Every cyber incident headline seems to ping-pong between shifting brands: Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard, APT29, UNC2452, Voodoo Bear—names that sound like the roll call from a hacker-themed comic, not the carefully curated codenames for state-sponsored threat actors plaguing the digital world. If you find this confusing, you’re not alone. Beneath the wry internet memes about “Advanced Persistent Pandas” and “Blizzards” lies a real and growing crisis in cybersecurity: the very people charged with protecting the world’s digital infrastructure often can’t speak a common language about who—or what—they’re defending against.
The confusion over threat actor names is rooted in the fractured, competitive nature of the cybersecurity industry. Security vendors, each with their own research pipelines, analytic frameworks, and even marketing goals, uncover the same threat groups but label them as they see fit. A Russian government-backed group, for example, might simultaneously be tracked under a half-dozen monikers: Microsoft’s “Midnight Blizzard,” CrowdStrike’s “Cozy Bear,” Mandiant’s “APT29”—the list goes on.
This isn’t a new issue. For years, incident responders and government agencies have grappled with “naming collisions.” It isn’t merely a matter of branding: the real-world consequences include operational delays when mapping intelligence, confusion during coordinated response efforts, and even accidental “double-counting” of threats in reporting.
The IT community’s frustration has led to wall-of-shame spreadsheets and mind-boggling mapping tables, begging a simple question: Why can’t the cybersecurity giants just agree on a single standard?
The resulting document is essentially a cross-reference table, showing Microsoft’s identifiers (such as “Satin Typhoon” for a Chinese state group) alongside other vendor- and government-assigned names. Some groups sport nearly a dozen aliases. For instance, Sandworm—the infamous Russian operations group tied to GRU Unit 74455—carries more than ten identities, including IRIDIUM, VOODOO BEAR, and the newly-minted “Seashell Blizzard” from Microsoft.
This approach is a step forward, but not nearly the “clarity” that cybersecurity professionals crave. After reading through the mapping, one still can’t refer to a group without also mentally footnoting half a dozen alternatives.
The joint initiative stopped short of enforcing or recommending a universal standard. Instead, Microsoft’s Security executive Vasu Jakkal characterized the project as an “initial taxonomy mapping,” intended to allow major naming conventions to coexist while making it easier for users to cross-reference threat actors.
The rationale? According to both Microsoft and CrowdStrike, the visibility each vendor has into the threat landscape is unique. Each analytic model, intelligence feed, or proprietary telemetry can yield subtle differences in attribution. Imposing a single global naming regime, the companies argue, would risk erasing these unique insights or slow down time-sensitive attributions by forcing consensus instead of quick action.
As Adam Meyers, CrowdStrike’s SVP of counter adversary operations, put it: “By building a shared reference system that allows teams to correlate aliases quickly, we’re helping defenders accelerate their response … [but] establishing a single standard may sound simple, but the reality is far more complex.”
A memorable moniker can drive vendor mind-share—think of “Fancy Bear,” “Sandworm,” or “Equation Group” dominating media coverage—and becomes shorthand for the vendor’s “unique” detection or attribution abilities. The name itself becomes a product.
However, this marketing motivation often leaves enterprise defenders and policymakers scratching their heads, wondering which “Panda,” “Bear,” or “Blizzard” is responsible for the breach of the week. In real-world incidents, this slows understanding and can even impact remediation. During the SolarWinds supply chain attack (tracked as SUNBURST, Dark Halo, Nobelium, and more), confusion over who was responsible hampered swift public-private coordination.
In the wake of the breach, Amazon famously delayed its $1 billion, 1.5-million-employee migration to Microsoft 365 by a full year. Why? Amazon demanded full, near-real-time access to audit logs and enhanced security oversight—protections it deemed necessary after witnessing even a cloud giant like Microsoft struggle to assure complete hacker eviction.
The confusion over naming—who exactly was responsible and what their usual tactics were—quickly turned from an academic quibble into a boardroom-level, billion-dollar business concern.
This event is far from unique. In nearly every major breach with ties to state-level actors, the multiplicity of names and attributions routinely leads to slowed response and haphazard coordination. Enterprises sensitive about where their data lives in the cloud need not just swift alerts—but unambiguous ones.
Worse, attackers are innovating rapidly. Recent phishing innovations, such as device code phishing and token hijacking, blur the boundaries of what constitutes a “group” as actor infrastructure and second-level subcontractors swap tools, collaborate informally, or even franchise attack kits. The fact that one group is called “Blizzard” and another is “Bear” pales compared to whether your monitoring stack detects that latest “Qakbot” malspam dropper or a custom loader only referenced in one vendor’s release.
