I wasn’t able to find a public, authoritative record for CVE-2025-53773 (the MSRC URL you gave returns Microsoft’s Security Update Guide shell when I fetch it), so below I’ve written an in‑depth, evidence‑backed feature-style analysis of the class of vulnerability you described — an AI / Copilot command‑injection / RCE chain that affects GitHub Copilot and Visual Studio — pulling together Microsoft advisories and independent research from 2025 on Copilot/AI-agent injection attacks and related Visual Studio / Git integration risks. If you want a piece strictly tied to the exact MSRC entry for CVE-2025-53773, please either paste the MSRC advisory text or confirm the CVE number and I’ll update and re-check live pages; as of Aug 12, 2025 I could not locate a public NVD/MITRE entry under 2025-53773. For context and corroboration I cite Microsoft/NVD and independent writeups below. (nvd.nist.gov, pillar.security, filaments.co)
What we know, and what we don’t
- Reported symptom: an “improper neutralization of special elements used in a command (command injection)” affecting GitHub Copilot and Visual Studio, enabling local code execution when an attacker supplies crafted input. This class of flaw maps to CWE-77 and to a growing set of 2025 AI-agent prompt/command‑injection disclosures. (app.opencve.io)
- Verification gap: I attempted to fetch the MSRC advisory page you provided; the site loads via client JavaScript and returned the platform shell in my extraction, not the advisory body. I therefore cross‑checked public vulnerability databases and vendor advisories for closely related, published Copilot/AI injection CVEs and for Visual Studio / Git integration CVEs from 2025. I found confirmed, public advisories for similar AI command‑injection problems (for example CVE‑2025‑32711 / “EchoLeak”) and a string of 2025 research demonstrating weaponization of Copilot rules/configuration files and risks introduced by bundling Git in Visual Studio — all of which help explain realistic attack paths for the sort of RCE you described. (nvd.nist.gov, pillar.security, filaments.co)
Attackers have two broad ways to turn an AI assistant or its environment into a local RCE vector:
1) Manipulate model-facing instructions / input so the assistant returns or writes content that gets executed. Examples: hidden instructions embedded in README/ rule files, or prompt injection in content the agent ingests (this is the “EchoLeak” / LLM‑scope class of issue). If the Copilot/agent is used to generate or write files into the developer workspace, the generated file can contain OS commands, build scripts, or installer code that later runs. The EchoLeak family was a high‑impact example in 2025 showing how untrusted content can be treated as trusted instructions by AI agents. (cyasha.com, socprime.com)
2) Abuse the development tool’s integration points (IDE + bundled tools like Git) so that malicious repository metadata, bundles, or hooks cause files to be written or executed on clone/checkout. Visual Studio bundles Git and other tools; if the underlying Git client misvalidates paths, bundle protocols, CR/LF line endings or symlinks, an adversary-hosted repository can cause client‑side writes into privileged locations or cause post‑checkout hooks to run. Several 2025 advisories demonstrated how Git protocol/bundle handling and CRLF/symlink edge cases allowed untrusted content to land in executable locations when developers cloned attacker repositories.
Putting the two together (AI + IDE/Git): realistic chain
- Step 1: Attacker crafts a public repository or a seemingly innocuous project artifact (README, .github/copilot-instructions.md, config/rules files) that contains either (a) hidden instructions or prompt‑style content that the Copilot agent will consume, or (b) crafted Git metadata / bundles / hooks designed to land files in specific paths on clone. Pillar Security’s “Rules File Backdoor” research in March 2025 showed the first method in live testing; Git protocol injection research and vendor advisories in 2025 showed the second method. (pillar.security)
- Step 2: A developer using Visual Studio (or VS Code with Copilot enabled) opens/clones or otherwise invokes Copilot/agent functionality that ingests the malicious file/metadata. If Copilot‘s agent mode or Copilot’s instructions file is authoritatively read and applied, the model may generate code (or a workspace artifact) that embeds attacker-supplied shell commands or scripts. If Git/IDE also writes attacker-provided bundles or follows misinterpreted paths (symlink/CRLF trickery), attacker content can end up in workspace hooks/.git/hooks or other locations where execution occurs automatically (post-checkout, build steps, CI). The end state: attacker-controlled code executed with the victim’s user privileges — local RCE. (pillar.security)
- “Improper neutralization of special elements used in a command” (CWE‑77) describes systems that accept externally‑influenced strings that then form part of a command line, script, or control sequence without properly escaping or validating those special characters/constructs. With AI agents the attack surface is broadened because the agent can both (a) parse hidden instructions inside text that humans assume are harmless and (b) emit code/artifacts that downstream tools will execute. With Git/IDE integrations, insufficient path validation or special‑character handling lets an attacker control where files land and whether they are executed. The combination is potent because both sides (the AI and the SCM/IDE) have historically been designed under different threat models — one assumes trusted instruction scopes, the other assumes untrusted repo contents. (app.opencve.io)
