📎 AI Summary:
The thread centers on a report that Japan’s emergency prediction systems for radioactive releases—ERSS and SPEEDI—failed after the Fukushima crisis due to power supply loss, potentially delaying effective evacuation in Fukushima Prefecture. Key points raised include that ERSS could not collect reactor data and had never been used before, while SPEEDI depended on ERSS outputs and was therefore also ineffective, raising doubts about Japan’s disaster-preparedness policy despite significant development and maintenance costs. Overall sentiment is critical toward government preparedness and the reliability of the systems during the disaster.

whoosh

Cooler King
Staff member
Joined
Apr 15, 2009
Messages
48,248
Thread Author #1
TOKYO —

Japan’s system for predicting the volume of radioactive materials to be released into the environment failed in the wake of the nuclear crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant due to the power supply cut following the March 11 earthquake and tsunami, sources close to the matter said Monday.

The malfunction of the Emergency Response Support System, or ERSS, coupled with the insufficiency of the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information, or SPEEDI, designed to predict the dispersal of radioactive materials based on forecasts by ERSS, is likely to have delayed the effective evacuation of residents in Fukushima Prefecture.

The systems’ failure casts doubt on the government’s disaster-prevention policy, which said that the systems should be used to analyze and predict the amount and spread of radioactive material into the environment during a nuclear crisis. The two systems have cost around 28 billion yen in total for their development and maintenance.

The ERSS is designed to collect data about the state of the nuclear reactors, such as pressure and temperature, from remote locations and analyze the expected development of a nuclear accident to predict the amount of radioactive materials to be released into the air.

The ERSS, which is managed by the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization under the supervision of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, had never been used since its start of development in 1987, as accidents that had occurred in the past were less serious than the system’s standard for activation.

The system was put to the test for its ability this time, but proved useless as the twin disaster was larger than initially envisioned. It still remains unable to collect data from the No. 1 to 5 reactors at the crippled Fukushima plant.
Link Removed - Invalid URL