Microsoft’s public mapping that “Azure Linux includes this open‑source library and is therefore potentially affected” is a precise, product‑level attestation — and it should be treated as an authoritative signal for any organization that runs Azure Linux images — but it is not a categorical guarantee that no other Microsoft product could also ship the same upstream component.
Background / Overview
CVE-2024-57809 is an upstream Linux kernel fix described as “PCI: imx6: Fix suspend/resume support on i.MX6QDL.” The patch corrects suspend/resume sequences for the i.MX6 family so that PCIe devices brought out of low‑power states do not leave drivers (for example, ath10k or iwlwifi) in a broken state or cause kernel hangs on resume. The vulnerability was publicly recorded in January 2025 and appears in mainstream trackers (NVD, Ubuntu, Debian/OSV, and distribution security trackers) with a medium availability‑oriented severity. Microsoft’s MSRC entry for the CVE explicitly states that
Azure Linux images include the implicated open‑source code and are therefore potentially affected, and that the company began publishing machine‑readable CSAF/VEX attestations (VEX: Vulnerability Exploitability eXchange) starting October 2025 to provide clearer product‑level mappings for third‑party CVEs. Microsoft adds that it will update the CVE/VEX mapping if additional Microsoft products are identified as carriers of the vulnerable component. This combination of upstream CVE data and Microsoft’s VEX attestation is good news for defenders: it gives an actionable signal for Azure Linux users. The operational nuance — and the source of real confusion — is what the attestation does
not say: it does not assert that Azure Linux is the only Microsoft product that could contain the code.
Why the wording matters: “attested” vs “exclusive”
What Microsoft has done (product‑scoped attestation)
- Microsoft inspected and mapped the upstream component to a specific Microsoft product family (Azure Linux) and published a VEX/CSAF attestation that the product “includes this open‑source library and is therefore potentially affected.” This is an authoritative, machine‑readable claim for that product.
What Microsoft did not do (and why that matters)
- The wording does not say “no other Microsoft product includes this component.” Microsoft explicitly committed to update the CVE record if other products are later identified as carriers, which implies the attestation was performed for a limited set of artifacts first. Absence of a VEX attestation for other Microsoft SKUs is not proof those SKUs are unaffected — it can only be read as “not yet attested.”
The technical reason this distinction is material
- Whether a given Microsoft artifact includes an upstream Linux kernel driver is a per‑artifact, build‑time property. A kernel driver like the i.MX6 PCIe support can be:
- compiled as a module (e.g., pci-imx6), or
- built into a particular kernel binary (vmlinuz) or
- omitted entirely depending on CONFIG_* flags used during build.
- Different Microsoft products and images (Azure Linux, linux‑azure kernels, WSL kernels, Marketplace images, vendor Marketplace appliances, etc. can therefore diverge in whether they carry the driver. That makes a single product attestation useful but incomplete for a multi‑artifact vendor footprint.
Cross‑checking the record (independent verification)
Key claims can and should be validated against at least two independent sources:
- The upstream CVE details and fix are recorded at NVD, OSV and multiple distro trackers; these describe the PCI: imx6 suspend/resume fix and list the upstream stable commits that remedied it. Use those commit IDs or distro changelogs to confirm whether a given kernel build contains the backport.
- Microsoft’s transparency work (CSAF + VEX publishing) and the specific Azure Linux VEX rollout are documented in the MSRC blog posts explaining the October 2025 VEX launch and the CSAF program started in 2024. Those blog posts explain Microsoft’s phased, product‑by‑product attestation approach. This public explanation is the authoritative statement about the MSRC process and timeline.
- Independent distribution security trackers (Ubuntu, Debian, SUSE, and others) independently map CVE‑2024‑57809 to upstream stable commits and to specific kernel package updates; these are useful cross references when mapping CVE→package→image for non‑Microsoft artifacts.
Putting these sources together: Microsoft’s Azure Linux claim is a correct, product‑scoped attestation; NVD/OSV/Ubuntu confirm the nature and severity of the kernel problem; neither the MSRC attestation nor public trackers assert exclusivity beyond the Azure Linux family.
Practical guidance: what Azure Linux customers should do now
- Treat the Azure Linux VEX attestation as authoritative for Azure Linux images and update those images promptly according to Microsoft’s remediation guidance. Microsoft’s VEX files and Azure Linux updates are the canonical signals for Azure Linux customers.
