Critical Stratix IOS Injection CVE-2025-7350 — Patch Now

Rockwell Automation has confirmed a serious injection vulnerability in Stratix IOS that affects multiple Stratix switch families and can be exploited remotely to upload and run malicious configurations without authentication; CISA has republished Rockwell’s advisory and assigned CVE‑2025‑7350 with a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.6 and a CVSS v4 base score of 8.6, and Rockwell recommends immediate upgrade to Stratix IOS 15.2(8)E6 or later. (cisa.gov)

Background / Overview​

Industrial networking gear used at operational technology (OT) edges is a frequent target for attackers because it sits on the critical path between controllers, HMIs, and plant-floor instruments. Rockwell Automation’s Stratix line—widely deployed in critical manufacturing environments—runs a version of Cisco IOS internally for many features. A parsing or command handling flaw in that embedded IOS code family has been traced to an improper neutralization of special elements vulnerability (CWE‑74) that impacts Stratix devices, specifically Stratix IOS versions 15.2(8)E5 and prior. The vulnerability is tracked as CVE‑2025‑7350 and is the focus of coordinated vendor and CISA advisories. (cisa.gov)
This article unpacks what is known about the Stratix IOS vulnerability, who and what is affected, the technical nature of the risk, recommended mitigations and patch guidance, practical hardening steps for operational teams, and the likely attack scenarios and operational impacts organizations should prepare for. Where vendor or public details are incomplete, those points are explicitly flagged so asset owners can perform their own impact assessments.

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Executive summary — what operators need to know now​

• Severity: High — CVSS v3.1 base score 9.6, CVSS v4 base score 8.6 indicates remote exploitability with significant confidentiality, integrity, and availability impacts. (cisa.gov)
• Affected product family: Stratix IOS — versions 15.2(8)E5 and prior (Stratix 5410, 5700, 8000 families explicitly called out). (cisa.gov)
• Vulnerability type: Injection (CWE‑74) — improper neutralization of special elements in output used by a downstream component; can allow an attacker to upload and execute malicious configurations. (cisa.gov)
• Exploitability: Remote; low attack complexity; no authentication required for the core condition identified. (cisa.gov)
• Vendor guidance: Upgrade Stratix IOS to 15.2(8)E6 or later where available; when immediate upgrade is infeasible, apply network hardening and isolation per Rockwell/CISA guidance. (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)
• Public exploitation: At the time of the advisory republication, CISA reports no known public exploitation specifically targeting this CVE. That does not mean exploitation is impossible or unlikely—only that no confirmed campaigns have been reported to date. (cisa.gov)

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Why this matters: OT risk, operational impact, and attack attractiveness​

Industrial switches like Stratix perform critical tasks beyond packet forwarding in many automation environments: they host management interfaces, participate in routing and time synchronization, and sometimes hold process-aware features. A successful injection that allows uploading and running attacker-supplied configurations can:

• Alter network forwarding/topology to split or reroute industrial communications (impacting PLC‑to‑HMI paths).
• Modify VLAN or ACL policies, enabling lateral movement or access to previously isolated segments.
• Introduce persistent device-level configuration that survives reboots or that is difficult to detect from engineering endpoints.
• Enable remote code execution or other post‑exploit actions depending on the switch’s internal features and the specifics of the injected payload.

Because the flaw is marked as remotely exploitable with low attack complexity and no required privileges, any Stratix device that is reachable from an attacker‑controlled network (including poorly segmented business networks or misconfigured remote access paths) is attractive. Attackers targeting manufacturing or supply‑chain processes have strong incentives to move laterally into these OT-specific assets; the combination of high impact and low complexity is what makes this advisory urgent for asset owners. (cisa.gov)

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Affected products and versions — precise inventory rules​

CISA’s advisory lists the affected Stratix IOS versions as 15.2(8)E5 and prior for the Stratix IOS family. The advisory specifically calls out that the issue impacts Stratix® 5410, 5700, and 8000 devices as they contain the vulnerable IOS code path. Operators should treat any Stratix device running Stratix IOS <= 15.2(8)E5 as in‑scope for mitigation. Confirm the precise installed Stratix IOS build on each device against device‑level release notes and Rockwell’s advisory tables to identify exact matches for your fleet. (cisa.gov, compatibility.rockwellautomation.com)
Practical inventory actions:

1. Query every Stratix switch for the installed image and FRN/revision string.
2. Flag any devices running notation indicating 15.2(8)E5 or earlier as "high priority" for remediation.
3. Record device model, serial number, firmware revision, and last configuration backup for roll‑back and post‑patch verification.

