LG Innotek CCTV Authentication Bypass: Unpatched End‑of‑Life Cameras

A newly published U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) advisory warns that an authentication‑bypass flaw in two LG Innotek CCTV models can be exploited remotely to attain administrative access — and that the affected products are end‑of‑life and will not be patched.

Background​

LG Innotek supplies camera modules and CCTV products used across commercial and industrial facilities worldwide. On September 30, 2025, CISA published advisory ICSA‑25‑273‑07 stating that the LG models LND7210 and LNV7210R are affected by an Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel (CWE‑288) vulnerability that has been assigned CVE‑2025‑10538. CISA reports a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.6 and a CVSS v4 base score of 8.8, classifying the issue as remotely exploitable with low attack complexity and with high confidentiality impact. The vulnerability, CISA says, can expose camera information — including user account data — and may allow unauthorized administrative access.
This advisory arrives in a broader context of recurring authentication and remote‑access flaws in networked video and industrial camera devices. Earlier in 2025 CISA issued a separate advisory for another LG Innotek model, the LNV5110R, for a similar authentication‑bypass / remote code execution vector (CVE‑2025‑7742), and multiple security outlets reported on that advisory at the time. Those prior notices underscore that authentication bypasses in camera firmware remain a systemic risk for deployed video systems.

Executive summary (what operators need to know)​

• Affected products: LG LND7210 — all versions, LG LNV7210R — all versions.
• Vulnerability: Authentication bypass (CWE‑288), CVE‑2025‑10538.
• Severity: CVSS v4 = 8.8 (high), CISA notes exploitable remotely and low attack complexity.
• Vendor response: LG Innotek confirmed devices are end‑of‑life and will not receive a patch; users must rely on compensating controls.
• Immediate operator priorities: inventory every LND7210 / LNV7210R in your estate, remove Internet exposure, isolate devices behind firewalls and management VLANs, and place remote access behind hardened jump hosts or VPNs.

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Technical details and verification​

What CISA published​

CISA’s advisory ICSA‑25‑273‑07 explicitly describes an authentication bypass in LND7210 and LNV7210R models and cites CVE‑2025‑10538. The advisory supplies both CVSS v3.1 and v4 vectors and explains that the vulnerability allows a remote actor to obtain camera information including user account information; successful exploitation could escalate to administrative control. CISA lists the vulnerability class as Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel (CWE‑288) and records the advisory as an initial publication on September 30, 2025.

Independent corroboration and context​

CISA is the authoritative publisher of this advisory; its bulletin is the canonical public record for the vulnerability notification. Where possible, independent tracking services — vulnerability aggregators and security publishers — normally mirror or analyze CISA advisories, and previous LG camera advisories (for other model lines such as LNV5110R) were widely reported by security press outlets, which helps establish a pattern of similar firmware issues across LG devices. That pattern is useful when evaluating likely exploit techniques and operational impact, but the technical specifics for CVE‑2025‑10538 are from the CISA advisory itself.
Important note on verification: the CISA advisory is explicit about affected models, CVE assignment, and scoring; third‑party trackers may take time to replicate the new CVE metadata. If additional independent confirmation (for example, a public proof‑of‑concept or a vendor patch advisory) appears after this advisory, operators should cross‑check vendor portals, official CVE registries, and NVD/CIRCL/NIST entries for updates. Where numeric counts of deployed devices are quoted in press pieces for other LG advisories, treat those numbers as researcher estimates unless they appear in vendor or national asset inventories.

Exploitability and expected attack surface​

CISA characterizes the flaw as exploitable remotely with low attack complexity and no required privileges or user interaction. That attack profile means a remote unauthenticated actor with network reachability to the camera’s management endpoints could attempt exploitation. The advisory also shows high confidentiality impact in its CVSS v4 vector, consistent with exposure of account information. These are the attributes that raise the urgency for operators who maintain cameras on poorly segmented networks or with internet visibility.

