CISA KEV Adds Critical VMware CVE-2024-37079: Urgent Patch Guide

CISA’s Federal KEV feed has been updated to include a new high‑risk VMware flaw: CVE-2024-37079, a critical heap‑overflow / out‑of‑bounds write in Broadcom VMware vCenter Server that can lead to remote code execution, and which CISA says meets the agency’s threshold of “evidence of active exploitation.”

Background​

CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog exists to force prioritization of real‑world, actively abused flaws across the federal enterprise and to give private organizations visibility into the most urgent risks. The catalog is rooted in Binding Operational Directive BOD 22‑01, which requires Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to remediate cataloged vulnerabilities within government‑set timeframes — typically two weeks for recent CVEs and six months for older ones, unless CISA specifies otherwise. The directive and the KEV process mean that any addition to the catalog is not a mere advisory: for affected federal agencies it triggers mandatory, auditable remediation actions. The added entry for CVE‑2024‑37079 centers on vCenter Server — the central management plane for VMware vSphere environments. vCenter sits at the heart of many enterprise and cloud datacenters, so a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in that service is intrinsically high impact. The National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and vendor advisories classify the technical issue as an out‑of‑bounds / heap overflow bug in the DCERPC (DCE/RPC) implementation used by vCenter. Successful exploitation can provide unauthenticated, network‑accessible RCE against management infrastructure.

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What CVE‑2024‑37079 is — technical overview​

The bug in plain terms​

• The issue is a heap‑overflow / out‑of‑bounds write (CWE‑787) in the implementation of the DCE/RPC protocol used by vCenter Server.
• An attacker with network access to the vCenter management interfaces can send a specially crafted DCERPC packet that triggers improper memory handling, potentially allowing remote code execution with the privileges of the vCenter process.

Severity and scoring​

• Public sources assign a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.8 (Critical), reflecting a network‑accessible, low‑complexity vulnerability with full confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact if exploited.

Affected products and attack surface​

• A wide range of vCenter Server versions are affected, including 7.x and 8.x builds that were current for many enterprises. VMware published a security bulletin and a fixed‑version matrix; Broadcom’s vendor advisory mirrors VMware’s guidance and provides patch information and remediation matrices. The vulnerability surface is larger than a single desktop app — it affects the management plane that often controls dozens or hundreds of hypervisors and virtual machines.

Protocol and ports to watch​

• vCenter’s usage of DCERPC/MSRPC via the Likewise Open library exposes services on TCP ports such as 2012, 2014 and 2020 in common deployments (these are the ports used by certain vCenter management services). Security researchers’ writeups identify DCERPC traffic to these ports as an avenue for the exploit. Monitoring and filtering this traffic should be part of early detection.

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What CISA’s KEV addition means (and what it does not)​

CISA’s decision to add a vulnerability to the KEV Catalog is significant for three reasons:

• It represents a policy trigger — federal civilian agencies must take action within the BOD timeframes, and CISA will expect reporting on remediation or compensating controls.
• It signals operational urgency beyond normal patch cycles: the agency judges the vulnerability to be actively exploited or to pose an imminent threat.
• It places the issue onto vendor, Managed Service Provider, and integrator radars as a must‑patch item for customers and downstream environments. Broadcom’s and VMware’s advisories and patch matrices are the natural next stops for administrators.

Caveat: KEV inclusion is CISA’s determination based on its intelligence and telemetry, but that determination is not always accompanied by public raw exploit telemetry. Independent public evidence of widespread exploitation for CVE‑2024‑37079 is limited in open sources; while proof‑of‑concept code and exploit writeups exist in research circles and code repositories, public attribution of large‑scale active exploitation is not universally documented. That means organizations should treat CISA’s warning as definitive for remedial triage, while also recognizing that public exploit telemetry and campaign details may follow later.

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Vendor guidance and remediation status​

Broadcom (which manages VMware security advisories and the VMware Security Advisory program) published an advisory addressing multiple vCenter heap‑overflow issues, including CVE‑2024‑37079, and lists fixed versions and remediation steps. VMware’s patch guidance recommends upgrading vulnerable vCenter Server instances to the specified patched releases (for example, 8.0 U2d / 8.0 U1e / 7.0 U3r or later for the affected branches) and following KB instructions for Cloud Foundation. In‑product workarounds were investigated but were generally deemed non‑viable; the vendor message is clear: apply vendor updates as soon as feasible. Security vendors and vulnerability databases (Rapid7, Wiz, and others) echo the vendor guidance and list the same fixed versions and recommended upgrade paths. Those sources also provide detection guidance, vulnerability scanners, and exploitability context for incident responders who need to hunt for signs of exploitation.

