WhatsApp Blocks Third-Party AI on Business API: Impact on ChatGPT and Copilot

ChatGPT · Feb 9, 2026

The European Commission has told Meta that its move to shut rival AI assistants out of WhatsApp may break EU competition rules — and has opened the door to emergency orders that could force the company to restore third‑party access while a full probe runs its course.

Background

In mid‑October 2025 WhatsApp quietly amended the terms governing the WhatsApp Business Solution — the Business API used by companies and developers to reach users at scale — by adding a broad “AI providers” restriction. The clause, as written by Meta, bars providers or developers of large language models (LLMs), generative AI platforms, and general‑purpose AI assistants from using the Business Solution when those AI capabilities are the primary functionality offered to end users. New signups were covered immediately in October; for existing AI integrations the update carried an enforcement date of 15 January 2026.
The practical effect was immediate. Several major AI services that had been accessible inside WhatsApp — most notably OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Microsoft’s Copilot — announced they would cease operating on WhatsApp ahead of that January date. WhatsApp’s own AI assistant, Meta AI, remained the only general‑purpose assistant explicitly permitted to operate on the platform under the new terms.
That sequence triggered regulatory alarms. The European Commission, which had already opened an in‑depth antitrust investigation into the policy months earlier, on Monday sent Meta a formal Statement of Objections setting out a preliminary finding that the new policy likely amounts to an abuse of a dominant position in the consumer messaging market across the European Economic Area. Brussels said it was considering interim measures — an emergency tool that could compel Meta to restore competitor access to WhatsApp while the larger probe continues — because it fears the policy could do “serious and irreparable” harm to the nascent market for AI assistants.

Why Brussels is worried: the legal and economic frame

Dominance and leverage: Article 102 TFEU in practice

At the heart of the Commission’s preliminary case is a familiar EU competition concern: a dominant platform provider leveraging control over a crucial distribution channel to distort downstream competition. Under EU law (Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), firms in a dominant position may not abuse that position by, for example, excluding rivals or imposing unfair conditions that prevent market entry or expansion.
The Commission’s argument follows a two‑part logic:

WhatsApp is dominant as a consumer messaging platform because of its enormous, cross‑border user base across the EEA; and
WhatsApp is becoming a key gateway for AI assistants seeking to reach consumers — an easily discoverable, friction‑free channel that lets an assistant behave like just another contact in a user’s chat list.

If both elements are accepted, the Commission says Meta’s decision to prohibit general‑purpose third‑party assistants while keeping Meta AI on the platform risks tilting the market in favour of Meta’s own service and raising effective barriers to entry for rivals.

Interim measures: when the Commission pulls the emergency lever

Interim measures in EU competition enforcement are rare because they must clear a high bar: regulators must convincingly show that waiting for a final decision would cause irreparable harm to competition that cannot be corrected later. The Commission’s public statements make clear it sees the WhatsApp change as potentially meeting that threshold: AI assistants are an emerging market where early access and user habits matter a great deal, and blocking distribution channels could harden market outcomes before competitors can scale.
If imposed, interim measures could take forms such as an order to maintain third‑party access on the Business API under the terms that existed before the October change, or to provide non‑discriminatory API access while the investigation proceeds.

What actually happened on the ground

Timeline — the key dates you need to remember

Mid‑October 2025: WhatsApp revises the WhatsApp Business Solution Terms to add the “AI providers” prohibition. New provider signups are covered immediately.
15 January 2026: Enforcement date for existing third‑party AI integrations.
October–November 2025: Major AI vendors announce migration plans and warn users about the impending cut‑off.
December 2025 onward: National authorities (notably Italy) and Brazil’s competition authority start taking action. The European Commission escalates to a Statement of Objections and signals interim measures in February 2026.

Who pulled out — and the counts

Major vendors and many startups that used WhatsApp as a discovery and distribution channel reacted quickly. Microsoft published official guidance saying Copilot on WhatsApp would be discontinued on 15 January 2026 and directed users to first‑party Copilot surfaces (mobile apps, web, Windows). OpenAI also told users ChatGPT would no longer be available on WhatsApp after the cut‑off and offered account‑linking and migration guidance for users who wished to preserve histories. Industry reporting and vendor notices attribute substantial WhatsApp usage for some suppliers (for example, OpenAI’s internal figure of “more than 50 million” people who used ChatGPT via WhatsApp was cited in vendor communications), but that number is vendor‑reported and should be treated with caution unless independently auditable.
Startups that used the Business API as their primary channel of growth — particularly those with consumer‑facing assistants — face either pivoting to their own apps and web surfaces or finding alternative messaging channels. For many, that pivot is costly in product, marketing and user retention terms.

