A laptop and phone display MFA and passkey security alongside signs promoting UK Cyber Essentials and NCSC guidance.
Two separate things happened to UK identity security in April 2026, and they are easy to blur together. First, the NCSC said publicly that it now favours passkeys. Second, the Cyber Essentials scheme moved to v3.3 and started failing organisations outright for missing MFA on cloud services. Taken together, they make a strong case for UK Microsoft 365, Entra and Windows shops to tighten sign-in this year. They are still not the same rule, though. Some of the "enterprise playbooks" now circulating mix the NCSC's advice with the certification requirements and present both as mandatory.

This piece separates the two and shows what you actually have to do to pass, as opposed to what is simply good practice.

A laptop and phone display MFA and passkey security alongside signs promoting UK Cyber Essentials and NCSC guidance. Event one: the NCSC recommends passkeys​

At CYBERUK 2026 in Glasgow, the NCSC said it would begin recommending passkeys wherever a service supports them, with two-step verification (2SV) where they are not available. The agency said the change would arrive through its ongoing refresh of guidance rather than in one go. A blog post by Dave Chismon, the NCSC's CTO for Architecture, and a technical paper were published on 23 April 2026.

The NCSC's findings, as set out in that blog:

  • Traditional MFA can be phished. That covers passwords combined with SMS codes, email codes, TOTP codes from apps or hardware tokens, and push approvals.
  • FIDO2 credentials, including passkeys, are as secure or more secure than traditional MFA against all the common credential attacks seen in the wild.
  • Passkeys count as MFA when user verification is required. The cryptographic key is something you have, and the device unlock (PIN, fingerprint, face) is something you know or are. The NCSC notes that the factors do not need to be on separate devices.
  • Large-scale attacks on correctly implemented passkeys are unlikely, because FIDO2 removes the cheap reuse or relaying of credentials that phishing kits rely on.

The reason is origin binding. A passkey is cryptographically tied to the real service, so a lookalike login page has nothing useful to steal or pass on. The NCSC says this removes the whole class of attack in which a code or approval is captured and replayed during a live phishing session.

Some popular summaries miss two qualifications:

  1. The NCSC's comparison paper is explicitly written from an individual user's perspective and covers personal use. It is not an enterprise control standard. The NCSC did list "large organisations" and "public sector" among the blog's intended audience, so enterprise IT can take the direction of travel seriously. It just isn't a certification rule.
  2. The NCSC included session hijacking among the attacks it looked at, but it never claims passkeys stop it. A stolen session cookie on a compromised endpoint is still a stolen session cookie. Passkeys protect the sign-in, not everything that happens afterwards.

The NCSC also doesn't suggest stranding users. Its consumer guidance says that where passkeys are unavailable, people should keep using strong passwords, ideally generated by a password manager, and turn on 2SV. It also notes that synced passkeys are only as safe as the account protecting the sync.

Summary: The NCSC now prefers passkeys and calls traditional MFA phishable. That is a recommendation, not a certification requirement.

Event two: Cyber Essentials v3.3 makes missing cloud MFA an automatic fail​

Cyber Essentials v3.3 (the requirements document is dated April 2026 and the new question set is known as "Danzell") is where the compliance pressure actually comes from. SureCloud says it applies to new assessment accounts created after 26 April 2026, while the NCSC lists 27 April as the effective date. According to IASME, organisations with an active account opened before the cut-over get six months to certify under the previous requirements.

The written MFA rule itself isn't new. Consultancy Nerdster notes that the requirements already said that authentication to cloud services must always use multi-factor authentication (MFA). What changed in April 2026 is how IASME marks it. Under the new marking, IASME treats failure to implement MFA on cloud services as an automatic fail 'whether it is free, included, or a paid option'.

The questionnaire items behind this are worth knowing, according to Cyber Essentials Preparation's breakdown:

QuestionWhat it asksFailure condition
A7.14Whether all your cloud services have MFA available—
A7.15List cloud services with no MFA optionAutomatic fail if a listed service does offer MFA
A7.16MFA applied to all cloud administrators?Automatic fail on "No"
A7.17MFA applied to all cloud users?Automatic fail on "No"

A7.17 is the one that catches people out. The Unite Group puts it bluntly: if a cloud service supports MFA and you have not enabled it for all users, you automatically fail. Fig Group says the most common pattern is that MFA is usually enabled for administrators but not standard users of the same cloud service.

