Brightpick Mission Control Flaws: Unauthenticated Access and Exposed Credentials

Brightpick Mission Control’s control-plane interfaces expose a cluster of high-risk flaws that let unauthenticated actors read secrets and directly manipulate robot orchestration — a dangerous combination for warehouses relying on autonomous picking fleets.

Overview​

Brightpick AI’s warehouse automation platform — specifically the Brightpick Mission Control / Internal Logic Control components — was disclosed in a coordinated advisory that documents three distinct CVEs: CVE‑2025‑64307, CVE‑2025‑64308, and CVE‑2025‑64309. The core problems are missing authentication on critical control functions, exposed or hard-coded credentials in client‑side code, and telemetry/credential disclosure via unauthenticated WebSocket endpoints. The advisory reports high CVSS scores (v3.1 and v4 ranges in the high‑to‑critical band) and warns that these issues are remotely exploitable with low attack complexity in many deployments.
The vendor, Brightpick AI, is a commercial warehouse‑automation supplier that markets Autopicker robots and a cloud/edge orchestration stack to coordinate fleets; the company’s product pages show aggressive global deployments for retail and grocery customers. Because these flaws touch orchestration, job assignment, and device telemetry — not just passive configuration data — their impact profile includes both information disclosure and immediate operational control: an unauthenticated actor could start/stop runners, assign or clear jobs, deploy totes, and otherwise manipulate the physical behavior of robots in a production warehouse.

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Background: why this matters to Windows‑centric operators and integrators​

Industrial and warehouse automation systems frequently interoperate with Windows-hosted management and analytics components: inventory servers, WMS integrations, logging endpoints, and engineering consoles are often running on Windows hosts that authenticate to or consume data from automation backends. This creates two core risks when an automation control plane is exposed:

• Direct operational control abuse: unauthenticated modifications to runner or job state can halt fulfillment or cause mis-picks that affect order integrity and business continuity.
• Credential & telemetry leakage: exposed credentials or telemetry increase the chance of lateral movement into Windows management hosts and enterprise services.

CISA and other ICS advisories repeatedly emphasize the same defensive baseline for missing‑authentication and credential‑exposure problems: minimize Internet exposure, place control networks behind strict perimeters, and use secure, updated remote access methods when required. The agency’s guidance on treating control systems as segmented, monitored assets is a direct fit for this class of vulnerability.

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What the advisory says (concise technical summary)​

• Affected product: Brightpick Mission Control / Internal Logic Control — the advisory states all versions are affected.
• Primary vulnerability classes:
• Missing Authentication for Critical Function — the Internal Logic Control web UI accepts management commands without authentication, enabling unauthenticated manipulation of robot functions.
• Unprotected Transport / Exposure of Credentials — hardcoded credentials are present in the client‑side JavaScript bundle and sensitive telemetry/configuration is delivered via unauthenticated WebSocket connections to discoverable URLs.
• Assigned CVEs and scores (as reported in the advisory):
• CVE‑2025‑64307 — Missing authentication for critical function. CVSS v3.1: 6.5 (vector AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N). CVSS v4: 7.1.
• CVE‑2025‑64308 — Hardcoded/exposed credentials in client JS. CVSS v3.1: 7.5. CVSS v4: 8.7.
• CVE‑2025‑64309 — Telemetry/credential exposure via unauthenticated WebSocket endpoints. CVSS v3.1: 8.6. CVSS v4: 8.2.
• Researcher attribution: the advisory notes the findings were reported to CISA by Souvik Kandar.
• Vendor response: Brightpick AI did not respond to the coordinating authority’s outreach at the time the advisory was issued; CISA urged mitigations and defensive compensations.

These problem classes and the operational consequences are consistent with other recent ICS advisories where missing authentication and plaintext credential exposure produced high‑impact outcomes for industrial and perimeter devices.

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Deep dive: how an attacker could exploit these flaws​

1) Discovery and access​

• The Internal Logic Control interface appears to be reachable on standard management endpoints inside a site network. An attacker — or automated scanner — can enumerate targets and find the unauthenticated management URL via routine network mapping.
• The advisory notes the WebSocket telemetry URL is discoverable via simple scanning; with that URL, an attacker receives device telemetry and credential material without authenticating.

2) Credential harvest​

• Hardcoded credentials in the client JavaScript bundle are trivial to extract: download the JavaScript artifact and search for constants or base64 strings. Once located, those credentials can be reused to call authenticated APIs or to craft further requests.

3) Command & control of robots​

• The missing authentication on critical functions means standard management actions (start/stop runners, assign jobs, clear stations, deploy storage totes) can be invoked without credentials. Because these are operational commands, not mere configuration reads, an attacker can influence real‑world robot behavior.

