ArmorBlock 5000 Webserver Flaws: Patch CVE-2025-7773/7774 Now

A pair of high-severity vulnerabilities in Rockwell Automation’s ArmorBlock 5000 I/O webserver — tracked as CVE-2025-7773 and CVE-2025-7774 — create a realistic, low-complexity path for remote attackers to hijack or misuse web sessions on specific 5032-series modules, prompting immediate patching and network-hardening guidance from CISA and Rockwell. (cisa.gov)

Background​

The affected hardware is the ArmorBlock 5000 family, specifically the 5032 16‑point configurable digital modules used as on‑machine distributed I/O in industrial and manufacturing settings. These modules include an embedded webserver used for configuration and maintenance; that webserver is the attack surface for the two issues disclosed on August 14, 2025. The ArmorBlock 5000 product line documentation confirms the module family and the presence of a browser‑accessible configuration interface. (rockwellautomation.com)
CISA’s Industrial Control Systems advisory (ICSA‑25‑226‑27) summarizes the two findings, assigns CVE identifiers (CVE‑2025‑7773 and CVE‑2025‑7774), and gives a CVSS v4 base score of 8.8 for the combined findings — placing both in the High severity band and noting remote exploitability with low attack complexity. The advisory explicitly lists the catalog numbers and impacted firmware: 5032‑CFGB16M12P5DR, 5032‑CFGB16M12DR, and 5032‑CFGB16M12M12LDR running firmware version 1.011 and prior. (cisa.gov)
Independent vulnerability aggregators and trackers reflect the same CVE assignments and scoring (published/observed on August 14, 2025), confirming the public disclosure and CVE registration timelines. These external records help corroborate CISA’s advisory metadata and published severity. (securityvulnerability.io, cvefeed.io)

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Executive summary of the technical findings​

• CVE‑2025‑7773 — Incorrect Authorization (CWE‑863): The ArmorBlock webserver issues session identifiers in a way that correlates with recent login intervals, making the per‑session number predictable. Predictable session numbers can allow an attacker to hijack or impersonate a management session without valid credentials if the other controls around session validation are weak. CISA documents a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.6 for the finding and provides a CVSS v4 vector that results in an 8.8 base score. (cisa.gov)
• CVE‑2025‑7774 — Improper Authentication (CWE‑287): Session credentials that can be intercepted (for example, via passive network monitoring when controls are absent) remain usable in the module for a three‑minute timeout window, enabling an attacker who obtains session tokens to perform privileged actions during that window. CISA assigned the same CVSS scores as above and highlights the time‑bound credential reuse as the central authentication failure. (cisa.gov)

Taken together, these weaknesses form a credible chain: an attacker who can observe or guess a session identifier and then reuse intercepted session credentials within the three‑minute window may be able to perform configuration or privileged webserver actions remotely. CISA’s advisory stresses remote exploitability and low attack complexity, which is why the calculated CVSS v4 values are high. (cisa.gov)

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Why these vulnerabilities matter (impact analysis)​

Industrial context: on‑machine control and safety​

ArmorBlock 5000 modules are used on machine frames and in distributed I/O racks where direct, timely control of sensors and actuators matters to production and safety. The modules support configuration and monitoring through browser access; for operators and maintainers this convenience is valuable, but it also increases the attack surface if the webserver’s session management and authentication are insufficiently robust. (rockwellautomation.com)

Attack scenarios​

• Passive reconnaissance + session prediction: An attacker on the same network or with access to an upstream network point could passively monitor traffic or attempt to predict session IDs if other telemetry exposes timing or sequence patterns. A predictable session sequence lowers the bar to session fixation or hijacking. (cisa.gov)
• Credential interception + short‑window reuse: If an attacker obtains a session token (for example, from an improperly segmented network, compromised workstation, or insufficiently protected remote access channel), the three‑minute reuse window documented by CISA is sufficient for an attacker to issue privileged commands or change configuration. This is particularly concerning for remote maintenance channels that traverse less‑trusted networks. (cisa.gov)
• Chaining to operational impact: Once webserver control is obtained, an attacker can attempt to alter I/O configuration, flip outputs, tamper with safety-related settings, or create logic that results in equipment stoppage or unsafe behavior. The availability impact is also scored high in the advisories (CVSS indicates a strong availability impact), reflecting potential production disruption. (cisa.gov)

Likelihood and threat model​

• Exploit complexity: CISA characterizes both issues as low complexity, meaning adversaries with modest resources can attempt exploitation.
• Access requirements: The advisories indicate network attack vectors; these are not constrained to local physical access, which increases risk for poorly segmented or Internet‑exposed control systems.
• Public exploitation: At the time of CISA’s advisory publication, no known public exploitation specifically targeting these ArmorBlock vulnerabilities had been reported — but the presence of low‑complexity, remote attack vectors means the window between disclosure and potential exploit is short and must be treated seriously. (cisa.gov)

