SAML token signature bypass in VMware Tools for Windows. It is a privilege escalation that stays inside the guest. It requires an attacker who already has a local privileged process on a Windows VM configured with guest alias mapping.
Broadcom's FAQ is clear on the shortcuts that don't work:
- Disabling guest operations does not protect you.
- Stopping or uninstalling VMware Tools is not a workaround.
- Not using guest aliases isn't a reliable defense either, because alias configuration can change over time.
To see which aliases exist on a VM, run VGAuthCLI.exe list as an administrator inside the guest. You can also run it through your endpoint management tool.
VMware Tools for other guest operating systems is not listed as affected. Virtual hardware upgrades aren't required. Workstation and Fusion aren't affected, but Broadcom notes that Windows VMs on those platforms that may later move into vSphere should run a fixed Tools version.
What to check if you might already be compromised
Patching closes the hole but won't remove an attacker who got in during September or October. The following checklist is our inference from Mandiant's published findings. It is not a Broadcom-prescribed procedure:
- SSO accounts: look for unexpected SSO administrator accounts and new
@vsphere.locallocal admins. - SSH toggling: look for SSH being enabled and then disabled on vCenter through the VAMI. Mandiant observed a
PUTrequest to/rest/appliance/access/ssh. - ESXi access: check
vpxuserlogins to the ESXi Host Client, new keys in root'sauthorized_keys, and hidden directories on VMFS volumes. - Port 2012 traffic: check for scans or connections to vCenter port 2012 from hosts that don't normally talk to it.
- BEARBONES banner: search for the SSH banner
SSH-2.0-pulsesecure_23345, which Mandiant used to trace the group's relay network. - Assume the SAML key is gone: if compromise is plausible, treat the STS signing key and directory credentials as stolen. Golden SAML tokens don't care about MFA.
- Protect AD: if domain controller disks were reachable, include Active Directory credential hygiene in your response.
Mandiant also argues that the default VAMI-managed firewall on the vCenter appliance isn't enough. It can't restrict access per port. Anyone with VAMI access can turn it off. It doesn't log denied connections, and it ignores outbound traffic. Mandiant recommends independent iptables policies instead:
- restrict ports 443, 2012, 5480 and 22 to trusted management hosts;
- send dropped connections to your SIEM;
- block outbound traffic from the appliance.
Analysis
This campaign follows a familiar pattern: break in through an edge device, then go after management infrastructure, where defenders often have the least visibility. Hypervisor management appliances and Linux utility boxes rarely run EDR, and that is exactly where Mandiant found this activity.
There are limits to what's known. The evidence doesn't show how many organizations were hit or who the victims were, and it doesn't suggest that every unpatched vCenter has been compromised. GTIG has also warned that ARMORY CASTLE has a history of broad, opportunistic exploitation once a zero-day becomes public. Now that this flaw is public, more attackers can try it.
The practical steps are:
- Find every vCenter you have, including the ones inside VCF and other bundles.
- Patch to the fixed build for your branch, minding the Back-in-Time issue.
- Restrict who can reach vCenter's management ports.
- Update VMware Tools on your Windows VMs.
- If any vCenter was reachable from a host that could have been compromised, start the investigation now.
References
- VMware patches vCenter zero-day exploited in attacks since September BleepingComputer · 2026-11-19T19:26:25-05:00
- CVE-2026-123890: Critical Authentication Bypass in VMware vCenter rapid7.com
- VMSA-2026-0009: Critical vCenter auth bypass (CVE-2026-123890, CVSS 9.8) plus SDDC Manager and VMware Tools fixes community.veeam.com