CVE-2025-7532: Local Token Leakage in FactoryTalk Action Manager

A local information-disclosure flaw in Rockwell Automation’s FactoryTalk Action Manager allows unauthenticated local clients to receive a reusable API token broadcast over a WebSocket, creating a pathway for attackers with local access to intercept credentials and manipulate the product’s runtime behavior. (cisa.gov)

Background / Overview​

FactoryTalk Action Manager is a component of Rockwell Automation’s FactoryTalk family used for software management and runtime event handling in industrial environments. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) republished an advisory on August 14, 2025 (Alert Code ICSA-25-226-30) describing a vulnerability that affects FactoryTalk Action Manager versions 1.0.0 through 1.01. CISA reports the issue as an Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor (CWE-200) and assigns the associated identifier CVE-2025-7532. (cisa.gov)
Rockwell Automation proactively reported the vulnerability to CISA, and the vendor recommends updating affected installations to FactoryTalk Action Manager 1.01 or later where possible; CISA echoes that guidance and lists standard ICS defensive measures (network segregation, firewalling, secure remote access, and impact analysis before remediation). (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)

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What the vulnerability is — technical summary​

• Attack class: Information disclosure via reusable API token leakage.
• Vulnerable component: Runtime event system inside FactoryTalk Action Manager.
• Trigger: Unauthenticated local WebSocket connections can receive an API token that the runtime broadcasts.
• Scope: Local attack surface only — the vulnerability is not remotely exploitable according to CISA.
• CVE: CVE-2025-7532.
• Severity scores: CVSS v3.1 base score 7.8 (vector AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) and CVSS v4 base score 8.5 (vector AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N). (cisa.gov)

In plain terms: the product broadcasts an API token over a WebSocket channel that is readable by any process or client with local network access to that socket. Because the token is reusable, capturing it allows subsequent token-based API operations until the token expires or is revoked. That combination of token reuse and local broadcast makes exploitation relatively straightforward where adversaries already have local network presence or the ability to run code on the host. (cisa.gov)

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Why this matters for industrial networks​

FactoryTalk components are widely deployed across critical infrastructure sectors including Chemical, Critical Manufacturing, Energy, Food and Agriculture, Transportation Systems, and Water/Wastewater. Compromise of management and runtime systems in those environments can escalate from data exposure to operational manipulation. CISA explicitly lists these sectors as in-scope for this advisory, underscoring the higher-than-usual consequences when control-plane credentials leak. (cisa.gov)
Key operational risks:

• Unauthorized control or configuration changes: A captured API token could be used to query state or submit API actions that alter system behavior.
• Lateral movement and persistence: Local token capture is frequently used as a step toward broader access, especially in networks that trust local artifacts or use shared tokens across components.
• Safety and availability impacts: In ICS contexts, altering setpoints, disabling alarms, or changing schedules can create physical hazards or prolonged downtime.

Because the attack vector is local, environments that permit third-party USBs, guest laptops, contractor tools, or untrusted processes on engineering workstations are at notably increased risk.

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Verification and cross-checks​

The primary, authoritative technical details come from CISA’s ICS advisory ICSA-25-226-30, which lists CVE-2025-7532, affected versions, and both CVSS v3.1 and v4 vectors and scores. Rockwell’s public security advisory index and product pages provide corroborating vendor guidance to apply updates and adopt security best practices for FactoryTalk products. These two independent sources align on the root facts: the vulnerability, the affected versions, and the vendor’s recommendation to update. (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)
Where statements could not be independently verified:

• Public exploit telemetry: CISA states there are no known public exploit reports for this vulnerability at present; that statement is time-sensitive and reflects information available at the advisory publication date (August 14, 2025). Organizations should treat exploit status as a changing fact and monitor vendor/CISA updates for any reported exploitation. (cisa.gov)

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Detailed impact analysis​

Token reuse + local broadcast = a high local-threat posture​

This vulnerability’s core problem is token telemetry — broadcasting a reusable token across an unauthenticated runtime channel. The risk multiplies because:

• Tokens often map to broad privileges in management APIs.
• Local processes and users commonly have fewer runtime protections; supply-chain tools, automation scripts, or misconfigured debug clients may listen on local sockets.
• Token capture requires only local access; hostile insiders, compromised operator workstations, or contractor devices could be sufficient.

Likely attacker scenarios​

• A contractor brings a laptop with remote-access tooling, installs a monitoring utility, and captures a token broadcast; the token is reused to make configuration changes before detection.
• A low-privileged user who gains temporary local access uses a simple WebSocket client to obtain the runtime token and then calls higher-privilege APIs that would normally be protected by authentication.
• Malware that achieves local foothold (e.g., via phishing, malicious USB) harvests the token and relays it to a remote operator, enabling off-host orchestration of FactoryTalk actions.

