Edge Copilot Mode: The Agentic AI Browser Redefining Web Workflows

Microsoft Edge is set to get a new layer of defense against malicious sideloaded extensions, a move that could materially reduce a long-standing browser attack surface — but the timing and scope announced in some reports remain only partially verifiable against Microsoft’s public roadmaps and documentation. Reports say Edge will be able to detect, revoke and remove sideloaded extensions judged to be malicious, with a rollout targeted for November 2025; Microsoft’s extension platform already includes several protections and enterprise controls that make such a capability a natural evolution.
This feature — if implemented as described — changes the playing field for both defenders and attackers. It raises immediate questions about detection methods, telemetry and user control, enterprise manageability, and the risk of false positives. Below is a detailed, verifiable briefing: what Microsoft has published, what reputable reporting and security research reveal, how the new protection would fit into Edge’s existing extension model, practical implications for users and IT, and where claims remain unconfirmed.

Background: why sideloaded extensions are a real problem​

Browser extensions are powerful: they can modify pages, intercept web requests, inject scripts, and access sensitive page content. That power also makes extensions a favored channel for abuse.

• Sideloading refers to installing an extension outside the browser’s vetted add‑ons marketplace. Sideloaded extensions may bypass store review and thereby carry higher risk.
• Threat actors use sideloading to deliver adware, trackers, credential stealers, and persistent nasties that resist removal by normal UI flows.
• Some malicious extensions persist via background processes, auto-reinstall mechanisms, or by hijacking settings (search engine, new-tab, homepage) and updates.

Microsoft has long provided enterprise policies and runtime protections to limit these risks, including a Group Policy/MDM setting (AllowSideloadingOfExtensions) that can disallow unverified sideloaded installs, and ExtensionSettings and ExtensionInstallBlocklist policies for fine-grained management. Those policies exist because sideloaded or unvetted extensions are recognized as a significant attack vector.

What’s being announced (the claim)​

Several reports state that Microsoft Edge will gain the ability to detect and revoke malicious sideloaded extensions automatically. The core capabilities attributed to the announcement are:

• Automatic detection of sideloaded extensions that exhibit malicious behavior or which have been flagged through telemetry and analysis.
• Automatic revocation, disabling and removal of such extensions from affected browsers to stop active exploitation and prevent further harm.
• A rollout scheduled or projected for November 2025, listed as “in development” on a Microsoft roadmap entry cited by reporting outlets.

These changes are described as expanding Edge’s current protections (which already include auto-disable behaviors for extensions that try to hijack key settings and a performance detector for slow or problematic extensions) to take direct remediation action against extensions determined to be malicious.

What Microsoft’s official resources say today​

Microsoft’s public developer and product documentation confirm several adjacent facts while not fully detailing the exact “revoke sideloaded extension” behavior as described in secondary reporting.

• Microsoft documents an ecosystem of extension governance: Partner Center, the Edge add‑ons store, developer policies, and a Publish API intended to harden the publishing/update process for extensions. These controls aim to reduce supply‑chain risk and secure developer credentials.
• Edge’s extensions roadmap and released-features pages show active work to secure the publishing pipeline and to transition the platform (Manifest V2→V3), but do not include a public, detailed specification for an automatic revocation mechanism for sideloaded extensions on the same pages examined for this story. Microsoft’s roadmap pages and extension docs reference extension lifecycle controls, enterprise policies and ongoing platform hardening.
• The browser policy configuration (AllowSideloadingOfExtensions) is explicitly documented for managed environments, reinforcing that administrative controls exist at the device and user policy level to block unverified sideloading. That policy remains an important complementary control for organizations.

Because Microsoft publishes many discrete resources (Edge developer docs, Microsoft 365 Roadmap entries, and the Edge blog), a specific, singular “revoke malicious sideloaded extensions” page in Microsoft’s public documentation could be added or updated as the feature develops. At time of publication, the extension governance and store hardening changes are documented; a public, full specification for automatic revocation tied to a November 2025 delivery was not found in a single Microsoft doc that names the feature with the precise language quoted in some reports. That timing therefore should be treated as reported but not independently confirmed in Microsoft’s public documentation.

---

How this would fit into Edge’s current extension security model​

Microsoft Edge currently uses a layered approach to extension safety:

• Store vetting: Extensions published to the Microsoft Edge Add‑ons store go through developer policy checks intended to find malware, privacy abuses, and disallowed behaviors. The Partner Center and the Publish API changes strengthen this vetting and publishing pipeline.
• Auto‑disable protections: Edge already disables extensions that attempt to forcibly change critical browser settings (search, new-tab, homepage) or that are flagged for misbehavior by local heuristics. Users can re-enable extensions after confirming their intent, and Microsoft documents these behaviors.
• Enterprise policy controls: Administrators can prevent sideloading or block all external extensions, force-install approved extensions, and control runtime host access via ExtensionSettings policies. These remain the recommended hardening controls for managed fleets.
• Runtime reputation and telemetry: Cloud-backed services such as Microsoft Defender SmartScreen and store reputation services are used to flag malicious sites and potentially untrusted content; an extension reputation model would logically reuse such telemetry for revocation decisions if Microsoft implements automatic removal.

A revocation capability aimed specifically at sideloaded extensions would therefore be a logical extension of Edge’s existing defenses — combining local detection heuristics, store/reputation telemetry and enterprise policy state to determine whether an extension should be disabled and removed automatically.

Practical detection levers Microsoft might use​

The likely signals and heuristics for detecting malicious sideloaded extensions include:

• Permission abuse: sudden use of broad host permissions (read/change data on all sites) or suspicious new permissions requests after updates.
• Behavior patterns: unexpected background network activity, hidden UI injection, credential harvesting behaviors or script injection on sites that contain sensitive input forms.
• Update metadata: suspicious update URLs or update patterns that match known abuse techniques (e.g., rapid repackaging, obfuscated updates).
• Reputation telemetry: correlation with known malicious developer accounts or indicators aggregated from Defender SmartScreen and threat telemetry.
• User reports and heuristics: spikes in user complaints about popups, redirects, or unexplained settings changes.

These levers already underpin store review and runtime protections; a revocation flow would combine them with an enforcement mechanism that can disable and remove the extension programmatically.

