Hitachi Energy Asset Suite Security Advisory: Urgent ICS Patch & Mitigations

Hitachi Energy’s Asset Suite — a widely deployed enterprise asset management platform in the energy sector — was the subject of a republished security advisory that consolidates multiple open‑source component vulnerabilities with serious operational impact potential, and operators must act now to prioritize updates, network segmentation, and detection controls. (cisa.gov)

Background / Overview​

Hitachi Energy’s Asset Suite is used by utilities and generation operators worldwide to manage physical assets, workflows, and outages; any compromise of its integrity or availability carries outsized operational risk. The recent advisory (a republishing of vendor PSIRT findings via CISA) lists several distinct weaknesses originating from third‑party libraries and frameworks embedded in Asset Suite releases 9.6.4.5 and earlier. The consolidated risk picture includes Server‑Side Request Forgery (SSRF), deserialization and serialization flaws, cleartext password exposure, uncontrolled resource consumption, open‑redirect/SSRF issues in URL parsing, and improper authentication that can lead to remote code execution (RCE) or denial‑of‑service (DoS) outcomes. (cisa.gov)
These are not theoretical supply‑chain talking points: the vulnerabilities cited map to published CVEs with public technical writeups and vendor fixes. Where a vendor patch for the Asset Suite itself isn’t yet published for a specific library issue, mitigation depends on layered compensations — network controls, service configuration hardening, and runtime detection. The advisory points operators to upgrade paths (Asset Suite 9.7 for most issues and 9.8 when available for an ActiveMQ‑related fix), and urges standard ICS defensive measures: isolate control systems, restrict internet exposure, and enforce secure remote access.

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The core technical findings (what’s in the stack and why it matters)​

1) Apache XML Graphics Batik — SSRF via malicious SVG (CVE‑2022‑44729)​

• What it is: Batik (an SVG processing library) prior to 1.17 could load external resources referenced by crafted SVG files, allowing an attacker to cause server‑side retrievals of arbitrary URLs. This can lead to information disclosure or resource consumption and is categorized as SSRF (CWE‑918). (nvd.nist.gov)
• Why it matters in Asset Suite: Servers that parse user‑supplied SVG (for example, in media upload or reporting features) may be induced to fetch internal resources or external endpoints, potentially exposing metadata or enabling follow‑on attacks.
• Verified references: NVD entry for CVE‑2022‑44729 and vendor guidance for Batik show upgrade to 1.17+. (nvd.nist.gov)

2) Logback receiver serialization — poisoned data → DoS (CVE‑2023‑6378)​

• What it is: A serialization flaw in logback’s receiver component allowed specially crafted data to crash or hang logging subsystems, enabling denial‑of‑service conditions. The issue was patched in later logback releases (1.2.13, 1.3.12, 1.4.12 and above depending on the branch). (github.com)
• Why it matters in Asset Suite: Logging frameworks are ubiquitous. If Asset Suite includes an affected logback version and exposes a receiver endpoint, remote attackers could send “poisoned” log data to exhaust an application’s availability.
• Verified references: NVD and the GitHub advisory / vendor changelog for logback document the affected ranges and fixed versions. (nvd.nist.gov)

3) H2 Database Engine — cleartext web admin password via CLI (CVE‑2022‑45868)​

• What it is: Prior to H2 2.2.220, the web admin console could be started with a -webAdminPassword CLI argument, which exposes the password in process arguments and thus to local process inspection. This is classified as cleartext storage/exposure (CWE‑312). (nvd.nist.gov)
• Why it matters in Asset Suite: If Asset Suite bundles an affected H2 component, a local attacker or a misconfigured monitoring solution might discover admin credentials by enumerating process arguments, enabling privileged access.
• Verified references: NVD documents the issue; vendor remediation is to stop passing credentials on the command line and upgrade to fixed H2 versions. (nvd.nist.gov)

4) Apache CXF — uncontrolled resource consumption via CachedOutputStream (CVE‑2025‑23184)​

