In a newly issued advisory, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has put multinational enterprises and IT professionals on high alert following a series of attacks specifically targeting Commvault’s Microsoft Azure-hosted environment. This warning, published just as threat actors ramp up campaigns against software-as-a-service (SaaS) cloud applications, exposes critical risks that resonate throughout the broader SaaS world, notably concerning default configurations and privileged access abuses.
Commvault, a global leader in cloud data protection and enterprise backup, began closely monitoring cyber threat activity aimed at its Azure infrastructure. According to CISA’s assessment, the incursion fits a wider pattern: attackers cast a wide net against SaaS applications with misconfigured permissions and excess privileges. These attackers have targeted not just user credentials but elevated, non-human accounts—service principals and automated backups—that, if compromised, could give threat actors the keys to companies’ most sensitive data.
CISA’s advisory urges security teams to scrutinize Microsoft Entra (formerly Azure Active Directory) audit logs for any unauthorized additions or modifications to credentials in service principals—actions often linked to backup apps similar to those used by Commvault. This recommendation highlights a perennial cloud security issue: powerful, automated identities are both essential for modern IT operations and irresistible targets for malicious actors.
This is not the first incident to underscore the dangers of trust-based authentication models and weak, default configurations within major cloud platforms. Historically, many high-profile breaches have shared these characteristics: misconfigured cloud resources, unattended elevated privileges, and an assumption of benign intent behind every automated process.
“By their very nature, these non-human identities often need to be privileged to access large amounts of data to back it up, perform analysis, and enable business processes. This makes them highly-prized targets for attackers who know they are likely overprivileged and under monitored,” Maude explains. This risk compounds rather than dissipates as organizations migrate more workloads and data to the cloud, making the attack surface both more complex and more opaque.
In the case of Commvault’s Azure environment, attackers exploited exactly these vectors. CISA’s guidance—careful log monitoring, suspicious login detection, and swift incident response—are now standard best practices, but many organizations are still slow to operationalize them, often overwhelmed by alert fatigue and the pace of cloud adoption.
This trend is reinforced by other breaches in recent memory. For instance, a 2024 compromise of a major U.S. healthcare cloud provider similarly hinged on weakly protected service principals. The attackers never needed to break multifactor authentication or brute-force passwords; a single, poorly-audited machine account gave them the access they needed.
Security operation centers (SOCs) are thus advised to treat any deviation—unexpected credential changes, unusual volume of backup or data export activity, logins outside typical schedules—as grounds for immediate investigation. Yet, as CISA’s guidance shows, too many organizations lack real-time visibility into these events, and SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) platforms are often not tuned for the nuanced behaviors of non-human actors.
Adams’ critique rings true across the SaaS sector: default trust models are out of step with adversaries’ sophistication. Cloud providers often market simplicity and agility at the expense of deeply embedded security controls, and customer organizations are not always aware of the risks this entails until after a breach.
James Maude expands on this, noting, “The entire cloud ecosystem depends on trust-based models, but as we’ve seen time and again, trust requires validation. Otherwise, privilege quickly becomes vulnerability.”
This marks a shift from past years' more guarded disclosures, wherein vendors were hesitant to highlight weaknesses in SaaS deployments or their own platforms. The new approach, rooted in collaboration and transparency, is one of the few reliable countermeasures against increasingly collaborative attackers.
Modern threat actors have demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of SaaS and cloud service architectures, consistently leveraging any gap between trust and verification. CISA’s latest advisory, underpinned by candid analysis from the security sector, confirms that the industry’s weakest link is now the silent, automated agents running behind the scenes.
Proactive security in the SaaS age demands vigilance not only over people but over every process, account, and interaction encoded into the digital enterprise. Those who act now—investing in visibility, validation, and minimization of cloud-wide privileges—stand the best chance of resisting the next inevitable wave of attacks. Those who wait, clinging to legacy security models, risk becoming headlines in the rapidly evolving world of cloud-driven compromise.
Source: SC Media CISA warns of attacks on Commvault’s Microsoft Azure environment
Anatomy of the Threat: What Happened Inside Azure?