---

Benefits: what a revocation feature would deliver​

• Faster mitigation: Automatic revocation could stop malicious extensions in minutes rather than days, preventing further exposure and exfiltration.
• Reduced user friction: Less reliance on users to notice and remove persistent unwanted extensions that often use stealthy persistence.
• Lower operational load: For enterprise security teams, automatic mitigation reduces incident triage time and containment overhead.
• Supply‑chain immunity improvements: Strengthening the update and publishing pipeline reduces the chance that a legitimate extension’s update can be weaponized.

---

Risks, limitations and unanswered questions​

The defensive upside is real, but automatic revocation also introduces new operational, privacy and reliability risks that require clear answers:

• False positives and user control: Automatic removal of an extension risks disabling legitimate tools. How will Microsoft minimize false positives and provide transparent remediation paths? Will users be able to restore false-positively removed extensions easily?
• Enterprise exceptions and manageability: Organizations often rely on specialized, in-house or legacy extensions. Robust policy controls must allow admins to opt out or whitelist enterprise extensions to avoid breaking workflows.
• Visibility and audit trails: Security teams need logs, telemetry access, and an appeals process. Will Microsoft provide admin dashboards and notification channels describing why an extension was revoked?
• Privacy and telemetry: Detection might rely on telemetry that sends metadata to Microsoft. The privacy posture must be documented — what data is collected, and how long is it retained?
• Potential for abuse: A remote revocation mechanism can become an attack surface itself if poorly secured. Strong authentication and tamper‑proof signing for revocation commands are essential.
• Scope: Will revocation apply only to sideloaded extensions, or also to store-installed extensions that become malicious after acquisition (supply-chain takeover)? The latter has deep implications for both users and enterprises.

Because the verification of the exact revocation mechanism and its governance model was not possible from a single public specification at press time, these remain important points to clarify before broad rollout is relied upon by administrators.

---

How to prepare: guidance for consumers and enterprises​

Short-term actions for everyday users:

• Audit installed extensions: Open Edge → Settings and more → Extensions → Manage extensions and remove anything unfamiliar or unused.
• Prefer vetted stores: Install extensions from the Microsoft Edge Add‑ons store when possible and avoid sideloading unless necessary.
• Limit site access: Change each extension’s site access to On specific sites rather than On all sites where feasible.
• Use profiles: Separate work and personal browsing profiles so risky extensions don’t mix credentials or cookies.

Enterprise steps for IT teams:

• Harden policies:
• Disable sideloading using the AllowSideloadingOfExtensions policy (or enforce via MDM/GPO where appropriate).
• Build an allowlist for required extensions and a blocklist for known risky IDs using ExtensionSettings, ExtensionInstallBlocklist and ExtensionInstallForcelist policies.
• Test before broad deployment:
• Pilot any new revocation behavior in a segment to evaluate false positive rates and compatibility with critical workflows.
• Logging and monitoring:
• Integrate Edge telemetry and extension events with SIEM/EDR pipelines so security teams can correlate extension behavior with other suspicious indicators.
• Update workflows and IR:
• Update incident response playbooks to include extension revocation, rollback, and user communication templates.
• User education:
• Train users to identify rogue extensions and to report unexpected browser behavior rather than re‑enabling removed extensions without guidance.

Edge’s enterprise documentation and policy settings provide the control surface to implement most of these measures today; adding a revocation feature should augment administrators’ ability to automatically protect managed fleets if the feature is delivered with enterprise‑grade controls and auditability.

---

Security context: why vendors are moving here​

The industry is moving toward active, telemetry-driven mitigation for endpoint and browser threats because prevention-only models fail when attackers get creative with trusted artifacts such as extensions, add-ins and plugins. Recent research and disclosed vulnerabilities have shown practical paths attackers use to install malicious extensions or weaponize legitimate APIs.

• Researchers disclosed a privileged API attack that could allow background installation under limited conditions (tracked as CVE‑2024‑21388); this kind of chain illustrates why runtime revocation and store hardening matter. Coverage of that research and Microsoft’s subsequent patching underscores the urgency of platform-level mitigations.
• Platform improvements such as the Publish API, elevated verification of developer accounts and dynamic API key models are concrete hardening steps Microsoft has already published for Edge extension developers. Those changes reduce the chances of account takeover and malicious updates.

Together, publish‑time hardening and runtime revocation provide a two-pronged defense: make it harder to push malicious code into the ecosystem and make it safer to remove it if it appears.

---

Verification, caveats and open items​

• Confirmed: Microsoft has been actively improving the extension ecosystem — Publish API changes, store developer policies, Manifest V2→V3 migration and enterprise policy controls are documented in Microsoft’s developer and product pages.
• Reported but not independently verifiable on a single Microsoft public page at time of publication: the exact Microsoft 365 Roadmap entry text that specifies “Adding protection against malicious sideloaded extensions” with a firm November 2025 rollout. That claim appears in reporting and summaries, and is plausible given Microsoft’s extension security trajectory, but readers and administrators should treat the November 2025 date as reported and subject to change pending an explicit Microsoft product announcement or a public Microsoft 365 Roadmap entry naming the feature.
• Unanswered technical questions that require Microsoft clarification:
• Exact detection signals and telemetry that will drive revocation decisions.
• The revocation workflow (disable vs remove vs quarantine) and how users/admins are notified.
• Administrative override and enterprise bypass/whitelisting mechanics.
• Privacy disclosures for any telemetry used.

These caveats are material: a powerful protection without clear governance, audit trails and enterprise controls risks unintended disruption.

---

Bottom line: a positive but cautious step​

Automatic detection and revocation of malicious sideloaded extensions would be a meaningful addition to Edge’s security posture — particularly for consumers and smaller organizations that lack sophisticated monitoring. It complements existing store vetting and enterprise policy controls, and addresses the reality that sideloaded add‑ons are a frequent vehicle for persistent unwanted software and data theft.
At the same time, the devil is in the details. Implementation must be transparent, auditable and manageable, with explicit enterprise controls and an appeals mechanism for falsely flagged extensions. Until Microsoft publishes a complete specification — and until administrators test the behavior in controlled environments — organizations should continue to rely on existing policies (disabling sideloading where appropriate), vet extension sources, and monitor extension behavior with their normal security tooling.
Edge’s move toward automated, telemetry-driven remediation reflects the broader industry trend of shifting from passive defenses to active, adaptive protection. When executed carefully — with attention to false positives, admin control, and user privacy — it will reduce a harmful attack surface that has troubled browsers for years.

