When most people think about air travel, they picture sleek jets cutting through clouds, satellite-guided navigation, and the kind of advanced technology that seems to belong more to the future than the past. What virtually no one pictures is a 30-year-old operating system—Windows 95—quietly but crucially guiding the planes above our heads. Yet, as revealed during a recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) budget hearing, that’s been the reality for America’s airspace. While the news may evoke nostalgia for some, it also points to an unsettling reality: critical infrastructure in the United States, and indeed around the world, often relies on software that debuted when the internet was a curiosity and floppy disks were king.
The FAA, responsible for the safe oversight of the nation’s airspace, announced its plan to phase out Windows 95 from its air traffic control systems with unequivocal urgency. “The whole idea is to replace the system. No more floppy disks or paper strips,” explained Chris Rocheleau, FAA’s acting administrator, during the budget hearing. The “paper strips” Rocheleau referenced are not relic props from a retro museum, but rather pieces of cover stock that carry mission-critical flight details—handwritten or printed—like plane types and scheduled takeoff times. It’s a system with origins in an era when AM radio was more advanced than most consumer technology.
The revelation might sound surreal, but for those familiar with the deep roots of Microsoft Windows in global infrastructure, it’s hardly an anomaly. According to industry evaluations and government reports, the FAA is not alone in its dependency on legacy platforms; much of the world’s technology backbone, from medical imaging to bank ATMs, still runs on outmoded, unsupported Windows operating systems.
The FAA’s own 2023 evaluation made this painfully clear: over one-third of the U.S. air traffic control systems were found to be unsupportable for the long term, with many already exhibiting signs of failure. These aren’t just dashboard computers—they’re the central nervous system for all commercial, cargo, and private aviation above the United States.
The intimidating cost is at the heart of the issue. Former FAA administrator Michael Huerta candidly described it: “At its core, it’s a money problem. The FAA has been asked to do more with less, essentially.” Maintaining aging hardware and software accounts for one of the largest expenditures in the FAA’s budget. Every dollar spent holding the creaking infrastructure together is a dollar not being put toward transformative modernization.
Yet, proposals to consolidate and upgrade the air traffic network—such as reducing the number of control facilities from the current 21 to a more streamlined, technology-driven footprint—have historically run into political headwinds. As Michael Huerta notes, decommissioning any facility inevitably encounters resistance from members of Congress concerned about jobs and federal funds in their districts. “Everyone who is familiar with the air traffic system recognizes that we probably don’t need the number of facilities which were built at a time when technology was very different,” he said, yet acknowledged that local politics can make rational consolidation difficult.
The FAA’s increasingly chronic maintenance woes raise questions not only about efficiency, but about resilience in the face of cyber threats. The longer the system remains tethered to an unsupported platform, the greater the risk that a vulnerability could one day compromise flight operations or, at worst, safety.
Notably, the plans for the 21 existing facilities have yet to be publicly detailed. Industry observers, including Huerta, point to consolidation as a likely next step. Fewer, more technologically advanced centers could manage larger volumes of air traffic with greater efficiency, but any moves toward closure will likely continue facing stiff opposition from local lawmakers and their constituents.
Upgrades are frequently delayed because downtime is impossible (consider the cost of taking a hospital’s MRI network offline, or suspending national air traffic). Hardware dependencies, regulatory constraints, and the sheer scale of rewiring decades-old workflows all contribute to glacial progress.
There is, however, a degree of tension: Microsoft benefits from pervasive legacy reliance, yet its brand is tied to the reliability and security of platforms the company would rather see retired. Every high-profile failure or vulnerability that traces its origin to an old version of Windows carries reputational risk for Redmond—something it tries to mitigate by pushing periodic modernization campaigns.
But this approach is rapidly reaching a point of diminishing returns. Components become harder to source, skillsets wane as veteran engineers retire, and each passing year widens the chasm between what’s possible and what’s practical. Add in the growing cyber threat landscape, and the risks soon outweigh the comfort of familiarity.
That said, a “big bang” upgrade—overhauling everything all at once—carries its own perils. Large technology projects, especially in government, are notorious for overruns, unforeseen technical debt, and organizational resistance. The FAA’s plan must therefore strike a delicate balance: replacing what’s outdated and dangerous, while maintaining operational continuity and accountability.
If it succeeds, the rewards are enormous: safer skies, lower operational costs, increased efficiency for airlines (and thus passengers), and a template for how the world’s most complex technology infrastructure can be responsibly and securely rebuilt. But if it fails—or if upgrades are endlessly delayed—the risks escalate, from minor outages to potential catastrophes that could have been prevented.
