Hitachi Energy has confirmed a vulnerability in its Asset Suite platform that lets an authenticated user manipulate performance log content or inject crafted entries into logfiles—behavior that can be used to obscure malicious activity or carry out follow‑on attacks—affecting Asset Suite versions 9.7 and earlier and tracked as CVE‑2025‑10217.
Asset Suite is Hitachi Energy’s enterprise asset management platform used widely across utilities and generation operators to manage physical assets, workflows, and outage processes. The affected code path centers on performance logging—a diagnostic feature often enabled for troubleshooting—and the way log output is neutralized before being written to persistent logs. The vulnerability has been assigned CVE‑2025‑10217 and was reported through coordinated vendor and government channels.
CISA’s advisory republished Hitachi Energy’s PSIRT findings and highlights the operational context: Asset Suite is commonly deployed inside critical‑infrastructure environments where confidentiality, integrity, and availability are mission‑critical, and even targeted manipulation of logs can materially impair incident response and forensics. The advisory stresses that the issue is relevant worldwide, particularly in energy sector deployments.
Hitachi Energy and CISA’s guidance provides the critical, actionable steps operators need to contain the immediate risk; implementing those steps now, and treating log integrity as a first‑class security control in ICS, will be key to preventing adversaries from using log manipulation as a camouflage for more damaging attacks. fileciteturn1file13turn0file6
Source: CISA Hitachi Energy Asset Suite | CISA
Background / Overview
Asset Suite is Hitachi Energy’s enterprise asset management platform used widely across utilities and generation operators to manage physical assets, workflows, and outage processes. The affected code path centers on performance logging—a diagnostic feature often enabled for troubleshooting—and the way log output is neutralized before being written to persistent logs. The vulnerability has been assigned CVE‑2025‑10217 and was reported through coordinated vendor and government channels.CISA’s advisory republished Hitachi Energy’s PSIRT findings and highlights the operational context: Asset Suite is commonly deployed inside critical‑infrastructure environments where confidentiality, integrity, and availability are mission‑critical, and even targeted manipulation of logs can materially impair incident response and forensics. The advisory stresses that the issue is relevant worldwide, particularly in energy sector deployments.
What the advisory says (executive gist)
- Affected products: Asset Suite — versions 9.7 and prior.
- Vulnerability type: Improper Output Neutralization for Logs (log injection / CWE‑117)—an attacker can insert crafted content into performance logs or manipulate logged output.
- Identified CVE: CVE‑2025‑10217.
- Severity scores: CISA notes a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.5 (vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N) and a CVSS v4 base score of 6.0 (vector AV:N/AC:L/AT
/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N). These scores indicate moderate to high integrity impact but not direct confidentiality loss or availability disruption in isolation.
Technical analysis — how the bug works
The root cause: unneutralized log output (CWE‑117)
The vulnerability is rooted in insufficient neutralization of user‑controlled or performance data before it is emitted to log files. When log output is not sanitized, an attacker can craft log entries containing control characters, markup, or escape sequences that alter log structure, insert misleading entries, or carry payloads that downstream tools (parsers, dashboards, SIEMs) may execute or interpret unsafely. This is classically known as log injection.Attack surface and prerequisites
Exploitability requires an authenticated user with the ability to trigger or influence performance logging inputs—Hitachi’s findings indicate the attack complexity is low once the attacker has the required privileges. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous in ICS/OT contexts because engineering workstations and operator consoles frequently remain logged into management UIs, and logging is often enabled for troubleshooting. An adversary who can modify logs may:- Hide malicious actions by overwriting or inserting false events.
- Inject content that later causes parsers or log viewers to misbehave or execute, enabling additional escalation.
- Create false evidence or erase indicators, crippling incident response. fileciteturn1file13turn1file5
Chaining potential
Although CVE‑2025‑10217 targets log handling, modern compromises frequently chain multiple weaknesses. Hitachi’s advisory compilation for Asset Suite shows other third‑party library flaws in the stack (e.g., issues in ActiveMQ/Jolokia, logback, Batik, CXF) that can be combined into higher‑impact attack chains—SSRF, RCE, or broker compromise are realistic follow‑ups if attackers can manipulate inputs and logs to mask lateral movement. This makes the log injection vector a high‑value enabler for attackers targeting ICS environments. fileciteturn1file13turn1file4Operational impact — why this matters for energy operators
Asset Suite runs in environments where operator decisions are driven by accurate telemetry and audit trails. If logs can be altered, the integrity of operational evidence is compromised. Consequences include:- Delayed or incorrect incident response because events are missing, modified, or made ambiguous.
- Regulatory and compliance exposure if audit trails are unreliable.
- Increased attacker dwell time: obfuscated logs make detection and attribution harder and allow adversaries to persist longer.
Immediate mitigations and vendor guidance
Hitachi Energy’s PSIRT and CISA both provide short‑term mitigations operators should enact immediately:- Disable performance logging where possible until a vendor patch is applied. This removes the direct attack surface used for log injection. Hitachi explicitly recommends this as the first step.
- Apply vendor updates as soon as relevant fixes are released for Asset Suite. Plan and test upgrades to the vendor‑recommended builds (the advisory identifies upgrade paths to 9.7 for many issues and to 9.8 for certain ActiveMQ/Jolokia fixes).
- Minimize network exposure: ensure Asset Suite servers and management interfaces are not reachable from the public Internet and are isolated behind firewalls. Restrict access to a minimal set of management hosts.