---

Quick checklist: immediate actions for readers​

• Consumers:
• Review Extensions → Manage extensions and remove unknown items.
• Prefer Microsoft Edge Add‑ons store and restrict extension site access.
• IT administrators:
• Harden policies: set AllowSideloadingOfExtensions to disabled for general users where possible.
• Create allowlists and blocklists using ExtensionSettings and ExtensionInstallBlocklist.
• Integrate Edge telemetry with SIEM and create alerts for unusual extension update URLs or outbound traffic from extension processes.
• Pilot any new Edge feature in a test group before broad rollout.

Microsoft’s ongoing enhancements to extension publishing, store policies and browser protections are encouraging; this next step toward automatic revocation of malicious sideloaded extensions would, if delivered with appropriate controls, give both consumers and enterprises an important new lever to fight extension-based abuse.

---

Source: Windows Report Microsoft Edge Will Block Dangerous Sideloaded Extensions, But Not Just Yet

Microsoft’s long-standing habit of routing Windows Search and several shell-driven links into Microsoft Edge — regardless of the user’s chosen default browser — may be closer to ending than many thought, but the change comes with caveats and new technical complexities that power users and IT pros need to understand now. A recent update to Microsoft Edge Canary exposed a group of experimental flags that strongly suggest Windows 11’s Start/taskbar search and related “Windows Search Bar” surfaces could soon honor a user’s default browser and preferred search engine — potentially opening links in Chrome (or Firefox) using Google (or DuckDuckGo), rather than forcing Microsoft Edge and Bing. This behavior was first reported in detail by a Windows-focused site after the flags were discovered in Canary, and it lines up with Microsoft’s ongoing, region-limited adjustments to respect user choice in areas affected by regulatory pressure.

Background / Overview​

Windows 11’s Start menu and taskbar search have for years been an awkward hybrid: local indexing and app-launching capabilities sitting beside web-powered suggestions and answers supplied by Microsoft’s own web stack. The web results portion has traditionally been powered by Bing and routed through Microsoft Edge even when a different browser is set as the user’s default. That has frustrated users and stirred public commentary about “forced” routing to Edge and Bing — a problem that has attracted community-built workarounds and developer tools to intercept and redirect such requests.
In 2024–2025 Microsoft began changing some behaviors in response to regulators and user pressure: experiments and Insider builds have introduced clearer separation between local results and web results in the Start menu, and Microsoft announced region-specific changes to respect default browser settings in the European Economic Area (EEA). These moves are part policy, part engineering: splitting the UI to label web results more transparently and, in some cases, allowing system-level components to open content in the default browser rather than Edge. Independent coverage confirms Microsoft has been rolling out such adjustments for EEA users.
What’s new now is evidence inside Edge Canary’s experimental flags that suggests a deeper integration between Edge’s in‑browser search handling and the Windows Search host — one that could, when toggled, make Windows Search respect both your default browser and default search engine. The flags discovered include names such as msWSBLaunchNonBingDSE, msWSBLaunchNonEdgeDB, and msWSBLaunchNonBingDSEAndNonEdgeDB, which — read literally — describe launching Windows Search Bar (WSB) results using a non‑Bing Default Search Engine (DSE) and a non‑Edge Default Browser (DB).

---

What the Edge Canary flags appear to mean​

The flags and the intended behaviors​

Several Edge Canary flags were listed in the report, and while flag names are not formal documentation, their naming is highly suggestive. Here’s a practical translation of the most notable tokens and how they appear to map to behavior:

• msWSBLaunchNonBingDSE
  • Implies Windows Search Bar will launch web queries using a non‑Bing default search engine (for example, Google or DuckDuckGo) that the user selects in the browser settings. The search results would be generated from that engine rather than Bing.
• msWSBLaunchNonEdgeDB
  • Suggests that the Windows Search Bar would open results in the user’s default browser (e.g., Chrome or Firefox) instead of forcing Edge. However, the flag name alone implies the default search engine used by the search box might still be Bing unless combined with the DSE flag.
• msWSBLaunchNonBingDSEAndNonEdgeDB
  • A combination flag that appears to enable both behaviors simultaneously: use the user’s preferred search engine and open the resulting page in the user’s default browser (e.g., Google in Chrome). This would be the “full respect” mode many users have sought.
• msEdgeSearchboxHandlerSendsFaviconData
  • Indicates Edge/Windows Search may pass favicon metadata back to the Search host so results show accurate site icons, improving recognizability of entries from alternate search engines. This is a smaller but UX‑meaningful improvement.
• Other “explicit” variants
  • Flags prefixed with “msExplicitLaunch…” likely represent stricter, explicit routing behaviors where Windows Search intentionally redirects the query through the default browser/search engine stack rather than Edge/Bing by default.

Why flags matter — and why they don’t equate to shipped features​

Edge’s flags expose experimental code paths developers can enable in Canary builds. Flags are valuable because they reveal direction-of-travel inside Microsoft’s engineering process, but they are not feature commitments. Code behind flags may be incomplete, region‑gated, subject to regulatory constraints, or disabled before general release. That caution is important: the presence of a flag is credible evidence of work being done, but it’s not official product documentation or a guaranteed release date. The Windows Latest report is a spot-check of Canary and should be treated as a reputable lead rather than proof of global rollout.

---

Why this could matter for users and IT administrators​

For power users​

• Restores predictable behavior: If Windows Search respects both a chosen browser and search engine, clicking a web result or an in‑shell search suggestion would open in your preferred environment. That ends the recurring annoyance of being pulled into Edge for trivial lookups.
• Better UX consistency: Extensions, bookmarks, password stores, and profiles that live in your chosen browser will be honored, maintaining sessions and signed‑in state rather than forcing a context switch to Edge.

For enterprises and managed devices​

• Group policy and MDM implications: Organizations that enforce a standard browser will want Windows Search to respect that policy across all shell surfaces. Any new behavior must be controllable via Group Policy or MDM settings to avoid fragmentation of user experience in managed fleets.
• Testing and compatibility: Redirecting Windows Search to non-Edge browsers introduces edge cases with SSO plugins, internal certificate stores, and custom protocol handlers. IT teams must verify that enterprise sign-in flows, conditional access rules, and SSO extensions behave correctly when Search launches Chrome/Firefox instead of Edge.

