Microsoft’s short MSRC attestation that “Azure Linux includes this open‑source library and is therefore potentially affected” is an authoritative inventory statement for Azure Linux — but it is not a categorical guarantee that no other Microsoft product or image could contain the same vulnerable Qualcomm component.
CVE‑2025‑22014 is recorded as a Linux‑kernel change in the Qualcomm area — soc: qcom: pdr — described as “Fix the potential deadlock.” The upstream fix resolves a concurrency issue that, under certain runtime conditions, could cause a kernel thread to deadlock inside the Qualcomm PDR (power/domain/rail) code path. Microsoft’s Security Response Center (MSRC) has publicly stated that Azure Linux includes the affected open‑source component and is therefore potentially affected, and Microsoft says it will update the CVE entry if it finds impact to additional products. That product‑scoped attestation is the starting point for defenders.
This article explains in plain operational terms what that MSRC sentence means, why customers should not assume exclusivity, where the same vulnerable code commonly appears across a vendor’s artifact portfolio, and practical steps you should take now to find, mitigate, and remediate exposure to CVE‑2025‑22014 in your estate.
However, the statement is deliberately scoped and does not provide a guarantee that other Microsoft products or images are unaffected. Large vendors ship many artifacts and rebuild many images; the same upstream kernel code can and does appear in multiple places. Until Microsoft expands its machine‑readable attestations (or until you verify artifacts in your own estate), assume other Microsoft artifacts could also carry the vulnerable code and perform artifact‑level discovery accordingly.
Treat the MSRC attestation as a reliable starting point: patch Azure Linux first, then broaden your investigations with SBOMs, image scans, kernel searches, and CI/CD checks. That combination of vendor transparency and local artifact verification is the practical, defensible posture for managing CVE exposure in complex cloud and hybrid environments.
In short: No — Azure Linux is not necessarily the only Microsoft product that could include the vulnerable Qualcomm code; it is simply the only Microsoft product Microsoft has publicly attested so far. Act on the Azure Linux attestation immediately, but don’t stop there — perform artifact‑level discovery and remediation across your image catalog, WSL kernels, CI/CD artifacts, and any Microsoft‑distributed images you rely on.
Source: MSRC Security Update Guide - Microsoft Security Response Center
Background / Overview
CVE‑2025‑22014 is recorded as a Linux‑kernel change in the Qualcomm area — soc: qcom: pdr — described as “Fix the potential deadlock.” The upstream fix resolves a concurrency issue that, under certain runtime conditions, could cause a kernel thread to deadlock inside the Qualcomm PDR (power/domain/rail) code path. Microsoft’s Security Response Center (MSRC) has publicly stated that Azure Linux includes the affected open‑source component and is therefore potentially affected, and Microsoft says it will update the CVE entry if it finds impact to additional products. That product‑scoped attestation is the starting point for defenders.This article explains in plain operational terms what that MSRC sentence means, why customers should not assume exclusivity, where the same vulnerable code commonly appears across a vendor’s artifact portfolio, and practical steps you should take now to find, mitigate, and remediate exposure to CVE‑2025‑22014 in your estate.
What Microsoft’s sentence actually says — and what it doesn’t
Microsoft’s phrasing is precise and limited by design. Read three points into it:- It is an inventory attestation for a named product family (Azure Linux): Microsoft inspected that product family’s builds and found the implicated upstream component present. That makes Azure Linux a confirmed carrier and therefore in‑scope for patching and mitigation.
- It is not an exclusionary or exhaustive statement: Microsoft’s short line does not prove that no other Microsoft product contains the same vulnerable code. Absence of a product name elsewhere in the CVE notice simply means Microsoft has not yet attested that other product; it does not prove those artifacts are safe.
- Microsoft has committed to machine‑readable VEX/CSAF attestations (the program began in October 2025) and to updating CVE mappings over time. That means the public attestation is a living statement; as Microsoft expands its inventory checks, additional products may be added to the CVE mapping, or the mapping may remain Azure Linux‑only if no other carriers are found.
Why the distinction matters — practical attack and supply‑chain impacts
A single open‑source kernel component can migrate across many artifacts inside a large vendor ecosystem. Here are the common pathways that turn one vulnerable upstream commit into multiple carriers:- Shared kernel builds and backports: vendors often backport upstream fixes into different kernel trees (host kernels, OEM kernels, marketplace images). A vulnerable driver commit can appear in each of those trees if it was present when the kernel snapshot was taken.
- Marketplace images and curated containers: Microsoft publishes many VM images and container base images. Some of these images are rebuilt or forked from a base distribution and can include the same kernel or userland packages that carried the vulnerability. Evidence from past incidents shows Azure Marketplace and Microsoft‑published container images have, at times, included vulnerable packages until updated.
- WSL / shipped kernels: Microsoft’s WSL2 kernel image is a Microsoft‑distributed kernel artifact. If that kernel build included the Qualcomm code path (or incorporated the same upstream tree), WSL kernels could, in theory, carry the same bug. You cannot infer WSL’s status from an Azure Linux attestation alone.