• What it is: In some Apache CXF releases the CachedOutputStream may not be closed, and when backed by temp files this can allow disk exhaustion (CWE‑400). Patches were released in CXF 3.5.10, 3.6.5 and 4.0.6. (nvd.nist.gov)
• Why it matters in Asset Suite: Overflow of temporary storage can crash application processes or cause degradation of service — in ICS environments where predictable availability matters, this is critical.
• Verified references: NVD and Apache advisories outline the fixed versions and mitigation strategies (correct stream handling, updated CXF). (nvd.nist.gov)

5) Spring Framework UriComponentsBuilder — open redirect / SSRF (CVE‑2024‑22262)​

• What it is: When applications parse externally supplied URLs using UriComponentsBuilder and then validate the host after parsing, certain inputs can bypass host validation checks, enabling either an open redirect or SSRF depending on how the parsed URL is used. This class of issues hit multiple Spring versions. (nvd.nist.gov)
• Why it matters in Asset Suite: Many web apps accept URLs as parameters (for callback links, previews, or integrations). If Asset Suite uses UriComponentsBuilder improperly, user‑controlled URLs can redirect users to attacker domains or cause server‑side fetches to internal services.
• Verified references: NVD and Spring security advisories, plus vendor notices for impacted Spring versions, confirm the vulnerability and recommended upgrades. (nvd.nist.gov)

6) Apache ActiveMQ + Jolokia — improper authentication → potential RCE (CVE‑2022‑41678)​

• What it is: Jolokia endpoints exposed in certain ActiveMQ deployments could be used by an authenticated user (or a service with default credentials) to invoke MBean operations that ultimately allow arbitrary command execution via reflection and vulnerable management MBeans. This is classified as improper authentication leading to remote code execution (CWE‑287). (nvd.nist.gov)
• Why it matters in Asset Suite: Messaging components such as ActiveMQ are often used in enterprise integrations. If Asset Suite installs a vulnerable ActiveMQ instance with Jolokia exposed and weak/default credentials, attackers can achieve RCE and persistent control.
• Verified references: NVD entries and multiple vendor/security researcher writeups describe the attack chains and recommended ActiveMQ versions that adopt stricter Jolokia defaults. (nvd.nist.gov)

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Risk evaluation — what operators should take seriously​

• Composite severity: The advisory aggregates multiple vulnerabilities whose combined CVSS v4/3 scores fall into the “high” or “critical” range in several cases. The presence of both DoS vectors (logback/CXF) and RCE vectors (ActiveMQ/Jolokia) in a single deployment magnifies risk: attackers frequently chain lower‑privilege flaws into more impactful outcomes. (nvd.nist.gov)
• Attackability: Several of the issues require either network access or local privileges; a subset (logback deserialization, CXF temp file exhaustion, UriComponentsBuilder misuse) are exploitable remotely with relatively low complexity. That increases the need for network‑level mitigations in ICS contexts. (nvd.nist.gov)
• Operational impact: For utilities and generation operators, an unavailable EAM system during an outage or maintenance window directly increases outage duration and risk to safety and regulatory compliance. A compromised Asset Suite could also be used as a stepping stone to other OT/IT systems.
• Supply‑chain observation: The root cause for most of the CVEs is open‑source components out of the control of Hitachi Energy, underscoring the industry challenge of transitive dependency management and the need for disciplined software bill‑of‑materials (SBOM) practices.