For threat intelligence teams participating in information sharing at the ISAC (Information Sharing and Analysis Center) level, this chaos is compounded as government reports, industry feeds, and news media all describe the same event in different dialects.
For those on the front lines—IT admins, cloud architects, and even the users trained to spot phishing—the signal is lost in the noise. When every “APT” and “Bear” sounds the same, cyber defense becomes demoralizing and less effective.
Attempts to create shared frameworks, such as MITRE ATT&CK’s group classifications, have helped, but even these are merely overlays and don’t replace individual vendor names.
As Michael Sikorski of Palo Alto Networks’ Unit 42 tells The Register, enforcing a singular naming convention would be “incredibly difficult,” but growing alignment on mapping “will better streamline how threat intelligence is shared and ensure that responses are faster and more effective.” This is, perhaps, the most realistic aspiration at present: improving cross-vendor coordination and customer understanding without waiting for an impossible global consensus.
For those curating threat intelligence feeds, news coverage, or educational resources, the message is clear: mapping, when available, should be incorporated, but care must be taken to reference every major alias to maximize comprehensibility and searchability.
Most defenders don’t need another poetic codename; they need instant understanding of who the adversary is, what their latest campaign targets, what TTPs are shifting, and what mitigations are required. Ultimately, this clarity—rather than perfect naming harmony—remains the most vital goal.
Yet, by favoring mapping and collaboration over siloing and branding wars, the industry signals a modest but meaningful cultural shift. Until (or unless) a true global naming standard emerges (an unlikely event given current economics and technical realities), security teams must be prepared to operate in a mapped, not unified, world. The responsibility thus falls on enterprises to ensure their teams have access to the latest mappings—and to remain as precise as possible in their detection, attribution, and response workflows.
As cyber adversaries continue innovating their attacks—be it through device code phishing or supply chain exploits—real progress will be measured not by whose “Bear” wins media attention, but by how quickly defenders can join the dots, regardless of what they’re called. In the end, language matters—but fast, effective action matters more.
Source: theregister.com Microsoft et al pledge 'clarity' on cybercrew names - hmph
Tracing the Roots of Threat Actor Naming Chaos
The confusion over threat actor names is rooted in the fractured, competitive nature of the cybersecurity industry. Security vendors, each with their own research pipelines, analytic frameworks, and even marketing goals, uncover the same threat groups but label them as they see fit. A Russian government-backed group, for example, might simultaneously be tracked under a half-dozen monikers: Microsoft’s “Midnight Blizzard,” CrowdStrike’s “Cozy Bear,” Mandiant’s “APT29”—the list goes on.This isn’t a new issue. For years, incident responders and government agencies have grappled with “naming collisions.” It isn’t merely a matter of branding: the real-world consequences include operational delays when mapping intelligence, confusion during coordinated response efforts, and even accidental “double-counting” of threats in reporting.
The IT community’s frustration has led to wall-of-shame spreadsheets and mind-boggling mapping tables, begging a simple question: Why can’t the cybersecurity giants just agree on a single standard?
The Latest Attempt at Clarity: Microsoft, CrowdStrike & Friends
On June 3, Microsoft and CrowdStrike jointly published what they touted as the “first version of our joint threat actor mapping.” The intent: help mutual customers more easily correlate group names across vendor ecosystems, providing network defenders with quicker, more actionable intelligence.The resulting document is essentially a cross-reference table, showing Microsoft’s identifiers (such as “Satin Typhoon” for a Chinese state group) alongside other vendor- and government-assigned names. Some groups sport nearly a dozen aliases. For instance, Sandworm—the infamous Russian operations group tied to GRU Unit 74455—carries more than ten identities, including IRIDIUM, VOODOO BEAR, and the newly-minted “Seashell Blizzard” from Microsoft.
This approach is a step forward, but not nearly the “clarity” that cybersecurity professionals crave. After reading through the mapping, one still can’t refer to a group without also mentally footnoting half a dozen alternatives.
The joint initiative stopped short of enforcing or recommending a universal standard. Instead, Microsoft’s Security executive Vasu Jakkal characterized the project as an “initial taxonomy mapping,” intended to allow major naming conventions to coexist while making it easier for users to cross-reference threat actors.
The rationale? According to both Microsoft and CrowdStrike, the visibility each vendor has into the threat landscape is unique. Each analytic model, intelligence feed, or proprietary telemetry can yield subtle differences in attribution. Imposing a single global naming regime, the companies argue, would risk erasing these unique insights or slow down time-sensitive attributions by forcing consensus instead of quick action.
As Adam Meyers, CrowdStrike’s SVP of counter adversary operations, put it: “By building a shared reference system that allows teams to correlate aliases quickly, we’re helping defenders accelerate their response … [but] establishing a single standard may sound simple, but the reality is far more complex.”