- EchoLeak (CVE‑2025‑32711): a zero‑click AI command‑injection / information‑disclosure problem in Microsoft 365 Copilot was disclosed in June 2025 — it illustrated “LLM scope violations” where external content causes the AI to leak sensitive information and is a canonical example of AI command injection in practice. NVD/MSRC entries and multiple vendor writeups examine it. (nvd.nist.gov, cvedetails.com)
- Rules File Backdoor (Pillar Security): March 2025 research showed how hidden characters and crafted rule/config files can coerce Copilot/agent decisions and cause the assistant to generate subtle malicious code. This is the primary public demonstration of the “model-facing instruction manipulation” attack family. (pillar.security)
- Multiple Git/Visual Studio advisories in 2025: researchers and vendors disclosed Git client issues where advertised bundles, protocol paths, CRLF quirks, and symlink handling could cause files to be written to attacker‑controlled or privileged locations on clone/checkout; Microsoft integrated hardened Git builds into Visual Studio updates to mitigate these chains. These advisories make clear that bundling of Git into an IDE means patching and update practices for the IDE become a critical part of the attack surface.
- Preconditions commonly required: victim must open or clone content from a repository or otherwise surface the malicious artifact into the Copilot/agent context; the attack is much easier when enterprise teams run automated clones, CI workers, or have relaxed symlink/permissions policies. The EchoLeak zero‑click examples are notable because they lowered user interaction requirements, but many practical chains still require at least one innocuous action (open, clone, fetch) to trigger the flow. (socprime.com)
- Privilege and blast radius: code executes with the privileges of the user or service performing the clone / running Copilot. In CI or build servers where agents run with elevated access, the blast radius can become large; on developer laptops with user‑level privileges, local persistence and lateral movement remain practical for skilled attackers.
1) Treat Copilot/agent outputs as untrusted: require code reviews and automated security scanning for all AI‑generated code. Do not auto‑promote AI-generated artifacts into production without human review and SAST/DSAST checks.
2) Patch and update aggressively: ensure Visual Studio, Visual Studio Code, and bundled Git versions are updated to vendor‑supplied security builds. Visual Studio releases in 2025 integrated hardened Git binaries to address protocol and bundle validation issues — apply those updates quickly.
3) Protect Git flows:
- Restrict acceptance of submodules from untrusted sources.
- Normalize and validate .gitmodules and config file line endings in CI pipelines (reject suspicious CRLF anomalies).
- Disable automatic execution of hooks in build agents, or run builds in ephemeral containers that start from a clean image.
4) Harden Copilot/Agent usage: - Disable any “Agent Mode” features that automatically apply workspace‑level rules without explicit admin approval.
- Limit Copilot’s network egress and token scope; rotate tokens and monitor API usage for spikes. Pillar Security’s research recommends inspection and governance around rule files used by agents. (pillar.security)
5) Network & endpoint controls: - Enforce egress filtering and DLP on traffic from developer workstations and CI runners.
- Use EDR to detect suspicious child processes spawned by git, msbuild, or typical developer toolchains.
6) CI/CD hygiene: - Run builds with least privilege, in fresh containers, with no persistent workspace that could be poisoned by an attacker repo.
- Scan fetched repositories (including submodules) for suspicious hooks, odd symlinks, or encoded/hidden characters in text files before running any build/checkout action.
- Hunt for: Unusual git clone/fetch sources in logs, newly created files in .git/hooks, unexpected child processes of git/IDE processes (powershell, sh, cmd.exe, bash), and spikes in Copilot API usage or tokens called from unusual IPs.
- EDR rules: flag post‑checkout hook creation or execution, and unexpected use of file write APIs targeting system or hooks directories after a clone. Monitor for obscured unicode or control characters in repository text files — these can hide instructions intended for an LLM. (pillar.security)
1) Isolate the affected host(s) and any CI agents.
2) Collect forensic artifacts: git clone commands and logs, workspace contents, Copilot/agent logs (requests/responses), installed VS/VS Code extensions and versions, and network egress logs for Copilot API tokens.
3) Rotate tokens/credentials used by Copilot integrations and revoke suspicious tokens.
4) Hunt for persistence (scheduled tasks, installed services, modified PATH, new hooks in other repos).