- For each Azure Linux image in your environment:
- Capture kernel details: uname -r and the installed package changelog for the kernel package.
- Confirm whether the patched kernel package or patched image has been applied; where Microsoft publishes a fixed kernel or image, plan a controlled reboot to that image during a maintenance window.
- If you run other Microsoft‑published artifacts (linux‑azure kernels, WSL2 default kernels, Marketplace images, CBL‑Mariner derived images), treat them as unverified until you confirm they are either attested in VEX or you have inspected the artifact directly. Microsoft will update VEX when other SKUs are found to be carriers, but until that update exists, artifact verification is the only defensible assurance.
How to verify whether a particular Microsoft kernel/image includes the i.MX6 PCIe code
These checks are practical and artifact‑level — they do not rely on vendor attestations.
- Check the running kernel version:
- uname -a
- Inspect kernel config (if available on the system):
- zgrep -i "PCI_IMX6" /proc/config.gz
- grep -i "PCI_IMX6" /boot/config-$(uname -r)
Look for options such as:
- CONFIG_PCI_IMX6
- CONFIG_PCI_IMX6_HOST
- CONFIG_PCI_IMX6_EP
These are the kernel config flags that select i.MX PCIe controller support and are commonly present for kernels targeting i.MX hardware. If these options are
set, the kernel includes the driver (either built‑in or as a module).
- Search for the module binary on disk (if modularized):
- find /lib/modules/$(uname -r) -name 'pci-imx6*' -print
- lsmod | grep pci_imx6 or lsmod | grep pci-imx6
- If you maintain custom images or build kernels, check your kernel tree or build config for drivers/pci/controller/dwc/pci-imx6.c or the Kconfig entries referenced above.
- Validate the fix in the installed kernel by checking the kernel changelog or package changelog for the stable commit IDs referenced in distro trackers (NVD/OSV/Ubuntu list the canonical git commit IDs). If the kernel package explicitly lists the upstream commit or the CVE, it’s a strong signal the fix is present.
If you cannot complete this artifact verification quickly, treat the artifact as potentially in scope and plan for patching or segmentation controls.
Broader Microsoft footprint: where else to look
Even though Azure Linux is the only Microsoft product Microsoft has published a VEX attestation for (as of the notice), other Microsoft artifacts commonly present in enterprise estates could also carry kernel drivers:
- WSL2 default kernel images (the WSL kernel Microsoft distributes)
- linux‑azure kernels (distribution kernels Microsoft packages for Azure VM images)
- Marketplace images and third‑party Marketplace appliances published via Microsoft
- Partner images and customer‑builds derived from CBL‑Mariner/Azure Linux
- Microsoft‑distributed container base images that repackage kernels for particular architectures (less common but possible for embedded/edge scenarios)
Each of these artifacts can have different build‑time configuration and therefore different driver sets. The only way to be certain for a given artifact is artifact‑level inspection or for Microsoft to publish a specific VEX entry that names the artifact as “Not Affected” or “Known Affected.”
Risk assessment and priorities for defenders
- Immediate priority: Azure Linux customers must prioritize remediation according to Microsoft’s VEX/CSAF guidance. For Azure Linux images, Microsoft’s attestation gives you a direct, automatable signal to patch and reboot.
- High priority: multi‑tenant hosts and cloud infrastructure. Availability‑oriented kernel bugs in device drivers can have outsized operational impact in hypervisor, CI/CD runners, or multi‑tenant services where a local operation or untrusted workload might trigger the bug.
- Medium priority: single‑tenant desktops and embedded devices where the i.MX6 driver is absent or the hardware platform is not i.MX6‑based. These systems are lower priority unless you use i.MX‑based hardware or vendor images target that platform.
- Long tail risk: vendor images, embedded devices, and Marketplace appliances with vendor forked kernels. These often lag upstream and require vendor engagement to obtain backports. Treat those devices conservatively until the vendor confirms a backport or provides an updated image.
Temporary mitigations while you patch
- Restrict which images and users can run untrusted code on vulnerable hosts.
- Remove or narrow device node access for PCIe/graphics devices that may exercise PCI paths (for example, /dev/dri or node device access), especially on shared CI runners or build servers.
