CISA Advisory: Missing Authentication in CompactLogix 5480 (CVE-2025-9160)

A newly republished advisory from CISA and Rockwell Automation raises urgent operational and security flags for organizations using the CompactLogix® 5480 controller family: the devices running specific Windows packages are affected by a Missing Authentication for Critical Function vulnerability that CISA records under CVE‑2025‑9160 and rates with a CVSS v4 base score of 7.0. This advisory describes a low‑complexity attack that requires physical access to the unit’s maintenance menu and, if successfully executed, can lead to arbitrary code execution on the controller — a worst‑case outcome for industrial control systems where availability, integrity and safety are paramount.

Background​

CompactLogix® controllers are widely deployed in critical manufacturing and industrial automation environments; the 5480 family in particular is used to run time‑sensitive control logic and to bridge plant-floor processes with higher‑level supervisory systems. The new advisory specifically calls out the CompactLogix® 5480 running Version 32‑37.011 with the Windows package (2.1.0) for Windows 10 v1607 as affected. The vulnerability class is identified as CWE‑306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function — a condition that, in industrial contexts, can allow unauthorized actors to perform high‑privilege operations without proper credential checks.
This advisory was republished by CISA on September 9, 2025 and shows Rockwell Automation reported the issue to CISA, indicating vendor awareness and coordinated disclosure. At the time of republishing CISA noted there were no known reports of public exploitation specifically targeting this vulnerability, and characterized the issue as not remotely exploitable (it requires physical access). Nonetheless, the advisory assigns significant impact because arbitrary code execution on controllers can translate into production disruption, safety hazards, and high recovery costs.

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What the advisory says — a technical précis​

Affected product and build​

• Product: CompactLogix® 5480 (Logix family).
• Affected build called out in the advisory: Version 32‑37.011 with Windows package (2.1.0) for Windows 10 v1607.

Vulnerability class and impact​

• CWE: CWE‑306 — Missing Authentication for Critical Function.
• Primary technical impact cited: arbitrary code execution when an attacker with physical access abuses the controller’s maintenance menu with a crafted payload. The advisory assigns a CVSS v4 base score of 7.0 and provides the vector string used for that calculation.

Exploit requirements and scope​

• Attack complexity: Low (the advisory emphasises that the maintenance menu can be abused with a crafted payload).
• Access vector: Local / physical access to maintenance menu. CISA explicitly states the vulnerability is not remotely exploitable in default conditions.

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Why this matters to operators and Windows users​

CompactLogix controllers host production logic and I/O interactions. A successful arbitrary code execution on such a controller can enable outcomes beyond mere denial‑of‑service: an attacker could alter control logic, manipulate setpoints, falsify sensor readings, or install persistent agents that survive reboots depending on firmware/OS behavior. In high‑throughput or safety‑sensitive manufacturing, those outcomes translate quickly to physical risk and financial loss.
CISA’s posture paper and previous Rockwell advisories demonstrate a recurring pattern: even when network access is restricted, local or adjacent attackers (or insiders) can leverage maintenance interfaces, misconfigured engineering workstations, or removable media to reach controllers. Therefore, the requirement for physical access should not lull asset owners into complacency — physical security and maintenance‑interface hardening remain core ICS defense layers. The general CISA guidance to minimize network exposure and to place control networks behind robust firewalls remains a baseline defense for these families of vulnerabilities. (cisa.gov, rockwellautomation.com)

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Cross‑checking the record: vendor and agency positions​

• Rockwell’s security advisory index (trust center) and multiple Rockwell statements across 2024–2025 demonstrate an active program of releasing firmware updates and mitigations for the Logix family; Rockwell historically classifies similar issues (DoS, input‑validation) and publishes corrective firmware versions and application notes. Rockwell’s trust center contains multiple advisories for Logix/5580/5480 products showing remediation patterns and mitigation advice that align with CISA’s recommendations. (rockwellautomation.com)
• CISA’s advisories for Logix controllers published previously (2024–2025) reinforce the operational risk posture: multiple advisories for Rockwell Logix series (improper input validation, uncontrolled resource consumption, missing authentication, etc.) collectively show the family’s large attack surface and the emphasis on defense in depth (segmentation, limiting remote exposure, secure remote access controls). Those broader advisories are relevant context for the new CWE‑306 advisory for the CompactLogix 5480. (cisa.gov)
• Notably, public web sources at the time of this article do not show widespread proof‑of‑concept exploitation for CVE‑2025‑9160; however, the advisory also states the flaw can lead to arbitrary code execution — an outcome that has high operational gravity even absent in‑the‑wild reports. The absence of public exploit reports does not reduce the need for remediation planning.