- Customer containers and PaaS apps: platform services that run customer containers or user code (for example App Service, Functions, or Container Instances) are only exposed if the customer’s image includes the vulnerable component. The platform itself being Microsoft‑hosted doesn’t automatically create exposure unless Microsoft’s published images or platform runtime images include the vulnerable library.
Immediate operational checklist (what you should do in the next 24–72 hours)
- Prioritize Azure Linux workloads
- If you run Azure Linux VMs, treat them as confirmed carriers until patched images or packages are published by Microsoft. Apply Microsoft’s updates or rebuild images using patched package sets as they are released.
- Scan your image and container registries
- Search your private registries, CI/CD artifacts, and container manifests for Azure Linux base images or for kernels built from the same Linux upstream commit range. Use image‑scanning tools that can detect kernel versions and packages. Past advisories show container images are a common overlooked carrier.
- Inspect managed platform runtime images
- Validate the kernel and package inventories for platform runtime images and Microsoft‑provided Marketplace images you rely on (including curated SDK and sample images). Don’t assume an MSRC entry naming Azure Linux means other Marketplace images are safe.
- Check WSL and developer artifacts
- Query any WSL2 kernels you distribute to developers and CI agents. If your organization uses Microsoft‑distributed WSL kernels or derivative images, verify whether those kernels contain the patched commit.
- Run host‑level detection rules
- Deploy short‑term detection: look for the vulnerable function names, module versions, or git commit IDs (when known) in /lib/modules, kernel configs, and compiled kernel vmlinux/system.map. If you can’t find a direct indicator, look for the driver name (soc:qcom pdr or equivalent driver module).
- Prepare a mitigation playbook
- Before long‑term patches land across every artifact, prepare mitigations such as:
- Reboot schedules to pick up updated kernels or modules;
- Temporary module blacklisting when safe to do so;
- Constraining access to vulnerable hosts via network controls and host isolation.
- Note: kernel module blacklisting can have functional impacts; validate in staging first.
How to verify beyond the product attestation — artifact‑level discovery
To move from “Azure Linux is affected” to “these artifacts in my estate are affected,” adopt an artifact‑level verification workflow:- SBOMs and Software Composition Analysis
- If you maintain SBOMs for VMs, containers, and images, correlate SBOM entries to the kernel version or source package containing the Qualcomm PDR code. Where SBOMs are absent, treat the artifact as unknown and add it to your discovery queue. Microsoft’s move toward CSAF/VEX is helpful, but adoption of SBOMs on the customer side remains essential.
- Binary and source‑level matching
- If you can obtain the upstream commit that fixed the deadlock (the CVE entry or the upstream kernel patch), you can search for those function names, commit hashes, or file diffs in your kernel trees and in packaged kernel sources that ship with images. This is the most reliable way to determine whether a given kernel build contains the vulnerable region.
- Image provenance checks
- Check CI build logs, Dockerfile histories, and image manifests for the base image tag and build date. If an image was built from an Azure Linux base image taken before Microsoft published the patch, treat it as potentially vulnerable until validated.
- Dynamic detection
- When static indicators are unavailable, consider dynamic monitoring for kernel deadlock symptoms and unusual task states, but understand this is noisy and not a substitute for artifact verification.
Remediation: patches, updates, and coordination
The most direct remediation is to install the upstream patch or the downstream package update that incorporates the kernel fix. For Microsoft Azure Linux customers, this usually means:- Apply Microsoft’s Azure Linux package updates or pick a patched Azure Marketplace image as soon as Microsoft publishes the fix for the CVE. Microsoft’s attestation makes clear they can and will push updates for Azure Linux images.
- For other Microsoft artifacts that are flagged by your scanning, follow the same model: update the kernel/package to a release that includes the upstream fix, or rebuild the artifact using a patched base. If the artifact is customer‑owned (for example, a container you built on top of a Microsoft base image), you are responsible to update the image and redeploy it.
- If a patched kernel build is not yet available for a specific artifact, implement compensating controls (network isolation, reduced privileges, host scheduling changes) and prepare for patching windows.
Detection and monitoring playbook (technical checklist)
- Host inventory:
- Collect kernel version strings, module lists, and compile‑time options from all Linux hosts and images. Map kernel versions to upstream commits where possible.
- Registry and image scanning:
- Use image scanners that detect kernel package versions or embedded vmlinuz/boot artifacts. Flag images built from Azure Linux base tags that predate the fix.
- CI/CD pipeline checks:
- Add build‑time checks to deny production images that contain known vulnerable kernel artifacts or that are built from non‑patched base images. Ensure pipelines pull patched base images or rebuild images when base images are updated.
- Network controls:
- For hosts that cannot be patched immediately, apply host isolation, ingress filtering, and least‑privilege network policies. Treat these as temporary controls while you coordinate patching.
- Incident readiness:
- Prepare quick rollback or redeploy playbooks so patched images or kernels can be rolled out rapidly. Maintain test validation steps to ensure the fix doesn’t regress other functionality, especially in specialized kernel builds.