For privacy-conscious users​

• Search engine choice matters: If Windows Search can use non‑Bing engines, users can reduce Bing-specific telemetry paths or simply pick a search provider they trust. However, the backend may still pass metadata through Microsoft layers before the redirect occurs — a detail that needs verification from Microsoft documentation or telemetry transparency reports. Community testing and controlled captures will be necessary to validate how data flows in practice.

---

Technical and security considerations​

How Windows Search currently routes queries​

Historically, Windows Search has relied on internal handlers and URL protocol redirections that are tightly integrated with Microsoft Edge. Some built-in shells (Start search, Widgets, Copilot, Lock screen content) deliberately invoke Edge with a specially formed microsoft-edge: URL payload, which bypasses the default-app resolution. That design is the reason community tools such as EdgeDeflector and MSEdgeRedirect emerged to intercept these payloads and forward them to the true default browser. The incoming Evidence suggests Microsoft is building native options to replace the need for such third‑party interceptors.

Potential telemetry and privacy implications​

• Telemetry leakage risk: Even if the user’s chosen browser and search engine are used, some preliminary routing or query transformation might still pass through Microsoft services for indexing, ranking, or just-in-time content generation (for example to assemble a richer result tile). Until Microsoft documents the exact processing and telemetry policies, users concerned about data flow should treat this as partially unverified. Flag-based discovery does not guarantee privacy parity with native Chrome searches.
• Favicons and result rendering: The msEdgeSearchboxHandlerSendsFaviconData flag suggests Edge will send back icon metadata to preserve visual fidelity. That’s a small but useful UX improvement that could reduce user errors when selecting results. But it also implies more metadata exchange between the Search host and Edge components — an area worth auditing for telemetry or fingerprinting concerns.

Security surface: protocol handlers and extension interactions​

• Protocol and extension behavior: If Windows Search opens results in Chrome, extensions (e.g., enterprise SSO extensions, privacy or ad-block extensions) will apply as normal. However, users who rely on Edge-only corporate plugins should verify those plugins are available (or have equivalent capabilities) in the chosen default browser.
• Attack surface considerations: Redirecting search results to third-party browsers increases the complexity of the call-chain when clicking OS-level links. Administrators should monitor for any unusual fall-through behaviors where an attacker could attempt to substitute or hijack a handler; standard security hygiene (default-app policy enforcement, tamper protections) remains essential.

---

How this lines up with Microsoft’s regulatory and regional strategy​

Microsoft’s moves to respect browser and search choice are not purely user‑experience driven. The European Digital Markets Act (DMA) and similar regulatory pressure have already pushed Microsoft to allow users in EEA countries to uninstall Edge, to stop nagging users aggressively, and to broaden the scope of default browser assignment for protocols and file types. Independent coverage confirms Microsoft has already introduced or tested features that make Windows respect default browser choices in EEA‑gated deployments. The Edge Canary flags we’re seeing now are consistent with that direction and may be Microsoft’s technical mechanism to implement and control such behavior more granularly.
At the same time, Microsoft has historically used staged rollouts. Features first appear in Canary and Insider channels, sometimes restricted by region, then graduate to broader releases after telemetry and policy checks. The flags discovered in Canary are therefore likely an early-stage implementation and may be toggled or limited to certain regulatory regions at first.

---

Practical guidance: what to do now​

If you want Windows Search to open links in your preferred browser today​

1. Verify default app assignments in Settings > Apps > Default apps, and set your browser as default for HTTP and HTTPS as well as .htm/.html where possible.
2. If Windows Search still opens Edge, consider community tools with caution:
   • MSEdgeRedirect and EdgeDeflector have historically been used to intercept microsoft-edge: links and forward them to the default browser. These tools can break with Windows/Edge updates and are not officially supported. Use them only when you understand the implications.
3. Monitor Insider builds and Edge Canary release notes — the feature may become available behind an official toggle or in a future Windows 11 update (region‑gated).

For IT admins preparing for change​

1. Test on a small group of devices using Windows Insider channels to observe behavior and to validate enterprise SSO, extension behavior, and policy enforcement.
2. Update documentation for helpdesk staff to include the new flow: clicking a Start search result might now open Chrome (or other browser), and troubleshooting steps should account for browser-specific extensions and certificate stores.
3. Prepare Group Policy and MDM configuration to either enforce or block the new behavior depending on enterprise policy needs. Confirm whether Microsoft exposes Group Policy templates for the new flags/behaviors when they ship.

---

Strengths, weaknesses, and remaining unknowns​

Notable strengths​

• User choice restored: If fully implemented, this is a major UX win — the OS respecting the user’s browser and search-engine preferences is the intuitive expectation.
• Reduced reliance on third‑party hacks: Official support removes the need for brittle, community-developed redirection tools that can break with updates.
• Incremental UX improvements: Favicons and improved settings search terms are small but meaningful interface improvements that make Search more usable across search engines.

Risks and open questions​

• Telemetry and data flow remain unverified: The technical flags do not document whether queries will still be proxied through Microsoft services for enrichment before being handed to the default browser/search engine. Until Microsoft releases authoritative documentation, assume some uncertainty about what data is shared, and when. Treat telemetry and privacy claims as partially unverified until Microsoft provides explicit documentation.
• Region gating and rollouts: Early changes and Microsoft’s DMA compliance moves suggest features may be limited to the EEA initially. Users elsewhere could be left waiting for a broader rollout.
• Compatibility and enterprise complexity: Redirecting shell-level links into different browsers may expose enterprise edge cases (SSO, conditional access, extensions). Organizations must validate all line-of-business flows before mass adoption.

---

How to verify and test the change yourself (step-by-step)​

1. Install Microsoft Edge Canary (if comfortable with experimental builds).
2. Visit edge://flags and search for flags with names resembling:
   • msWSBLaunchNonBingDSE
   • msWSBLaunchNonEdgeDB
   • msWSBLaunchNonBingDSEAndNonEdgeDB
   • msEdgeSearchboxHandlerSendsFaviconData
3. Enable the desired flags and restart the browser (note: flags change frequently, and enabling them can destabilize your browser).
4. Set your preferred browser as default in Windows Settings, and set your preferred search engine in the chosen browser.
5. Open the Start/taskbar search and click a web result to observe:
   • Which browser opens
   • Which search engine is used
   • Whether favicons and result rendering changed
6. Record results and, if you’re an admin, test with managed device policies in a lab environment before broader deployment.