Caveat: CVE and public registry cross‑checks are recommended. The republished advisory assigns CVE‑2025‑9160; readers should verify the CVE entry in the NVD/CVE list and vendor advisory pages for any updates to affected versions or vendor remediation status, because CVE metadata and patch mapping can be revised after initial publication. Where public CVE pages are slow to update, the vendor trust center and CISA advisory are the authoritative artifacts to use for triage.

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Strengths of the vendor/agency response — what was done well​

• Coordinated disclosure: Rockwell reported the issue to CISA and the advisory is republished by CISA, demonstrating coordinated vendor‑to‑agency handling and public notification. That helps asset owners prioritize and plan mitigations.
• Clear product and version mapping: The advisory lists a specific build combination (CompactLogix 5480: Version 32‑37.011 + Windows package 2.1.0 on Win10 v1607) rather than vague ranges — this specificity helps operators quickly scan inventories to find affected units.
• Actionable, pragmatic mitigations: Alongside vendor best practices, CISA reiterates practical controls: isolate control networks behind firewalls, do not permit direct internet access to controllers, and prefer secure remote access channels (VPNs with up‑to‑date versions and hardened endpoints). These are standard but effective compensating controls where immediate firmware fixes are delayed. (cisa.gov)

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Weaknesses and risks in the current response​

• Patch availability and scope unclear in republished notice: The advisory notes the affected version but does not publish an explicit corrected firmware version (or the public advisory may be used as an initial notification). When vendors do not immediately publish a corrective firmware or a clear upgrade path, operators are left to rely on mitigations rather than full remediation. Rockwell’s trust center typically lists corrected versions for many Logix advisories and should be checked for an update. (rockwellautomation.com)
• Local/physical‑access classification may understate real‑world attack paths: While the advisory says the flaw requires physical access to the maintenance menu, many ICS incidents begin with compromised engineering workstations, privileged vendor‑remote sessions, or unmonitored maintenance ports. In practice, local often translates to adjacent or accessible via misconfiguration, so owning organizations must assume broader exposure vectors. Historical Rockwell advisories and external analyses emphasize pivot paths from IT to OT or via remote management tools. (cisa.gov, ics-cert.kaspersky.com)
• Limited public detail on exploit mechanics: For defenders the advisory provides high‑level impact (arbitrary code execution via crafted payload in maintenance menu) but relatively few low‑level exploit indicators (file names, payload markers, system behavior traces). Without detailed IOCs or a vendor patch, detection and hunting are harder. This makes timely patch management and layered controls even more critical.

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Practical mitigation and triage checklist for WindowsForum readers (engineers, integrators, and sysadmins)​

The following checklist is organized to help operators take prioritized actions immediately and over the medium term.
Immediate (hours to 48 hours)

• Inventory: Identify CompactLogix® 5480 units and confirm firmware/Windows package versions. Prioritize any with the exact build: Version 32‑37.011 + Windows package 2.1.0 (Win10 v1607).
• Physical controls: Restrict access to controller cabinets, engineering workstations, and maintenance panels. Enforce sign‑in controls for maintenance tasks and restrict removable media.
• Network isolation: Ensure controllers are not directly reachable from the internet; block unnecessary ports and isolate OT VLANs behind strict ACLs. CISA advises removing internet accessibility for control system devices. (cisa.gov)

Short term (days to 2 weeks)

• Apply compensating controls: Disable or lock maintenance menus where possible (per vendor guidance) and restrict maintenance access to a small, vetted set of administrators.
• Harden remote access: If remote maintenance or vendor access is required, use well‑configured, up‑to‑date VPNs with MFA and jump hosts; log all sessions and restrict the software allowed on those jump hosts. CISA recommends VPNs but warns they are only as secure as their endpoints. (cisa.gov)
• Monitoring & logging: Increase logging for engineering stations and controller management interfaces; enable alerts for unusual maintenance menu access, unexpected uploads/downloads, or abnormal reboots.

Medium term (weeks to months)

• Vendor patches: Monitor Rockwell’s Trust Center and CISA advisories for a vendor‑issued corrective firmware or Windows package update; schedule lab testing followed by staged rollouts. Rockwell’s advisories historically map corrected firmware versions for Logix families; confirm the exact corrective release before mass upgrades. (rockwellautomation.com)
• Defense‑in‑depth: Implement network segmentation, host‑based controls on engineering workstations, role‑based access control for engineering accounts, and application whitelisting for maintenance tools.
• Tabletop and recovery drills: Run incident simulations that include scenarios where controllers are compromised or require physical intervention to recover; verify procedures for safe shutdown, code verification, and recovery without jeopardizing safety interlocks.

