Linux Kernel Fix: NULL Pointer Dereference in Aspeed LPC Snoop (CVE-2025-38145)

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A small defensive check landed in the upstream Linux kernel in mid‑2025 that closes a straightforward but dangerous NULL‑pointer dereference in the Aspeed LPC snoop helper — a fix that should be treated as a high‑priority stability update for systems that run Aspeed-based SoCs or BMC firmware.

Glowing blue circuit board featuring an ASPEED SOC chip and code icons.Background​

Aspeed System-on-Chip (SoC) families are a common choice for baseboard management controllers (BMCs) and other embedded management functions in servers, appliances, and network devices. Those SoCs expose features such as LPC (Low Pin Count) snooping that allow system firmware or platform code to observe LPC bus activity for debugging, bridging, or security-monitoring purposes.
The Linux kernel driver for Aspeed’s LPC snoop functionality contains a function named aspeed_lpc_enable_snoop(). In its original form the function called devm_kasprintf() to build a small, formatted string and then proceeded to use the returned pointer without checking whether the allocation had succeeded. If devm_kasprintf() returned NULL (for example, when the kernel was under memory pressure), the unchecked pointer dereference led to a kernel oops — an immediate availability failure for the affected host. The issue is tracked as CVE‑2025‑38145 and was fixed by adding a proper NULL check and short‑circuit cleanup in the error path.
Why this matters beyond a single bug: kernel NULL dereferences are not merely nuisance warnings. They almost always cause immediate kernel warnings, oopses, or panics, and therefore create a reliable Denial‑of‑Service vector for local or adjacent attackers; in embedded or multi‑tenant contexts that can be operationally catastrophic. The fix is small and conservative — exactly the kind of micro‑defensive coding that prevents trivial crash primitives from being weaponized.

What exactly was wrong​

The root cause in simple terms​

  • The code used devm_kasprintf() to allocate and format a string.
  • There was no check for the allocation returning NULL.
  • If the allocation failed, later code dereferenced the NULL pointer and crashed the kernel.
This pattern is classic kernel defensive hygiene failure: kernel-side formatting helpers (like devm_kasprintf()) can return NULL on allocation failure, and every call site must validate the return value before use. The upstream patch adds that validation and properly unwinds resources if the allocation fails.

Why the bug is reliably impactful​

A NULL pointer dereference in kernel context is almost always fatal to the current execution path and frequently leads to an oops or panic. This leads to:
  • Immediate service interruption for whichever subsystem the kernel is handling.
  • Potential repeated crashes if the same code path can be retriggered by a local process or an automated script.
  • In embedded or appliance contexts (BMCs, management NICs, SoC devices) — where Aspeed chips are common — the crash can render administrative access unusable until the device is rebooted or the offending module is unloaded.
Multiple vulnerability trackers assigned a medium base severity (CVSS v3.1 ~5.5) with the principal impact being Availability (A:H) and an attack vector of Local; exploitability is straightforward when attackers have the ability to trigger the path that calls aspeed_lpc_enable_snoop(). EPSS and exploit telemetry are low for this CVE, but that does not reduce the operational urgency of patching devices that rely on Aspeed code paths.

The upstream fix (technical summary)​

The upstream patch authored by Henry Martin adds a defensive NULL check immediately after the devm_kasprintf() call and improves error‑path cleanup so that partially allocated resources are released in all failure cases. The patch message explicitly references the original feature commit that introduced the Aspeed LPC snoop chardev and calls out Fixes: 3772e5da4454. Later patch revisions also tightened cleanup (ensuring kfifo and miscdevice resources are released properly on error).
Key changes introduced by the patch:
  • Add a check for devm_kasprintf() returning NULL.
  • If allocation fails, release any resources that were allocated earlier in the function.
  • Ensure the misc device and any kfifo used by the code are torn down on error to avoid resource leaks or dangling pointers.
This is intentionally minimal and low‑risk: functionally it only stops the code from dereferencing a NULL pointer and avoids leaking kernel objects. Those kinds of fixes are easy to backport and safe for stable trees, which is why patch authors target them first.

