Hitachi Energy MACH GWS Vulnerabilities: Implications & Security Strategies

Hitachi Energy’s MACH GWS products, essential components within the world’s energy infrastructure, have recently come under the cybersecurity spotlight due to a suite of critical vulnerabilities. These security issues, cataloged under high CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) ratings and disclosed both by Hitachi Energy and security authorities such as CISA, have far-reaching implications for the reliability, integrity, and safety of critical control systems worldwide. A thorough examination of these vulnerabilities, their technical details, and the vendor’s response provides not only a technical understanding but also valuable perspective on the ongoing challenges of securing industrial control systems.

Understanding MACH GWS and Its Critical Role​

MACH GWS (Gateway Station) products are at the heart of modern power transmission and distribution, used extensively for substation automation, communications, and process control. Hitachi Energy—headquartered in Switzerland and operating across global energy sectors—has a reputation for producing robust power and automation solutions. However, like all connected technologies, MACH GWS is not immune to evolving cyber threats.
The recent vulnerabilities, disclosed as part of CISA advisory ICSA-25-133-03, affect multiple versions of MACH GWS, ranging from version 2.1.0.0 up through 3.3.0.0. Given that these systems underpin electrical grids and industrial operations worldwide, their exposure presents a tangible risk to the stability and security of national infrastructure.

A Deep Dive Into the Vulnerabilities​

Summary of Security Issues​

• CVSS v4 Score: The highest-rated vulnerabilities reach an alarming 9.4 out of 10.
• Attack Vector: Exploitable remotely with low attack complexity.
• Major Risks: Code injection, unauthorized file access/modification, session hijacking, and exposed ports/services without authentication.

Versions and Associated Vulnerabilities​

Product Version	CVEs Impacted
MACH GWS 2.1.0.0	CVE-2024-4872, CVE-2024-3980
MACH GWS 2.2.0.0 – 2.4.0.0	CVE-2024-4872, CVE-2024-3980
MACH GWS 3.0.0.0 – 3.3.0.0	CVE-2024-4872, CVE-2024-3980, CVE-2024-3982
MACH GWS 3.1.0.0 – 3.3.0.0	CVE-2024-7940

1. Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic (CWE-943, CVE-2024-4872)​

A flaw in the MACH GWS’s query validation mechanism can allow authenticated attackers to inject malicious code into persistent data. While this requires valid credentials, the potential for data integrity breaches and privilege escalation is high. The vulnerability scores 9.9 (CVSS v3.1) and 9.0 (CVSS v4), signifying its criticality.

2. Path Traversal Vulnerability (CWE-22, CVE-2024-3980)​

Authenticated users can manipulate file paths and names, potentially granting them unauthorized access to system-critical or application-critical files. This vulnerability also achieves a critical 9.9 in CVSS v3.1 and 9.4 in CVSS v4, emphasizing how dangerous privilege abuse can be within trusted environments.

3. Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay (CWE-294, CVE-2024-3982)​

Here, attackers with local access can exploit session hijacking via session logging tools if those are enabled (which by default, they are not). This limits the exposure somewhat but, once enabled, could let determined insiders circumvent authentication mechanisms. This is scored at 8.2 (v3.1) and 7.3 (v4), representing a high but not critical risk.

4. Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306, CVE-2024-7940)​

Most concerning for many OT (Operational Technology) environments, certain services intended for local access are exposed on all network interfaces—without authentication. Attackers can connect to these services remotely if network protections are weak, scoring 8.3 (v3.1) and 8.8 (v4), and raising the risk of remote system compromise.

Comprehensive Impact Assessment​

CISA’s advisory highlights that successful exploitation could permit attackers to:

• Inject arbitrary code, impacting data or gaining persistence.
• Read, modify, or delete vital files, threatening operational continuity.
• Hijack authenticated sessions, circumventing normal security controls.
• Access or control services intended for internal use, potentially remotely.

For systems in energy sector operations—where downtime, manipulation, or misconfiguration can have catastrophic consequences—these risks transmute into real threats to reliability, safety, and national security.

Technical Breakdown: Exploitation Pathways and Risks​

Remote Exploitability and Attack Complexity​

Several vulnerabilities, notably CVE-2024-4872 and CVE-2024-3980, can be exploited over the network with low complexity, provided the attacker has credentials. This allows not only targeted attacks by malicious insiders but also risk from compromised legitimate accounts, spear-phishing, or credential stuffing campaigns.
The path traversal and query logic injection issues are especially problematic within the context of industrial control because:

• Operations staff often have broad access, increasing the risk of misuse if credentials are stolen.
• Critical ICS (Industrial Control System) networks often lag behind in cybersecurity hygiene and segmentation compared to IT environments.
• The opportunity for pivot attacks increases, as attackers with low-privileged access could escalate privileges or move laterally within the OT network.

Risks from Local Exploitation​

The capture-replay authentication bypass (CVE-2024-3982) is notable for its requirement of local machine access and administrative privileges to enable potentially vulnerable session logging. While less severe than remote code injection, the potential for this to facilitate insider threats or persistent access cannot be discounted, especially in loosely monitored environments.

Unauthenticated Network Exposure​

CVE-2024-7940’s exposure of a supposed local-only service to the entire network (without authentication) exemplifies the dangers of “secure by design” assumptions not being enforced in practice. When combined with common lapses in network segmentation, this exposes critical control interfaces to the risk of remote abuse—even if the attack complexity is marked “high.”

The Vendor Response and Path to Remediation​

Patches and Upgrade Guidance​

Hitachi Energy responded swiftly, issuing patches and updates for affected product lines. The remediation guidance provided is as follows:

• MACH GWS 3.0.0.0–3.3.0.0: Upgrade to version 3.4.0.0.
• MACH GWS 2.1.0.0: Apply patch HF1 through HF6 sequentially.
• MACH GWS 2.2.0.0–2.4.0.0: Apply patch HF3 through HF6 sequentially.