4) Blast radius​

• Impact is immediate and physical: disrupted fulfillment flows, mis‑picks, blocked aisles, and potential safety hazards if robots are driven into unexpected states. The attack path can also lead to lateral pivoting to orchestration servers and Windows-hosted integrations that consume telemetry or accept device‑submitted credentials.

This attack chain follows patterns seen across industrial advisories where unauthenticated management interfaces or easily retrievable credentials were weaponized quickly by both opportunistic and targeted actors.

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Risk evaluation: business, operational, and safety consequences​

• Confidentiality: harvested credentials and exported telemetry reveal device states, job queues, and possibly inventory movement — useful for industrial espionage or planning follow‑on attacks.
• Integrity: unauthenticated operations let attackers arbitrarily change job assignments and robot behaviors, introducing errors into order fulfillment that may be hard to detect.
• Availability: attackers can halt runners, clear queues, or produce cascading failures that reduce throughput and require manual recovery.
• Safety and compliance: robot misbehavior in busy pick/pack lines may create safety hazards, regulatory exposure, and contractual SLA violations.

CISA‑style risk guidance emphasizes that missing authentication issues in OT/ICS contexts are especially dangerous because they convert network‑reachability failures into direct effects on physical processes. The Brightpick findings fit that pattern: remote network access with low complexity to trigger physical consequences.

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Strengths of the disclosure and notable positives​

• Clear, operationally actionable content: the advisory lists concrete affected functions (runner control, job assignment, tote deployment), which helps defenders prioritize incident response and validate exposure quickly.
• Specific CVE assignments and scoring: three CVEs and accompanying CVSS vectors give security teams a triage framework to map to existing vulnerability management workflows.
• Practical mitigations recommended by CISA: the advisory reiterates tried‑and‑true ICS mitigations (segment, firewall, block Internet access, use secure remote access) that are actionable in most environments. Those mitigations align with long‑standing OT best practices and are practical stop‑gap measures where vendor patches are not immediately available.

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Key weaknesses and risks introduced by the product design​

• Unauthenticated control plane: allowing critical functions without server‑side authentication is a fundamental design error for any device that can affect physical operations.
• Client‑side secrets: placing operational credentials in client JavaScript or other front‑end artifacts creates a single point of compromise that scales across every exposed instance with that bundle.
• Telemetry leakage over unauthenticated WebSockets: telemetry often contains not only operational status but also diagnostic secrets (session tokens, device keys). Exposing that stream defeats layered defense and aids reconnaissance.

These weaknesses follow common root causes seen across ICS advisories: insufficient server‑side authorization, insecure credential storage, and poor endpoint exposure controls. Independent ICS advisories document similar exploit chains and the same practical mitigations — reinforcing that Brightpick’s problems are part of a systemic class that is well understood and preventable.

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Immediate, prioritized mitigations for operators (practical checklist)​

Apply these defensive steps immediately — ordered by speed and impact.

• Isolate the Brightpick control network:
• Place all Brightpick management and robot control endpoints behind a segmented VLAN and firewall rules that allow only trusted management hosts to connect.
• Block Internet access:
• Ensure Mission Control management ports and any WebSocket endpoints are not reachable from the Internet. If you use NAT or port forwarding for vendor access, remove or restrict those rules immediately.
• Restrict access to management hosts:
• Only allow connections from hardened jump hosts or bastion services with multi‑factor authentication and strong endpoint hygiene.
• Search and rotate credentials:
• Inspect client bundles and telemetry for exposed keys/credentials. Treat any discovered credential as compromised and rotate it at affected services and integrations.
• Use network controls to block telemetry leaks:
• Intercept and inspect WebSocket traffic on perimeter proxies; block or require authentication for any telemetry endpoints.
• Apply host hardening and EDR/IDS:
• Place monitoring on engineering workstations and the Mission Control server; look for anomalous job‑assignment API calls, repeated start/stop commands, or unusual WebSocket sessions.
• If vendor patching is available, schedule expedited updates:
• When Brightpick releases fixes, test and deploy them quickly following vendor guidance.

For sites that cannot immediately patch or isolate, consider temporary operational measures: stop remote or vendor‑initiated orchestration connections, pause automated replenishment for sensitive aisles, or run critical picks under manual control until remediation is validated.
These recommendations mirror standard ICS response playbooks and the tactical mitigations CISA publishes for control‑system advisories.