The Business—and Ego—of Naming the Enemy
Dig a layer deeper and you’ll find more at play than just technical rigor. Google’s Threat Intelligence Group Deputy Chief Analyst Luke McNamara was candid: “Historically, security companies have certainly wanted to have their own naming schemes for marketing purposes.” Whether the names are catchy, intimidating, or just weird, standing out in the jungle of threat intel branding carries real business value.A memorable moniker can drive vendor mind-share—think of “Fancy Bear,” “Sandworm,” or “Equation Group” dominating media coverage—and becomes shorthand for the vendor’s “unique” detection or attribution abilities. The name itself becomes a product.
However, this marketing motivation often leaves enterprise defenders and policymakers scratching their heads, wondering which “Panda,” “Bear,” or “Blizzard” is responsible for the breach of the week. In real-world incidents, this slows understanding and can even impact remediation. During the SolarWinds supply chain attack (tracked as SUNBURST, Dark Halo, Nobelium, and more), confusion over who was responsible hampered swift public-private coordination.
High Stakes: The Midnight Blizzard Breach and Its Fallout
Recent events underscore the need for clear, shared threat actor definitions. In January 2024, Microsoft suffered a high-profile compromise at the hands of “Midnight Blizzard,” the group more widely known as Cozy Bear/ATP29. This Russian intelligence unit breached sensitive systems, exploiting cloud vulnerabilities and evading detection for months.In the wake of the breach, Amazon famously delayed its $1 billion, 1.5-million-employee migration to Microsoft 365 by a full year. Why? Amazon demanded full, near-real-time access to audit logs and enhanced security oversight—protections it deemed necessary after witnessing even a cloud giant like Microsoft struggle to assure complete hacker eviction.
The confusion over naming—who exactly was responsible and what their usual tactics were—quickly turned from an academic quibble into a boardroom-level, billion-dollar business concern.
This event is far from unique. In nearly every major breach with ties to state-level actors, the multiplicity of names and attributions routinely leads to slowed response and haphazard coordination. Enterprises sensitive about where their data lives in the cloud need not just swift alerts—but unambiguous ones.
Threat Actor Naming: The Strengths and Failings of the Mapping Approach
Notable Strengths
- Shared Reference Tables Aid Rapid Defense
The new mapping initiative does cut through some confusion, especially for sizable enterprises using more than one vendor’s threat intelligence. SOCs (Security Operation Centers) can map incoming advisories from Microsoft, CrowdStrike, and Mandiant far faster, sometimes automating the reference step. - Flexibility and Analytic Nuance
Each vendor can preserve the unique perspective their technical detections bring. Sometimes, an apparent “overlap” masks real-world differences: one company may track a group’s entire lifespan, while another splits it if a dramatic tactics shift occurs. Maintaining flexibility avoids flattening complex reality. - Reduction of Accidental Double-Counting
Joint mapping can help prevent the mistaken identification of different clusters as entirely separate actors, which has marred government and industry reporting in the past. - Encouraging Vendor Collaboration
The move signals a broader cultural shift: instead of jealously hoarding data for the press release, vendors are working—where possible—to align definitions and methodologies.
Persistent Risks
- Fundamental Lack of True Clarity
The mapping is triage, not a cure: users must still keep lookup tables handy, and casual observers (and many IT pros) will continue to struggle with threat intelligence’s “name soup.” The mapping does not fully solve the problem for leaner organizations, government response units, or the broader public. - Potential for Political and Marketing Abuse
There’s little doubt that some naming decisions will continue to be made with one eye on marketing. Vendors may still “rush to brand” a high-profile group for the win, muddying the waters ahead of competitors. - Genuine Analytic Disagreements Persist
Sometimes, different names actually reflect disagreements over what constitutes a distinct group. Is “FamousSparrow” its own threat actor or just an offshoot of another cluster, as ESET and Microsoft presently debate? Mapping can’t force analytic consensus where none exists. - Slowed Attribution in Crisis
When fast-moving incidents hit—such as the SolarWinds compromise or the MOVEit mass ransomware assaults—initial confusion over naming can still result in delayed guidance to customers, partners, and the press. - Lack of Standardized Enforcement
Unlike regulated industries like medicine or aviation, cybersecurity has no governing body for threat intelligence standards; there’s no “Internet Threat Naming Authority.” Enforcement between commercial competitors would be a logistical and political minefield.