Meta’s defence — product design and operational limits

Meta has defended the policy change on multiple fronts:

The company argues the Business API was designed for predictable, transactional business‑to‑consumer flows — notifications, bookings, customer support — not as a delivery channel for open‑ended LLM assistants that generate vast, unpredictable traffic.
WhatsApp says the surge in automated LLM traffic placed operational strain on systems and introduced moderation burdens the Business Solution was not architected to shoulder.
Meta insists there are many alternative channels by which AI assistants can reach users — app stores, websites, operating systems, device partnerships and other messaging platforms — so WhatsApp is not an indispensable or “essential” distribution route.
Meta pointed to national decisions elsewhere: after scrutiny in some jurisdictions the company made carve‑outs for particular markets (Italy, Brazil) — an argument it uses to say there is no systemic market foreclosure across all countries.

Taken together, Meta’s defence is both technical (systems and product intent) and legal (non‑essentiality of the channel).

Where the disagreement is real — law, facts and economics

Is WhatsApp an “essential gateway”?

Regulators and complainants argue that the unique combination of WhatsApp’s ubiquity, low friction, and contact‑based discovery made it de facto essential for consumer AI assistants seeking scale and low‑friction adoption. Vendors were able to reach millions without new installs or sign‑ups — a growth shortcut that substitutes for expensive marketing and onboarding.
Meta counters that the Business API is not a public app platform and that rivals can and do reach users via other popular surfaces. The debate turns on empirical facts: how many users genuinely relied on WhatsApp as their discovery path for AI assistants, whether alternatives provided equivalent conversion and retention rates, and whether the policy change immediately reduced rivals’ ability to compete at scale.

Data and training advantages: an open question

A politically charged subtext — but one regulators are likely to probe — is whether Meta’s ownership of a direct user interface for conversational AI creates data and network advantages that amplify market power. If Meta AI can collect richer interaction signals inside WhatsApp (and if those signals can be used to improve Meta’s models or personalization), the exclusion of rivals could compound competitive advantage beyond mere distribution.
Meta has repeatedly stated that user conversation data is subject to its privacy policies and regulatory constraints; whether that precludes relevant learning signals or personalization advantages is a technical and legal question the Commission will want to untangle. At this stage, regulators have raised the risk as part of their preliminary concerns rather than relying on any single confirmed data‑use allegation.

National actions and global ripple effects

Italy’s competition authority and Brazil’s antitrust watchdog reacted faster than many other jurisdictions. Both opened inquiries and ordered temporary suspensions or carve‑outs that forced Meta to allow third‑party assistants to operate in those markets while investigations proceed. That piecemeal regulatory resistance had two immediate effects:

It bought time for AI firms and startups in those markets, keeping discovery and distribution channels open locally; and
It signalled to Brussels that national authorities are prepared to use interim powers — a fact likely to influence the Commission’s decision calculus on EU‑wide interim measures.

Notably, different national outcomes underscore the fact‑specific nature of antitrust remedies: what an authority finds necessary in Rome or Brasilia may not be identical to what the Commission does for the EEA.

Practical fallout for users, startups and enterprises

For users

Convenience loss: many users who had been using ChatGPT or Copilot inside WhatsApp must now install vendor apps or use web clients to continue the same services.
Data portability headaches: many WhatsApp integrations used unauthenticated contact models; in those cases chat histories cannot be migrated server‑side. Vendors recommended users export chats before the deadline — a manual and imperfect process that can create privacy and data‑management risks.
Fragmentation: the migration may fragment user experience across different apps and raise friction for non‑technical users.

For startups and SMEs

Discovery and growth pain: startups that depended on WhatsApp as a low‑cost acquisition channel face increased marketing costs, product rework and the risk of lost cohorts.
Increased concentration risk: if Meta AI gains on‑platform scale while rivals are forced off, venture‑backed AI firms may find it harder to attract users and monetise.
Legal relief: affected startups have recourse through national authorities and the Commission, and some jurisdictions have already provided emergency respite.

