CISA Advisory 2025: EcoStruxure PME Vulnerabilities & Mitigations

Schneider Electric’s EcoStruxure Power Monitoring Expert (PME) has been flagged in a coordinated advisory for a cluster of high‑impact vulnerabilities that, together, create multiple realistic attack paths into industrial monitoring infrastructure—issues that matter to Windows administrators, data center operators, and security teams responsible for energy and critical manufacturing environments. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) published advisory ICSA‑25‑224‑03 on August 12, 2025, describing several distinct flaws (path traversal, unsafe deserialization, and server‑side request forgery) that affect PME 13.1 and that Schneider Electric intends to remediate in PME 2024 R3, scheduled for November 11, 2025. ntruxure platform is widely used across commercial facilities, critical manufacturing, and energy sectors to collect, analyze, and act on power and infrastructure telemetry. PME sits squarely in the OT/IT intersection: it runs on Windows servers in many installations and exposes web and network interfaces for management and integration. That hybrid placement makes PME an attractive target—compromise can cascade from monitoring to decision systems, or be used as a foothold into adjacent networks. CISA’s advisory emphasizes this operational reality and highlights the global footprint of affected installations.
The advisory groups several CVEs togethet complementary risks:

• directory traversal flaws that can expose or enable execution of arbitrary files,
• an unsafe deserialization vector exposed via a TCP service that binds to a random high port,
• and multiple server‑side request forgery (SSRF) issues that permit the product to be induced to make HTTP(S) requests to internal services. These issues were reported by a researcher working with Trend Micro’s Zero Day Initiative and coordinated through CISA.

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Executive summary of the technical findings​

• Overal advisory lists a consolidated CVSS v4 assessment in the high‑severity band (the bundle headline shows a CVSS v4 value of 8.7 for the set), with individual CVEs ranging roughly from medium‑high to very high depending on the combination of impact and required privileges.
• Affected product and version: EcoStruxure Power Monitoring Expert: Version 13.1. PME 2024 R3, scheduled for November 11, 2025. Until the vendor release, mitigations and network controls are required.
• Primary vulnerability types:
• Path traversal (CWE‑22) — two distinct directory traversal issues thae access and can, with admin file upload paths, lead to remote code execution under specific conditions.
• Deserialization of untrusted data (CWE‑502) — a TCP service listens on a non‑fixed high port and performs unsafe deserialbused by an authenticated low‑privilege account to achieve code execution or privilege escalation.
• Server‑side request forgery (CWE‑918) — pre‑authentication SSRF allowing unauthenticated remote callers to coerce PME into connecting to interg sensitive internal web‑accessible APIs/ports.

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Technical deep dive​

1) Path traversal (CWE‑22) — two flavors​

Two CVEs identify separate path traversal weaknesses. Both require authentication to exploiequence and exploit complexity.

• CVE‑2025‑54926: This path traversal permits an authenticated administrator to upload a crafted file via HTTP that the system will write to an unintended location. In some configurations the product then executes or processes that file, creating a remote code execution (RCE) possibility. The advisory reports a CVSS v3.1 score of 4.9 and a CVSS v4 of 6.9 for this issue, reflecting the fact that an attacker needs elevated privileges (admin) to weaponize the flaw.
• CVE‑2025‑54927: A related but more severe traversal that allows an authenticated attacker to reach and read sensitive files and—depending on system configuration—could be chained with ointegrity and availability. The advisory calculates a CVSS v3.1 score of 7.2 and a CVSS v4 score of 8.6 here, indicating higher confidentiality and availability impact.

Why this matters: in many PME deployments administrative accounts are shared across operational staff and integrators. Where an attacker can obtain a credential (via phishing, credential stuffing, or lateral versal that requires only authenticated access becomes practical. The consequence is exposure of operational secrets (certificates, backups, database files) and, in the worst case, ability to place executable artifacts that the service will process.

2) Unsafe deserialization (CWE‑502)​

CVE‑2025‑54923 describes a random‑port TCP listener that accepts serialized objects and deserializes them without appropriate checks. The service’s listening port is not fixed (it changes at each restart), but is discoverable via local configuration data and network scans. The vulnerability requires authentication at a lower privilege level than admin (PR:L), and the CVSS v3.1 score is 8.8 (v4: 8.7), reflecting the high impact that arbitrary deserialization can have.
Unsafe deserialization is a classic vector for remote code execution when attacker‑controlled object graphs can invoke gadget chains inside the application or runtime libraries. In PME’s case, an attacker who can access the TCP pserialized payloads could escalate to code execution or manipulate application state.

