CISA has formally added CVE-2025-54948 — a critical OS command injection in Trend Micro Apex One’s on‑premises Management Console — to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog, citing evidence of active exploitation and triggering accelerated remediation expectations for federal agencies while sending a clear warning to all organizations that rely on the affected product. (cisa.gov) (success.trendmicro.com)
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) KEV Catalog is a prioritized, action‑oriented list of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) that CISA has determined are being used in real‑world attacks. The KEV exists under Binding Operational Directive BOD 22‑01, which requires Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to remediate catalog entries on compressed timelines and encourages the private sector to treat KEV items as top priorities. CISA added CVE‑2025‑54948 to the KEV on August 18, 2025. (cisa.gov) (cisa.gov)
BOD 22‑01 reframes vulnerability management by focusing scarce operational effort on flaws with confirmed exploitation rather than on vulnerability severity alone. The result is a compact set of “known exploited” items that demand quick operational responses — typically within days or weeks for new CVEs — from federal agencies and strong voluntary action from other organizations. (cisa.gov)
Private sector organizations are not legally bound by BOD 22‑01, but the operational calculus is the same: KEV listings identify actively exploited vectors; ignoring them materially increases breach risk. Many large enterprises and managed service providers explicitly adopt KEV prioritization as part of their vulnerability management playbooks. (picussecurity.com)
Source: CISA CISA Adds One Known Exploited Vulnerability to Catalog | CISA
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) KEV Catalog is a prioritized, action‑oriented list of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) that CISA has determined are being used in real‑world attacks. The KEV exists under Binding Operational Directive BOD 22‑01, which requires Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to remediate catalog entries on compressed timelines and encourages the private sector to treat KEV items as top priorities. CISA added CVE‑2025‑54948 to the KEV on August 18, 2025. (cisa.gov) (cisa.gov)BOD 22‑01 reframes vulnerability management by focusing scarce operational effort on flaws with confirmed exploitation rather than on vulnerability severity alone. The result is a compact set of “known exploited” items that demand quick operational responses — typically within days or weeks for new CVEs — from federal agencies and strong voluntary action from other organizations. (cisa.gov)
What CVE‑2025‑54948 is — the technical picture
The vulnerability in plain terms
CVE‑2025‑54948 is an OS command injection vulnerability affecting the management console of on‑premises installations of Trend Micro Apex One. In vulnerable configurations, the management console fails to properly validate certain inputs, allowing a remote, unauthenticated attacker with access to the console to upload malicious payloads and execute arbitrary OS commands on the host. That capability can yield full remote code execution (RCE) and give an attacker a foothold to deploy additional malware, steal data, or move laterally. (success.trendmicro.com) (tenable.com)Severity and classification
Trend Micro’s advisory and independent technical write‑ups classify the issue as CWE‑78 (OS Command Injection) with a high criticality score (Trend Micro’s advisory reports a CVSSv3.1 base score of 9.4, reflecting remote, unauthenticated exploitability and high impact). A second CVE, CVE‑2025‑54987, is functionally the same flaw but applies to a different CPU architecture; both were disclosed alongside mitigation guidance. (success.trendmicro.com) (tenable.com)Affected products and scope
- Product: Trend Micro Apex One (on‑premises Management Console)
- Affected builds: on‑prem versions prior to the patched builds specified in Trend Micro’s advisory (the vendor lists exact build identifiers and recommended updated builds in its bulletin).
- Not affected: Trend Micro’s cloud offerings (Apex One as a Service) and certain managed endpoint services where vendor mitigations were applied earlier. Trend Micro states the cloud/managed services were mitigated by July 31, 2025; on‑prem installations remain at risk without vendor fix application. (success.trendmicro.com, tenable.com)
Timeline and evidence of exploitation
- Early August 2025 — Trend Micro and responsible researchers reported two command injection flaws in Apex One’s management console; Trend Micro released an advisory and an interim mitigation tool. (success.trendmicro.com, socradar.io)
- August 6–7, 2025 — technical blogs and vendor advisories documented active exploitation claims, and multiple security vendors published analysis and guidance. (tenable.com, techradar.com)
- August 18, 2025 — CISA added CVE‑2025‑54948 to the KEV Catalog due to evidence of in‑the‑wild exploitation. That formal KEV listing moves the CVE into prioritized remediation under BOD 22‑01 for federal civilian agencies. (cisa.gov)
Why this matters: risk scenarios and likely attacker objectives
An exploitable management console gives adversaries several powerful options:- Immediate remote code execution on the host that manages endpoint agents, enabling:
- Deployment of ransomware or other destructive payloads.