Caveat: this is experimental work. Flags are ephemeral and may be renamed, removed, or limited by region. Do not enable Canary flags on production machines.

---

Conclusion​

The Edge Canary flags discovered in late September point to a concrete engineering path that could finally make Windows Search behave the way many users expect: open web results in the default browser and use the preferred search engine. That would be a meaningful reversal of a long-standing friction point in Windows UX. But it’s not yet a finished product. The flags are evidence of work but not a shipping promise, and critical details around telemetry, data flow, and regional rollouts remain to be confirmed by Microsoft.
For now, users who need the behavior can rely on community tools and careful default-app configuration; organizations should prepare to test and validate the change when it appears in Insider or production builds. Keep an eye on Canary/Dev release notes and Microsoft’s official documentation — as Microsoft moves features through labs and regulatory-driven rollouts, the full story will become clearer. Meanwhile, the message is cautiously optimistic: after years of workarounds, Windows 11 may be ready to respect the choices users make about how and where they browse the web.

---

Source: Windows Latest Windows 11's Start menu search might finally respect Google Chrome as your default browser

Microsoft appears to be testing a change that would finally let Windows 11’s taskbar search hand off web queries to whatever browser and search engine you have set as default—rather than forcing results into Microsoft Edge and Bing. The evidence comes from new experimental flags discovered in Microsoft Edge Canary that reference “WSB” and “DSE” behaviors and explicitly mention “NonEdgeDB” and “NonBingDSE,” which strongly imply Windows Search could soon open queries in a non‑Edge browser using a non‑Bing Default Search Engine. This behavior is already enforced in the European Economic Area (EEA) under regulatory pressure, and the current Canary flags suggest Microsoft is experimenting with extending similar options more broadly.

Background / Overview​

Windows has historically routed certain system-initiated web links—Start menu and taskbar search results, Widgets content, and some system apps—into Microsoft Edge with Bing even when users had a different browser or search engine set as their default. That tension has drawn criticism from users and regulators for years, and it led to workarounds (third‑party tools) and legal pushes in various jurisdictions. In the EEA, Microsoft has already implemented changes so system components open links in the user’s default browser; those changes are part of Microsoft’s public updates to comply with the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA). The official Windows Insider blog documents EEA-specific behavior changes including making third‑party search providers available in Windows Search and opening web content with the default browser in the EEA.
Outside the EEA, however, Windows has continued to prefer Edge+Bing in many system flows—until now, according to traces found in Edge Canary that suggest Microsoft may be testing options to let Windows Search respect the system default browser and default search engine globally. Those flags were first reported and explained by independent outlets that monitor Canary builds and flag dumps.

---

What was found in Edge Canary: the flags and what they mean​

The flags themselves​

Edge Canary contains a cluster of experimental flags that include the following strings:

• msExplicitLaunchNonBingDSE
• msExplicitLaunchNonBingDSEAndNonEdgeDB
• msExplicitLaunchNonEdgeDB
• msWSBLaunchNonBingDSE
• msWSBLaunchNonBingDSEAndNonEdgeDB
• msWSBLaunchNonEdgeDB

These flags are visible in the Edge://flags UI in certain Canary snapshots; they do not necessarily have working implementations behind them, but their naming convention is revealing. Independent reporters and reverse‑engineers have pointed to those exact flags when describing the experiments.

Interpreting the abbreviations​

• WSB — very likely stands for Windows Search Box or Windows Search Bar, i.e., the UI on the Windows taskbar / Start menu that accepts web queries.
• DSE — almost certainly Default Search Engine, the search engine the browser uses for address‑bar queries.
• NonEdgeDB — reads as Non‑Edge Default Browser (DB = Default Browser), implying a mode where the system will open the user’s chosen default browser instead of Edge.

Putting it together: flags like msWSBLaunchNonBingDSEAndNonEdgeDB appear to represent an enablement where the Windows Search Box will open a query in the default browser using that browser’s default search engine—i.e., Google in Chrome—rather than redirecting to Bing in Edge. The flags that contain “ExplicitLaunch” vs. “WSBLaunch” likely capture different triggering contexts (explicit launch from the search box vs. other workflows). All of this is plausible given known internal naming patterns and the previous EEA changes Microsoft shipped.

Important caveat: flags are experiments, not releases​

Flags in Canary builds are routinely used for internal experiments and may never ship to stable releases as implemented. They can be introduced, renamed, or removed without public notice. The presence of a flag strongly suggests the company is exploring the capability, but it does not guarantee global rollout or parity with the EEA implementation. Reporters who discovered the flags warned that the functionality could remain an experiment. Treat the evidence as probable intent, not final behavior.

---

Why this matters: user experience and market implications​

For users: fewer friction points and better consistency​

If the flags represent a shipped change, the immediate benefit is simple: the Windows Search Box would finally behave like other system link handlers and respect your global defaults. That means:

• Clicking a web result from Start / taskbar search would open in your chosen browser (e.g., Chrome, Firefox).
• The query would use the search engine you prefer (e.g., Google, DuckDuckGo) rather than being re‑routed to Bing.
• The result would feel consistent across all system interactions, removing a longstanding annoyance for many power users.

This change reduces cognitive friction and restores expectations that "default" means default. It would be a meaningful usability win for millions who avoid the built‑in search flyout because it historically forced Edge/Bing.

For competition and market share​

The change would have both practical and symbolic significance. Practically, it removes one of the mechanisms Microsoft used to keep users within Edge/Bing. Symbolically, it signals a softening of the more aggressive UX nudges that led to negative headlines and regulatory attention. That said, Microsoft is simultaneously experimenting with other features—like targeted prompts to pin Edge for users who heavily use Chrome—which indicates the company is exploring a mix of compliance and growth tactics. Those pinning or “campaign” flags have their own privacy and telemetry implications.