3) Server‑side request forgery (CWE‑918) — pre‑auth SSRF​

Two CVEs (CVE‑2025‑54924 and CVE‑2025‑54925) describe SSRF conditions; both are notable because CISA describes them as pre‑authentication, meaning an unauthenticated attacker can trigger the product to make arbitrary HTTP requests to internal addresses. The CVSS v3.1 scores are both 7.5 with corresponding CVSS v4 values in the high‑8 range.
SSRF risk profile: SSRF is particularly powerful in networked OT contexts because many ICS/OT services expose internal‑only management APIs (web consoles, Modbus/TCP web frontends, internal metadata endpoints) that are not accessible from outside the SSRF allows an attacker outside that perimeter to probe and interact with those internal resources using PME as a proxy, potentially reading sensitive data, authenticating against endpoints that accept internal traffic, or leveraging further vulnerabilities on internal hosts.

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Realistic attack scenarios​

• Lateral reconnaissance and credential abuse: A phishing campaign compromises a domain user who has PME access. Using that account, an attacker uploads a deliberately crafted file via the path traversal upload endpoint (CVE‑2025‑54926) to write a web shell or scheduled task, leading to remote code execution and persistence.
• Internal pivot using SSRF: An unauthenticated attacker discovers the PME management URL (via public internet scanning or leaked asset lists). They send a specially crafted request to PME’s SSRF endpoint (CVE‑2025‑54924) to probe internal automation management consoles. The response reveals an internal API and credentials in an unintended endpoint, enabling further compromise.
• Low‑privilege deserialization‑based escalation: An attacker with minimal authenticated access locates the random TCP service port (exposed in logs or via discovery) and sends a malicious serialized payload that leverages available gadget classes in the .NET/Java runtime (depending on PME architecture). That yields execution as a service user and, combined with misconfigurations, full system takeover.

These scenarios are practical in hybrid infrastructures where PME servers have both Internet‑facing integration endpoints and trust relationships to internal services. The advisory explicitly warns about cross‑network impact and recommends isolation.

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Why this is particularly sensitive for Windows‑hosted OT workloads​

PME frequently runs on Windows servers and integrates with Windows authentication and domain services. Windows servers are commonly the bridge between corporate IT and OT, meaning:

• A Windows a enable exploitation paths that require authentication.
• Domain‑wide tools (Group Policy, AD replication) can increase blast radius if PME service accounts are over‑privileged.
• Standard Windows tooling (PowerShell, scheduled tasks, remote management) provides easy persistence mechanisms that attackers can leverage post‑exploit.

CISA and Schneider Electric therefore emphasize least privilege, thorough audits of Windows‑authenticated accounts that can access PME, and network segmentation to reduce exposure.

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Vendor response and timeline​

Schneider Electric has stated fixes will be included in PME 2024 R3, planned for release on November 11, 2025. Until that release, the vendor and CISA recommend layered mitigations: isolate PME in an air‑gapped or tightly segmented network, apply Windowsstrict access, limit administrative accounts, and follow Schneider Electric’s published cybersecurity hardening guidelines. CISA also notes no public exploitation of these specific CVEs had been reported as of the advisory’s publication on August 12, 2025.
The planned release date is material: it leaves a window of approximately three months during which high‑risk systems must be defended via compensating controls rather than vendor patches. Organizations must therefore treat this advisory as requiring immediate operational response rather than a routine patching tions: practical, prioritized actions
Schneider Electric and CISA provide mitigation guidance; below is an operational checklist prioritized for rapid risk reduction.
High‑priority actions (implement immediately)

• Isolate PME: Place PME servers on a segmented VLAN that is not directly routable from the Internet or corporate networks. Restrict access to only the specific management subnets.
• Windows firewall and network ACLs: Enforce restrictive inbound rules that allow only known administration IPs to reach PME management ports and block all other ingress.
• Audit and reduce privileges: Immediately perform an audit of accounts that can authenticate to PME. Remove non‑essential accounts and enforce the principle of le or rotate any service account credentials that appear overprivileged.
• Disable or filter the random TCP service: Where possible, block traffic to the ephemeral TCP peak ports from untrusted hosts. If local controls allow disabling the listener or binding it to localhost, apply that change. (If disabling is not possible, ensure only trusted admin hosts can reach the port.)
• Harden file upload paths: If PME upload endpoints are exposed to administrative roles, apply strict validation and scanning of uploaded content. Where a dedicated gateway or reverse proxy is used, add input validation and make uploads pass through an allowlist filter.

Medium‑priority actions (within 72 hours)

• Introduce strict web application firewalls (WAF) or reverse proxy policies that can detect path traversal patterns and block suspicious payloads.
• Increase monitoring for anomalous file writes, new services, or scheduled tasks on PME hosts. Add file integrity monitoring on critical directories.
• Enforce multifactor authentication (MFA) on accounts that access PME where supported.