Why Microsoft names Azure Linux first (and why that’s a good thing)
There are operational reasons vendors begin their public CVE attestation with a single product family:- It provides an immediate, actionable target for customers who run that product; if you run Azure Linux, you now know to patch. That clarity is valuable and aligns with responsible disclosure practices.
- Microsoft’s early VEX/CSAF pilot began with Azure Linux in October 2025; the company can publish machine‑readable attestations for that product quickly because they control the image pipeline and can scan the distribution outputs. Extending that same attestation effort across every Microsoft image and product is larger work and will be completed over time.
- Publicly stating the attestation and promising updates reduces ambiguity and helps customers prioritize remediation and scanning efforts. The danger comes when readers infer exclusivity from a narrow phrase; this is a human inference problem rather than a vendor error.
Common misunderstandings and risks to watch for
- Misreading “includes and is therefore potentially affected” as “only Azure Linux is affected.” That inference is incorrect and dangerous; absence of attestations for other products is not evidence of absence.
- Assuming customer‑hosted services are safe because the platform is not listed. If a user’s container image or application package contains the vulnerable kernel component (or a userland library), platform‑hosted services may still run vulnerable code. Remediation requires action by the image or application owner in many scenarios.
- Overlooking derivative artifacts: build caches, vendor SDKs, sample images, CI runners and developer VM images are often overlooked but are plausible carriers. Don’t limit your search to production images only.
Vendor transparency and industry context: CSAF, VEX, and why machine‑readable attestations matter
Microsoft’s public commitment to publish machine‑readable CSAF/VEX attestations (the program began with Azure Linux in October 2025) is a positive development for supply‑chain visibility. Machine‑readable attestations let automation tools ingest product‑impact mappings and produce prioritized lists of affected assets. However:- VEX/CSAF is only useful if the vendor’s coverage is broad and kept current. A single product attestation is helpful, but defenders still need artifact‑level evidence for their own inventories.
- Cross‑vendor cooperation and SBOM adoption are necessary to scale the discovery problem. Until every image and build artifact provides provenance and composition data, defenders must continue to combine vendor attestations with their own scanning.
Risk analysis and what to expect next
- Short term: expect Microsoft to publish a patched Azure Linux package and updated image(s) for CVE‑2025‑22014. Operators running Azure Linux should patch immediately and follow Microsoft’s guidance.
- Medium term: Microsoft may expand its VEX/CSAF mapping to include additional Microsoft images or products if their inventory scans find the vulnerable code elsewhere. If Microsoft’s scan surfaces other carriers, the CVE entry will be updated to reflect that. Until that occurs, other Microsoft artifacts remain potentially in scope and must be independently verified.
- Long term: this CVE highlights the broader industry need for comprehensive SBOMs, stronger image provenance, and automated attestation ingestion so that supply‑chain exposure can be mapped from vendor advisories into enterprise asset inventories without lengthy manual work. Microsoft’s CSAF/VEX publishing is a step in that direction, but it is not a complete solution by itself.
Practical recommendations — prioritized
- If you run Azure Linux: apply Microsoft’s updates immediately and redeploy patched images. Test reboots and service restarts in staging before rolling to production.
- Scan your container and VM image registries for Azure Linux base images and for images built prior to the patch publication date. Rebuild or update any images that depend on those bases.
- Audit WSL kernels, CI runners, developer VMs, and any Microsoft‑distributed images used in your pipelines. Don’t assume developer artifacts are out of scope.
- Implement detection and temporary isolation policies for hosts that cannot be patched immediately. Prepare a rapid deployment plan to get patched kernels and images into production.
- Track Microsoft’s CVE/VEX updates. If Microsoft adds other products to the attestation, prioritize those newly‑attested artifacts for remediation.
Final assessment
Microsoft’s MSRC wording for CVE‑2025‑22014 is a useful and accurate product‑level attestation: Azure Linux includes the affected open‑source component and is therefore potentially affected. That affirmation is valuable because it gives Azure Linux operators a clear, immediate action path.However, the statement is deliberately scoped and does not provide a guarantee that other Microsoft products or images are unaffected. Large vendors ship many artifacts and rebuild many images; the same upstream kernel code can and does appear in multiple places. Until Microsoft expands its machine‑readable attestations (or until you verify artifacts in your own estate), assume other Microsoft artifacts could also carry the vulnerable code and perform artifact‑level discovery accordingly.
Treat the MSRC attestation as a reliable starting point: patch Azure Linux first, then broaden your investigations with SBOMs, image scans, kernel searches, and CI/CD checks. That combination of vendor transparency and local artifact verification is the practical, defensible posture for managing CVE exposure in complex cloud and hybrid environments.
In short: No — Azure Linux is not necessarily the only Microsoft product that could include the vulnerable Qualcomm code; it is simply the only Microsoft product Microsoft has publicly attested so far. Act on the Azure Linux attestation immediately, but don’t stop there — perform artifact‑level discovery and remediation across your image catalog, WSL kernels, CI/CD artifacts, and any Microsoft‑distributed images you rely on.
Source: MSRC Security Update Guide - Microsoft Security Response Center