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Why this is dangerous: practical attack scenarios​

An authentication bypass in a networked camera can be leveraged in multiple operationally damaging ways:

• Administrative takeover — attacker obtains admin access to the web UI or management APIs and changes configurations, disables logging, or creates persistent backdoors. This is the primary confidentiality/integrity risk CISA highlights.
• Camera feed manipulation — tampering with video streams for surveillance evasion (removing a camera from monitoring, replaying older footage). This undermines physical security and incident response.
• Credential harvesting and lateral movement — user data or configuration files exposed by the bypass can reveal credentials reused elsewhere; a compromised camera can be a pivot for internal network access.
• Supply‑chain and pivot uses — attackers can use camera administrative access as a foothold to scan the network, discover management servers, and attempt attacks on more critical assets.

Operational environments that expose camera management interfaces to corporate networks, remote vendor maintenance tunnels, or the public Internet are most at risk; legacy or poorly monitored engineering VLANs are also common targets. This pattern is not unique to LG: similar authentication‑bypass and web UI faults have been tracked across ICS and camera vendors, requiring network‑layer compensations when patching is unavailable.

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Mitigations — prioritized, practical steps (what to do now)​

Because LG Innotek lists the affected models as end‑of‑life and declares they cannot be patched, defenders must assume vulnerability persistence and adopt defense in depth. The following is an operational remediation checklist, ordered by urgency.

Immediate (within 24 hours)​

1. Inventory: Identify every instance of LND7210 and LNV7210R on your network (IP, MAC, location, firmware version). Use asset discovery tools, DHCP logs, and configuration management records.
2. Remove internet exposure: Block any inbound traffic from the Internet to camera management ports. Enforce deny‑by‑default at perimeter firewalls.
3. Isolate: Move cameras to an isolated management VLAN or physically segregated network accessible only by designated engineering hosts and jump servers.
4. Restrict management access: Allow management only from a short list of hardened, patched operator workstations and a monitored jump host (no direct RDP from general user laptops).
5. Disable unused services: Turn off HTTP/RTSP/ONVIF management endpoints where they are not needed for operations or monitoring.

Short term (72 hours – 30 days)​

1. Harden remote access: If remote maintenance is required, force connections through a centralized, logged, and multi‑factor‑authenticated jump host or an up‑to‑date VPN with endpoint posture enforcement.
2. Network controls: Create strict ACLs and firewall rules restricting traffic to and from camera subnets. Deny outbound connections except to required management or ingestion endpoints.
3. Monitoring and detection: Deploy IDS/IPS signatures for unusual HTTP/ONVIF requests, monitor for repeated unauthenticated GET/POST attempts, and log administrative actions for cameras. Increase retention for logs related to camera management.
4. Credential hygiene: Rotate any credentials that might be stored in camera configurations or management servers. Replace shared or default passwords.
5. Incident response preparation: Update playbooks to include camera compromise scenarios, and rehearse containment and eradication procedures.

Longer term (weeks to months)​

1. Replace affected hardware: Plan an asset‑replacement lifecycle for LND7210 / LNV7210R units. Procurement criteria should require continued vendor support and secure‑update mechanisms.
2. Supplier management: Negotiate security‑by‑design and vulnerability‑response SLAs with vendors to prevent future EoL exposures from becoming permanent security holes.
3. Network architecture: Implement micro‑segmentation for physical security devices and centralize video ingestion via hardened NVRs that do not require direct camera UI access from general networks.
4. Continuous validation: Add camera models to vulnerability scanning, asset management, and patch‑tracking systems. Treat camera firmware updates as first‑class components of the security program.

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Detection and hunting guidance​

• Watch for unusual or unauthenticated POST/PUT requests to camera management endpoints and file‑write activity that writes to nonvolatile storage.
• Monitor for sudden changes to camera configuration, disabled logging, or unexpected reboots.
• Correlate any camera‑side admin actions with source IPs; if management host IPs are outside expected ranges, escalate immediately.
• Hunt for lateral movement originating from camera subnets — e.g., unexpected SMB/SSH/HTTP connections to internal hosts.
• Add cameras to security monitoring dashboards and set alerts for configuration changes and failed authentication floods.

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Critical assessment: vendor response, strengths, and risks​

Strengths in public handling​

• The advisory provides clear, machine‑readable metadata (CVE assignment and CVSS vectors) and names the researcher (Souvik Kandar), which supports coordinated disclosure and operational triage. That level of transparency is valuable to defenders.
• CISA’s advisory includes a list of practical mitigations and calls for immediate defensive measures; it follows established ICS/IoT guidance around isolation and segmentation, which aligns with industry best practice.