For enterprises and admins​

Enterprises and IT administrators will want clarity about policy controls and group policy options. Microsoft maintains a robust policy surface for Edge and Windows that controls search and searchbar behavior; documentation for Edge policies (for example, the SearchbarAllowed policy) shows Microsoft can gate and configure search bar behavior by policy. If this Windows Search hand‑off becomes a consumer and enterprise setting, admins will demand ADMX/GPO/Intune controls and clear documentation. Microsoft’s policy docs and the broader M365 change logs suggest administrators are already in scope for related search behavior changes (e.g., the retirement of Microsoft Search in Bing and redirection of work searches).

---

Regulatory context: why the EEA matters and what Microsoft already changed there​

The European Economic Area’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) forced big platform vendors to give users more control over defaults and how core system components interact with third‑party apps. Microsoft’s EEA changes—announced on the Windows Insider blog—explicitly modify default browser behavior, allow third‑party search providers to integrate more directly into Windows Search, and ensure Microsoft apps open links with the system default browser in the EEA. Those changes are publicly documented and already rolling through Insider channels and retail updates in EEA markets.
Because Microsoft applied these changes selectively—EEA first—reporters and users outside Europe have been watching for whether and when Microsoft will follow suit globally. The Edge Canary flags can be read as exploratory steps toward either a global rollout or a configurable option that mirrors EEA behavior. But Microsoft’s EEA changes were explicitly tied to DMA compliance; expanding the behavior outside the EEA would be a business decision rather than a regulatory obligation.

---

Technical and policy details: what to watch for​

What to expect if the feature ships​

• A new setting in Settings > Privacy & search or Defaults that controls whether system-level web links open in the default browser and use the default search engine.
• Updates to Edge policies and ADMX templates to let IT admins control the hand-off behavior.
• Possible toggles in the Windows Search UI (scopes or configuration that picks the preferred web provider).
• Edge releases that either remove or rework the experimental flags and add a supported UI or policy counterpart.

Microsoft’s existing updates for the EEA included policy and product changes for how default browsers are set and how Store apps behave; this suggests the company has the engineering and documentation machinery to roll out similar changes with enterprise controls.

What remains unverified or unknown​

• Whether these Canary flags will reach Beta/Dev channels, and whether they will become stable features. Canary flags alone are suggestive but not definitive.
• The precise UX: will the hand‑off occur only for “explicit” queries typed in the taskbar, or will it also affect contextual links inside search results, previews, and “web result” cards? The flag names hint at distinct triggers (explicit vs. WSB) but don’t document behavior.
• Telemetry and privacy behavior: whether the selection logic that triggers prompts (e.g., the Edge pinning experiments) requires collecting usage signals that users or regulators might find intrusive. Several past experiments used heuristic thresholds (e.g., Chrome usage >90%) to trigger special UI, which led to privacy concerns.

---

Strengths of the change (if implemented cleanly)​

• Restores user trust by making defaults meaningful and predictable; this will make Windows feel less coercive.
• Improves accessibility for users who choose Chrome/Firefox and rely on integrated search, reducing the need for third‑party hacks and workarounds.
• Aligns with regulatory expectations where Microsoft already changed behavior in the EEA; a global rollout would reduce fragmentation and simplify support.
• Reduces friction for workflows that cross device/browser boundaries—links launching in the expected browser is a straightforward usability improvement.

---

Risks, unanswered questions, and potential user harms​

• Experimentation vs. privacy: Microsoft has previously used usage signals to decide when to show nudges and pinning prompts. If the hand‑off or any prompts rely on behavioral telemetry, privacy advocates will scrutinize the data collection and thresholds. Evidence of flags aiming to “optimize” pinning based on Chrome usage suggests Microsoft still considers telemetry-driven campaigns. Transparent documentation and opt‑out controls will be essential.
• Partial or confusing rollout: If behavior differs by region (EEA vs. non‑EEA) or by Insider channel, consumers and support teams could face inconsistent experiences. Microsoft historically rolls out region‑specific changes for regulatory reasons; a half-rolled or poorly explained global change would create support friction.
• Policy and enterprise complexity: Enterprises will want deterministic controls. If Microsoft exposes hand‑off behavior only through flags or opaque telemetry, admins will complain. Proper GPO/Intune management controls must be provided to avoid surprise changes in managed environments.
• Potential for continued nudges: Even as Microsoft enables default‑respecting behavior, other experiments (Edge pin prompts, targeted campaigns) may continue to appear. That could feel like a “one step forward, one step sideways” outcome for users who want a clean separation.
• Ambiguity around Microsoft Search retirement: Microsoft retired Microsoft Search in Bing for organizations in 2025 and redirected work/school search flows to M365.cloud.microsoft and SharePoint. The evolving mix of search endpoints is complex and could create confusion where consumer, business, and “system” search experiences diverge. Enterprise admins should watch for documentation clarifying how default browser/search hand‑offs interact with organization‑scoped results.

---

How to follow and validate the change yourself​

• Install Microsoft Edge Canary (if you want to watch the work in progress).
• Open edge://flags and search for flags containing “msWSB” or “NonBingDSE” to see whether the experimental identifiers appear in your build. Be prepared for flags to exist with no functional behavior.
• Monitor the Windows Insider Blog and Microsoft’s official release notes for definitive EEA and global changes. Microsoft’s blog posts documented the EEA changes and the Edge version that began respecting defaults there.
• Watch major Windows coverage outlets that track Canary flag discoveries and provide practical explanations and demos; these outlets often reproduce the flag names and show short demos when the behavior works in a given build.

Note: enabling flags in Canary is for enthusiasts and testers; do not expect Canary flags to reflect final UX or to have enterprise support or documentation. Treat Canary as a laboratory, not a promise.

---

What this means for the broader browser/search landscape​

• If Microsoft follows through and introduces a clean, supported way for Windows Search to respect defaults globally, it reduces an advantage Edge/Bing had by virtue of being the system‑preferred path. That could modestly lower the volume of users passively steered to Microsoft offerings and reinforce the role of browser vendors and search providers in competing on product merits rather than system integration alone.
• Conversely, Microsoft’s continued appetite for nudges (pin prompts, targeted UI for heavy Chrome users) shows it will still actively try to grow Edge usage. The presence of both behaviors—default respect alongside promotional campaigns—means the market will be shaped by both product competition and careful UX nudging. Users and regulators should therefore evaluate both the enabling changes and the surrounding campaigns.