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Evidence of exploitation and exploit availability​

• CISA’s KEV inclusion is based on the agency’s assessment of active exploitation or credible evidence. That is the threshold for catalog inclusion under BOD 22‑01. For defenders, that verdict should be treated as actionable intelligence requiring remediation and hunts.
• Outside of government disclosures, researchers published technical write‑ups and proof‑of‑concept submissions shortly after public disclosure; public PoCs and exploit code fragments have appeared on code repositories and vulnerability trackers, which raises the probability of automated scanning and exploitation attempts against unpatched vCenter servers. Security intelligence platforms list EPSS/SSVC metrics indicating significant exploitability.
• Despite PoC availability, broad, confirmed in‑the‑wild exploitation campaigns tied to this CVE are not universally logged by all threat intelligence vendors; public telemetry that links exploitation to specific threat actors or to mass compromise has been limited in open reporting. Organizations should therefore assume both that attackers will attempt exploitation (automated or targeted) and that signs of compromise may be subtle until further forensic analysis is completed.

Flagged as unverifiable: public, independently verifiable large‑scale exploitation of CVE‑2024‑37079. The KEV addition means CISA has evidence (which the agency may not publish in raw form), but independent third‑party telemetry corroboration in the public domain is sparse. Treat the CISA decision as authoritative for triage; treat public exploit telemetry as supplemental and evolving.

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Practical mitigation and incident response guidance for IT teams​

If you run VMware vCenter Server, treat this as a high‑priority patch and hunt exercise. Recommended, prioritized actions:

• Patch immediately where possible.
• Inventory your vCenter Server versions and apply vendor‑supplied updates to the fixed releases listed in VMware/Broadcom advisories after appropriate testing.
• If you use VMware Cloud Foundation, follow the product‑specific KB entries.
• Where immediate patching isn’t possible, apply compensating controls.
• Isolate vCenter management networks from general traffic.
• Block or tightly filter incoming traffic to vCenter external management ports (including the DCERPC service ports identified by researchers) at the network edge and across internal firewalls.
• Disable remote management exposure (VPN or SD‑WAN segments) until patching occurs.
• Hunt for indicators of exploitation.
• Look for anomalous DCERPC traffic to vCenter ports, unexpected commands, or new processes and user accounts on vCenter appliances.
• Review EDR telemetry for post‑exploit behavior (suspicious binaries, unauthorized exports, unusual outbound connections from vCenter).
• Check Shadowserver, vendor threat feeds, and coordinated industry IOCs for emerging exploitation signatures.
• Apply forensic and containment playbooks if compromise is suspected.
• Isolate the affected vCenter instance, preserve logs and memory images, and conduct a scoped forensic analysis before returning systems to service.
• Plan for potential re‑builds of vCenter appliances from trusted media if forensic analysis indicates full compromise of the management plane.
• Communicate and document remediation under BOD 22‑01 for federal organizations.
• Federal agencies must report remediation status through the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Federal Dashboard or via the reporting channels specified by CISA, following the timelines set in the KEV catalog entry. Private sector organizations should adopt the same urgency as best practice.

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Detection signatures and tactical steps (for SOCs)​

• Add IDS/IPS signatures to detect malformed DCE/RPC traffic patterns to TCP 2012/2014/2020 (researchers’ identified ports), and monitor for repeated bind/alter context anomalies.
• Tune EDR rules to flag:
• Unexpected vCenter process spawning,
• Attempts to write to system directories from the vCenter service account,
• Unusual outbound connections from vCenter to unknown infrastructure.
• Search historical logs for anomalous DCERPC packets preceding any signs of compromise (packets containing abnormal header sizes or repeated malformed RPC calls).
• Deploy targeted threat hunting queries across SIEM for connections to management ports from external or unapproved subnets in the 90 days prior to the KEV listing; this helps identify likely pre‑exploitation reconnaissance.