Longer‑term/continuous

• Apply PME 2024 R3 when Schneider Electric releases it on November 11, 2025, after testing in a controlled environment.
• Implement an OT‑centric patch management program that separates testing, approval, and staged rollouts to avoid operational disruption.
• Maintain an inventory of internal services and ensure PME cannot act as an HTTP proxy to sensitive management services.

Schneider Electric also references its cybersecurity hardening guidance and recommended best practices document; those should be part of remediation procedures alongside CISA’s defensive recommendations.

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Detection and incident response guidance​

Detection tips

• Network signatures: Monitor for PME initiating outbound HTTP connections to internal addresses that are not part of normal telemetry or integration flows—this can indicate SSRF probes.
• Port discovery: Watch for repeated scanning or connection attempts to ephemeral high ports on PME hosdeserialization attacks.
• File system changes: Alert on creation of new executable artifacts under web content or application‑data directories—path traversal followed by execution can leave telltale file writes.

Forensic triage steps

• Isolate the host from networks while preserving volatile evidence (memory, network logs).
• Collect web server logs, application logs, and Windows Event logs for the timeframe of suspicious activity.
• Capture a memory snapshot and image of the system disk to investigate unknown processes or scheduled tasks.
• Search for indicators of compromise such as web shells, new user accounts, or suspicious PowerShell activity.

Reporting and coordination

• Follow internal incident response playbooks; if operational impact is critical or national‑interest systems are affected, escalate to relevant government agencies per mandatory reporting requirements.
• Share non‑sensitive IOCs with trusted partners and vendors to enable broader detection.

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Risk analysis: strengths and weaknesses of the advisory and vendor plan​

Strengths

• Coordinated disclosure: The advisory was handled through a coordinated disclosure process, providing organizations advance notice and specific mitigations.
• Clear technical classification: Each vulnerability is mapped to CWE identifiers and CVE numbers, enabling targeted detection and hunting.
• Practical mitigations: The advisory focuses on network segmentation and account hygiene—controls that are effective in OT contexts.

Potential gaps and risks

• Patch timeline: The vendor’s fix is scheduled for November 11, 2025, which window for adversaries to exploit environments that cannot implement robust network segmentation.
• Authentication requirements for several flaws: Because several issues require only authenticated access, credential theft techniques (phishing, lateral movement) increase the risk significantly.
• Operational constraints: Many OT environments delay patching and network changes due to availability requirements, meaning compensating controls must be implemented carefully to avoid disrupting critical services.
• Detection maturity: Many operational environments lack fine‑grained logging and telemetry. Without endpoint monitoring and network visibility, SSRF and deserialization attacks can remain stealthy.

Organizations must therefore weigh the practical difficulty of implementing mitigations against the high‑consequence nature of the vulnerabilities. Where operational constraints exist, compensating controls should be considered mandatory.

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Practical checklist for Windows administrators (quick reference)​

• Immediately review all Windows accounts with access to PME. Revoke or restrict accounts not essential to operations.
• Apply strict Windows firewall rules to limit inbound management access to PME.
• Segregate PME on its own VLAN and apply firewalling between PME and other internal services.
• Block outbound HTTP from PME to internal ranges that are not required for normal operation (to limit SSRF utility).
• Monitor for unusual file writes and new services on PME hosts; enable EDR on Windows servers where ope- Plan for patch testing and staged deployment of PME 2024 R3 when it becomes available on November 11, 2025.

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Conclusion​

The EcoStruxure PME advisory issued by CISA on August 12, 2025, documents a collection of vulnerabilities that together create both direct and indirect paths to sensitive data exposure and remote code execution on systems that are often central to energy, manufacturing, and commercial facility operations. The combination of path traversal, unsafe deserialization, and pre‑authentication SSRF elevates the urgency: these are not isolated web bugs but a set of weaknesses that can be chained and exploited against production systems.
The vendor has committed to a patch release (PME 2024 R3) on November 11, 2025, but until that remediation is available, organizations must implement layered mitigations—network isolation, strict Windows firewall rules, privilege audits, and targeted monitoring—to reduce attack surface and detect malicious activity. Given the critical infrastructure context of many PME deployments, defenders should treat this advis priority and apply the recommended controls immediately.

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This article synthesizes technical details and mitigation guidance from the coordinated advisory and associated vendor guidance to provide operationally useful recommendations for administrators and security teams responsible for EcoStruxure PME deployments.

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Source: CISA Schneider Electric EcoStruxure Power Monitoring Expert | CISA