Who is affected​

  • Any Linux kernel build that includes the Aspeed SOC LPC snoop driver and the vulnerable commit range.
  • Typical targets include: BMCs in servers, hardware management appliances, embedded platforms using Aspeed AST series chips, and OEM images that embed upstream kernel drivers without vendor backports.
  • General‑purpose desktop and server distributions that do not include the Aspeed LPC snoop driver or do not instantiate the device at runtime are unlikely to be affected.
Vendors and distribution trackers (Debian, Amazon Linux, Oracle Linux, Ubuntu and others) listed the CVE and produced advisories or backports for affected kernel packages; cloud vendors have also annotated their images. If you run appliances or OEM devices, confirm whether the vendor’s kernel includes the affected driver and whether a patched kernel package or firmware image has been published.

Exploitability, threat model, and real‑world risk​

Attack prerequisites​

  • Local code execution or the ability to trigger kernel code paths that call aspeed_lpc_enable_snoop().
  • Low privileges are often sufficient; the vulnerable code is in a kernel driver that may be reached from kernel threads handling device registration, sysfs/chardev interactions, or platform probe/unbind flows.

What an attacker can do​

  • Force a kernel oops or panic by invoking the driver path that calls aspeed_lpc_enable_snoop() when kernel memory allocation fails. This yields a reliable Denial‑of‑Service against the host until it is rebooted or the offending mechanism is disabled. Such a DoS can be sustained if the attacker can repeat the triggering sequence.

How likely is weaponization?​

Public EPSS and exploit telemetry for CVE‑2025‑38145 are low, which aligns with other kernel robustness defects that are more likely to be used for denial‑of‑service rather than remote code execution. However:
  • In managed, multi‑tenant, or appliance contexts — especially where Aspeed BMCs expose management interfaces to untrusted networks — the relative risk increases.
  • Even absent public PoC exploit code, the simplicity of the root cause (missing NULL check) means that attackers with local access can craft crash triggers without complains.

Detection and monitoring guidance​

Detection focuses on kernel logs and runtime evidence of driver errors:
  • Monitor dmesg and system journal for messages that include "NULL pointer deref" or stack traces referencing aspeed_lpc_enable_snoop or related Aspeed LPC snoop functions.
  • Watch for unexplained kernel oot, BMC probe/unbind events, or when platform device driver binding/unbinding occurs.
  • If you have fleet telemetry, add a simple pattern alert for kernel oops strings and aggregate crash counts per host so you can triage appliances that are repeatedly failing.
Practical commands and checks (examples you can add to runbooks):
  • Confirm the running kernel version: uname -a
  • Check for Aspeed driver presence: lsmod | grep -i aspeed
  • Look for crash evidence: journalctl -k --no-pager | grep -i -E "aspeed|snoop|NULL pointer deref|oops"
Note: the exact module name and dmesg text can vary by kernel version; search for “aspeed” and “lpc” terms broadly when hunting.

Mitigation and remediation​

The only correct fix: install vendor-supplied kernel updates​

  • Apply kernel packages from your OS vendor that include the upstream stable patch. Major distributions and vendors have issued advisories and backports (Debian, Oracle/UEK, Amazon Linux, and others). Confirm the package identifiers and fixed versions in your vendor advisory and schedule kernel updates accordingly.
ions when immediate patching is impossible
  • Restrict local access to BMC or management interfaces so untrusted users/processes cannot exercise device probe/unbind and chardev interactions.
  • If practical and safe for your environment, disable the Aspeed LPC snoop facility by blacklisting the module or disabling the kernel config that enables it; note this may remove legitimate functionality and should be tested before wide deployment.
  • Isolate vulnerable appliances to management VLANs or behind firewall rules to prevent adjacent attackers from triggering the code path.
Short‑term mitigations reduce exposure but do not remove the underlying defect. The patched kernel remains the definitive remediation.

