A retail checkout terminal is depicted with a security shield as payment data streams toward a server.
More than a million payment-card records ended up on a criminal server after attackers infected hundreds of checkout terminals running Windows builds that had missed a security update from December 2024. Cybernews researchers found the attacker's server left open on the internet, and it held both the stolen card data and the tools used in the attack. For Windows admins, the lesson is that point-of-sale (POS) machines need patching just as much as office PCs and servers.

A retail checkout terminal is depicted with a security shield as payment data streams toward a server. What Cybernews found​

Cybernews reported that the server held the complete attack infrastructure, including malware source code, exploitation tools, and a carding panel named "VINY JUNIOR TRILHAS" storing the exfiltrated payment card data. A carding panel is the back-office dashboard a criminal uses to sort and sell stolen card data. Secureblink, which covers threat news, said the panel also let the operator browse or sell it.

The numbers, as reported by Cybernews, TechRadar and Mezha.net:

  • 782 compromised systems. TechRadar said most of which were in Brazil (677). Other notable mentions include the United States with 22 endpoints, and Russia with 8. Those three countries account for 707 machines. The reporting doesn't say where the other 75 were.
  • More than 20 countries. Neowin, summarising the Cybernews research, described the compromise of more than 700 POS terminals across more than 20 countries and the exposure of at least one million credit and debit card records.
  • Brazilian banks were the main target. TechRadar reported that the Cybernews team also found the attackers primarily targeted Brazilian banks.
  • Timeline. The server was locked down on August 31, 2026. Mezha.net says Cybernews reported it to the country's Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) on September 8. The reporting doesn't clearly say which country's CERT received it.

Cybernews also described this as a long-running operation rather than a single breach. Archyde's account says compromised terminals relayed daily transactions, turning each infected checkout machine into a continuous data collection point.

Section summary: The attacker left an exposed server holding the malware, the exploit tools and the stolen card data. About 87% of the 782 infected terminals were in Brazil.

How the attack worked​

The key flaw is CVE-2024-49138, an elevation-of-privilege bug in the Windows Common Log File System (CLFS) driver. CLFS is a kernel-level logging component, and attackers have targeted it repeatedly over the years. According to the German outlet IT-Finanzmagazin, the attackers used a Windows flaw that Microsoft had closed in December 2024, as reported by Cybernews.

Based on Cybernews' account, the attack had three stages:

  1. Get onto the terminal. CVE-2024-49138 is a local privilege-escalation bug, so the attacker needed some foothold on the machine first. None of the public reporting explains how they got that initial access.
  2. Escalate privileges. Geekspin, citing Cybernews, said the hacker modified publicly available test code for a known Windows vulnerability tracked as CVE-2024-49138, specifically tailoring it to infiltrate retail point-of-sale (POS) machines.
  3. Harvest card data. According to Cybernews, once the malware gained system-level access through the privilege escalation vulnerability, it installed a remote access trojan that continuously harvested payment card data as transactions were processed.

The reports describe the malware differently. Mezha.net calls it an infostealer, while Cybernews calls it a remote access trojan (RAT). A RAT is the more worrying of the two because it also gives the attacker interactive control of the terminal.

This exploit wasn't new or sophisticated. Public proof-of-concept code was already available, and the attacker adapted it for POS machines. That points to a patch-management failure rather than an advanced intrusion.

Section summary: An old, already-patched Windows kernel bug and public exploit code gave the attacker SYSTEM-level access. The malware then copied card data from every transaction.

What was stolen, and what wasn't reported​

IT-Finanzmagazin listed the panel's contents as card numbers (PANs), validity periods, BINs, issuing countries and banks, card type and brand, and the exfiltration date. For the 782 compromised terminals, it also held the Windows version and the city and country where each was located.

The public reports don't say whether CVV codes, PINs, cardholder names or billing addresses were stolen. Readers shouldn't assume either way. The fact that the attacker recorded each terminal's Windows version suggests they were keeping track of which machines were vulnerable, but that's my inference rather than something the researchers stated.

Who is behind it? Secureblink notes that Cybernews assesses the operator as Brazilian based on the language used in recovered documentation and a carding panel named "Viny Junior Trilhas," but this is an assessment, not a confirmed attribution.

Why the terminals were still unpatched​

Cybernews says the compromised systems were running software that hadn't been updated in at least one year and nine months as of the August 2026 discovery. That's about 21 months between Microsoft's December 2024 fix and the discovery, slightly less than the "nearly two years" in some headlines.

Why does a checkout machine go unpatched for that long? Neowin's summary of the research says some POS systems remained unpatched as many retailers worry about downtime, compatibility issues, or just don't prioritize patching.

This is a familiar problem in retail IT. POS machines are often managed by a third-party vendor, certified against one specific OS build, and running in shops with no IT staff on site. A reboot during trading hours means customers can't pay, so updates get postponed. That's a real business concern, but every month of delay leaves the terminal open to known exploits.

What Windows admins should do​

The public reporting doesn't name the POS vendor, the exact Windows builds involved, or any indicators of compromise. Treat the steps below as general good practice, not a checklist written for this campaign.

  1. Check your POS estate for the December 2024 cumulative update or later. Any terminal or back-office Windows machine without it is still vulnerable to CVE-2024-49138. Look up the KB that applies to each build in Microsoft's Security Update Guide entry for the CVE.
  2. Find machines on unsupported Windows versions. A terminal that can't receive security updates should be isolated on the network, migrated to a supported release, or replaced.
  3. Close off initial access. A privilege-escalation bug only matters once the attacker is already on the machine. Review remote-access tools, shared credentials and vendor support connections on payment systems.
  4. Keep payment terminals on a separate network segment. A compromised terminal shouldn't be able to reach the wider corporate network, and the corporate network shouldn't have open access to terminals.
  5. Treat a suspected infection as an incident. Patching blocks this exploit but won't remove a trojan that's already running. Bring in your payment processor and POS provider and follow your card-industry incident-response procedures.

What cardholders should know​

Cybernews researchers warned that the risk depends on individual banks' fraud detection systems and cardholder protection policies. The researchers say the stolen data could be used for fraudulent purchases, sold on the dark web, or used in phishing. One scenario they describe is a fake "your card is being used, click here to block it" email.

If you get a message like that, don't click the link. Open your bank's app or call the number printed on your card. Check your statements for small test charges, which criminals often run before larger fraud.

Bottom line: No new zero-day was involved. The attacker used a fix Microsoft shipped in December 2024, public exploit code, and hundreds of terminals that hadn't been updated in about 21 months. If you run Windows POS machines, check their patch status now.

 

References

  1. Data from more than 1 million payment cards stolen in attack on 782 POS systems - Mezha.net Mezha.net 2026-11-19T17:23:57+00:00
  2. Hackers Steal Over 1 Million Credit Cards via Unpatched Windows Bug in POS Attack archyde.com
  3. Over 1 million credit cards stolen in attack spanning 20 countries cybernews.com