A subtle but important memory‑management bug in the Linux kernel’s Mellanox mlx5e network driver — tracked as CVE‑2023‑53371 — was patched upstream after maintainers discovered an error path that failed to free a dynamically allocated object, permitting a local attacker or misbehaving process to leak kernel memory and, with repeated triggers, cause service degradation or denial of service.
The mlx5e driver implements high‑performance networking features for Mellanox/NVIDIA ConnectX‑class adapters; it is widely used in servers, hypervisors, and network function virtualization (NFV) platforms. The reported defect lives in the flow steering / traffic‑tracking helper path — specifically the function mlx5e_fs_tt_redirect_any_create inside drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/fs_tt_redirect.c — where an allocated object referenced by fs->any was not reliably released on an error return. At a technical level, this is a classic missing-release memory leak: the code allocated memory for a helper structure and then, when a subsequent step failed, returned without freeing that allocation. The net result under stress or repeated invocation is progressive kernel slab consumption that can ultimately trigger OOM conditions or disruptive behavior on long‑running hosts. Vendors and trackers characterize the practical impact as availability/resource exhaustion rather than immediate confidentiality or integrity compromise.
Because the vulnerability is local in nature, exposures concentrate in multi‑tenant, NFV, and hypervisor environments where untrusted actors can exercise device control or where device management workflows are heavily automated. The practical steps for system owners are clear: identify mlx5 hosts, apply vendor kernel updates that include the fix, reboot into patched kernels, and monitor kernel memory usage to ensure the leak no longer appears. Operators and vendors should treat this repair as routine but urgent hygiene: the patch is small and low‑risk, but the window between disclosure and complete fleet patching is where availability incidents can occur — and in cloud or multi‑tenant environments, that window is where attackers with local access may try to create operational disruption.
Source: MSRC Security Update Guide - Microsoft Security Response Center
Background
The mlx5e driver implements high‑performance networking features for Mellanox/NVIDIA ConnectX‑class adapters; it is widely used in servers, hypervisors, and network function virtualization (NFV) platforms. The reported defect lives in the flow steering / traffic‑tracking helper path — specifically the function mlx5e_fs_tt_redirect_any_create inside drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/fs_tt_redirect.c — where an allocated object referenced by fs->any was not reliably released on an error return. At a technical level, this is a classic missing-release memory leak: the code allocated memory for a helper structure and then, when a subsequent step failed, returned without freeing that allocation. The net result under stress or repeated invocation is progressive kernel slab consumption that can ultimately trigger OOM conditions or disruptive behavior on long‑running hosts. Vendors and trackers characterize the practical impact as availability/resource exhaustion rather than immediate confidentiality or integrity compromise. What the bug is — concise technical summary
- Component: Linux kernel, net/mlx5e (Mellanox mlx5e driver).
- Function / file: mlx5e_fs_tt_redirect_any_create in drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/fs_tt_redirect.c.
- Root cause: the memory pointed to by the structure member
fs->anywas not freed in the error path of the function, leaving the allocation orphaned on failure. - Impact: local denial of service via kernel memory leak (progressive slab growth leading to instability).
- Exploitability: local only; no public proof‑of‑concept for privilege escalation or remote code execution at disclosure.
How the upstream fix works
Upstream maintainers addressed the defect by ensuring that the allocation assigned tofs->any is freed on all error return paths, aligning the error cleanup with the behavior of mlx5e_fs_tt_redirect_any_destroy. In short, the fix restores symmetrical allocation/free semantics so partial failure does not leak the allocated object. The change is intentionally minimal and defensive — a small cleanup added to the error path — which makes the patch low risk and straightforward to backport into stable kernels. Open vulnerability trackers and the OSV entry reference the upstream stable commit IDs that contain the cleanup change; distribution vendors have been mapping those commits into their kernel packages as backports. Note that direct retrieval of some git.kernel.org commit pages may be blocked or unavailable from some networks, but the change is recorded in multiple vulnerability databases and distributor advisories. Why this matters to admins and operators
Even a small per‑trigger leak can be operationally meaningful in servers that run for months or years, or in environments where the vulnerable path is exercised frequently by automation, tests, or multi‑tenant workloads. Consider these real‑world scenarios:- An orchestration script or tenant workload repeatedly triggers the mlx5e flow (for example, via programmatic devlink or representor manipulations) and slowly accumulates leaked allocations until memory pressure affects other subsystems.
