CISA Warns High-Severity Redis Misconfig in LogixAI (CVE-2025-9364)

Rockwell Automation’s FactoryTalk Analytics LogixAI has a serious configuration weakness that demands immediate attention from OT and IT teams: CISA republished an advisory assigning CVE-2025-9364 to an overly permissive Redis instance used by LogixAI, calling out exposure of sensitive system information and assigning high-severity scores (CVSS v3.1 ~8.8; CVSS v4 ~8.7). (cisa.gov)

Background / Overview​

FactoryTalk Analytics LogixAI (commonly referred to as LogixAI) is Rockwell Automation’s on‑rack/edge machine‑learning module and runtime used to run predictive models and soft sensors directly alongside ControlLogix environments. The product positions itself as a no‑code ML engine for process anomaly detection and soft sensor prediction, deployed either as a compute module, edge PC, or VM in production sites worldwide. Rockwell’s product pages and documentation describe LogixAI as an embedded analytics module that ingests controller tags and generates real‑time predictions. (rockwellautomation.com.cn)
CISA’s advisory (ICSA‑25‑252‑08) specifically identifies an “open database issue” in versions 3.00 and 3.01 of Analytics LogixAI that stems from a Redis instance configured with overly permissive access, which could allow an attacker on an adjacent/inner network to read sensitive data — and in some cases, alter it. The advisory warns the vulnerability is exploitable from an adjacent network with low attack complexity and recommends upgrading to LogixAI 3.02 or later. (cisa.gov)

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What the advisory actually says — a technical summary​

• Affected product: FactoryTalk Analytics LogixAI.
• Affected versions: 3.00 and 3.01. (cisa.gov)
• Vulnerability class: Exposure of Sensitive System Information to an Unauthorized Control Sphere (CWE‑497). The root cause is an over‑permissive Redis instance bound and reachable on internal networks. (cisa.gov)
• CVE assigned: CVE‑2025‑9364 (CISA references the CVE record; the public CVE page requires JavaScript to render but the identifier is published in the advisory). (cve.org, cisa.gov)
• Severity: High — CVSS v3.1 base ≈ 8.8, CVSS v4 base ≈ 8.7 (vectors published in the advisory). (cisa.gov)
• Exploitability: Adjacent network (intranet), low attack complexity — meaning an attacker already on the same plant/OT LAN or a poorly segmented business network could reach the vulnerable Redis port and exploit it. (cisa.gov)

This is not a controller logic bug or a PLC buffer overflow; it is a design/configuration exposure in a supporting service (Redis) that holds analytics metadata, models, or other sensitive artifacts used by LogixAI. That makes the attack vector largely network‑based and procedural: unnecessary network exposure or weak Redis defaults enable compromise.

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Why this matters: operational and security impact​

FactoryTalk Analytics LogixAI is designed to run near process control, often integrated with ControlLogix systems that manage production‑critical machinery. Compromise of the LogixAI data store or manipulation of analytics artifacts can have several outcomes:

• Disclosure of sensitive operational data — models, processed sensor streams, or derived predictive outputs that may reveal process setpoints, product recipes, or production anomalies.
• Integrity risk to analytics and automations — tampering with model parameters, predictions, or soft‑sensor outputs could produce false alarms or false assurances and negatively influence operator decisions or automated control logic that depends on those predictions.
• Lateral movement and foothold — a reachable Redis instance often provides an attractive pivot point for attackers moving from corporate networks into OT or vice versa.
• Regulatory and safety exposure — in regulated industries, leaked formulas, batch recipes, or process parameters represent both IP loss and compliance risk.

CISA highlights Critical Manufacturing as an impacted sector and notes worldwide deployment, underscoring the potential blast radius of the exposure. (cisa.gov)

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The root cause in plain language: Redis misconfiguration​

Redis is a powerful in‑memory data store, but it’s also historically easy to expose when default settings are left in place. The advisory describes an “over permissive Redis instance” — typically meaning:

• Redis bound to non‑loopback interfaces (e.g., 0.0.0.0) instead of localhost.
• Redis running without authentication or ACLs.
• No network filtering or firewalling protecting the Redis port (default TCP 6379).
• Persistence or admin commands accessible (e.g., CONFIG, FLUSHALL) that allow data discovery and alteration.