Technical Intricacies: Beyond Name, into Tactics
Consider how the confusion plays out in actual incident response. Security advisories—like those published by CISA and NCSC—are forced to footnote multiple references, e.g., “the threat actor tracked as APT29 (a.k.a. Cozy Bear, Midnight Blizzard, UNC2452), known for leveraging OAuth token forgery and cloud lateral movement…”. This need to constantly re-explain, cross-validate, and correlate intelligence creates friction for defenders trying to track attacker techniques, tools, and procedures (TTPs).Worse, attackers are innovating rapidly. Recent phishing innovations, such as device code phishing and token hijacking, blur the boundaries of what constitutes a “group” as actor infrastructure and second-level subcontractors swap tools, collaborate informally, or even franchise attack kits. The fact that one group is called “Blizzard” and another is “Bear” pales compared to whether your monitoring stack detects that latest “Qakbot” malspam dropper or a custom loader only referenced in one vendor’s release.
The Human Factor: Consequences for Enterprise and End Users
In the trenches, it’s not just CISO-level leaders who suffer. For mid-sized enterprises, confusion over adversary names can spell operational chaos. Picture a scenario in which an organization receives simultaneous threat intelligence muscle-flexes from vendors referring to the same actor by different names. The result? Analyst fatigue, wasted cycles reconciling nomenclature, potential gaps in threat coverage, and possibly, missed indicators that should have been actioned.For threat intelligence teams participating in information sharing at the ISAC (Information Sharing and Analysis Center) level, this chaos is compounded as government reports, industry feeds, and news media all describe the same event in different dialects.
For those on the front lines—IT admins, cloud architects, and even the users trained to spot phishing—the signal is lost in the noise. When every “APT” and “Bear” sounds the same, cyber defense becomes demoralizing and less effective.
Will Mapping Give Way to Standardization?
Despite the recent movement toward mapping-led clarity, true standardization of threat actor naming remains elusive. All the major vendors involved state—repeatedly—that analytic and visibility differences make one-size-fits-all naming impossible. There’s a genuine technical argument here: what you see depends on where you look, so what you call it depends on what you know.Attempts to create shared frameworks, such as MITRE ATT&CK’s group classifications, have helped, but even these are merely overlays and don’t replace individual vendor names.
As Michael Sikorski of Palo Alto Networks’ Unit 42 tells The Register, enforcing a singular naming convention would be “incredibly difficult,” but growing alignment on mapping “will better streamline how threat intelligence is shared and ensure that responses are faster and more effective.” This is, perhaps, the most realistic aspiration at present: improving cross-vendor coordination and customer understanding without waiting for an impossible global consensus.
SEO Implications: Naming Fuzziness Hurts the Wider Security Search Ecosystem
A less-discussed consequence is what this naming chaos does to search and SEO. A user seeks guidance on “Midnight Blizzard,” for example, but much of the indepth history is catalogued under “APT29” or “Cozy Bear.” Vendors chase search positioning with their chosen brand, sometimes pushing technical details behind landing pages optimized for the latest alias. This fragmentation makes comprehensive public knowledge harder to access, frustrates defenders, and ultimately leaves knowledge gaps in long-tail queries.For those curating threat intelligence feeds, news coverage, or educational resources, the message is clear: mapping, when available, should be incorporated, but care must be taken to reference every major alias to maximize comprehensibility and searchability.
A Call for Pragmatism—and Plain Language
The tongue-in-cheek suggestion by former CISA chief Jen Easterly to “stop glamorizing” hacking crews with fancy names isn’t without merit. Much of the confusion arises from the desire for evocative branding. But beyond “Velvet Chollima” belly-dance jokes and the soccer-team-sounding “Crouching Yeti,” stands a critical need for sober, clear, and pragmatic communication.Most defenders don’t need another poetic codename; they need instant understanding of who the adversary is, what their latest campaign targets, what TTPs are shifting, and what mitigations are required. Ultimately, this clarity—rather than perfect naming harmony—remains the most vital goal.
Conclusion: Toward Coherent Collaboration
The ongoing effort by Microsoft, CrowdStrike, and peers to create a living cross-reference for threat actor names is a necessary, if imperfect, step toward better cyber defense. Clarity will always be relative in an industry where intelligence, attribution, and even basic facts are competitive currency.Yet, by favoring mapping and collaboration over siloing and branding wars, the industry signals a modest but meaningful cultural shift. Until (or unless) a true global naming standard emerges (an unlikely event given current economics and technical realities), security teams must be prepared to operate in a mapped, not unified, world. The responsibility thus falls on enterprises to ensure their teams have access to the latest mappings—and to remain as precise as possible in their detection, attribution, and response workflows.
As cyber adversaries continue innovating their attacks—be it through device code phishing or supply chain exploits—real progress will be measured not by whose “Bear” wins media attention, but by how quickly defenders can join the dots, regardless of what they’re called. In the end, language matters—but fast, effective action matters more.
Source: theregister.com Microsoft et al pledge 'clarity' on cybercrew names - hmph