Major weaknesses and real risks​

• End‑of‑life / no patch — LG Innotek’s statement that these models can no longer be patched is the single most consequential risk factor. For widely deployed devices, EoL without remediation forces long‑term reliance on human and network compensating controls — controls that are often inconsistently applied and can fail under staff turnover or misconfiguration. This situation substantially raises residual risk.
• High impact, remote exploitability — the combination of remote attack vector, low complexity, and high confidentiality impact increases the likelihood of weaponization, automated scanning, and opportunistic exploitation. CISA notes no known public exploitation at publication time, but that absence is not a durable guarantee.
• Operational friction — replacing cameras in production facilities involves cost, procurement cycles, and potential downtime. Organizations constrained by budget or site access will have to accept elevated risk for longer periods while deploying compensating controls.

Broader industry implications​

This advisory is consistent with a recurring industry pattern: legacy or low‑cost embedded devices are left in the field beyond vendor support lifetimes, and vulnerabilities discovered in such devices can remain exploitable indefinitely if owners do not replace hardware. For industrial control and commercial facilities — where cameras may be integrated with safety and operational systems — this creates material risk that extends beyond privacy concerns. The pragmatic answer requires both short‑term defensive hardening and long‑term procurement policy changes that prioritize secure lifecycles.

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Practical replacement and procurement guidance​

• Treat end‑of‑life cameras as replace‑as‑soon‑as‑feasible assets. Prioritize replacements for cameras that are Internet‑accessible or reside on flat networks bridging business and operational segments.
• When procuring replacements, require: signed firmware updates, secure boot/firmware integrity checks, vendor vulnerability disclosure policy, and a minimum support lifecycle.
• Consider consolidating video ingestion through hardened network video recorders (NVRs) that can provide centralized authentication and reduce direct management exposure for cameras.
• Budget for scheduled device refresh cycles and include firmware maintenance costs in total cost of ownership rather than treating cameras as disposable.

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What defenders should communicate internally​

• Brief operations, facilities, and executive teams on the unpatchable nature of these two camera models and the consequent need to treat them as high‑risk assets.
• Document mitigations applied, timeline for replacement, and acceptance of residual risk if replacement cannot be immediate. Maintain an auditable record of compensating controls (firewall rules, jump host access lists, rotation of credentials).
• Coordinate with physical security teams to map camera coverage changes that may result from isolation or replacement activities.

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Final analysis and outlook​

CISA’s ICSA‑25‑273‑07 advisory establishes a clear operational problem: an authentication bypass in LND7210 and LNV7210R models with high severity and no vendor patch due to end‑of‑life status. The practical consequence is that defenders must treat these devices as permanently vulnerable until replaced and must apply layered, compensating controls to reduce exposure. The technical scoring (CVSS v3.1 = 8.6; CVSS v4 = 8.8) and CISA’s classification of remote exploitability and low attack complexity mean that the window for exploitability is real and actionable.
Historically, similar camera and ICS device vulnerabilities have been quickly weaponized once public details circulated; the immediate defensive posture should emphasize inventory, isolation, monitoring, and a prioritized replacement plan. Where vendor support is unavailable, the only durable mitigation is removing or replacing the vulnerable hardware and redesigning network architecture to minimize direct management exposure. The combination of transparent disclosure by the researcher and decisive operational controls by asset owners offers the most practicable path to reduce the risk posed by these unpatchable devices.

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Appendix — quick checklist (one‑page handout for IT/OT ops)​

• Inventory LND7210 / LNV7210R devices (IPs, locations).
• Block Internet access to camera management ports.
• Move cameras to isolated VLANs/jump‑host only access.
• Restrict management to hardened, monitored operator workstations.
• Rotate any credentials exposed or stored in camera backups.
• Enable verbose logging on camera management traffic; retain logs for extended period.
• Deploy IDS/IPS rules to detect unauthenticated management access patterns.
• Plan and budget for replacement of EoL cameras; require secure update and lifecycle terms in procurement.

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This advisory should be treated as urgent operational intelligence: apply the network controls and monitoring described above immediately, and begin a procurement and replacement plan for affected cameras without delay.

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Source: CISA LG Innotek Camera Multiple Models | CISA