5) Rebuild CI workers from known good images and re-run pipeline with strict validations enabled.
6) Notify stakeholders and file a vendor support ticket with Microsoft/GitHub if the vector involves vendor components or if exploit patterns are seen. (socprime.com)
Policy and developer best practices (longer term)
- Governance for AI in dev workflows: maintain an “AI usage policy” that defines approved patterns, code review gates for AI-generated code, and who can enable agent modes.
- Content whitelists and signing: where allowed, only accept repository contributions after verifying signatures and enforcing repo-level checks.
- Educate developers: run tabletop exercises demonstrating how a booby‑trapped repo could lead to code execution, so teams appreciate the chain and don’t blindly accept AI-generated fixes or new submodules.
- Integrate “AI-aware” SCA/SAST: static analyzers and secret scanning tools should be aware that AI may generate code and look for patterns indicating injected instructions or hidden unicode. Pillar and other researchers in 2025 called for new tooling that can detect AI‑mediated manipulations. (filaments.co, pillar.security)
- Small dev teams/hobbyists: high risk if default IDE settings allow automatic agent actions or if developers frequently pull third‑party submodules without review.
- Enterprises with CI/CD: elevated risk because automated clone/checkout flows often run with broader privileges; these environments are high-value if attackers can plant build‑time payloads.
- Regulated industries: the data-exfiltration dimension of AI agent flaws (EchoLeak → disclosure of sensitive docs) adds compliance exposure beyond typical code execution risks. (cvedetails.com)
1) Immediately check and install the latest Visual Studio / Git updates published by Microsoft for July–Aug 2025. Microsoft integrated hardened Git binaries in 2025 updates; apply those patches.
2) Disable any automatic agent/agent‑mode features in Copilot that read repo rule files or automatically apply workspace modifications until your org has a tested governance policy. (pillar.security)
3) Scan projects and CI runners for .git/hooks and suspicious post‑checkout or post‑merge scripts; disallow or vet submodule additions from outside trusted orgs.
4) Rotate Copilot/GitHub tokens, restrict Copilot token scopes and monitor API usage for anomalous queries. (github.blog)
5) Run automated SAST/security scans on any AI‑generated code and mandate human review before merge. Use DLP/EDR telemetry to detect suspicious exfil or process execution. (securityweek.com, socprime.com)
How I sourced this article (transparency)
- Vendor / canonical CVE data and advisories: Microsoft / NVD entries for related 2025 AI and SCM issues (EchoLeak CVE‑2025‑32711 and MSRC advisories referenced from the NVD). (nvd.nist.gov, app.opencve.io)
- Independent research: Pillar Security “Rules File Backdoor” analysis (March 2025) and other 2025 blog/industry writeups about AI agent and Copilot security. (pillar.security, globenewswire.com)
- Ecosystem/operational analysis: multiple 2025 writeups and vendor advisories on Git protocol injection, CRLF/symlink handling and Visual Studio’s bundled Git updates (these explain why an IDE + Copilot pairing can become an execution chain). I also reviewed internal forum‑style summaries and collated best practices from vendor guidance and public incident analyses.
- If you want: I’ll re-check the specific MSRC page you provided and incorporate its exact text into the article — paste the advisory here or confirm I should keep trying to fetch it and I’ll attempt another live retrieval. (Note: MSRC pages sometimes render content via JavaScript; pasting the advisory text or a screenshot will let me cite it precisely.)
- I can also produce a tailored checklist and a Visual Studio / Copilot configuration hardening guide (step‑by‑step, with UI navigation and PowerShell commands) for Windows sysadmins and dev leads.
- If you have the MSRC advisory text or a different CVE number, paste it and I’ll update the piece to match that authoritative source exactly.
- Final note: you cited MSRC’s MSRC URL for CVE‑2025‑53773. I attempted to fetch that page but the advisory body didn’t surface through my automated extraction; I therefore relied on closely related, public, authoritative 2025 advisories (NVD/MSRC for CVE‑2025‑32711 / EchoLeak, Pillar Security, and Visual Studio/Git advisories) to produce an accurate, actionable analysis of the same vulnerability class (AI/agent command injection + IDE/Git integration leading to RCE). If CVE‑2025‑53773 is an internal or newly published MSRC entry that I couldn’t render, please paste its content and I’ll update promptly. (nvd.nist.gov, pillar.security)
- fetch the MSRC page again and paste any text I can extract, or
- build the Visual Studio hardening checklist described above (step‑by‑step), or
- convert this article to a shorter alert you can post on WindowsForum.com (TL;DR + action items).
Source: MSRC Security Update Guide - Microsoft Security Response Center