This patch sequence is aimed at ensuring all point-releases and hotfixes are consistently applied to maximize security coverage. It’s worth noting that the complexity of patching in operational ICS environments cannot be overstated; system downtime, testing, and risk assessment are mandatory steps that may significantly delay widespread adoption of these fixes.

Defense-in-Depth Guidance​

Both Hitachi Energy and CISA stress that patching alone is insufficient. Recommended best practices include:

• Isolating control networks with firewalls and limiting internet exposure.
• Restricting physical and remote access to ICS components.
• Applying strict password policies and multifactor authentication wherever possible.
• Disabling unnecessary services, ports, and user accounts.
• Conducting routine, end-to-end vulnerability assessments and penetration testing.
• Training all personnel to resist phishing and social engineering attempts.

For threat monitoring, organizations are encouraged to use advanced intrusion detection (IDS/IPS) tailored to industrial protocols, and to ensure security logging and monitoring are enabled and regularly reviewed.

Evaluating the Strengths and Shortcomings​

Strengths of the Vendor’s Approach​

• Transparency: Disclosing the vulnerabilities and their effects comprehensively demonstrates a commitment to customer trust and to the broader cybersecurity ecosystem.
• Timely Response: Issuing clear remediation steps and collaborating closely with CISA reflects best practices in vulnerability handling.
• Detailed Technical Data: Publicly available CVSS scores, vector strings, and CVE tracking enable third-party vendors and asset owners to accurately assess risk and prioritize remediation.

Areas of Concern and Ongoing Risks​

• Credential Dependence: Several vulnerabilities rely on attackers having valid credentials—a scenario that remains all too common, given widespread credential phishing and reuse.
• Operational Challenges: Applying patches and upgrades to ICS environments often requires extensive testing, planned downtime, and sometimes physical presence. This can result in prolonged exposure windows.
• Legacy Equipment: Many operators in the power sector run older, unsupported, or “frozen” configurations for reasons of compliancy, reliability, or cost; these may not be eligible for current patches or may experience integration issues.
• Network Exposure: The presence of unauthenticated services exposed on internal networks (and, in poorly segmented environments, possibly internet-facing) is an urgent concern. Relying solely on network segmentation and “trusted” environments reflects assumptions that are increasingly out of touch with the evolving threat landscape.

The Broader Context: ICS Security Realities​

The disclosure underscores a recurring theme within critical infrastructure cybersecurity: the balance between operational stability and rapid adoption of security best practices. Industrial environments value uptime above all else, meaning that new patches—even critical ones—can be slow to roll out.
These vulnerabilities serve as a case study for why defense-in-depth is not merely a recommendation but a necessity. Compromise at any layer—be it user credentials, network segmentation, or software flaws—can cascade into system-wide exposure, enabling attackers to move from “low” to “high” impact rapidly.

Practical Recommendations for Asset Owners​

Organizations running Hitachi Energy MACH GWS products—or similar ICS gateways—should take immediate and sustained action to mitigate these vulnerabilities:

• Apply All Available Patches: Prioritize upgrading to patched versions as advised by Hitachi Energy, with change management and full risk assessment processes in place.
• Conduct a Network Segmentation Audit: Ensure that only those who absolutely require access can connect to the MACH GWS interfaces and segment control systems from corporate or internet-facing networks.
• Audit and Harden Authentication Practices: Implement strong, unique credentials, multi-factor authentication, and regular credential rotations. Monitor for suspicious or anomalous logins.
• Review Logging and Monitoring: Activate security event logging—carefully balancing between operational stability and the minimization of log-related vulnerabilities. Analyze logs for indicators of compromise.
• Limit and Control Local Access: Physical and administrative access should be as restrictive as practical, with access rights reviewed frequently.
• Implement Defense-in-Depth Strategies: Utilize firewalls, endpoint protection, network monitoring, and incident response planning to minimize both the chance and impact of compromise.
• User Awareness and Training: Since spear-phishing and social engineering remain common initial attack vectors, continuous user education is vital.

Looking Forward: Lessons and Industry Implications​

The MACH GWS advisory offers several lessons for the broader critical infrastructure community:

• Security Must Be Proactive, Not Reactive: Embedding security in development—via secure coding, aggressive input validation, and regular penetration testing—must become the standard, not the exception, for ICS vendors.
• Assume Breach Mentality: Trust boundaries are insufficient in modern OT networks. Every layer—from network to endpoint—must be assumed at risk and protected accordingly.
• Collaboration is Key: Only through open disclosure and partnership between vendors, asset owners, and regulators can systemic risks be addressed at scale.
• Update Cycles Matter: ICS vendors should continue to streamline update processes, making it easier and safer for customers to patch without unduly risking operational reliability.

Conclusion: Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity as a Shared Responsibility​

The vulnerabilities exposed in Hitachi Energy’s MACH GWS lineup are a clarion call to the energy sector and other critical infrastructure operators. While the technical flaws are concerning, the greater risk is complacency: assuming that industrial control systems can remain secure while connected, unpatched, or insufficiently monitored. The evolving threat landscape, characterized by sophisticated attackers and increasing interest in infrastructure targets, demands vigilance, partnership, and an embrace of secure-by-design principles throughout the technology lifecycle.
By moving swiftly to patch vulnerable systems, rigorously segmenting OT networks, and fundamentally rethinking authentication and exposure assumptions, asset owners can transform these disclosures from mere alarm bells into lasting improvements in operational resilience. The road to secure critical infrastructure is long and fraught with challenges—but transparent, collaborative security responses are vital milestones along the way.

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Source: CISA Hitachi Energy MACH GWS Products | CISA