- Installation of persistent backdoors and credential harvesters.
- Manipulation of endpoint policy to disable protections or push malicious agent updates.
- Lateral movement: a console compromise can be a staging point to target connected servers, admin workstations, or the corporate network.
- Data exfiltration: with console‑level control, attackers can target logs, configuration exports, and endpoints for sensitive data.
What vendors and responders have recommended (immediate mitigations)
Trend Micro and independent vendors issued a mix of interim and longer‑term remediation steps:- Apply the vendor’s interim mitigation tool (a short‑term “fix tool” published by Trend Micro) immediately if you operate on‑prem Apex One. The tool is intended to block known exploit techniques while a full patch is released, but it has operational side effects: it disables the Remote Install Agent function in the management console (Trend Micro warns this tradeoff up front). (success.trendmicro.com, socradar.io)
- Restrict network access to the Apex One Management Console. This includes:
- Removing public exposure of management console IPs.
- Applying source IP restrictions or allow‑lists for trusted admin networks.
- Tightening firewall rules and VPN requirements for console access. (tenable.com, techradar.com)
- Monitor for suspicious activity around management console ports and services commonly used by Apex One (administrators should pay particular attention to web management ports typically used by the console and to file upload endpoints noted in vendor advisories). Security vendors suggested auditing traffic on ports often associated with Apex One management and look for anomalous file uploads or process creations. (socradar.io, securityweek.com)
- Prepare for and apply the formal vendor patch as soon as it is released; Trend Micro indicated a formal patch was expected in mid‑August 2025 and later published fixed builds. Organizations should follow their change control processes but treat this patch as high priority. (success.trendmicro.com, securityweek.com)
- For organizations that cannot immediately patch, consider additional compensating controls:
- Isolate affected consoles on segmented management networks.
- Enforce Multi‑Factor Authentication (MFA) for admin access to consoles where supported.
- Enable/collect robust telemetry and endpoint EDR logs prior to remediation so that potential exploitation indicators can be hunted. (tenable.com, socradar.io)
Practical checklist for Windows administrators and security teams
- Inventory: Identify on‑prem Apex One management console instances, including build numbers and network exposure.
- Isolate: Immediately block external access to any management console reachable from the public internet.
- Apply interim mitigation: Download and run Trend Micro’s fix tool if patching cannot be performed immediately, and plan for the operational impacts (Remote Install Agent disabled). (socradar.io, success.trendmicro.com)
- Patch: Schedule and deploy the vendor’s formal patch at the soonest maintenance window.
- Hardening: Restrict console access to admin‑only networks, require MFA, and reduce console privileges to the minimum required for daily operations.
- Monitor and hunt: Look for evidence of file uploads to console endpoints, unexpected agent pushes, new admin accounts, or anomalous process execution on the console host.
- Incident readiness: Prepare forensic capture processes, retain logs, and coordinate with legal/incident response teams if exploitation is suspected. (tenable.com, securityweek.com)
The federal compliance angle: what the KEV listing triggers
Because the CVE is now in the KEV Catalog, FCEB agencies must follow BOD 22‑01 remediation timelines. BOD 22‑01 defines specific remedial windows depending on the CVE’s assignment date and risk; for many newly cataloged vulnerabilities, the schedule is compressed and enforced through federal reporting mechanisms and dashboards. Agencies should treat this as a compliance and operational priority: verify inventories, apply mitigations, and report remediation status as required. Noncompliance is not treated lightly in the federal context. (cisa.gov)Private sector organizations are not legally bound by BOD 22‑01, but the operational calculus is the same: KEV listings identify actively exploited vectors; ignoring them materially increases breach risk. Many large enterprises and managed service providers explicitly adopt KEV prioritization as part of their vulnerability management playbooks. (picussecurity.com)
Strengths, weaknesses, and operational tradeoffs of current guidance
Strengths
- Clear prioritization: CISA’s KEV listing and Trend Micro’s public advisory converge to give administrators a concise list of immediate actions (apply fix tool, restrict console access, patch when available). This alignment helps reduce ambiguity during crisis response. (cisa.gov, success.trendmicro.com)
- Rapid vendor response: Trend Micro published an interim mitigation and indicated a formal patch timeline; cloud/managed services were mitigated before on‑prem patches, reducing overall exposure for many customers. (success.trendmicro.com, securityweek.com)
Weaknesses and risks