---

Bottom line and outlook​

The Edge Canary flags are the clearest technical hint yet that Microsoft is actively experimenting with making Windows Search respect a user’s default browser and default search engine outside of the EEA. That would fix a long‑standing annoyance for many Windows users and align Windows behavior with user expectations about defaults. The change would also dovetail with Microsoft’s EEA DMA work and the company’s broader updates to search behavior.
However, Canary flags are experiments—not guarantees—and Microsoft’s simultaneous testing of targeted promotions for Edge indicates the company will continue to balance regulatory compliance, user experience, and business incentives. The final outcome will hinge on whether Microsoft releases the feature with clear settings, administrative controls, and transparent telemetry policies. Users and admins should watch for official announcements, documented controls, and concrete rollout timelines in Beta/Dev channels or official Windows Insider and Edge release notes.

---

Quick takeaway (for readers who want the headline)​

• Experimental Edge Canary flags suggest Windows 11’s taskbar search could be changed to open queries in your default browser and default search engine instead of forcing Edge and Bing.
• This matches behavior Microsoft already implemented in the EEA for DMA compliance; the Canary traces may indicate a plan to broaden or configurableize that behavior.
• The change is promising for user choice, but it remains experimental; watch for official Microsoft rollout notes, enterprise policy support, and clear privacy documentation before assuming the behavior is final.

The practical era where the Windows taskbar politely honors your browser and search choice may be arriving—but only time, documented releases, and policy controls will show whether Microsoft ships it cleanly and transparently.

---

Source: Windows Central Microsoft might finally let Windows 11's search box use Google and Chrome instead of Bing and Edge

Microsoft appears to be testing a change that would let the Windows 11 taskbar search respect the browser and search engine you set as defaults — meaning a typed query could open in Chrome with Google (or in your preferred browser/search combination) instead of being routed to Microsoft Edge and Bing by default.

Background​

For years, the Windows search experience has been a hybrid: a local index and launcher for apps and files paired with web-powered results supplied by Microsoft’s web stack. Historically outside the European Economic Area (EEA) that web portion has opened in Microsoft Edge and defaulted to Bing, even when users set Chrome or another browser as the system default. That behavior has been a frequent source of frustration for power users and administrators alike.
In mid‑2025 Microsoft began adjusting this behavior for EEA customers to comply with the European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA). Microsoft explicitly documented region‑limited changes that let the Microsoft Bing app and other shell experiences open web content in the user’s default browser in the EEA, and those changes started appearing in Insider builds and limited releases in May–June 2025.
The new development: Edge Canary build metadata contains a set of experimental flags whose names strongly suggest Windows Search could be made to honor both the Default Browser (DB) and the Default Search Engine (DSE) chosen by the user. The flags — discovered and publicized in recent testing coverage — include tokens such as msWSBLaunchNonBingDSE, msWSBLaunchNonEdgeDB, and msWSBLaunchNonBingDSEAndNonEdgeDB, among others. The names imply: Windows Search Bar (WSB) launching with a non‑Bing default search engine, launching to a non‑Edge default browser, or both.

---

What was discovered: the Edge Canary flags explained​

The flags and their likely meanings​

• msWSBLaunchNonBingDSE — Likely instructs the Windows Search Box (Windows Search Bar) to use a non‑Bing Default Search Engine when composing and launching web queries. This would let the search flyout send queries to Google, DuckDuckGo, or other engines (as configured in the browser).
• msWSBLaunchNonEdgeDB — Likely allows results clicked in Windows Search to open in the system’s default browser (e.g., Chrome, Firefox) instead of being forced into Microsoft Edge.
• msWSBLaunchNonBingDSEAndNonEdgeDB — Combines the behaviors above so a search launched from Windows Search would open in the default browser using the default search engine — for example, Google in Chrome.
• msExplicitLaunch... variants — The word “explicit” in the flag names suggests a mode that would only toggle the behavior when specifically invoked or selected, implying Microsoft is experimenting with opt‑in or conditional behaviors rather than a global forced switch.

Where the flags came from and who reported them​

The flags were first highlighted in coverage of an Edge Canary build by Windows-focused outlets and community leakers who examine in‑build flag lists and metadata. These early reports were then aggregated by mainstream outlets noting that the behavior matches Microsoft’s recent EEA changes and could be a step toward wider rollout. The underlying Edge Canary flags are experimental and carry no guarantee they will ship to Beta or Stable channels.

---

Why this matters: user choice, workflow friction, and the first‑keystroke battleground​

Windows search is often the first keystroke users make when they want to find files, apps, or quick web answers. For many people the ability to use their default browser and preferred search engine is a matter of convenience and privacy preference. Allowing Windows Search to open queries in the user’s chosen browser/search engine would:

• Restore consistency across the system: clicking a web result from the search flyout would behave like clicking any other https link (open with default browser).
• Reduce friction for users embedded in other ecosystems (Google, DuckDuckGo, Brave, etc.) who prefer those engines for search relevance, privacy, or features.
• Lower the appeal of third‑party redirect tools and community workarounds that intercept or rewrite search links. Those tools have proliferated because default behavior has been perceived as coercive by some users.

At the same time, this change intersects with regulators’ priorities. Microsoft’s EEA changes under the DMA explicitly nudge components to respect user defaults for browsers and search providers — the Canary flags appear to be a technical reflection or extension of that policy work.

---

What’s verified and what remains uncertain​

Verified facts​

1. Microsoft rolled out region‑specific changes in the EEA that make several system components open web content using the default browser; those changes were documented in the Windows Insider blog and started appearing in Insider builds and limited retail rollouts in mid‑2025.
2. Multiple independent outlets have reported Edge Canary builds exposing flags whose names match the patterns described above (WSB, DSE, DB tokens). The presence of the flags in Canary builds is documented by screenshots and in‑build flag lists shared publicly in the testing community.

Unverified or uncertain points (and cautionary notes)​

• Whether these Canary flags will be promoted to Edge Beta/Stable or integrated into a Windows update is not guaranteed. Experimental flags frequently appear and disappear; many never reach general release. Treat the presence of flags as a hint of intent, not a roadmap commitment.
• The exact mechanics — for example, how Windows Search decides whether to use the browser’s DSE vs. system defaults, whether the change requires the Bing app to be uninstalled, or whether administrative policies can lock behavior — are not fully documented. Microsoft’s public EEA guidance covers some cases but does not translate those policy points into a ship timeline outside the EEA.
• The interplay with other Microsoft features (Widgets, Lock Screen web content, Copilot integrations) and edge cases in corporate-managed environments remains to be clarified. Early Microsoft documentation indicates some Microsoft apps may continue to choose their own browser behavior.