How to verify the fix is present​

  • Check vendor advisory and patched package version numbers. Vendors typically map upstream stable commits to their package builds — use this mapping as the authoritative indicator for your distribution. Oracle and other vendors published specific errata that map the CVE to ELSA or kernel-uek packages.
  • Confirm the kernel tree contains the defensive change. Upstream commit messages and LKML threads reference the exact patch and Fixes tag (Fixes: 3772e5da4454). If your environment allows it, compare your kernel’s changelog or commit list against the upstream stable commit that introduced the NULL check.
  • Validate at runtime by reproducing the prior crash condition in a safe staging environment (if you have a controlled reprodng to the patched kernel, the same trigger should no longer produce a NULL dereference or kernel oops.
Checklist for operations teams:
  • Inventory devices that include Aspeed SoCs (BMCs, OEM appliances).
  • Query which kernel builds are running on those devices.
  • Cross‑reference the running build with vendor advisories (look for mention of CVE‑2025‑38145 or the upstream Fixes: commit).
  • Schedule and deploy kernel updates, then reboot into the patched kernel.

Broader lessons — why tiny kernel fixes matter​

  • Kernel drivers for SoCs and BMCs run with high privileges and are ubiquitous in datacenter management stacks; small defensive omissions (like a missing NULL check) create very low-effort attack primitives with outsized operational impact. ility‑critical fixes.
  • The fix here is intentionally minimal and safe to backport. That pattern — target surgical defensive checks — is the right approach for stable trees and vendor kernels since it minimizes regression risk while closing high‑leverage crash vectors. Upstream maintainers and distributors largely followed this approach for CVE‑2025‑38145.
  • Inventory and artifact-level verification matter. Big vendors ship many kernel artifacts; a single upstream fix doesn’t mean every vendor image is safe. Operators must verify the patch presence in their specific images and kernels rather than assume all images from a vendor are automatically fixed. This operational discipline is critical for embedded devices and long‑lived appliances.

Recommended action plan (operational checklist)​

  • Identify all systems that may run Aspeed LPC snoop code (BMCs, OEM appliances, dedicated management servers).
  • For each system:
  • Record kernel version and build metadata (uname -r, package info).
  • Check vendor advisories for CVE‑2025‑38145 and map to fixed package identifiers.
  • Prioritize patching for systems exposed to untrusted local users, multi‑tenant hosts, or management networks accessible to adjacent attackers.
  • Test patched kernels in staging; verify absence of the prior crash symptoms under representative workloads.
  • Deploy patches per change control; reboot hosts where required to load the updated kernel module.
  • If immediate patching is impossible, apply short‑term controls: restrict access, isolate devices on management networks, or disable the snoop facility where safe.
  • Monitor kernel logs and fleet telemetry for residual crashes, and verify remediation by observing the absence of new aspeed‑related oopses.

Fiappraisal​

CVE‑2025‑38145 is a textbook example of a small coding omission that yields a reliable availability impact. The vulnerability is neither sophisticated nor subtle — it is a missing NULL check on devm_kasprintf() that allows an attacker with local access (or the ability to induce the relevant probe/unbind sequence) to trigger a kernel oops. Because the fix is tiny and non‑disruptive, vendors and distributions have already incorporated it into stable backports and advisories; operations teams should treat this CVE as a routine but important kernel upgrade.
Two broader operational points are worth emphasizing:
  • Embedded and vendor‑pinned kernels have the longest remediation tails. Appliances and BMC firmware often lag distribution kernels; track vendor errata closely and push updates to hardware that expose management planes to untrusted networks.
  • Even low‑EPSS, availability‑only CVEs deserve rapid attention in multi‑tenant or critical infrastructure ash can cascade into management plane outages and service downtime; the simplicity of the trigger increases the real‑world risk for appliances widely deployed in datacenter fleets.
Apply the vendor patches, verify the patch presence in your images, and add the relevant kernel oops strings to your log monitoring so you can detect any unpatched hosts. The fix is straightforward — treating it as a low‑priority item would be an avoidable operational risk.

Conclusion: CVE‑2025‑38145 is a small, remediable kernel robustness bug whose principal consequence is denial of availability. The patch is minimal and safe; operators should update affected kernels, verify vendor ship‑lists for embedded devices, and harden access to management interfaces until all fleet artifacts are confirmed patched.

Source: MSRC Security Update Guide - Microsoft Security Response Center
 

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