For enterprises and developers

Technical re‑architecture: companies using AI inside customer service workflows need to audit whether their bots are incidental (and therefore allowed) or primary (and therefore affected).
Compliance complexity: vendors must interpret where their use case sits relative to Meta’s broadly worded “AI providers” definition — a determinations that Meta reserves to itself, creating regulatory and contractual uncertainty.

Remedies the Commission could order — and their likely effects

If the Commission proceeds with interim measures or a remedial order after a final decision, possible outcomes include:

Temporary reinstatement: require Meta to maintain pre‑October API access for qualifying third‑party AI assistants pending investigation.
Non‑discrimination obligations: mandate that Meta offer API access on fair, reasonable and non‑discriminatory terms, without preferential treatment for Meta AI.
Interoperability or access remedies: order technical changes to allow third parties to plug in on a non‑exclusive basis or to require a transparent certification or approval regime that is objective.
Structural remedies (less likely in the short term): in extreme cases, EU regulators can seek remedies that affect business models, but those are rare and would follow a full and adverse final decision.

Each remedy has trade‑offs. Interim reinstatement preserves competition immediately but may create technical and moderation burdens for WhatsApp; imposing long‑term non‑discrimination or interoperability obligations raises complex engineering, privacy, and safety questions.

Strengths and weaknesses of the Commission’s case

Strengths

Timing and market dynamics: AI assistants are an emergent market where early distribution advantages can have long‑lasting effects. Regulators can credibly argue that waiting for a standard enforcement process could permanently distort market structure.
Concrete precedents: National authorities in Italy and Brazil have already found sufficient preliminary reasons to intervene, strengthening the Commission’s argument that action is necessary to preserve market contestability.
Clear factual hook: Meta’s policy change directly replaced multiple third‑party assistants with a first‑party alternative (Meta AI) on an enormously popular consumer surface — a textbook scenario for exclusionary concerns.

Weaknesses and risks

Product design defence: Meta’s argument that the Business API was never intended to serve as an app‑like distribution channel for general‑purpose assistants is plausible and rests on product governance and operational constraints. If regulators accept that technical reality, the case’s legal foothold weakens.
Alternative channels: If empirical evidence shows rivals could effectively reach users via other channels with similar conversion and retention, the Commission’s claim of foreclosure is less powerful.
Proving irreparable harm: Interim measures require convincing proof that harm cannot be fixed later. Demonstrating that lost early momentum for a rival is truly irreversible is difficult and fact‑intensive.
Enforcement practicality: Any order to reinstate third‑party access would involve difficult technical, moderation and compliance trade‑offs that regulators would need to anticipate and monitor.

What to watch next

Meta’s formal reply to the Statement of Objections. The company has the right to a full defence and will present technical, commercial and legal arguments aimed at rebutting the Commission’s preliminary view.
Whether the Commission imposes interim measures. Given Brussels’ public language, an emergency order is plausible, but it will hinge on the quality of the evidentiary record showing immediate and irreparable competitive harm.
Parallel national proceedings. Italy and Brazil have already shaped the landscape; other national competition authorities may start inquiries or issue interim orders of their own.
Industry responses: will vendors pursue legal remedies, seek negotiated technical solutions with Meta, or accelerate migration to proprietary surfaces?
Wider policy consequences: this dispute will inform EU thinking about platform gatekeeping, the Digital Markets Act‘s interplay with traditional antitrust, and how authorities balance safety/moderation burdens against competition concerns.

Practical advice for affected parties

For developers and startups

Audit your reliance on platform APIs for distribution. If a single channel accounted for a large share of sign‑ups, invest in multi‑channel strategies (mobile apps, web, alternative messaging platforms) and owner‑controlled account models to reduce single‑point dependence.
Document the business impact of restricted access now: user metrics, conversion rates, retention and marketing costs. These facts matter if you file complaints with competition authorities.
Preserve user data responsibly. Encourage users to link accounts or export histories only via secure, privacy‑compliant flows.

For enterprise customers

Reassess which bots are mission‑critical and whether the Business API usage is incidental or primary under the new terms.
Build contingency plans for customer‑facing assistant availability and customer notification workflows in case of sudden integration changes.

For regulators and policymakers

Design interim remedies with operational realism in mind: require objectively verifiable certification and safety standards for third‑party assistants rather than open‑ended reinstatement that leaves safety gaps.
Encourage technical interoperability standards where feasible, while respecting privacy and consumer safety requirements.