- CI/Test farms or developer machines that frequently detach/attach interfaces or run netdev simulation harnesses can reproduce the erroneous path often, accelerating the leak.
- Cloud hypervisors and shared hosts: a local tenant with limited privileges but the ability to interact with NIC control plane can, in theory, turn a leak into a service disruption on the host or in a noisy‑neighbor attack. Vendor advisories emphasize that multi‑tenant contexts increase exposure.
Who is affected
- Any Linux distribution shipping a kernel build that contains the vulnerable mlx5e code path and that has not yet applied the upstream cleanup fix is potentially affected. Trackers and distributor advisories list vendor package statuses and backport decisions.
- Systems using Mellanox / NVIDIA ConnectX‑5/ConnectX‑6 (mlx5) hardware or that load the mlx5 kernel modules are the most likely to be exposed.
- Single‑user desktops without Mellanox hardware are typically not affected; multi‑tenant hosts, NFV, storage and hypervisor platforms are higher priority.
Detection and forensics — how to spot exploitation or hits
This class of bug leaves tangible operational traces before catastrophic failure:- Monitor kernel logs (dmesg / journalctl -k) for warnings about leaked allocations, refcount warnings, or recurring netdev error traces associated with mlx5_core / mlx5e symbols. kmemleak reports (if enabled) will list unreferenced allocations with backtraces pointing to the allocation site.
- Watch kernel slab / kmem usage trends. Repeated small leaks accumulate and show as steady, unexplained growth in kernel slab caches (e.g., kmalloc‑100 / kmem‑accounting).
- Reproduce suspicious conditions in a lab with kmemleak enabled: exercise the attach/probe or flow creation path repeatedly and examine the kmemleak output; many public triage notes show kmemleak traces were used to confirm the leak during triage.
- Check whether mlx5 modules are loaded:
- lsmod | grep mlx5
- Confirm kernel version and vendor package metadata:
- uname -r; dpkg -l | grep linux-image (or rpm -q kernel)
- Inspect kernel logs for mlx5 traces:
- journalctl -k | grep -i mlx5
- If kmemleak is available, run the detector and inspect reports:
- echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak; cat /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak
Recommended remediation and mitigation steps
The single reliable remediation is to install the vendor‑supplied kernel update that incorporates the upstream fix and then reboot into the patched kernel. Because kernel fixes require a reboot to take effect, plan maintenance windows accordingly. Vendors typically backport the small corrective change to stable kernel series; verify package changelogs reference the CVE or the upstream commit IDs where possible. Operational playbook:- Inventory hosts with mlx5 hardware or loaded mlx5 modules.
- Use lspci to find Mellanox devices and lsmod to detect module usage.
- Map running kernel versions to vendor advisories and list the fixed kernel package names for each distro in your fleet. Confirm whether your vendor already shipped a backport.
- Apply kernel package updates on staging/pilot hosts first, reboot, and run regression checks exercising the NIC and devlink/representor workflows. Validate that previously observed leakage or kmemleak traces no longer appear.
- Roll out to production after successful pilot validation; monitor kernel slab usage and dmesg after the reboot.
- Limit local device control: restrict who can run devlink/ethtool and who has the CAP_NET_ADMIN capability on hosts. This reduces attacker surface where tenants or unprivileged processes could repeatedly exercise the vulnerable path.
- Unload mlx5 modules only on systems where it is safe to do so and where alternative networking exists — this is disruptive and not generally recommended for production NICs that carry traffic. The command is typically: modprobe -r mlx5_core (but confirm dependencies and service impact first).
- Isolate at‑risk hosts: place machines with mlx5 hardware into stricter network segments or avoid exposing management APIs until patched.
Vendor and distribution status (practical mapping)
Multiple distribution trackers and catalogues list the CVE and its status:- Ubuntu has recorded CVE‑2023‑53371 and assigned a medium priority (see Ubuntu Security Notices for package mappings). Administrators running Ubuntu kernels should consult their release-specific tracker for fixed package versions.
- Debian/OSV entries show the CVE and map it into Debian’s security tracker; Debian maintainers typically backport stable fixes into distribution kernel packages.