Limitations and mitigations inherent to the flaw​

• The flaw is local-only and therefore not directly exploitable over the public internet. Well-segmented networks that prevent access to engineering systems from business or internet zones will reduce risk substantially. CISA and Rockwell both emphasize reducing network exposure and isolating control networks. (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)

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Immediate mitigation checklist — what to do now​

The following is a prioritized, tactical checklist for defenders in affected environments. Where vendor patches are available, prioritize them; otherwise apply compensating controls immediately.

• Update FactoryTalk Action Manager to version 1.01 or later when possible. Vendor guidance and CISA both list upgrading as the primary remediation step. (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)
• If an immediate upgrade is impractical, apply the following compensating controls:
• Restrict local access to hosts running Action Manager: lock down physical and interactive access to engineering workstations and servers.
• Harden OS user accounts: remove or limit membership in wide-ranging groups (e.g., default interactive groups) for sensitive directories and services.
• Block or filter local WebSocket connections where feasible: configure local firewall/host-based firewall to restrict inbound connections to the Action Manager WebSocket port to specific management hosts only.
• Rotate API tokens and credentials used by Action Manager and related services; invalidate tokens where a reusable token mechanism is accessible.
• Implement strict application whitelisting and endpoint protection on machines that run FactoryTalk components to prevent unauthorized processes from opening socket listeners or capturing memory.
• Network segmentation and firewall policies:
• Ensure engineering and control networks are isolated behind industrial firewalls.
• Only allow management traffic from known, hardened operator workstations or jump hosts.
• Disable unnecessary local services on Action Manager hosts.
• Monitor and detect:
• Enable logging for WebSocket connections and audit accesses to Action Manager APIs.
• Look for indicators such as unexpected WebSocket clients on the runtime port, abnormal API calls, or token reuse patterns.
• Use EDR/IDS signatures that can flag base64-looking tokens being transmitted via WebSocket frames or suspicious processes invoking WebSocket client libraries.
• Conduct impact analysis:
• Validate any automated or scheduled operations that rely on API tokens; ensure they fail securely when tokens are rotated or revoked.
• Test updates in a staging environment before production rollout and document rollback procedures.

Each of the above steps maps directly to CISA and Rockwell recommendations for product updates and control network protection, as documented by the advisory and vendor guidance. (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)

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Detection and monitoring guidance — practical signals to watch​

Detection in this context focuses on capturing abnormal local activity and identifying token misuse.

• Host-level telemetry:
• Monitor process creation and network socket activity for nonstandard programs opening WebSocket client connections to the Action Manager runtime.
• Audit local file and memory access on the Action Manager host, especially reads of configuration files or in-memory tokens.
• Monitor for suspicious child processes of known operator tools.
• Network-level telemetry (internal network segments):
• Inspect internal network flows for WebSocket traffic to the Action Manager runtime port. Filter for unexpected source IPs or MAC addresses and one-to-many broadcasts.
• Look for repeated identical tokens being used from different clients or hosts — a classic sign of token capture and reuse.
• API-level auditing:
• Enable and centrally collect Action Manager API logs. Alert on:
• Administrative API calls outside change windows.
• API calls originating from endpoints not in the known management set.
• Rapid sequences of privileged API calls following a previously unseen WebSocket handshake.
• SIEM/UEBA:
• Model expected operator behavior; alert on deviations such as account access from unusual hosts or times, or API calls that don’t align with scheduled maintenance.

Note: detailed signatures and exact port/protocol numbers are vendor-specific; confirm the Action Manager runtime port and logging configuration in vendor documentation prior to deploying detection rules. Where such specifics are not publicly available, teams should prioritize behavior-based detection (unexpected clients, token reuse patterns) over brittle string-matching signatures.

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Hardening and longer-term controls​

Beyond immediate mitigations, organizations should incorporate architectural and operational defenses:

• Replace reusable tokens with short-lived, scoped tokens (if possible). Tokens that expire quickly reduce the window of opportunity for attackers. If the product does not support this natively, request changes via vendor support channels and consider compensating rotations.
• Enforce least privilege across management APIs: ensure tokens grant the minimal necessary privileges for operations.
• Adopt a hardened management jump host model: only permit management calls from dedicated, monitored jump hosts with multifactor authentication (MFA).
• Apply Defense-in-Depth: combine network segmentation, host hardening, application allowlisting, robust logging, and forensic readiness to detect and contain aberrant activity rapidly.
• Periodic reviews and product lifecycle management: ensure critical ICS software is on a supported patch path and that vendor advisories are subscribed to and triaged.