The Redis project itself warns against exposing Redis directly to untrusted networks and recommends binding to trusted interfaces, using ACLs or requirepass, and protecting the service with network controls. Those standard Redis hardening steps are precisely the defenses that would have prevented this LogixAI exposure from being exploitable. (redis.io)

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Verification and cross‑references​

The analysis below cross‑checks CISA’s advisory with vendor resources and product download pages:

• CISA’s advisory (ICSA‑25‑252‑08) is the authoritative public notice describing CVE‑2025‑9364, affected versions (3.00, 3.01), and mitigations (upgrade to 3.02+). (cisa.gov)
• Rockwell’s product compatibility and download center shows FactoryTalk Analytics LogixAI versions including 3.00, 3.01, 3.02, and later releases — confirming Rockwell published updated builds that line up with CISA’s remediation guidance (3.02 and later). That compatibility listing is the vendor’s product distribution record and corroborates the availability of a corrected release. (compatibility.rockwellautomation.com)
• General Redis security guidance (bind to localhost, restrict access, use ACLs/requirepass/TLS, disable/rename dangerous commands) comes from Redis’ official documentation and is directly relevant here because CISA calls out an over‑permissive Redis instance as the failure mode. (redis.io)

CISA’s republished advisory notes the CVE and also explicitly states that no known public exploitation of this specific vulnerability was reported at publication time; however, the attack vector (adjacent network + low complexity) makes rapid remediation important. (cisa.gov)
(Technical caution: while the advisory references the CVE record, some public CVE pages require JavaScript for full rendering; the identifier and scoring are published in the advisory itself and on Rockwell’s distribution pages.) (cve.org, compatibility.rockwellautomation.com)

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Practical mitigation steps — prioritized checklist​

Operators should treat this as a high‑priority patching and network‑segmentation exercise. The following steps apply to LogixAI specifically and more broadly to any OT system that embeds a data store (Redis, SQL, etc.):

• Patch first (highest priority)
• Verify installed LogixAI version on each asset: if running 3.00 or 3.01, schedule immediate upgrade to 3.02 or later. Rockwell’s compatibility/download page lists 3.02+ as the corrected release path. Test upgrades in a staging environment before pushing to production. (compatibility.rockwellautomation.com)
• Network segmentation and access controls
• Ensure LogixAI hosts are on isolated OT management networks that are not directly reachable from corporate or internet‑facing networks.
• Block inbound access to Redis ports (default 6379) at network ingress points and on host firewalls; allow only known management hosts to reach the service.
• Use network ACLs and microsegmentation where possible.
• CISA’s advisory stresses minimizing network exposure for control system devices and placing them behind firewalls. (cisa.gov)
• Harden the Redis instance (if you must continue using an older build temporarily)
• Bind Redis to localhost or a restricted interface; do not leave it listening on public or broad internal addresses. (redis.io)
• Use Redis ACLs (Redis 6+) or requirepass to enforce authentication for clients. Note: AUTH is unencrypted unless TLS is configured; treat it as an additional layer, not the sole defense. (redis.io)
• Disable or rename dangerous commands (e.g., FLUSHALL, CONFIG, DEBUG, SHUTDOWN) where practical and consistent with your deployment model — but plan carefully in HA/replication/AOF setups. Renaming is a “quick and dirty” mitigation but can cause replication/AOF issues if not applied consistently. (programmer.group, redis.io)
• Where possible, enable TLS for Redis client and replication links to prevent credential eavesdropping. (redis.io)
• Detection and monitoring
• Monitor for unexpected Redis connections, anomalous commands (CONFIG, FLUSH*), and unusual client IPs with SIEM/EDR sensors.
• Log application behavior and model artifacts: any sudden changes in model metadata or prediction outputs should trigger a forensics review.
• Operational steps and risk assessment
• Perform impact analysis and change control prior to upgrades (CISA reminder).
• If you cannot immediately upgrade, apply the network controls and Redis hardening above as compensating controls and document the exposure until patching is scheduled. (cisa.gov, redis.io)
• Post‑patch validation
• After upgrade, validate that Redis is correctly configured (bound interfaces, ACLs, TLS if available) and confirm that analytics outputs are unchanged or within expected tolerances.
• Maintain offline, tested backups of models and controller application code to ensure clean recovery if compromise is suspected.

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Recommended technical configurations (concise, for engineers)​

• Redis: set bind 127.0.0.1 or to a management interface; configure ACLs (create named users, least privilege), enable TLS, and if using requirepass make passwords long and stored securely. Consider rename-command only as a transitional control and apply uniformly across replicas. (redis.io)
• Network: block TCP/6379 except between explicitly trusted hosts; restrict management ports using jump hosts and allow only specific admin subnets. (cisa.gov)
• Logging: enable and centralize Redis logs, monitor for AUTH failures and unexpected privileged commands.
• Change control: stage the LogixAI upgrade in a lab or dark site and run model integrity tests before production rollout. (compatibility.rockwellautomation.com)

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Detection indicators and incident playbook snippets​