- Centralize kernel logs (journalctl -k, serial console captures) to ensure you can spot suspend/resume warnings and device state errors — these are the most likely operational indicators for this CVE.
- For environments that rely on Marketplace images, engage the image publisher and request patch timelines; do not assume Marketplace images are automatically updated in place.
These are compensating controls only — the definitive remediation is a patched kernel or updated vendor image.
Why Microsoft’s phased VEX rollout is still meaningful
Microsoft’s shift to machine‑readable CSAF and VEX is a positive step for large vendors that ship many artifacts. The benefits are concrete:
- VEX lets defenders automate product‑level vulnerability decisions (Known Affected / Not Affected / Under Investigation / Fixed).
- Publishing VEX for Azure Linux reduces noise for customers who run that product and speeds remediation automation.
- The public MSRC posts describing CSAF and VEX explain the phased approach and show Microsoft’s intent to expand attestations beyond Azure Linux.
The trade‑off is that the rollout is incremental: until every Microsoft SKU is attested, customers cannot rely on a single VEX file to represent Microsoft’s entire artifact footprint. That is an operational limitation, not a defect in the VEX model.
Clear answer to the user’s question
- Short, precise answer: No — Azure Linux is the only Microsoft product Microsoft has publicly attested as including the vulnerable open‑source component for CVE‑2024‑57809 so far, but that attestation is product‑scoped and is not proof that no other Microsoft product includes the same code. Customers must therefore treat other Microsoft artifacts as potential carriers until they are either attested by Microsoft via VEX or verified by artifact inspection.
- What to do with that answer: If you run Azure Linux, act immediately on Microsoft’s VEX/CSAF signal and apply the provided fixes. If you run other Microsoft images, apply the verification steps above (kernel config, module presence, package changelog) or wait for Microsoft to publish a VEX attestation for those artifacts. Do not assume “no VEX entry” equals “not affected.”
Critical analysis — strengths, weaknesses, and residual risk
Strengths
- Microsoft’s publication of VEX/CSAF for Azure Linux increases automation and clarity for defenders; it is a measurable operational improvement for customers who run that product.
- The CVE itself is an upstream, narrowly scoped kernel fix that is straightforward to backport; distributions have already published package updates in many kernel lines, making remediation practical.
Weaknesses / residual risks
- Phased attestations leave temporary coverage gaps: until Microsoft attests more SKUs, customers must perform artifact verification themselves. Absence of attestations is not a guarantee of safety.
- The long tail problem persists: vendor‑forked kernels, embedded devices, and Marketplace appliances may lag and remain vulnerable until their maintainers provide backports. These devices are operationally significant for many enterprises and often take the longest to remediate.
What defenders need to accept
- The correct posture is a two‑track response:
- Immediately remediate attested products (Azure Linux) via Microsoft’s published updates and VEX guidance.
- Concurrently inventory and verify all other Microsoft artifacts and third‑party images in your estate; treat them as in scope until proven otherwise.
This two‑track posture is conservative, defensible, and aligns with the way modern supply‑chain vulnerabilities manifest: code inclusion is an artifact‑level fact, not a vendor‑wide boolean.
Closing recommendations (concise checklist)
- Apply Microsoft’s Azure Linux updates immediately if you run Azure Linux images.
- Automate VEX/CSAF ingestion so your tooling can mark Azure Linux artifacts as requiring remediation.
- Inventory Microsoft‑provided kernels/images (AKS nodes, Marketplace images, WSL kernels, linux‑azure) and verify kernel config and module presence for i.MX PCIe support (CONFIG_PCI_IMX6 / pci‑imx6 module).
- Engage image vendors for Marketplace appliances and embedded device suppliers for backport timelines.
- Centralize kernel logs and tune detection rules for suspend/resume and PCIe device state errors; preserve vmcore and serial captures for debugging.
Microsoft’s public statement that “Azure Linux includes this open‑source library and is therefore potentially affected” is a meaningful, actionable attestation for Azure Linux customers — and Microsoft’s CSAF/VEX rollout improves automation of remediation decisions — but it is not an exclusivity statement. Defenders must combine Microsoft’s attestations with artifact‑level verification and disciplined inventory to reach a complete, defensible remediation posture.
Source: MSRC
Security Update Guide - Microsoft Security Response Center