Commvault, a global leader in cloud data protection and enterprise backup, began closely monitoring cyber threat activity aimed at its Azure infrastructure. According to CISA’s assessment, the incursion fits a wider pattern: attackers cast a wide net against SaaS applications with misconfigured permissions and excess privileges. These attackers have targeted not just user credentials but elevated, non-human accounts—service principals and automated backups—that, if compromised, could give threat actors the keys to companies’ most sensitive data.CISA’s advisory urges security teams to scrutinize Microsoft Entra (formerly Azure Active Directory) audit logs for any unauthorized additions or modifications to credentials in service principals—actions often linked to backup apps similar to those used by Commvault. This recommendation highlights a perennial cloud security issue: powerful, automated identities are both essential for modern IT operations and irresistible targets for malicious actors.
SaaS Environments: The Undeniable Achilles’ Heel
According to Nic Adams, CEO and co-founder of security firm 0rcus, the infrastructure that powers SaaS—celebrated for its scalability and flexibility—can be dangerously brittle. “The industry’s obsession with endpoint agents and EDR leaves entire SaaS ecosystems wide open: misconfigurations, overprivileged service principals, and leaky API integrations are free money for adversaries,” Adams warns. He paints a picture of a sector preoccupied with securing endpoints, while the complexities and blind spots of SaaS infrastructure go under-monitored and under-protected.This is not the first incident to underscore the dangers of trust-based authentication models and weak, default configurations within major cloud platforms. Historically, many high-profile breaches have shared these characteristics: misconfigured cloud resources, unattended elevated privileges, and an assumption of benign intent behind every automated process.
The Perils of Overprivileged Service Principals
One of the most disconcerting aspects of the CISA advisory is the focus on so-called “service principals”—automated, non-human identities used by applications, backup services, or automated scripts to interact with cloud resources. According to James Maude, Field CTO at BeyondTrust, these identities are double-edged swords. On one hand, they underpin vital automated operations; on the other, they often wield broad, scarcely-monitored power within the cloud ecosystem.“By their very nature, these non-human identities often need to be privileged to access large amounts of data to back it up, perform analysis, and enable business processes. This makes them highly-prized targets for attackers who know they are likely overprivileged and under monitored,” Maude explains. This risk compounds rather than dissipates as organizations migrate more workloads and data to the cloud, making the attack surface both more complex and more opaque.
From Misconfiguration to Exploitation: A Systemic Flaw
The attack surface for SaaS platforms isn’t merely theoretical. CISA and multiple industry experts highlight that default settings, especially in rapid cloud deployments, often leave critical audit and access controls inert. The convenience of “plug-and-play” comes at a price: unvetted privileges, wide-open API endpoints, and the ability for attackers to escalate from initial access to enterprise-wide compromise.In the case of Commvault’s Azure environment, attackers exploited exactly these vectors. CISA’s guidance—careful log monitoring, suspicious login detection, and swift incident response—are now standard best practices, but many organizations are still slow to operationalize them, often overwhelmed by alert fatigue and the pace of cloud adoption.
Table: Common SaaS Security Pitfalls
| Pitfall | Description | Consequence |
|---|---|---|
| Default Configurations | Cloud apps left running with default settings | Easier for attackers to exploit |
| Overprivileged Service Principals | Automated accounts with excessive permissions | Broad unauthorized data access |
| Weak API Security | Insufficient controls on machine-to-machine communication | Data leaks or service manipulation |
| Poor Log Management | Failure to monitor logins and credential changes systematically | Attacks go unnoticed |
| Inconsistent Human vs. Non-Human Controls | Stricter controls for user accounts, lax controls for automated | Non-human identities as attack path |
From Commvault to Cloud-Wide Concern: Is This a Trend?
The incident with Commvault is not isolated. Over the past year, there has been a marked uptick in attacks on SaaS platforms, targeting cloud storage providers, collaboration suites, and backup services across sectors. Research from Gartner and recent findings from Microsoft’s own Security Response Center confirm that attackers are increasingly turning to machine identities—service principals, API tokens, automated scripts—as these often lack the rigorous oversight imposed on traditional human logins.This trend is reinforced by other breaches in recent memory. For instance, a 2024 compromise of a major U.S. healthcare cloud provider similarly hinged on weakly protected service principals. The attackers never needed to break multifactor authentication or brute-force passwords; a single, poorly-audited machine account gave them the access they needed.