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Mitigations: immediate actions and medium‑term remediation​

Immediate (hours to days)​

• Inventory and isolate
• Identify all Asset Suite instances and components in your environment. Treat each as high‑value and place them behind segmented VLANs and firewall rules that restrict outbound connections to only what’s necessary.
• Reduce attack surface by disabling unnecessary network services; ensure management interfaces are not exposed to the internet. CISA’s standard recommendation — minimize network exposure and isolate control networks — applies here. (cisa.gov)
• Apply vendor hotfixes where available
• Hitachi’s advisory recommends upgrading Asset Suite to 9.7 for most listed component issues, and to 9.8 when available to address the ActiveMQ/Jolokia item. If an organization cannot immediately apply a full Asset Suite upgrade, prioritize patching or configuration changes for the specific vulnerable subsystems (for example, upgrade embedded Batik, logback, CXF, H2, or enforce tighter Jolokia config). Where vendor guidance is not publicly discoverable for a PSIRT ID, treat the vendor recommendation as authoritative but verify exact fixed builds against your installed components before rollout.
• Compensating controls
• Block outbound HTTP(S) from application servers to the internet except to approved update/management endpoints. This reduces SSRF‑style impact.
• Restrict access to message broker management endpoints (ActiveMQ web console/Jolokia) to specific management hosts; enforce strong non‑default credentials and limit allowed Jolokia operations. (wiz.io)
• Emergency detection
• Enable and tune logging/alerts for:
• Unusual outbound connections from Asset Suite hosts.
• High rates of logback or application exceptions (indicating attempted poison payloads).
• Unexpected file‑system growth in temp directories (possible CXF CachedOutputStream abuse).
• Jolokia API calls and anonymous/authenticated activity to ActiveMQ endpoints. (nvd.nist.gov)

Short to medium term (days to weeks)​

• Upgrade the affected third‑party libraries when vendor patches (or Asset Suite package updates) are available: Batik → 1.17+, logback → patched branch releases, H2 → 2.2.220+, CXF → 3.5.10/3.6.5/4.0.6, Spring → patched 5.x/6.x branches per Spring advisory, ActiveMQ → versions that adopt stricter Jolokia defaults. Cross‑check installed JAR versions against CVE advisories prior to applying OS‑level patches. (nvd.nist.gov)
• Implement or improve SBOM processes to map which open‑source packages and versions are present inside Asset Suite builds; this materially accelerates triage when new CVEs surface.

Long term (weeks to months)​

• Harden release processes: require deterministic third‑party dependency updates, adopt dependency scanning in CI/CD, and maintain a rolling program to keep critical libraries within supported and patched ranges.
• Threat‑model Asset Suite deployment patterns: introduce application‑layer proxies or web application firewalls to mitigate SSRF/open redirect attempts where update timelines are extended by testing constraints.
• Coordinate with vendor support for staged testing and patch schedules that respect ICS change control while addressing security risk.

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Detection and incident response guidance​

• Focused detections
• Monitor for process start commands that include cleartext passwords (an indicator for H2 admin password leakage). If found, rotate credentials and remediate host access. (nvd.nist.gov)
• Alert on outgoing connections to internal addresses from web application threads that normally do not make such calls (SSRF indicator).
• Watch for heavy growth in /tmp or app temp directories and for repeated exceptions coming from logging libraries (possible logback poisoning). (nvd.nist.gov)
• Containment playbook (high level)
• If an ActiveMQ or Jolokia compromise is suspected, isolate the broker from production traffic and change management credentials immediately.
• Capture volatile evidence (process lists, network connections, mbean invocations) and preserve logs for forensic review.
• If file‑system exhaustion or unknown files appear, take snapshots where safe and scan for web shells or unauthorized artifacts.
• Engage vendor support and, where applicable, national cyber authorities per organizational incident reporting policies. CISA encourages reporting suspected malicious activity for tracking and correlation. (cisa.gov)

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Critical analysis — strengths in the response and remaining risks​

What Hitachi and CISA did well​

• Consolidation: The vendor PSIRT and CISA advisories provide a consolidated list of component issues along with recommended immediate actions (upgrade paths and network mitigations). Consolidation helps operators prioritize rather than chase disparate CVE pages.
• Patch guidance: For most upstream defects (logback, Batik, CXF, H2, Spring, ActiveMQ), fixed versions exist in the open‑source ecosystem, and the advisories recommend explicit Asset Suite versions to move to — this gives operators an actionable upgrade path. (github.com)