For now, the sky’s grid still glows dimly with the light of ancient code, and Microsoft, for better or worse, remains at the center of this hidden backbone of civilization. The real question, at the heart of the FAA’s modernization push, is how long we can keep flying on legacy—and when we’ll finally invest what’s necessary to ensure our future is as secure as our past has proven to be.
Source: Windows Central The FAA still uses Windows 95 and floppy disks for air traffic control, but that's changing
A Surprising Legacy: Windows 95 at the Heart of American Airspace
The FAA, responsible for the safe oversight of the nation’s airspace, announced its plan to phase out Windows 95 from its air traffic control systems with unequivocal urgency. “The whole idea is to replace the system. No more floppy disks or paper strips,” explained Chris Rocheleau, FAA’s acting administrator, during the budget hearing. The “paper strips” Rocheleau referenced are not relic props from a retro museum, but rather pieces of cover stock that carry mission-critical flight details—handwritten or printed—like plane types and scheduled takeoff times. It’s a system with origins in an era when AM radio was more advanced than most consumer technology.The revelation might sound surreal, but for those familiar with the deep roots of Microsoft Windows in global infrastructure, it’s hardly an anomaly. According to industry evaluations and government reports, the FAA is not alone in its dependency on legacy platforms; much of the world’s technology backbone, from medical imaging to bank ATMs, still runs on outmoded, unsupported Windows operating systems.
Why Is Outdated Software Still Running Our Skies?
The persistence of Windows 95 in such mission-critical contexts is not a sign of negligence. The challenge of replacing it is immense, both technically and financially. Modernizing these systems is akin to swapping the engine of an airplane mid-flight. For decades, the FAA has managed to keep legacy systems running—largely because the alternatives are staggeringly costly and require unprecedented levels of coordination.The FAA’s own 2023 evaluation made this painfully clear: over one-third of the U.S. air traffic control systems were found to be unsupportable for the long term, with many already exhibiting signs of failure. These aren’t just dashboard computers—they’re the central nervous system for all commercial, cargo, and private aviation above the United States.
The intimidating cost is at the heart of the issue. Former FAA administrator Michael Huerta candidly described it: “At its core, it’s a money problem. The FAA has been asked to do more with less, essentially.” Maintaining aging hardware and software accounts for one of the largest expenditures in the FAA’s budget. Every dollar spent holding the creaking infrastructure together is a dollar not being put toward transformative modernization.
The Political Calculus of Modernization
While the technical and financial obstacles are significant, the political ones may prove just as difficult to overcome. Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy characterized air traffic control modernization as “the most important infrastructure project that we’ve had in this country for decades,” pointing to a rare consensus across the political aisle.Yet, proposals to consolidate and upgrade the air traffic network—such as reducing the number of control facilities from the current 21 to a more streamlined, technology-driven footprint—have historically run into political headwinds. As Michael Huerta notes, decommissioning any facility inevitably encounters resistance from members of Congress concerned about jobs and federal funds in their districts. “Everyone who is familiar with the air traffic system recognizes that we probably don’t need the number of facilities which were built at a time when technology was very different,” he said, yet acknowledged that local politics can make rational consolidation difficult.
The Hidden Risks: Old Software in Critical Systems
Running airspace on aging Windows technology isn’t just a financial or political liability—it’s a clear security and safety concern. Legacy operating systems, particularly those no longer supported with security updates from Microsoft, are prime targets for cybercriminals. Flaws that are well-understood in today’s security discourse—buffer overflows, privilege escalation bugs, and remote code execution vulnerabilities—are often left unpatched in outdated platforms. And the aviation sector is not immune to the rising tide of cyberattacks that threaten everything from hospitals to public utilities.The FAA’s increasingly chronic maintenance woes raise questions not only about efficiency, but about resilience in the face of cyber threats. The longer the system remains tethered to an unsupported platform, the greater the risk that a vulnerability could one day compromise flight operations or, at worst, safety.
Why Not Just “Upgrade Windows”?
At first glance, the question seems obvious—why not just update to a newer version of Windows or switch platforms entirely? The answer is multifaceted:- Custom Software: The air traffic systems in use today often rely on highly specialized custom software written decades ago. This software may be dependent on quirks or undocumented behavior in Windows 95, making migration an extremely complex endeavor.
- Certified Hardware: Critical systems are certified for reliability and accuracy. Changing even one hardware component or software routine requires meticulous testing and regulatory re-certification—a process measured in years, not months.
- Real-Time Constraints: Air traffic control depends on real-time decision-making and extremely high reliability. Mainstream consumer operating systems, even modern ones, are not designed with the same deterministic priorities as these bespoke systems.
- Interdependent Legacy Systems: The rest of the technical ecosystem, from radar displays to communications links, may also be tied to old standards. Moving one part forward often means a cascade of updates throughout the system, each with their own regulatory hurdles.