Critical Challenges: Detection and Response
Unlike human users, whose logins and activity can be correlated with shifts in behavior or business context, machine identities often operate in the background—24/7, mostly unmonitored, and with limited audit trails. Attackers leveraging these identities can blend in with legitimate automation, making detection far harder.Security operation centers (SOCs) are thus advised to treat any deviation—unexpected credential changes, unusual volume of backup or data export activity, logins outside typical schedules—as grounds for immediate investigation. Yet, as CISA’s guidance shows, too many organizations lack real-time visibility into these events, and SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) platforms are often not tuned for the nuanced behaviors of non-human actors.
Critical Recommendations from CISA
- Monitor Service Principal Modifications: Regularly scan Microsoft Entra logs for additions or changes to credentials and permissions related to backup applications.
- Correlate Login Patterns: Flag logins that don’t align with normal business hours or established schedules for automated processes.
- Audit and Reduce Privileges: Strictly limit the scope and power of service principal accounts to the bare minimum necessary for their operations.
- Enforce Strong API Controls: Secure all machine-to-machine communications with robust authentication and endpoint validation.
Industry Perspective: Where Are the Gaps?
The consensus among security professionals is that while human risk management has advanced—thanks to multi-factor authentication (MFA), just-in-time access requests, and extensive onboarding checks—machine risk remains underappreciated. Gartner’s 2025 Cloud Security Outlook stresses that more than 60% of cloud-related breaches in the past two years involved automated, non-human identities.Adams’ critique rings true across the SaaS sector: default trust models are out of step with adversaries’ sophistication. Cloud providers often market simplicity and agility at the expense of deeply embedded security controls, and customer organizations are not always aware of the risks this entails until after a breach.
James Maude expands on this, noting, “The entire cloud ecosystem depends on trust-based models, but as we’ve seen time and again, trust requires validation. Otherwise, privilege quickly becomes vulnerability.”
Strengths: Commvault’s and CISA’s Transparency
Despite the severity of the incident, Commvault’s openness in working with CISA and informing the wider industry is commendable. Rapid disclosure and actionable advice—rather than quiet cleanup—allow sector-wide improvements and help prevent subsequent breaches. Similarly, CISA’s advisory is both practical and timely, emphasizing real-world steps over theoretical solutions.This marks a shift from past years' more guarded disclosures, wherein vendors were hesitant to highlight weaknesses in SaaS deployments or their own platforms. The new approach, rooted in collaboration and transparency, is one of the few reliable countermeasures against increasingly collaborative attackers.
Weaknesses: Endemic Problems in SaaS Security
Still, this episode lays bare serious, recurring weaknesses:- Visibility Gaps: Many organizations lack unified, real-time monitoring across their SaaS portfolios, particularly for service principals and machine accounts.
- Cultural Blind Spots: Security teams prioritize “user” risk over “system/process” risk, underinvesting in policies for the latter.
- Vendor Default Shortcomings: Out-of-the-box configurations remain too permissive, insufficiently securing new deployments.
The Road Ahead: Mitigating Machine Identity Risk
To stem the tide of SaaS-targeted attacks, experts suggest a four-pronged approach:- Inventory All Service Principals: Maintain up-to-date records of every non-human identity in use, cataloging scope, purpose, and privilege.
- Apply Least Privilege Everywhere: Regularly review and narrow permissions so each service principal can do nothing more—and nothing less—than its assigned task.
- Adopt Behavioral Analytics: Implement tools capable of “learning” what normal looks like for each automated process, alerting on any anomaly.
- Enforce Automated Key Rotation: Reduce the shelf-life of secrets, API tokens, and credentials to limit the window of opportunity for attackers.
Conclusion: A Call to Action for the SaaS Era
The attacks against Commvault’s Azure environment—while not yet confirmed to have led to data loss or customer impact—serve as a wake-up call for everyone invested in digital transformation. As more mission-critical business functions shift to the cloud, organizations must rethink their approach to machine identity, privilege management, and continuous monitoring.Modern threat actors have demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of SaaS and cloud service architectures, consistently leveraging any gap between trust and verification. CISA’s latest advisory, underpinned by candid analysis from the security sector, confirms that the industry’s weakest link is now the silent, automated agents running behind the scenes.
Proactive security in the SaaS age demands vigilance not only over people but over every process, account, and interaction encoded into the digital enterprise. Those who act now—investing in visibility, validation, and minimization of cloud-wide privileges—stand the best chance of resisting the next inevitable wave of attacks. Those who wait, clinging to legacy security models, risk becoming headlines in the rapidly evolving world of cloud-driven compromise.
Source: SC Media CISA warns of attacks on Commvault’s Microsoft Azure environment