Detection and forensic guidance

• Look for unexpected access to maintenance menus, unusual file uploads, unexplained process launches on controller‑attached Windows hosts, or modified startup entries for services that interact with the controller.
• Preserve volatile artifacts and engineering workstation logs before rebooting devices if you suspect compromise; coordinate with vendor support and incident response teams.

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For forensic teams and SOCs: what to capture now​

• Engineering workstation event logs (security and system), FactoryTalk/Studio 5000 session logs, USB/removable‑media insertion events, and active remote‑support sessions.
• Controller logs and any uploaded script/binary metadata (timestamps, checksums).
• Network captures of maintenance sessions (where allowed) and any abnormal packets to maintenance ports; these may reveal crafted payloads or transfer patterns.
• If compromise is suspected, retain disk images of relevant systems to permit binary analysis and vendor coordination.

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Editorial analysis: wider implications and the systemic picture​

This advisory is another data point in an ongoing trend: industrial ecosystems are increasingly software‑rich, and traditional operational assumptions (physical isolation, trusted maintenance menus) are brittle under modern threat models. Several systemic takeaways follow:

• Security posture is not just a patch problem. Many Rockwell advisories over the last two years reveal recurring classes of issues (improper input validation, missing authentication, debug interfaces exposed) and a pattern where mitigations and compartmentalization are as important as firmware fixes. Operators must maintain rigorous change management and network architecture hygiene in addition to patching. (rockwellautomation.com, cisa.gov)
• The local nature of many ICS bugs is not a comfort. Insider threat, contractor maintenance workflows, and insecure remote maintenance channels turn local vulnerabilities into practical attack vectors. Hardening maintenance processes, reducing the attack surface for vendor tooling, and strict physical access controls need to be standard operating practice. (ics-cert.kaspersky.com)
• Visibility gaps remain a critical challenge. The lack of deep IOC detail in many advisories limits defenders’ ability to hunt and detect pre‑exploit activity. Investment in endpoint monitoring for engineering workstations and OT‑aware NDR (network detection and response) focused on CIP/EtherNet‑IP behaviors is increasingly a necessity rather than a nicety. (cisa.gov)

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Action roadmap for WindowsForum readers (concise, prioritized)​

• Verify: Check inventory for CompactLogix® 5480 units and exact build strings (32‑37.011 + Win pkg 2.1.0).
• Contain: Restrict physical and network access to affected units; block public Internet access and isolate OT networks. (cisa.gov)
• Compensate: Disable or lock maintenance menus where vendor guidance permits, and enforce strict vendor‑maintenance processes.
• Patch: Track Rockwell Trust Center for a corrective release; test and schedule upgrades once vendor fixes are published. (rockwellautomation.com)
• Monitor: Increase logging, inspect engineering workstation events, and implement alerting for unexpected maintenance activity.

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Final assessment and recommendations​

The republished CISA advisory for CompactLogix® 5480 (CVE‑2025‑9160) shines a spotlight on a high‑impact class of ICS vulnerability — missing authentication for critical functions — and the possible outcome of arbitrary code execution if an attacker can reach the controller’s maintenance interface. Even though CISA reports no known public exploitation at the time of republishing, the combination of low attack complexity and the potential for catastrophic operational effects warrants rapid, prioritized action from asset owners.
Operators should treat this advisory as part of a broader risk program: combine immediate compensating controls (segmentation, restricted physical access, hardened remote support), aggressive inventory and patch planning, and enhanced monitoring of engineering workstations and maintenance interfaces. Cross‑check vendor trust center pages and CISA advisories for updates to corrective firmware and follow a staged, tested upgrade plan once vendor patches are available. (rockwellautomation.com, cisa.gov)
Cautionary note: the CVE assignment and advisory details included here are drawn from the republished advisory material provided to CISA and the vendor; security registries and vendor advisories can change as fixes are released and metadata is updated. Operators must verify the precise CVE, affected build ranges, and corrective firmware on the vendor’s official advisory page and on CISA’s ICS advisory repository before making irreversible operational changes.

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A disciplined patch program, strict operational controls around maintenance workflows, and a layered detection capability remain the most reliable defenses against this class of vulnerability. The CompactLogix 5480 advisory is a reminder that physical controls and maintenance discipline are as critical as network security in modern industrial environments.

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Source: CISA Rockwell Automation CompactLogix® 5480 | CISA