• Indicators of potential exploitation:
• Unexpected remote client connections to Redis from business subnets.
• Presence of administrative Redis commands executed from unknown IP addresses (CONFIG, FLUSHALL).
• Sudden changes to model artifacts, trained model timestamps, or prediction baselines.
• Unexplained spikes in model errors or unusual operator‑facing alarms coincident with Redis activity.
• Short incident triage steps:
• Isolate the impacted LogixAI host from the OT network (preserve system images and volatile evidence where possible).
• Snapshot Redis data and configuration for forensic review.
• Verify model integrity and compare to offline backups.
• Notify incident response and coordinate with Rockwell support for guidance.
• Apply the vendor update (3.02+) only after staging and validation. (cisa.gov, compatibility.rockwellautomation.com)

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Broader context — this isn’t an isolated pattern​

This advisory fits a recurring pattern seen across industrial stacks: modern OT products increasingly use familiar open‑source components (Redis, web frameworks, Node.js, RTOS networking stacks), and security failures often arise not from exotic zero‑days but from misconfiguration, exposed service endpoints, or outdated third‑party components. CISA and vendors have republished numerous Rockwell advisories in recent months that emphasize the same operational mitigations: minimize internet exposure, segment networks, and apply vendor updates promptly. These operational realities are repeatedly reinforced in the public advisory corpus. (cisa.gov)

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Strengths and limitations of the advisory and vendor response​

Strengths

• The advisory is clear about the affected versions (3.00, 3.01) and the remediation path (3.02+). That clarity lets site owners prioritize and plan patches. (cisa.gov, compatibility.rockwellautomation.com)
• CISA highlights practical OT‑centric mitigations (isolate OT devices, place control systems behind firewalls) that align with traditional defense‑in‑depth. (cisa.gov)

Limitations and remaining risks

• The advisory describes the issue as exploitable from an adjacent network. That means organizations with weak segmentation or remote maintenance access may be at higher near‑term risk until patches are deployed — and these network realities vary widely across operators and countries. (cisa.gov)
• The CVE registry and some third‑party aggregators may not immediately reflect vendor patch metadata. Vendors’ support portals and compatibility pages are often the fastest way to confirm corrected builds and download packages; operators should use them as canonical sources. (compatibility.rockwellautomation.com)
• If operators rely on older deployment patterns (e.g., Redis replicas, AOF persistence, or certain HA topologies), some ad‑hoc mitigation steps (like renaming commands) can cause replication issues unless rolled out consistently across all instances. Redis docs caution about this. (programmer.group)

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Final assessment and recommended timeline​

• Immediate (Days 0–7): Inventory all LogixAI instances and confirm versions. If any instance reports 3.00 or 3.01, treat it as high priority. If you cannot immediately patch, block Redis port access at the network perimeter and implement host firewall rules to restrict access to management hosts only. (cisa.gov, compatibility.rockwellautomation.com)
• Short term (Weeks 1–4): Plan and execute upgrades to 3.02+ in a staged manner (test → pilot → production). Harden Redis per best practices (bind/ACL/TLS), and apply the organizational controls recommended by CISA: network segmentation, limited remote access, and defense‑in‑depth. (cisa.gov, redis.io)
• Medium term (1–3 months): Review architecture for other embedded open‑source services (datastores, caches, web components) and apply vendor hardening guidance across the estate. Integrate SBOMs and third‑party dependency checks into the OT procurement and patching process. (compatibility.rockwellautomation.com)

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Conclusion​

CVE‑2025‑9364 is a high‑severity, network‑reachable exposure rooted in an over‑permissive Redis deployment inside FactoryTalk Analytics LogixAI versions 3.00 and 3.01. The fix is straightforward in principle — upgrade to LogixAI 3.02 or later — but the real work for operators is rapid discovery, staged patching, and layered compensations (network segmentation, Redis hardening, monitoring) to prevent lateral movement and data tampering while upgrades are tested and deployed. Follow the vendor download/compatibility guidance for the corrected release and align network and Redis hardening to industry best practices. (cisa.gov, compatibility.rockwellautomation.com, redis.io)

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Appendix — Quick reference links (for operations teams)

• CISA advisory: Rockwell Automation Analytics LogixAI (ICSA‑25‑252‑08) — authoritative advisory and CVE summary. (cisa.gov)
• Rockwell compatibility/download center: LogixAI download and release notes (shows 3.02+ availability). (compatibility.rockwellautomation.com)
• Redis official security guidance and configuration hardening. (redis.io)

Note: this article synthesizes the CISA advisory and vendor distribution information and cross‑references Redis hardening guidance. Where public CVE pages are referenced, some registries may require browser JavaScript for full rendering; always use vendor pages and CISA advisories for confirmation of corrected builds and instructions. (cve.org, cisa.gov)

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Source: CISA Rockwell Automation Analytics LogixAI | CISA