A turning point for platform competition and AI ecosystems

This dispute is more than a fight over one clause in a terms‑and‑conditions update. It tests whether platform owners can — and should — foreclose access to powerful emerging AI distribution channels simply by rewriting technical rules, and it highlights the tension between product safety and market openness in the age of generative AI.
The Commission’s readiness to consider interim measures signals urgency: regulators believe the risk of permanent market distortion is real. Meta’s defence — grounded in product design and safety claims — raises legitimate concerns about how public policy should manage technical capacity and content moderation burdens.
For users and startups, the outcome will shape where AI assistants live and how easily they can be discovered. For policymakers, this is an early and consequential test case about how traditional competition tools apply to platformed AI ecosystems. And for the broader tech industry, the case will sharpen the trade‑offs between centralized control and open distribution at a moment when competition and innovation in AI are both accelerating.
Ultimately, the Commission now has to balance two competing public goods: the safety and reliable operation of a global messaging platform, and the preservation of contestable markets that allow new AI assistants — large and small — to compete on merit rather than on who controls a critical gateway. The next chapters — Meta’s reply, any interim order, and the final enforcement decision — will define that balance for years to come.
Conclusion: regulators are taking the claim of foreclosure seriously, vendors and startups are scrambling to adapt, and users are facing immediate friction. How Brussels frames its remedies — and how courts later treat them — will likely set precedent for how regulators police gatekeepers in the age of generative AI.

Source: theregister.com Brussels eyes crowbar for Meta's WhatsApp AI lockout

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WhatsApp Blocks Third-Party AI on Business API: Impact on ChatGPT and Copilot

What changed, exactly​

Key elements of the policy update​

How vendors responded​

Why Meta made the change — unpacking the stated reasons​

Who is affected — users, developers, and enterprises​

End users​

Businesses and customer‑service teams​

Developers and AI providers​

Regulatory and competition risks​

Antitrust attention​

Regulatory angles to watch​

Technical implications and privacy considerations​

End‑to‑end encryption and AI processing​

Data portability and chat history​

Security implications​

Strategic and market implications​

For Meta​

For OpenAI, Microsoft, and other AI players​

For alternative platforms​

Practical guidance: what users and businesses should do now​

For individual users​

For businesses using the WhatsApp Business API​

For developers and AI vendors​

Strengths and potential legitimacy of Meta’s case — and the counterarguments​

Notable strengths in Meta’s position​

Important counterarguments and risks​

Scenarios going forward: likely outcomes and what to watch​

Short term (next 3–9 months)​

Medium term (9–24 months)​

Long term (24+ months)​

A checklist for IT leaders and product teams​

Final assessment​

ChatGPT

AI

Background​

Why Brussels is worried: the legal and economic frame​

Dominance and leverage: Article 102 TFEU in practice​

Interim measures: when the Commission pulls the emergency lever​

What actually happened on the ground​

Timeline — the key dates you need to remember​

Who pulled out — and the counts​

Meta’s defence — product design and operational limits​

Where the disagreement is real — law, facts and economics​

Is WhatsApp an “essential gateway”?​

Data and training advantages: an open question​

National actions and global ripple effects​

Practical fallout for users, startups and enterprises​

For users​

For startups and SMEs​

For enterprises and developers​

Remedies the Commission could order — and their likely effects​

Strengths and weaknesses of the Commission’s case​

Strengths​

Weaknesses and risks​

What to watch next​

Practical advice for affected parties​

For developers and startups​

For enterprise customers​

For regulators and policymakers​

A turning point for platform competition and AI ecosystems​

Similar threads

What changed, exactly

Key elements of the policy update

How vendors responded

Why Meta made the change — unpacking the stated reasons

Who is affected — users, developers, and enterprises

End users

Businesses and customer‑service teams

Developers and AI providers

Regulatory and competition risks

Antitrust attention

Regulatory angles to watch

Technical implications and privacy considerations

End‑to‑end encryption and AI processing

Data portability and chat history

Security implications

Strategic and market implications

For Meta

For OpenAI, Microsoft, and other AI players

For alternative platforms

Practical guidance: what users and businesses should do now

For individual users

For businesses using the WhatsApp Business API

For developers and AI vendors

Strengths and potential legitimacy of Meta’s case — and the counterarguments

Notable strengths in Meta’s position

Important counterarguments and risks

Scenarios going forward: likely outcomes and what to watch

Short term (next 3–9 months)

Medium term (9–24 months)

Long term (24+ months)

A checklist for IT leaders and product teams

Final assessment