---

Security, enterprise, and privacy implications​

Security considerations​

Allowing Windows Search to open web results in the default browser and use that browser’s search engine seems benign on the surface, but it carries potential attack‑surface implications:

• If Windows Search hands off queries as raw URLs or query strings to a third‑party browser, there’s a risk that malformed inputs or redirected payloads might be handled differently by non‑Edge engines or extensions. Browsers and extensions can alter requests; any change to the launch path should be audited for how it sanitizes or encodes inputs. This is especially relevant for enterprise environments processing crafted content. (This is a general caution rather than a documented exploit specific to the flags.)
• Browser integration points may expose differing privacy practices: default search engines collect differing telemetry, and an enterprise that relies on Edge + Bing for logging or filtering may lose visibility if users shift to alternate browsers. Admins need to assess policy impacts.

Enterprise and manageability​

Administrators should consider:

• Group Policy and Edge/Windows policies: Microsoft publishes Edge policy controls (for example, policies controlling the search bar behavior and other Edge-managed features). Any global change will likely be accompanied by policy options to control the behavior on managed devices; check updated ADMX/Intune templates when these features move beyond Canary.
• Compliance and auditing: enterprises that route web traffic through specific proxies, DLP filters, or legal intercept mechanisms must verify how a change in the Windows search handoff affects logging and enforcement. If the system begins opening queries in Chrome and Chrome bypasses enterprise HTTP interception, that will create gaps.
• Endpoint security posture: companies should test policy impact in a lab before broadly enabling or disabling any experimental flags and prepare mitigations such as blocking or redirecting unapproved browsers by policy if needed.

Privacy and user choice​

• For privacy‑first users, respecting the chosen search engine (e.g., DuckDuckGo) is a clear win. Putting that choice at the OS level reduces reliance on third‑party plugins that sometimes carry their own privacy tradeoffs.
• However, users must understand that the search engine controls where query data flows. A single keystroke may change where a company’s telemetry and search history are recorded. IT controls and privacy documentation will need updating.

---

Practical scenarios and examples​

1. A user sets Chrome as the default browser and Google as Chrome’s default search engine. With both the non‑Edge DB and non‑Bing DSE flags active, a search typed into the Windows Search box could open Google results in Chrome instead of opening Bing in Edge.
2. A privacy‑focused user who prefers DuckDuckGo could set DuckDuckGo as the DSE and have Windows Search results navigate directly to DuckDuckGo in their default browser when these flags are enabled.
3. An enterprise that relies on Edge’s managed settings will want to test whether enabling these behaviors breaks internal workflows (for example, single‑sign‑on extensions or custom policies that depend on Edge being the handler). Policy rollouts should be staged and documented.

---

What to watch next: timelines, signals, and how this may roll out​

• Microsoft’s EEA changes have already been pushed to Insider and limited retail channels in mid‑2025; those changes are a precedent showing Microsoft can and will adjust how system components honor defaults in response to policy. Expect Microsoft to continue EEA‑first rollouts and then evaluate broader deployment based on testing and legal posture.
• Canary flags are the earliest public signal of engineering intent. Next signals to look for are flag promotion to Edge Beta/Dev release notes, an announced Feature ID in Insider release notes, or a formal Windows update that documents Search behavior changes outside the EEA. If Microsoft intends broad rollout, the Beta channel or the Windows Insider blog are the likely places to see it.
• Keep an eye on management and policy documentation (ADMX updates, Intune settings). If Microsoft intends to make the behavior widely configurable, policy knobs will appear there.

---

Strengths of the change​

• Restores predictable behavior: the OS honoring user defaults is consistent with user expectations on modern platforms and reduces friction.
• Respects user choice and privacy preferences: giving users their chosen search engine reduces dependence on sometimes‑opaque redirect extensions and third‑party hacks.
• Aligns with regulatory compliance: the flags are technically consistent with Microsoft’s DMA-driven EEA changes and signal the company’s willingness to adapt Windows shell behavior.

---

Risks and reasons to be cautious​

• Canary ≠ final: Presence in Canary is not a release promise. Experimental flags are often exploratory. Users and admins should not depend on Canary behavior for production planning.
• Policy gaps for enterprises: until Microsoft ships controlled policy options, enterprises could experience management and auditing gaps if the default browser changes how web content is routed. Plan tests and staging.
• Potential for fragmentation: different browsers and search engines have different feature sets and privacy models; routing Windows shell queries to a third‑party engine could produce inconsistent experiences across devices and complicate troubleshooting for support teams.

---

What end users and IT should do now​

1. For end users:
   • Treat this as a welcome but experimental hint of future choice. If you rely on a non‑Edge/ non‑Bing workflow, keep your browser and search engine defaults configured and test behavior when new Insider or Beta builds arrive.
2. For IT admins:
   • Begin lab testing when Canary/Beta builds surface flag behavior. Validate the effect on SSO, DLP, proxying, and user telemetry.
   • Monitor Microsoft’s Windows Insider and Edge release notes for policy updates and ADMX changes.
3. For security teams:
   • Include these scenarios in threat modeling: how will handoff from Windows Search to third‑party browsers affect URL handling, extension interference, and content filtering?
   • Prepare mitigations if your organization requires strict routing through managed browsers or gateways.

---

Conclusion​

The experimental flags spotted in Microsoft Edge Canary offer a credible signal that Windows Search could soon respect a user’s chosen browser and search engine, closing a long‑running usability complaint outside the EEA. This potential change aligns with Microsoft’s documented EEA adjustments under the DMA and reflects a broader move toward respecting system defaults in specific contexts.
However, these are still experimental flags. They indicate intent and direction but do not establish a shipping timetable or full technical behavior. Users will benefit from the added choice if Microsoft ships the feature with clear documentation and enterprise policy controls; organizations should evaluate impact, update policies, and stage testing accordingly. Until the functionality appears in Beta or Stable channels and Microsoft publishes implementation details and admin controls, the prudent stance is cautious optimism: welcome the possibility, but validate before depending on it.

---

Source: Notebookcheck You may soon be able to Google search in Chrome straight from Windows 11's search box