- Operational impact of mitigations: The vendor’s interim fix disables the Remote Install Agent function — an important operational capability for many administrators. That introduces a meaningful tradeoff: reduced attack surface at the cost of impaired agent deployment workflows. Organizations with heavy reliance on Remote Install Agent must plan alternative agent deployment processes and test them before mitigation. (socradar.io)
- Visibility gap on exploitation scope: Public advisories confirm at least one exploitation attempt but do not provide a clear measure of scale or success. That lack of transparent telemetry can leave defenders uncertain about prioritization inside large, complex environments. CISA and vendors often withhold sensitive details for investigative reasons, but that increases the burden on defenders to assume worst‑case exposure and act accordingly. (thehackernews.com, success.trendmicro.com)
- Supply chain and hosted environments variance: Cloud‑hosted and managed Apex One services were mitigated earlier, while on‑prem systems remain vulnerable until patched. Organizations using third‑party hosting must confirm that providers have applied mitigations or patches. BOD 22‑01 stresses coordination with third‑party providers because federal agencies remain accountable for systems hosted by others. (securityweek.com, cisa.gov)
Operational case studies and community response
Security vendors and researchers moved quickly to produce detection and scanner signatures; Tenable, SecurityWeek, and others produced vendor‑agnostic detection guidance and scanning plugins to identify susceptible Apex One builds. Community forums and operations teams have been sharing playbooks for temporarily disabling remote management exposure, invoking the vendor fix tool, and sequencing patches to minimize operational disruption. Those community notes — while informal — are helpful when integrated into change‑management processes. (tenable.com, securityweek.com)What remains uncertain — and what to watch next
- Attribution and intent: public advisories do not attribute the attacks or identify the threat actors. While adversary identification is useful for defensive posture, defenders must not delay remediation pending attribution. (thehackernews.com)
- Scope of compromise: there is no broad public reporting of large‑scale successful compromises tied to these CVEs as of the KEV addition; the advisory language indicates confirmed exploitation but leaves open whether those attempts resulted in full operational takeovers. Treat that ambiguity as a reason to expedite remediation, not to downgrade urgency. (success.trendmicro.com, thehackernews.com)
- Patch completeness and regressions: the interim mitigation tool purposely limits functionality; the formal patch must both remediate the flaw and restore legitimate admin features without introducing regressions. Administrators should test patched builds in controlled environments before deploying widely. (socradar.io, securityweek.com)
Longer‑term lessons for vulnerability management
- Inventory discipline matters: the KEV program’s effectiveness depends on accurate software and network inventories. The faster an organization can identify affected instances, the faster it can respond. (cisa.gov)
- Assume management consoles are high‑value targets: security teams should treat administrative consoles — especially those that can push software or change agent behavior — as crown jewels, applying stricter network segmentation, MFA, and monitoring. (tenable.com)
- Plan for operational tradeoffs: mitigation tools that reduce features to block attacks are sometimes necessary. Organizations must be ready with alternate operational workflows (for example, fallbacks for agent deployment) to avoid business disruption while staying secure. (socradar.io)
Quick reference: What to do now (executive summary)
- Treat CVE‑2025‑54948 as a top priority for on‑prem Apex One Management Consoles. (cisa.gov, success.trendmicro.com)
- If you manage federal systems, follow BOD 22‑01 timelines and report remediation status as required. (cisa.gov)
- Immediately remove any public exposure of the management console and restrict access by source IP or VPN. (tenable.com)
- Apply Trend Micro’s interim fix tool if you cannot patch immediately; plan for the disabled Remote Install Agent and test alternatives. (socradar.io)
- Patch to the vendor’s fixed builds as soon as they are validated and available. (securityweek.com)
- Monitor and hunt for signs of exploitation: unexpected file uploads to console endpoints, new admin accounts, or agent‑related anomalies. (tenable.com)
Conclusion
CISA’s inclusion of CVE‑2025‑54948 in the KEV Catalog is a decisive signal: this is not a theoretical vulnerability but one that has shown real‑world exploitation. For organizations running on‑premises Trend Micro Apex One, the attack surface is concrete and remediable — but doing so requires immediate, coordinated action that balances operational continuity against security posture. The vendor’s interim mitigation and the ensuing formal patches are the right short‑ and medium‑term steps, but the broader lesson remains systemic: administrative consoles and management planes must be defended with the highest discipline, segmentation, and rapid patch cadence if defenders are to stay ahead of adversaries who prize high‑value targets. (cisa.gov, success.trendmicro.com, tenable.com)Source: CISA CISA Adds One Known Exploited Vulnerability to Catalog | CISA