If your organization uses additional Stratix lines (e.g., 5200, 5800, 5400 families), treat them with caution: Rockwell has published multiple, related Stratix advisories historically because many Stratix families embed Cisco IOS or IOS XE components; confirm each product’s advisory status in Rockwell's security advisory index and CISA pages. (cisa.gov)

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Technical details: what the advisory says about CVE‑2025‑7350​

The weakness is described as an injection (CWE‑74) that arises when unneutralized or improperly sanitized elements are passed to a downstream component within the embedded IOS code. In practice, that can permit an attacker to craft requests or payloads that cause the device to accept attacker-controlled configuration content and execute or apply it without proper authentication.
Key technical takeaways published:

• The root cause is not limited to Rockwell’s own code—Cisco IOS code used within Stratix devices is implicated, which means the underlying vulnerability is in software components integrated by Rockwell. This mirrors earlier incidents where Cisco IOS/XE vulnerabilities impacted Stratix product families. (cisa.gov)
• The advisory includes both traditional CVSS v3.1 metrics (9.6) reflecting severe confidentiality/integrity/availability impacts and a CVSS v4 vector (8.6) that formalizes attack requirements and victim outcomes under the newer schema. These numbers indicate a high likelihood that an attacker with network access could produce significant operational disruption. (cisa.gov)
• Rockwell’s mitigation path is to supply corrected Stratix IOS releases; the recommended upgrade to 15.2(8)E6 or later addresses the issue according to Rockwell and has been re‑published by CISA as the canonical vendor remediation. (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)

Important caution: the advisory text describes uploading and running malicious configurations without authentication as possible; the exact mechanism and the range of post‑exploit capabilities (full root shell, limited command injection, configuration only) can vary by device model, installed features, and existing device hardening. Asset owners must validate the practical impact in their environment using staged tests, vendor release notes, and secure lab validation before presuming the full scope of code execution vs. configuration manipulation. (cisa.gov)

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Vendor and third‑party confirmation​

Rockwell has published security advisories and product release notes covering Stratix firmware updates and the corrected FRN/IOS builds. Those vendor materials confirm the remediation paths and provide release‑level notes mapping anomalies corrected in the E6 build families. Rockwell’s trust center lists specific FRN updates and a matrix of affected product families and corrected versions. CISA’s advisory republishes Rockwell’s recommendations and places the issue within the ICS context for critical manufacturing organizations. (rockwellautomation.com, cisa.gov)
Independent vendors and security outlets have historically tracked Stratix‑embedded IOS problems because of the re‑use of Cisco code, and Cisco's own security advisories for IOS/NX‑OS/NX‑OS components are useful to review for cross‑corroborating technical details where the Stratix advisory references Cisco‑origin flaws. Reviewing Cisco advisories for any related IOS/XE code fixes can help determine whether additional hardening steps or configuration changes at the IOS feature level are warranted. (sec.cloudapps.cisco.com, cisco.com)

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Practical mitigation and patch guidance — prioritized checklist​

The single most effective action is firmware upgrade. Rockwell and CISA both recommend updating to Stratix IOS 15.2(8)E6 or later when that build is available and validated for your hardware revision. Follow Rockwell’s published FRN and release notes for the exact download and installation steps for your model. (cisa.gov, compatibility.rockwellautomation.com)
If immediate upgrade is not possible, implement these prioritized mitigations:

• Isolate control networks: Ensure Stratix devices are not reachable from the internet. Place them behind firewalls and physically or logically segment OT networks from corporate networks. Limit management interfaces to a jump host or secure jump server. (cisa.gov)
• Restrict management plane access: Limit source addresses that can access management APIs or web UI. Harden SSH/TACACS/RADIUS and ensure strong authentication for administrative accounts. Where available, disable unused services and restrict CLI access. (rockwellautomation.com)
• Harden remote access: If remote access is necessary, use modern VPNs with MFA and endpoint posture checks; ensure remote access appliances are patched and hardened. Recognize VPN is only as secure as connected endpoints. (cisa.gov)
• Apply network controls against protocol abuse: Use ACLs and IDS/IPS rules to block unexpected or malformed traffic patterns that would be used to deliver injection payloads; block nonessential ports and protocols to OT segments. (cisa.gov)
• Monitor and log: Increase monitoring (syslog, config change alerts) for unexpected configuration uploads, unexplained reboots, or new ACL/VLAN changes. Alert on any file or config artifact that contains unusual characters or dereferenced sequences associated with injection attempts. (cisa.gov)
• Plan secure patch rollouts: Because production OT environments often cannot tolerate unscheduled downtime, prepare staged validation testing, backups of current configurations, and a rollback plan before applying FRN updates. Apply updates first to lab or non‑critical segment devices. (compatibility.rockwellautomation.com)

Step‑by‑step urgent remediation sequence (recommended order):

1. Inventory devices and identify all Stratix devices and their exact Stratix IOS builds.
2. Block external network access to those devices where feasible (temporary measure).
3. Perform temporary hardening: restrict management access, disable unused services, and enforce least‑privilege administrative controls.
4. Test the official 15.2(8)E6 image in a staging environment that mirrors your production topology.
5. Schedule staggered updates with configuration backups and verification tests.
6. Monitor post‑patch behavior for unexpected side‑effects and confirm mitigation.

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Detection, monitoring, and incident response considerations​

Detection of an exploitation attempt against this vulnerability should focus on abnormal configuration changes, suspicious file uploads, or unexpected changes to ACLs, VLANs, or routing tables on Stratix devices. Since the advisory flags the ability to upload and run malicious configurations, monitoring for configuration push events outside scheduled maintenance windows is critical.
Recommended detection controls:

• Enable and centralize switch syslog; create alerts for configuration changes, user‑creation events, or unexpected reboots.
• Maintain a stored baseline (and cryptographic hash) of expected configuration files for each device and alert on any divergence.
• Instrument jump hosts and management workstations for EDR/host monitoring to detect file drops or script execution attempts tied to configuration deployments.
• Treat unusual CLI commands/sequences and unexpected web UI actions as high‑priority alerts for investigation.

If an anomaly is confirmed:

1. Isolate the affected device from the production network immediately (preserve evidence).
2. Collect forensic data — current configuration, running processes, and logs — before power‑cycling or reimaging.
3. Introduce a clean management workstation for triage and remediation steps.
4. Coordinate with Rockwell Automation support and share findings with their security contact and CISA if the incident affects critical infrastructure.

CISA’s advisory also recommends reporting suspected malicious activity to them for tracking and correlation; organizations should follow internal incident response policies and regulatory reporting obligations as appropriate. (cisa.gov)

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Attack scenarios and threat modeling — realistic threat chains​

Because the vulnerability is network‑exposed and requires low complexity to exploit, plausible attack chains include:

• An attacker with access to a misconfigured corporate segment or compromised VPN connection discovers Stratix management interfaces and sends crafted payloads that cause the device to accept and apply malicious configurations, enabling traffic interception or rerouting.
• A supply‑chain or remote maintenance case where a third party with legitimate access inadvertently uploads a crafted configuration file that contains the malicious elements; because the issue can be triggered by configuration inputs, legitimate upload channels represent a realistic vector.
• Chaining with other vulnerabilities: the injection could be used together with weak credentials, exposed management endpoints, or gateway compromises to gain broader footholds.

