Critical Industrial IoT Vulnerability: CVE-2022-24999 in ABB RMC-100 Controllers Threatens Manufacturing Security

Few industrial vulnerabilities have the far-reaching potential to disrupt critical infrastructures as profoundly as those discovered in the heart of IIoT (Industrial Internet of Things) systems. Among the latest to draw attention is CVE-2022-24999, a prototype pollution flaw unearthed in ABB’s RMC-100 automation controller line. This exploit, assigned a notably high CVSS v4 score of 8.7 by CISA, places core manufacturing operations at risk, given the breadth of ABB deployment worldwide and the crucial role its devices play in production lines. Let's delve deeper to understand the implications, technical contours, and the multi-layered defense measures vital for stemming this threat in an increasingly interconnected operational technology (OT) landscape.

ABB RMC-100 Vulnerability: More Than a Technicality​

The Enormity of Industrial Exposure​

ABB’s RMC-100 and RMC-100 LITE products, both widely integrated in critical manufacturing sectors, are at the heart of this advisory. The sheer ubiquity of these controllers in automation infrastructures—from factories in the EU to logistics hubs across North America—means a vulnerability of this scale is much more than an academic concern. When OT systems are breached or even temporarily compromised, the effects ripple out far beyond operational setbacks, potentially impacting everything from safety and compliance to national economies.

Prototype Pollution: The Under-Estimated Threat​

Prototype pollution, the core flaw here, is notoriously insidious. It occurs when an attacker manipulates internal object prototypes in JavaScript environments, often via insufficiently validated inputs. ABB’s implementation of a RESTful web interface, while an enabler of inter-device connectivity and smoother configuration, inadvertently exposes the underlying system to such attacks.
Successfully exploited, the vulnerability allows a remote attacker to send a specially crafted message to the RMC-100’s web UI. The result? A node process crash, translating to a denial-of-service (DoS) event that halts certain automation workflows until the REST interface is manually restarted. While the attack does not compromise confidentiality or integrity directly (hence a lesser score in those CVSS metrics), the high availability risk is paramount in 24/7 industrial environments where uptime is non-negotiable.

Technical Deep Dive​

Which Products Are Vulnerable?​

• RMC-100: Impacted firmware runs versions from 2105457-036 to 2105457-044.
• RMC-100 LITE: Versions from 2106229-010 to 2106229-016 are affected.
• Vulnerability Vector: Only systems with the REST interface enabled are impacted, and critically, this interface is disabled by default—an important built-in risk mitigation.

The exploit hinges on access to the REST API, meaning that instantiations exposed to networks (especially if directly reachable from outside the plant perimeter) present a larger risk.

Anatomy of CVE-2022-24999​

The heart of the issue is found in the way the RMC-100 web UI node processes incoming REST calls. By manipulating object prototype attributes using custom payloads, a remote attacker can corrupt the node’s internal state. With no robust mechanism to sanitize or control these modifications, resource corruption ensues, resulting in a Denial-of-Service until administrators can intervene and reset the node.

• Attack Complexity: Low—no user privileges or interaction are needed.
• Vector: Network—exploitable remotely, emphasizing the critical importance of internal network protection.

Both CVSS v3 (score: 7.5) and the latest v4 (score: 8.7, which weighs availability even more) numbers reinforce the dangerous potential of this flaw.

Assessing the Real-World Risk​

Operational Impact​

Unlike ransomware or data-theft campaigns making daily headlines, this vulnerability's greatest threat is operational downtime. In tightly coupled manufacturing and automation systems, even a transient DoS can lead to:

• Disrupted production lines
• Delayed orders and shipping
• Material waste during unscheduled stops
• Safety system triggers or failures to operate
• Erosion of trust with partners and clients

Moreover, while the exploit does not presently have reports of active, public abuse, the mere possibility—paired with public exploit code’s rising prevalence—demands urgent defensive action.

Network Segmentation: The Hidden Weakness​

Ironically, the single factor that could render vast installations vulnerable is also among the most common failings in industrial IT: lax internal segmentation. While ABB’s default position disables the REST interface, real-world operational needs—like custom MQTT setups—lead many administrators to re-enable it, sometimes without appreciating the extra exposure. When these systems are left reachable from broader business networks or, in the worst cases, the open internet, the protective boundary is no more effective than a motley fence.

Mitigation: Defense in Depth is Non-Negotiable​

ABB’s Immediate Recommendations​

• Patch Early, Patch Often: Users are urged to apply ABB’s updates as soon as possible. Vulnerable versions must be upgraded at the earliest convenience.
• Disable REST When Possible: Since the REST interface is not used during normal operations, keep it off unless immediately needed for configuration.
• Never Put RMC-100 on Public Networks: These controllers should never be accessible from the internet, under any circumstance.

Cybersecurity Hygiene for Industrial Environments​

Beyond direct updates, ABB underscores textbook—but often neglected—cybersecurity practices:

• Strong Network Segmentation: Isolate automation and control networks from IT and public-facing domains.
• Physical Security: Control physical access to all devices and network switches.
• Import Controls: Scan all files and data before introducing them to the control environment to avoid “sneakernet” malware.
• Remote Access: When remote configuration is inescapable, use up-to-date, securely configured VPNs, acknowledging that VPNs are only as secure as their endpoints and need their own regular patch cycles.