Other v3.3 changes that matter for scoping:

  • A formal definition of "cloud service", and an explicit statement that cloud services cannot be excluded from scope.
  • An updated passwordless-authentication definition that now includes FIDO2.
  • A reference to the Software Security Code of Practice in the software development section.
  • More emphasis on backups. Nerdster notes these remain recommended rather than required.
  • Organisation-owned accounts stay in scope even when a supplier, contractor or MSP uses them.
  • Patching gets stricter too. High-risk and critical updates (CVSS v3 7.0 or higher) must be applied within 14 days, and two new auto-fail questions, A6.4 and A6.5, mean that failure to meet this requirement results in an automatic assessment failure.

The Unite Group also says v3.3 treats business social media accounts, including LinkedIn, Facebook and X, as cloud services. Nerdster adds that AI tools belong on your cloud inventory as well. So the company LinkedIn page and that ChatGPT trial someone in marketing signed up for both need MFA.

Summary: v3.3 requires MFA wherever a cloud service offers it, for every user, and IASME now auto-fails you if it's missing. It does not require passkeys.

Where the two rules meet (and where the playbooks overreach)​

The most important correction to the "playbook" framing: Cyber Essentials v3.3 does not ban SMS. The standard describes SMS as less secure but still substantially better than no MFA, and recommends stronger alternatives where they are suitable and available. Its passwordless definition is broad. It covers FIDO2 authenticators and security keys, but also one-time codes, QR codes and push notifications.

That leads to a three-way split:

  • To pass Cyber Essentials: MFA must be on, for everyone, on every in-scope cloud service that offers it.
  • To follow NCSC best practice: use passkeys where supported and 2SV where they aren't.
  • To actually stop phishing: remove the phishable fallback methods once passkeys are in place. This is a good security recommendation, not a scheme requirement.

There is also a Microsoft-specific trap. Apexward Group, an IASME Certification Body, says IASME's guidance is that allowing sign-in without a second factor because the user is on a trusted IP address, or a conditional access rule based on location, is not MFA. Many Entra ID tenants still have a Conditional Access policy that skips MFA for named locations such as the head office. If yours does, that exemption could undermine your A7.17 answer. Review it before the assessor does. Apexward also confirms that passkeys and FIDO2 count.

A practical rollout sequence for Windows and Microsoft 365 estates​

Steps 1–3 come from the v3.3 requirements and IASME marking. Steps 4–7 are implementation advice based on general industry practice; the scheme does not mandate them.

  1. Build the cloud inventory first. List every SaaS service, admin portal, social account and AI tool that stores or processes organisational data, including accounts used by contractors and MSPs.
  2. Check MFA availability for each service. IASME keeps a reference list, but Apexward warns that IASME keeps a list of whether common cloud services offer MFA, while noting it cannot be complete. Only list something under A7.15 if you are sure.
  3. Enforce MFA for every user, not just admins. Then remove location-based MFA bypasses from Conditional Access.
  4. Choose phishing-resistant methods where the platform supports them. For Windows 11 fleets, that typically means Windows Hello for Business and FIDO2 security keys, and Microsoft Entra ID supports both. Check method availability against your Entra licensing and Microsoft's current documentation, not vendor price tables.
  5. Give privileged accounts the strongest option. v3.3 already requires separate administrator accounts that aren't used for email or browsing. Many teams issue hardware keys to those accounts, with a registered backup so recovery doesn't fall back to SMS.
  6. Retire weaker methods gradually. If an attacker can force the login down to an SMS code or a push prompt, the passkey adds little. Remove fallbacks user group by user group as enrolment completes.
  7. Tighten helpdesk recovery. Lost-device and lost-key resets are where social engineers aim next. Require strong out-of-band identity checks before issuing temporary credentials.

The bottom line​

What gets lost in the playbook framing is that Cyber Essentials makes you turn MFA on, while the NCSC's passkey advice is about choosing MFA that phishing can't defeat. Treat v3.3 as the minimum: MFA on every cloud account, no trusted-location exemptions, and critical patches within 14 days. Then follow the NCSC's direction and move toward passkeys, starting with the administrators and finance approvers attackers target most.

Be cautious with vendor comparison tables and promotional hardware prices dressed up as compliance guidance. Neither the NCSC nor IASME tells you which identity provider to buy, how many keys to issue per person, or which token brand to use.

 

References

  1. UK NCSC Passkeys and Cyber Essentials v3.3: Enterprise Playbook - JournalArta JournalArta 2026-11-20T06:47:49+00:00
  2. Cyber Essentials Danzell (v3.3): Every 2026 Change Explained nerdster.co.uk
  3. Cyber Essentials v3.3 Danzell: What Changed & How to Prep - SureCloud surecloud.com