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Verification and cross‑references​

To ensure the advisory’s claims and the technical assertions are grounded, the following independent checks were performed:

• Official CISA advisory (ICSA‑25‑226‑27) — primary authoritative source for the vulnerability descriptions, affected products list, CVE assignments, and mitigation recommendations. This advisory is the focal validated public disclosure on August 14, 2025. (cisa.gov)
• Rockwell product documentation and support pages — confirm the ArmorBlock 5000 product family, the 5032 configurable models, and the presence of an embedded webserver for configuration and diagnostics, validating that the disclosed attack surface exists in real deployed hardware. Rockwell’s product pages and technical documentation describe browser configuration capabilities and the 5032 module variants named in the advisory. (rockwellautomation.com)
• Third‑party CVE aggregators and vulnerability trackers — independent feeds capture CVE‑2025‑7773 and CVE‑2025‑7774 with consistent scoring and timestamps on publication (Aug 14, 2025), providing an independent corroboration of the CVE assignments and public disclosure timeline. These sources are useful to security teams who consume automated vulnerability feeds and confirm the advisory’s public record. (securityvulnerability.io, cvefeed.io)
• Internal/archived analyst threads in the provided upload set — analyst and advisory aggregations contained in the uploaded corpus reinforce that ICS stakeholders had been tracking Rockwell vulnerabilities generally and that CISA and vendors typically coordinate disclosure and mitigation guidance. These internal materials contextualize how similar Rockwell advisories have been handled in the past.

Where specific vendor advisories were not found on Rockwell’s public security advisory index at the time of this review, CISA’s published advisory functions as an authoritative consolidated disclosure; Rockwell has historically posted vendor advisories on their Trust Center when they issue product corrections or guidance. Readers should treat CISA as the canonical US government advisory channel and watch Rockwell’s security advisories page for vendor‑issued patches or additional mitigation steps. (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)
Caveat: some public vulnerability databases may take days to reflect enriched NVD/NIST metadata (or may show alternate staging information). For operational triage, rely on the vendor and CISA advisories rather than third‑party summaries alone. (cvefeed.io, rockwellautomation.com)

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Recommended mitigations and operational guidance​

CISA and Rockwell’s guidance converge on immediate, pragmatic controls to reduce exposure. The following prioritized actions reflect the advisory text and standard ICS best practices.

Immediate (take within 24–72 hours)​

• Patch or upgrade: Apply the corrected firmware or software from Rockwell Automation if and when Rockwell publishes a corrected firmware release for 5032 modules. CISA’s advisory advises updating to the corrected version where possible. If a vendor patch is available, prioritize staged deployment and verification in a test segment before widespread rollout. (cisa.gov)
• Isolate the devices from the Internet: Ensure ArmorBlock modules (and broader control networks) are not directly accessible from the public Internet. Move any management interfaces behind strict firewall rules or air‑gapped network segments where feasible. This is the single most effective compensating control for remote‑accessible ICS web interfaces. (cisa.gov)
• Segment and firewall: Place the control network behind firewalls with deny‑by‑default rules. Prevent lateral movement from corporate or guest networks into the control plane. Use network ACLs to restrict which management workstations can reach module webservers. (cisa.gov)

Short term (weeks)​

• Restrict and harden remote access: If remote access is required, use up‑to‑date VPNs or jump hosts with multifactor authentication, strict logging, and endpoint posture checks. Recognize that VPNs reduce but do not eliminate risk — keep remote management channels tightly limited. (cisa.gov)
• Shorten session lifetime and monitor: Where possible, reduce web session timeout values and enforce session binding to source addresses. Instrument detection for anomalous session activity (multiple sessions from disparate addresses, rapid session switches, or session reuse attempts). Note: these settings may be limited by the device firmware and may require vendor fixes to change default behaviors. (rockwellautomation.com, cisa.gov)
• Apply compensating controls: Use application layer gateways or WAFs in front of management interfaces when practical; implement logging and SIEM ingestion of module management actions so that anomalous attempts can be detected and investigated.

Long term (policy and lifecycle)​

• Asset inventory and exposure scanning: Identify all deployed 5032 modules and inventory firmware versions. Remove Internet exposure using passive/active scanning tools and reconfigure network architecture to reduce accessible attack surfaces. Maintain rigorous baselines so any change in exposure is immediately visible. (cisa.gov)
• Vendor lifecycle and procurement controls: Treat embedded device firmware updates and vendor security bulletins as part of procurement and maintenance cycles. Require secure update mechanisms, cryptographic signing of firmware, and vendor transparency around vulnerability response in vendor contracts.