These long-term controls reflect best practices emphasized by Rockwell and CISA for FactoryTalk and related industrial systems. (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)

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Communications and incident response playbook​

If you detect or suspect token exposure or misuse, follow a controlled IR process:

• Isolate affected host(s) from the control network while preserving volatile evidence (memory, running process lists, open sockets).
• Collect logs (application, OS, network), memory snapshots (if safe and legal), and WebSocket session traces where feasible.
• Rotate exposed tokens and credentials immediately; revoke tokens at the vendor management/API layer if possible.
• Conduct forensic analysis to determine whether the token was used for unauthorized state changes or data access.
• Notify relevant stakeholders per internal policy, including plant operations, IT security, and vendor support.
• Report confirmed incidents to national authorities/sector CSIRTs as appropriate; CISA encourages reporting for correlation against other incidents. (cisa.gov)

Be cautious: in ICS environments, “isolation” steps must balance cyber containment against operational continuity and safety. Always perform impact analysis and coordinate with process/operations owners before taking service-affecting actions.

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Threat modeling — who benefits from exploiting CVE-2025-7532?​

• Opportunistic insiders or contractors with local access: such individuals can exploit the low complexity and local vector to extract tokens.
• Malware families that achieve local foothold: a small, simple WebSocket sniffer module could harvest tokens and hand them off to remote operators.
• Attackers aiming to remain stealthy: token-based access can leave fewer host-level artifacts than interactive credential theft, enabling stealthier post-exploitation actions.

Given the requirement for local presence, the vulnerability is less useful to remote-only threat actors unless they can first obtain local foothold through other means (phishing, supply chain, remote desktop misconfigurations). This makes multi-layered defenses especially effective: preventing initial local access eliminates the crucial first step.

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Strengths in the response so far — and remaining gaps​

Notable strengths:

• Quick vendor disclosure: Rockwell reported the issue to CISA and recommended a specific product update, enabling a clear remediation path. (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)
• Clear advisory details: CISA’s public advisory documents the vulnerability class, affected versions, and CVSS scoring for both v3.1 and v4, giving defenders the context needed to prioritize patching. (cisa.gov)

Potential gaps and risks:

• Local-only classification may lull teams into complacency. Local access is frequently easier than many defenders expect in industrial environments because of contractors, vendor support tools, or weakly segmented jump hosts.
• The advisory does not publish exploit code or in-depth technical indicators for the token broadcast mechanism; defenders must craft detection heuristics without vendor-provided IOCs. That increases detection complexity and potential for false negatives.
• Token reuse behavior is implementation-specific. If the product’s token lifetime and scope are not fully documented publicly, defenders must assume the worst and rotate tokens broadly until remedying the root cause.

Where claims could not be independently verified, teams should treat those as evolving facts — for example, whether public exploit code appears after the advisory date, or whether additional Rockwell patches modify the runtime token behavior further. Maintain continuous monitoring of official vendor and CISA updates. (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)

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Recommended prioritized action plan (30/60/90 day)​

• First 30 days (urgent)
• Inventory all FactoryTalk Action Manager instances and confirm software versions.
• Patch any instances to 1.01+ immediately where possible. (cisa.gov)
• Block nonessential local network connections to Action Manager ports and restrict management host access.
• Rotate API tokens and credentials; revoke nonessential tokens.
• 60 days (stabilize)
• Deploy host-based detection for WebSocket listeners and unexpected local clients.
• Harden engineering workstations and implement application control.
• Update incident response playbooks to include token-exposure scenarios and forensic collection steps.
• 90 days (mature)
• Move to short-lived scoped tokens where supported, or work with vendor to adopt such a model.
• Conduct tabletop exercises simulating token capture and abuse in ICS contexts.
• Integrate FactoryTalk management into long-term vulnerability management and patch cycles.

This timeline balances immediate containment against operational realities in ICS environments.

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Final analysis and takeaways​

CVE-2025-7532 in FactoryTalk Action Manager is not a remote zero-day; it is nonetheless consequential because it exposes reusable credentials on a broadcast channel. The combination of token reuse and unauthenticated WebSocket broadcasting creates a low-effort, high-impact local attack chain that adversaries with local access can exploit to manipulate system behavior.
The authoritative advisory by CISA provides clear technical details and prioritization metrics (CVSS v3.1 = 7.8; CVSS v4 = 8.5) and emphasizes upgrading to FactoryTalk Action Manager 1.01 or later and applying standard ICS defensive practices. Rockwell’s security channels support and complement these recommendations. (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)
Practical defense rests on three pillars:

• Patch promptly where possible (vendor update to 1.01+).
• Minimize local exposure with host hardening, segmentation, and restricted management access.
• Detect and respond to token misuse and unusual WebSocket/API activity using host and network telemetry.

Organizations that treat local access as a first-class threat and apply layered controls will substantially reduce the real-world risk posed by this vulnerability. Continuous monitoring of vendor and CISA updates is essential because exploit availability and remediation guidance may evolve after the advisory’s publication. (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)

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Source: CISA Rockwell Automation FactoryTalk Action Manager | CISA