Modernization Plans: Ambitions and Obstacles
Despite these hurdles, momentum for change is building. The FAA now has plans—backed by both the Trump administration and broader bipartisan agreement—to construct six new air traffic control facilities and overhaul much of the current infrastructure. The cost to taxpayers is expected to be tens of billions, a daunting figure that nonetheless pales in comparison to the potential cost of failure in the world’s busiest airspace.Notably, the plans for the 21 existing facilities have yet to be publicly detailed. Industry observers, including Huerta, point to consolidation as a likely next step. Fewer, more technologically advanced centers could manage larger volumes of air traffic with greater efficiency, but any moves toward closure will likely continue facing stiff opposition from local lawmakers and their constituents.
A Snapshot: Critical Infrastructure and Enduring Legacy Systems
The FAA’s challenges are set against a broader backdrop: Microsoft Windows operating systems—often in specialized, outdated versions—underpin vast swathes of public and private infrastructure worldwide. Hospitals depend on them for imaging and diagnostics; utility companies for SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition); ATMs for financial transactions. The degree of embeddedness is staggering, and often invisible to end users.Upgrades are frequently delayed because downtime is impossible (consider the cost of taking a hospital’s MRI network offline, or suspending national air traffic). Hardware dependencies, regulatory constraints, and the sheer scale of rewiring decades-old workflows all contribute to glacial progress.
Microsoft’s Quiet Role—and Continuing Profit
Perhaps the only clear winner in this saga is Microsoft. Even as mainstream support for Windows 95 ended years ago, custom support contracts for governments and large enterprises remain lucrative. Microsoft’s extended support for legacy customers keeps the revenue stream flowing, even as it actively encourages a shift to newer cloud-based operating models.There is, however, a degree of tension: Microsoft benefits from pervasive legacy reliance, yet its brand is tied to the reliability and security of platforms the company would rather see retired. Every high-profile failure or vulnerability that traces its origin to an old version of Windows carries reputational risk for Redmond—something it tries to mitigate by pushing periodic modernization campaigns.
The Global Outlook: This Is Not Just an American Problem
The United States is hardly unique in its infrastructural legacy woes. Across Europe and Asia, similar dependencies persist. Britain’s rail signaling, German healthcare devices, and networks in countless developing economies are built on foundations laid in the 1990s and early 2000s. The FAA’s effort—ambitious and costly as it is—may serve as a proving ground for the scale and nature of upgrades required worldwide. The lessons learned, both technical and political, are likely to be studied and emulated elsewhere.Critical Analysis: Balancing Risks and Progress
There are notable strengths to the FAA’s existing strategy of “make do and mend.” Older technologies tend to be well-understood by their operators. Many have seen decades of incremental improvement, bug-fixing, and operational hardening. When failures arise, there’s a large cadre of engineers and technicians familiar with even the oldest modules and quirks.But this approach is rapidly reaching a point of diminishing returns. Components become harder to source, skillsets wane as veteran engineers retire, and each passing year widens the chasm between what’s possible and what’s practical. Add in the growing cyber threat landscape, and the risks soon outweigh the comfort of familiarity.
That said, a “big bang” upgrade—overhauling everything all at once—carries its own perils. Large technology projects, especially in government, are notorious for overruns, unforeseen technical debt, and organizational resistance. The FAA’s plan must therefore strike a delicate balance: replacing what’s outdated and dangerous, while maintaining operational continuity and accountability.
Looking Ahead: Can Modernization Succeed?
Whether the FAA can deliver on its modernization promise is still uncertain. The main threat is inertia—both financial and political—that could relegate these plans to the same fate as many past efforts: partial success, followed by renewed maintenance and delay. Political determination, industry partnership, and sustainable funding must all align for progress to become reality.If it succeeds, the rewards are enormous: safer skies, lower operational costs, increased efficiency for airlines (and thus passengers), and a template for how the world’s most complex technology infrastructure can be responsibly and securely rebuilt. But if it fails—or if upgrades are endlessly delayed—the risks escalate, from minor outages to potential catastrophes that could have been prevented.
Conclusion: The Hidden Engine of Civilization
The average passenger stepping onto a Boeing or Airbus has little reason to consider what makes it possible for thousands of flights to crisscross the continent every day. The silent, unseen systems that keep planes airborne and passengers safe are a testament to the reliability and staying power of software like Windows 95—a double-edged sword of stability and stagnation.For now, the sky’s grid still glows dimly with the light of ancient code, and Microsoft, for better or worse, remains at the center of this hidden backbone of civilization. The real question, at the heart of the FAA’s modernization push, is how long we can keep flying on legacy—and when we’ll finally invest what’s necessary to ensure our future is as secure as our past has proven to be.
Source: Windows Central The FAA still uses Windows 95 and floppy disks for air traffic control, but that's changing