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Detection and incident response recommendations​

• Enable and centralize logging for any systems that administer or monitor ArmorBlock modules. Correlate authentication and configuration change events with network flows to identify suspicious session reuse or unusual remote configuration attempts.
• Watch for:
• Repeated failed or abandoned session attempts followed by a successful session from a different source IP.
• Configuration changes initiated outside scheduled maintenance windows.
• Unexpected outbound connections from devices that normally do not make external calls.
• If a suspected compromise is detected:
• Isolate the affected module(s) from the network — avoid simply rebooting without capturing forensics.
• Capture volatile state (logs, session tables, active connections) for analysis.
• Coordinate with Rockwell support and CISA reporting channels per internal IR playbooks. CISA asks organizations to report suspected malicious activity to aid correlation. (cisa.gov)

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Vendor response and timeline expectations​

CISA’s advisory notes that Rockwell Automation reported the vulnerabilities to CISA and recommends users update to corrected versions if available. Historically, Rockwell posts product‑specific advisories and corrected firmware on its Trust Center and provides security best practice documentation for mitigation. Organizations should monitor Rockwell’s security advisories page and Rockwell’s support portal for firmware updates or published workarounds specific to the 5032 modules. (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)
Third‑party CVE trackers show the CVE reservations and publication on August 14, 2025; this confirms coordinated disclosure and public registration of the issues. While CISA reports no known public exploitation at the time of publishing, low‑complexity, network‑accessible issues should be assumed attractive to opportunistic threat actors until firmware with an effective fix is widely deployed. (securityvulnerability.io, cvefeed.io)
Cautionary note: some public vulnerability databases may lag in NVD enrichment or vendor patch metadata; rely first on vendor and CISA advisories for mitigation steps and formal corrected release information. (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)

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Practical checklist for control‑system operators (actionable)​

• Inventory — list all ArmorBlock 5032 modules and record firmware version; prioritize devices running 1.011 or earlier. (cisa.gov)
• Isolate — immediately remove any direct Internet exposure for these modules. (cisa.gov)
• Patch — apply vendor firmware updates when Rockwell publishes corrected builds; test in staging first. (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)
• Harden remote access — require MFA, limit source addresses, and apply endpoint checks. (cisa.gov)
• Monitor — add logging of webserver sessions and configuration changes to your SOC/monitoring pipeline. (cisa.gov)
• Plan — schedule an operational review to remove management interfaces from routine networks and adopt jump‑host architectures. (cisa.gov)

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Strengths and limitations of the advisory and public data​

Strengths:

• The CISA advisory provides a clear, concise assessment: affected models, firmware versions, CVE IDs, CVSS v4 scoring, and immediate mitigations — all critical for industrial operators to act quickly. (cisa.gov)
• The advisory aligns with Rockwell’s product definitions, making triage straightforward for asset owners who already track module catalog numbers and firmware baselines. (rockwellautomation.com)

Limitations and risks:

• Vendor‑specific corrected firmware may not be immediately available for all affected installations; where updates are delayed, organizations must rely on compensating controls (network segmentation, access restrictions). The time gap between advisory publication and enterprise patching is when operators are most exposed. (cisa.gov)
• Some operational environments cannot accept immediate downtime for patching; these environments require careful staging, compensating controls, and increased monitoring to reduce risk during remediation periods.
• Public vulnerability feeds and the NVD can lag or contain incomplete enrichment data; relying solely on third‑party aggregators without consulting the vendor or CISA can lead to misprioritization. (cvefeed.io, rockwellautomation.com)

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Conclusion​

The ArmorBlock 5000 webserver vulnerabilities (CVE‑2025‑7773 and CVE‑2025‑7774) are material to any deployment that uses the 5032 configurable modules with firmware 1.011 or prior. CISA’s advisory rates the combined findings High (CVSS v4 8.8) and highlights remote exploitability and low attack complexity — a combination that demands immediate, prioritized remediation activity: inventory, isolation from Internet exposure, staged patching, and strengthened remote access. Operational teams should treat these issues as urgent: implement compensating network controls now, accelerate testing and deployment of vendor updates, and enhance monitoring for anomalous session or configuration activity until the underlying session and authentication weaknesses are corrected. (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)
For ICS operators and Windows‑connected management workstations, the safest course is rapid segmentation of control networks, disciplined patch verification, and tight remote access controls — the same defensive posture recommended in the advisory and in Rockwell’s broader security best practices. (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)
(Note: advisory content and CVE metadata were validated against the CISA advisory and corroborated with Rockwell product documentation and independent vulnerability feeds on the public web; where vendor corrections are posted, follow the vendor release notes and test updates in a controlled staging environment before broad rollout.) (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com, securityvulnerability.io)

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Source: CISA Rockwell Automation ArmorBlock 5000 I/O - Webserver | CISA