- Control remote access: when remote access is required, use hardened VPNs or jump hosts and ensure those access paths are themselves patched and logged. CISA reiterates that VPNs are only as secure as the endpoints.
Detection, logging hygiene, and forensic readiness
Ironically, one of the first steps is to harden how logs are collected and reviewed:- Treat current logs as potentially tainted. Preserve copies (write‑protected) of raw logs for offline analysis before making changes.
- Implement detection rules that look for anomalous log formatting, unexpected control characters, or repeated patterns consistent with injection attempts. SIEM parsers can be tuned to flag unparsable entries or entries containing HTML/JS-like payloads.
- Monitor for abnormal system behavior that might indicate chained attacks—unusual outbound connections, Jolokia/ActiveMQ management access, or sudden growth in temp directories are meaningful indicators for Asset Suite deployments.
- If performance logging must remain enabled in a limited zone, capture logs centrally in a write‑once repository that validates and normalizes entries before making them available to human operators.
Patch planning, change control, and ICS realities
Patching Asset Suite is not the same operational task as pushing an OS update. Industrial environments impose constraints:- Downtime windows must be coordinated with operations teams and regulators.
- Integration testing is required for downstream systems (ERP, CMMS, SCADA bridges).
- Dependencies (plugins, embedded JARs) may require synchronous upgrades or configuration changes.
- Inventory: identify all Asset Suite instances, exact builds, and integration points.
- Test: apply vendor fixes in a lab/testbed that mirrors production integrations.
- Staged deploy: upgrade a small subset during a low‑impact window, validate telemetry and integrations, then continue in planned waves.
- Validate: apply detection rules and verify that logging and audit trails behave as expected.
- Post‑deploy: rotate any potentially exposed credentials and continue increased monitoring.
Prioritized checklist — immediate (0–48 hours)
- Disable performance logging on all accessible Asset Suite instances unless absolutely required for critical troubleshooting.
- Isolate Asset Suite hosts from the Internet and restrict inbound management access to a small allowlist of engineering jump hosts.
- Capture and preserve current logs in a write‑protected archive for offline forensic review.
- Identify and block public access to any ActiveMQ/Jolokia or administrative endpoints; enforce strong non‑default credentials where access is required.
- Put a high‑priority ticket in for vendor patches and scheduling controlled test/upgrade cycles.
Medium‑term (days–weeks) and strategic recommendations
- Implement egress‑only allowlists for application servers (only permit outbound to known update/management endpoints). This reduces SSRF and exfiltration risk.
- Deploy SBOM and dependency scanning into your asset lifecycle so transitive vulnerabilities are visible and trackable.
- Harden engineering workstations: restrict web browsing on consoles that access OT management systems, apply endpoint protection, and force session lockout/timeouts. Browser‑based injection is a common pivot in OT environments.
- Adopt defense‑in‑depth: segmentation, microsegmentation for management VLANs, and multi‑factor authentication for all admin operations.
Threat and exploitation posture — what to assume
CISA’s advisory explicitly noted that no known public exploitation targeting this vulnerability had been reported at the time of publication; however, that assertion is time‑bound and should be treated as a snapshot rather than an ongoing guarantee. Asset owners should operate under the conservative assumption that opportunistic actors will attempt to weaponize any widely announced weakness, especially one that can help obscure other malicious activity. Continuous monitoring of threat feeds and rapid patching posture remain essential.Strengths and limitations of the advisory and vendor guidance
Strengths
- The advisory provides clear, actionable mitigations (disable performance logging, restrict exposure, patch when available) that are practical for immediate risk reduction.
- It situates the vulnerability in the broader stack context, helping operators prioritize by likely attack chains and transitive risks.
Limitations and risks
- Patching timelines in ICS contexts are inherently constrained by operational windows, making compensating controls crucial while upgrades are scheduled.
- The advisory relies on vendor‑reported fixes for third‑party components; operators should independently verify that the effective JARs and plugin versions in their deployed systems are updated (not just the top‑level Product version). This is a persistent supply‑chain challenge.
- The statement of “no known exploitation” is not a safety guarantee; it can create a false sense of security if taken out of context. Continuous telemetry and threat monitoring are mandatory.
Practical hardening checklist for Windows‑based engineering workstations
- Disable general web browsing and personal email on workstations that interact with Asset Suite.
- Ensure browser and Java runtimes are up to date; limit use of legacy plugins and relaxations that were historically used for OT compatibility.
- Enforce strict session management, endpoint EDR, and least privilege for domain accounts that manage Asset Suite.
Final assessment — recommended priority and next steps
CVE‑2025‑10217 is a pragmatic, operationally significant vulnerability: while its numeric CVSS scores reflect an integrity‑focused impact, the real‑world consequences in energy and ICS deployments are amplified because the weakness undermines audit trails and detection capability. Operators should treat this advisory as high priority for risk mitigation:- Immediately disable performance logging where feasible.
- Isolate Asset Suite hosts and block access to management endpoints from untrusted zones.
- Schedule controlled testing and vendor patching, with SBOM checks for embedded libraries. fileciteturn1file13turn1file4
Hitachi Energy and CISA’s guidance provides the critical, actionable steps operators need to contain the immediate risk; implementing those steps now, and treating log integrity as a first‑class security control in ICS, will be key to preventing adversaries from using log manipulation as a camouflage for more damaging attacks. fileciteturn1file13turn0file6
Source: CISA Hitachi Energy Asset Suite | CISA