Remaining and nontrivial risks​

• Patch deployment complexity in ICS: Asset Suite upgrades may require scheduled downtime, compatibility testing with integrations (ERP, CMMS, OT bridges), and regulatory change control. Operators cannot simply “hit update” in many production environments, which creates a window of sustained exposure.
• Transitive dependencies and hidden exposures: Even if the main Product is updated, transitive JARs embedded in plugins or third‑party integrations can reintroduce vulnerable code. A robust SBOM and CI/CD gating are still uncommon in many ICS vendors and their customers.
• Exploitation potential of chained flaws: Attackers can chain SSRF to internal metadata disclosure, then reuse credentials to pivot to messaging or other services. The mix of SSRF, cleartext passwords, and Jolokia management flaws in one platform increases the feasibility of complex attacks.
• Public exploit knowledge: Several of the CVEs have public PoCs or proof‑of‑concept writeups (especially ActiveMQ Jolokia RCE material); organizations should assume that opportunistic attackers will try to weaponize these chains unless mitigations are applied. (github.com)

Claims requiring cautious treatment​

• The advisory text notes “No known public exploitation specifically targeting these vulnerabilities has been reported to CISA at this time.” That statement is time‑bounded and must be treated as a snapshot. Operators should assume exploitation may appear at any time and continuously monitor external threat feeds for active exploitation. This “no known exploitation” assertion should not reduce urgency.

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Practical checklist for Asset Suite operators (ordered priorities)​

• Immediately inventory all Asset Suite installations and the exact build numbers; verify if they are 9.6.4.5 or older.
• If running 9.6.4.5 or prior, plan upgrades to the vendor‑recommended 9.7 and schedule testing to validate integrations. If you cannot upgrade immediately, apply the compensating network and config mitigations listed in this advisory.
• Ensure ActiveMQ/Jolokia endpoints are not publicly reachable and that default/weak credentials are changed; disable Jolokia if not required. (wiz.io)
• Block unneeded outbound HTTP(S) from application servers, and enforce egress allowlists for necessary update endpoints only.
• Rotate any credentials that may have been exposed (especially if H2 or other components were invoked with CLI passwords). (nvd.nist.gov)
• Implement detection rules for unusual outbound fetches, temp‑dir growth, excessive logging exceptions, and Jolokia API activity.
• Retain vendor support and, where appropriate, run planned staged updates in test environments to validate API and integration behavior before production rollout.
• Document your SBOM and integrate dependency scanning into release processes to avoid repeating this scenario.

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Final assessment and conclusion​

The Hitachi Energy Asset Suite advisory is a stark reminder that enterprise OT/IT software inherits the security posture of its open‑source components. The technical findings are concrete: each cited CVE maps to a real, documented defect in a component widely used in Java‑based stacks. Operators face a realistic, immediate risk because several issues are exploitable remotely and involve either code execution or availability impacts. The vendor’s recommended upgrades (moving to Asset Suite 9.7 and later 9.8 for certain fixes) and existing upstream patches for Batik, logback, H2, CXF, Spring, and ActiveMQ provide clear remediation paths — but operational realities in industrial environments mean mitigations, segmentation, and runtime detection are equally essential while upgrades are scheduled. (github.com)
Operators should treat the advisory as high priority: begin inventory and isolation work immediately, enforce egress restrictions, harden messaging and admin endpoints, and prepare a tested upgrade plan with vendor coordination. Assume the advisory’s “no known exploitation” status is transient and monitor for emerging exploit reports; proactive mitigations today reduce the likelihood of having to perform incident response under operational stress tomorrow. (cisa.gov)
(If your environment uses Asset Suite, generate a prioritized remediation ticket today, validate backups and rollback plans, and synchronize with your change control window to accelerate the upgrade to vendor‑recommended builds.)

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Source: CISA Hitachi Energy Asset Suite | CISA