- Amazon Linux / ALAS lists the CVE and, in some mappings, an assessed CVSS vector with an Important/7.0 score where applicable; vendor statuses vary by kernel channel and may show “pending fix” for some package streams.
Critical analysis — strengths of the fix, residual risks, and operational advice
Strengths
- The upstream patch is minimal and defensive: it simply ensures consistent cleanup semantics in an error path that previously omitted freeing an allocation. Minimal changes like this are easy to review, test, and backport, which accelerates vendor fix cycles.
- Because the vulnerability is local‑only and the fix is a cleanup, regression risk is low; vendors can safely include the change in stable backports.
Residual risks and caveats
- Operational exposure lingers until every affected host is patched. OEM images, embedded vendor kernels, and appliance images often lag the mainline and distribution kernels; these images may remain vulnerable until the vendor explicitly ships an updated image. Inventory and vendor confirmation are essential.
- Multi‑tenant environments increase the attack surface. What is local on a shared host can effectively be “adjacent” or “co‑tenant” in cloud and virtualized contexts. If tenants can exercise devlink / representor / netdev operations, the risk grows.
- Leak detection requires observability. Small leaks can take time to manifest; if slab telemetry or kmemleak isn’t enabled, operators may miss slow degradation until it becomes material. Centralized kernel telemetry and alerting help catch issues early.
Practical advice
- Prioritize patching hosts that host multi‑tenant workloads, NFV functions, hypervisors, and storage nodes. Single‑host desktops without mlx5 hardware are lower priority.
- Use kmemleak or slab metric alerts on long‑lived hosts. If you observe unexplained slab growth and the mlx5 stack is present, prioritize patching and perform a controlled reboot into a fixed kernel.
- Maintain an accurate inventory of vendor kernel packages and the corresponding upstream commit IDs used by your images — vendor communication is the fastest path to confirm whether an image contains the fix.
What remains uncertain and what was unverifiable at time of writing
- The public git.kernel.org commit pages referenced by some trackers were not retrievable from all networks during verification attempts (HTTP 403 or access restrictions), so direct inspection of the raw patch diffs was not always possible from every vantage point. Vulnerability databases and distributor advisories reference the upstream stable commit IDs and document the fix; administrators should rely on vendor advisories and package changelogs where git access is restricted. This limitation is a fetch/access issue, not an indication the commits don’t exist.
- There is no authoritative, public proof‑of‑concept showing privilege escalation or remote exploitation using only this memory leak. Public advisories and trackers uniformly classify the primary impact as availability/resource exhaustion; any claims of immediate RCE should be treated as unverified until reproducible exploit chains are published.
Detection, response and long‑term hardening checklist
- Prioritize patching for hosts with mlx5 hardware and multi‑tenant exposure.
- Verify patched package changelogs reference the CVE or upstream commits; maintain a mapping between kernel package versions and upstream fix commits.
- Enable and run kmemleak in test environments to validate fixes and to reproduce leak conditions where safe.
- Harden local device controls: restrict CAP_NET_ADMIN, restrict access to devlink/netdev interfaces, and remove unnecessary device exposure on multi‑tenant hosts.
- Maintain kernel observability (centralized slab metrics, dmesg aggregation, vmcore capture on kernel oops) so that slow leaks are detected before they become outages.
Conclusion
CVE‑2023‑53371 is a textbook example of how small lifecycle omissions in kernel drivers can yield meaningful operational risk. The technical fix is small and low‑risk — freeing an allocated object on the error path — and distributors should be able to backport it quickly to stable kernels. Nevertheless, the operational work is not trivial: operators must inventory affected hosts, coordinate kernel upgrades and reboots, and apply short‑term mitigations where patching cannot be immediate.Because the vulnerability is local in nature, exposures concentrate in multi‑tenant, NFV, and hypervisor environments where untrusted actors can exercise device control or where device management workflows are heavily automated. The practical steps for system owners are clear: identify mlx5 hosts, apply vendor kernel updates that include the fix, reboot into patched kernels, and monitor kernel memory usage to ensure the leak no longer appears. Operators and vendors should treat this repair as routine but urgent hygiene: the patch is small and low‑risk, but the window between disclosure and complete fleet patching is where availability incidents can occur — and in cloud or multi‑tenant environments, that window is where attackers with local access may try to create operational disruption.
Source: MSRC Security Update Guide - Microsoft Security Response Center