Organizations should assume that once a configuration‑based injection is successful, attackers can persist by installing backdoor configurations or manipulating network paths to evade detection. This underscores the need for both preventive and detective controls. (cisa.gov)

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Strengths and limitations of available public information​

Strengths:

• The advisory provides clear numeric severity ratings (CVSS v3.1 and v4), an explicit CVE identifier (CVE‑2025‑7350), and a single, vendor‑recommended remediation path (update to 15.2(8)E6 or later). That makes triage and prioritization straightforward for asset owners. (cisa.gov)
• Rockwell’s trust center and release notes include FRN mapping and corrected anomaly lists for the 15.2(8)E series, which helps operators cross‑reference device FRNs and validate update contents. (compatibility.rockwellautomation.com)

Limitations and cautionary notes:

• The public advisories describe the vulnerability impact broadly (uploading and running malicious configurations) but do not publish full exploit details. Asset owners should not assume the exploit is limited to configuration manipulation alone; additional vectors or post‑exploit capabilities may exist and could be discovered later.
• The advisory indicates no known public exploitation at publication time; however, silence on public exploitation is not a guarantee of safety. The vulnerability attributes (remote, low complexity, no auth) make it attractive for opportunistic attackers, so timely patching and network hardening are warranted. (cisa.gov)
• Because Stratix firmware embeds Cisco code, a complete understanding sometimes requires cross‑referencing with Cisco advisories for the same time frame. Differences between vendor mappings can create ambiguity about which exact code paths were changed in each release; testing is therefore essential. (sec.cloudapps.cisco.com)

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Operational recommendations for Windows‑centric engineering and SOC teams​

Many OT engineering workstations and management consoles run Windows. Those teams should coordinate with OT network and automation engineers to ensure:

• Windows‑based jump hosts used for switch management are fully patched, run endpoint protection, and enforce MFA for operator accounts.
• Access to configuration upload tools from Windows desktops is restricted to hardened, monitored jump hosts.
• File transfer and remote session policies limit the types of files that can be uploaded to switches and restrict interactive configuration windows to authorized maintenance windows.
• SOC teams create detection rules for suspicious configuration push patterns originating from Windows hosts; EDR telemetry on those hosts can be critical if an attacker tries to use Windows tooling as a pivot to Stratix devices.

These actions close the “human/desktop” vector where legitimate engineering workflows can be abused to push malicious configurations—one of the likely vectors in practice.

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What asset owners should do next — immediate checklist​

1. Inventory: Identify all Stratix devices and confirm Stratix IOS build strings. Flag devices running <= 15.2(8)E5 for immediate attention. (cisa.gov)
2. Block: Remove management interfaces from internet exposure; apply temporary ACLs restricting access to trusted admin subnets. (cisa.gov)
3. Test: Obtain and validate the 15.2(8)E6 image in a lab; test planned upgrade procedure and verify no regression for critical features. (compatibility.rockwellautomation.com)
4. Schedule: Plan phased upgrades with configuration backups and rollback options; communicate maintenance windows to operations teams. (rockwellautomation.com)
5. Harden: Enforce strong authentication, close unused services, and restrict file upload and management paths to jump hosts. (cisa.gov)
6. Monitor: Increase logging and configure alerts for unexpected config changes or anomalous network traffic to/from Stratix devices. (cisa.gov)

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Conclusion: timely patching plus layers of defense​

CVE‑2025‑7350 is a high‑impact injection vulnerability in Stratix IOS that demands immediate, measured action from asset owners in critical manufacturing and other OT environments. The combination of remote exploitability, low attack complexity, and the potential to upload and execute malicious configurations elevates the risk posture for any Stratix device running 15.2(8)E5 or earlier. The most effective remedy is to follow Rockwell’s update plan and migrate to 15.2(8)E6 or later after appropriate testing; where immediate patching is not possible, deploy the recommended network isolation, access control, and monitoring compensations.
Organizations should treat this advisory as urgent: inventory your Stratix fleet, restrict management-plane exposure, validate and deploy vendor fixes on a controlled schedule, and enhance detection of suspicious configuration activity. CISA and Rockwell’s public advisories provide the baseline remediation steps and immediate protective controls to reduce exploitation risk while upgrades are scheduled. (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)

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Rockwell’s official advisories, product release notes, and CISA’s ICS advisory are the authoritative references for the upgrade paths and FRN mappings; consult them when creating your operational patch plan and when validating test results in your environment. (compatibility.rockwellautomation.com, cisa.gov)

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Source: CISA Rockwell Automation Stratix IOS | CISA