ABB also strongly advises reviewing its broader cybersecurity advisories, which often contain case studies and mitigations gleaned from real-world incident response.

The Role of CISA and ICS Security Best Practices​

CISA, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, complements ABB’s stance by providing an arsenal of actionable guidance:

• Incident Response: Follow established protocols at the first sign of compromise and report to CISA for aggregation and wider threat analysis.
• Defense-in-Depth: CISA’s publications, such as “Improving Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity with Defense-in-Depth Strategies,” remain critical reading for all OT administrators.
• Continuous Assessment: Regularly audit both configuration and personnel adherence to security protocols. Human error remains a leading cause of configuration drift that leaves systems exposed.

Importantly, no known public exploitation targeting this vulnerability has been reported to date. This window of respite should galvanize OT teams to act decisively before attackers inevitably refine and disseminate working exploits.

The Broader Context: Prototype Pollution in IIoT​

Why Prototype Pollution is Surging​

Prototype pollution’s resonance within industrial systems is symptomatic of broader development and deployment trends:

• Reuse of Web Frameworks in OT: Modern automation controllers increasingly run web stacks derived from mainstream IT, inheriting both their flexibility and their vulnerabilities.
• API-First Architectures: The proliferation of RESTful APIs exposes more surface area than legacy, opaque protocols did.
• Insufficient Security Testing: Firmware and embedded software lag behind enterprise applications in adopting robust SDLC (Software Development Life Cycle) practices, leading to repeat classes of vulnerabilities.

Supply Chain and Third-Party Components​

A central—and sobering—lesson lies in the fact that even if an end-user follows all guidelines, vulnerabilities embedded in off-the-shelf IIoT devices like those from ABB can ripple across entire supply chains. With just-in-time manufacturing now common, a temporary outage in a single plant can disrupt upstream and downstream partners, causing compounding economic effects.

Looking Forward: Building Resilience in IIoT​

Automation Without Negligence​

The allure of automated control—reduced costs, increased efficiency, real-time analytics—will only continue to drive adoption of connected controllers like RMC-100. But as organizations embrace digital transformation, the old model of security through obscurity is insufficient. Device-level vulnerabilities, especially those remotely exploitable and requiring low skill or specialized access, necessitate a new baseline of vigilance.

Strategic Recommendations for Industry Leaders​

• Industrial Cybersecurity Training: Move beyond one-off awareness sessions. Make security—especially around new deployments—a career-long learning journey for both OT and IT staff.
• Automated Patch Management: Where feasible, integrate patch checking into plant maintenance routines. Retrofits will remain a challenge for long-lived hardware, but visibility is half the battle.
• External Penetration Testing: Engage third-party experts to simulate real-world attacks against OT networks, specifically targeting vectors like exposed REST interfaces and commonly used APIs.

The Vendor Role: A Journey, Not a Destination​

While ABB’s prompt acknowledgment, patch availability, and advisory transparency are positive steps, they also point to the increased onus on vendors to prioritize secure-by-design principles:

• Secure Defaults: Interfaces should be enabled only when strictly necessary, with security warnings and just-in-time guidance for operators.
• Robust Input Validation: Defense in depth at the code level, with aggressive filtering and sandboxing of external inputs, is mandatory for web-exposed modules.
• Transparency and Support: Rapid advisory publication and easy, well-documented upgrade paths empower customers to manage risk more effectively.

An Evolving Threatscape​

The Interplay of Convenience and Risk​

The need for seamless, remotely managed automation systems is not going away. However, each new interface and API, if not rigorously secured by both design and day-to-day operations, provides a fresh entry point for attackers. As we have seen in other sectors, attackers are creative: even as an initial flaw like prototype pollution “only” causes a DoS, persistent adversaries may find chained exploits that escalate the impact.

Surveillance and Continuous Monitoring​

It’s no longer sufficient to fix known flaws and hope for the best. Continuous monitoring of network activity, anomaly detection, and strong incident response are essential. Industrial Security Operations Centers (SOCs) must expand their remit to cover both enterprise and production environments, blending knowledge from both to spot cross-domain threats that may otherwise slip through the cracks.

Conclusion: The Price of Inaction​

As industrial automation pushes deeper into every sector—from food processing to energy distribution—the stability and security of systems like the ABB RMC-100 become linchpins for economic resilience. The prototype pollution vulnerability logged as CVE-2022-24999 stands as a stark reminder: the foundational software in industrial environments is only as strong as its weakest interface.
With attackers never far behind public advisories, and automation infrastructure increasingly forming the invisible backbone of modern life, robust, proactive risk management in IIoT is mission critical. Organizations cannot rely solely on vendor defaults or isolated technical controls; layered defense, rigorous patching, and a culture of security awareness must become non-negotiable facets of daily operation.
Failing to address these challenges—before attackers are able to exploit them at scale—could result in consequences well beyond inconvenient downtime. In a world where production halts can lead to health, safety, and financial crises, diligence is not only prudent; it's a fundamental responsibility.

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Source: www.cisa.gov ABB RMC-100 | CISA