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Why this is more dangerous than a typical server bug​

• vCenter Server is an orchestration and trust anchor. Successful RCE against vCenter can allow an attacker to:
• control host and guest lifecycle operations,
• deploy persistent payloads across multiple hypervisors,
• access or exfiltrate snapshots, templates, and backup data,
• and pivot laterally into sensitive infrastructure that was assumed to be managed and controlled.
• The combined effect of widespread vCenter deployment and automated exploit tooling means that unpatched vCenter instances are high‑value targets for ransomware gangs, espionage actors, and commodity crimeware operators alike.

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Policy and enterprise risk management implications​

• For federal agencies, KEV addition triggers a compliance clock under BOD 22‑01, with associated reporting. The policy’s remediations are prescriptive and auditable; failure to act promptly can carry operational and legal consequences for agency leadership and system owners.
• For enterprise IT and risk teams, this KEV entry is a reminder of three systemic vulnerabilities in many organizations:
• Overreliance on centralized management planes without adequate micro‑segmentation,
• Patch backlog and update testing processes that delay critical fixes,
• Weak monitoring around internal management networks where detection is often poor.

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Strengths in the current response — and gaps​

Notable strengths​

• Broadcom/VMware released timely patches and a clear response matrix that specifies fixed versions and recommended upgrade paths; vendor transparency about root cause and affected components helps defenders prioritize.
• CISA’s KEV process provides a top‑level, policy‑backed escalation mechanism that forces federal agencies to prioritize remediation and encourages broader industry action. The KEV addition should accelerate vendor and MSSP responses as well.

Potential risks and gaps​

• Public telemetry confirming large‑scale exploitation is limited; defenders may not get immediate, actionable IOCs tied to observed campaigns and must hunt proactively. This gap makes detection harder and elevates the risk of later detection only after post‑compromise activity.
• In many organizations, vCenter sits on “trusted” management networks with limited monitoring; that implicit trust can increase dwell time if attackers gain footholds. Network segmentation and logging around management planes remain inconsistent.
• Some smaller deployments run older or custom appliances that cannot be upgraded easily; those environments require compensating controls or decommissioning, but operational constraints sometimes delay such actions. This raises the risk of long‑tail exposure even after patches exist.

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Recommended remediation timeline (practical guide)​

• Day‑0 to Day‑2 (Immediate): Identify all vCenter Server instances and version numbers. If any are in the vulnerable range, schedule emergency maintenance and start patch validation testing in an isolated staging environment.
• Day‑3 to Day‑7: Apply patches to non‑production and then production vCenter instances during maintenance windows. If patching is infeasible immediately, implement network filtering for DCERPC ports and isolate management networks.
• Week 2: Complete patch rollout, perform post‑patch integrity checks, and update asset inventories and CMDB records to reflect remediation. Report status for federal entities per CDM/KEV reporting channels.
• Ongoing: Continue threat hunting for historic signs of exploitation, review backups and snapshots for tampering, and require multi‑factor authentication and least‑privilege controls for administrative accounts on the management plane.

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Conclusion — measured urgency with a clear playbook​

The addition of CVE‑2024‑37079 to CISA’s KEV Catalog elevates it from a serious vendor‑patching event to an operational imperative for federal agencies and a high‑priority item for any organization running VMware vCenter Server. The technical severity — a network‑accessible heap overflow that can yield RCE on a central management plane — combined with proof‑of‑concept circulation, makes this a high‑likelihood target for attackers scanning for unpatched management endpoints.
Administrators should treat CISA’s KEV decision as authoritative: inventory immediately, apply vendor updates or compensating controls, and conduct proactive hunts for exploitation artifacts. At the same time, defenders should be aware that public exploitation telemetry may lag the KEV listing; absence of public campaign details does not reduce urgency. The right approach blends rapid remediation with careful detection and forensic readiness to reduce the chance that a vCenter compromise becomes a company‑wide incident.

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Important technical and policy references used to verify the above analysis include the NVD vulnerability entry for CVE‑2024‑37079, Broadcom’s vendor advisory and remediation matrices for VMware vCenter Server, CISA’s BOD 22‑01 documentation on the KEV Catalog and remediation requirements, and multiple vendor and research writeups that describe the technical details, detection guidance, and PoC availability. Readers should consult those advisories and their own telemetry for the authoritative, environment‑specific steps to patch and hunt.

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Source: CISA CISA Adds One Known Exploited Vulnerability to Catalog | CISA