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Remediation roadmap for IT/OT teams (30/60/90 plan)​

• 0–30 days (contain & hunt)
• Implement segmentation and firewall blocks; create EDR hunts for suspicious job change API calls; rotate any exposed credentials.
• 30–60 days (patching & architecture)
• Test and deploy vendor patches or configuration changes removing unauthenticated endpoints; move telemetry to authenticated, mutually‑encrypted channels (TLS + token auth).
• 60–90 days (hardening & resilience)
• Adopt defense‑in‑depth: strict role‑based access control, credential rotation policies, logging and SIEM integration for operational telemetry, and incident playbooks for robotic-system incidents.
• Continuous
• Add Brightpick controllers and Mission Control instances to vulnerability and asset inventories; include them in regular penetration testing and OT tabletop exercises.

Prioritize compensating controls where vendor fixes are unavailable; many ICS vendors historically do not push patches quickly, so network and process changes are often the only realistic mitigations in the near term. This is a recurring theme across ICS advisories.

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Guidance for Windows administrators and SOC teams​

• Treat Brightpick management traffic as high‑value telemetry: ingest it into SIEM, correlate job‑change events with user sessions, and alert on unauthenticated control commands originating from unexpected IPs.
• Harden Windows hosts that integrate with Mission Control: apply EDR, enable LAPS/credential vaulting, and remove any local accounts that can be re-used by exposed credentials.
• Validate VPN and remote access controls: if operators use VPNs for vendor access, ensure VPN clients are updated, MFA is enforced, and client posture checks block unmanaged devices from connecting.
• Hunt for indicators of compromise:
• Unexpected API calls to job/runner endpoints.
• Unusual WebSocket sessions to telemetry endpoints.
• Creation of new service accounts or sudden rotation of job queues.

Windows servers and engineering workstations are a common pivot in OT intrusions; defending these hosts is therefore critical to prevent containment failures after an initial Brightpick compromise. Community incident analysis of similar advisories underscores that outcome.

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What remains uncertain — and where to be cautious​

• Public availability of the CISA page: while the advisory text has been made available in the coordinated disclosure you provided, independent retrieval of the advisory via public search did not return an exact direct copy at the time this piece was written. Defenders should confirm the advisory identifier and canonical text directly with the issuing agency (CISA) or vendor channels when planning remediation. Treat any internet‑facing indicators as time‑sensitive — exploitability and scanning activity can change rapidly after disclosure.
• Proof of public exploitation: the advisory notes no confirmed in‑the‑wild exploitation at publication, but absence of public reports does not mean there is no scanning or targeted activity. Historically, missing‑authentication flaws with exposed credentials are weaponized quickly once details are public. Be conservative in your threat model.

Flagged claim: any numeric counts of internet‑exposed Brightpick instances or direct telemetry of exploitation attempts were not independently verifiable from public threat feeds at the time of this reporting; treat those numbers as unknown and prioritize local discovery and containment.

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Final analysis: why this is a critical wake‑up call​

Brightpick Mission Control’s reported flaws are a textbook example of how modern operational systems — which combine web UI, JavaScript bundles, and real‑time telemetry — can fail to apply the basic security principles that apply to enterprise software. When unauthenticated management operations combine with easily extracted client‑side credentials and unauthenticated telemetry, the result is an attacker path that is both low‑cost to discover and high‑impact in consequence.
The vendor and integrators must do three things urgently:

• Remove unauthenticated control paths and require strong server‑side authentication and authorization for any function that affects robot motion or job assignment.
• Never embed operational credentials in client bundles; switch to short‑lived token exchange, server‑side secrets, and proper credential vaults.
• Move telemetry to authenticated, encrypted channels and enforce strict origin checks and token validation for WebSockets and streaming endpoints.

Until fixes are available, operators must apply network isolation, monitoring, and credential rotation to limit exposure. Similar ICS advisories and mitigation patterns repeatedly show these actions prevent the majority of opportunistic and many targeted attacks.

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Conclusion​

The Brightpick Mission Control advisory highlights a recurring, avoidable class of failures in modern automation stacks: mixing rich web clients and real‑time control without robust server‑side authentication and secure credential handling. The consequences are not hypothetical — they are immediate, physical, and potentially disruptive to service and safety. Operators should treat these findings as urgent: inventory Brightpick assets, isolate and monitor them, hunt for exposed credentials or telemetry leaks, and deploy compensating controls until vendor patches and secure configuration guidance are confirmed.
Where possible, verify the advisory text and CVE data with the issuing agency and the vendor, and push Brightpick for coordinated fixes and a public remediation plan. The combination of missing authentication and exposed credentials is one of the fastest routes from network reconnaissance to physical impact — and cannot be left to chance.

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Source: CISA Brightpick Mission Control / Internal Logic Control | CISA