Rockwell Automation has confirmed two high-severity denial-of-service vulnerabilities in the 1715 EtherNet/IP Communications Module that can be exploited remotely and have been assigned CVE‑2025‑9177 and CVE‑2025‑9178; vendor fixes are available in firmware/software version 3.011 and later, while affected devices running version 3.003 and prior require urgent mitigation or upgrade to restore resilience.
Industrial control systems (ICS) routinely depend on protocol-specific interface modules such as the 1715 EtherNet/IP Adapter (1715‑AENTR) to provide redundant I/O communications and management functions. These adapters expose both management interfaces (a built‑in web server) and the CIP/EtherNet‑IP communication stack, creating two distinct attack surfaces: the web management plane and the real‑time I/O/control plane. The recently disclosed issues affect both surfaces in different ways and demonstrate how even non‑destructive bugs can produce operational disruption in critical manufacturing contexts.
The vendor — Rockwell Automation — published advisory SD1757 on October 14, 2025, detailing the issues, affected versions, and the corrected release. Public vulnerability entries and CVE aggregators have indexed the CVE identifiers and reproduced Rockwell’s technical summaries and scoring.
Why this matters: many operators rely on the web UI for diagnostics, configuration, and for recovery actions that can speed incident response. Losing the management interface — even when I/O remains intact — slows troubleshooting, complicates maintenance windows, and can force unplanned on‑site interventions. The fact that a simple flood of requests can crash a management service emphasizes the importance of rate limiting and hardening web endpoints in OT devices.
Why this matters: CIP is the backbone for many Rockwell devices’ I/O exchange. A temporary disruption in CIP means sensors and actuators may stop reporting or accepting commands until communication is restored. Unlike the web server crash, this issue can affect the operational control plane and therefore has a higher potential to cause production stoppages or safety‑critical conditions depending on the use case.
Caveat about exploitation in the wild: at the time of the vendor advisory and initial registries, there were no confirmed public exploitation reports for these CVEs and Rockwell indicates the issues were discovered internally during testing. However, the public availability of the advisories and the low‑complexity network vector mean defenders should assume exploitation is feasible and prioritize remediation. Where there is no public exploit feed or EPSS score yet, treat that absence as lack of visibility, not a guarantee of safety.
Organizations that observe suspicious activity or otherwise require coordination on incident response should follow established internal reporting processes and consider notifying appropriate national cyber authorities to support cross‑industry correlation and response. Where claim verification or detailed technical testing is required, consult vendor documentation and maintain an auditable change management record for any firmware or configuration changes made in response to these advisories.
Source: CISA Rockwell Automation 1715 EtherNet/IP Comms Module | CISA
Background
Industrial control systems (ICS) routinely depend on protocol-specific interface modules such as the 1715 EtherNet/IP Adapter (1715‑AENTR) to provide redundant I/O communications and management functions. These adapters expose both management interfaces (a built‑in web server) and the CIP/EtherNet‑IP communication stack, creating two distinct attack surfaces: the web management plane and the real‑time I/O/control plane. The recently disclosed issues affect both surfaces in different ways and demonstrate how even non‑destructive bugs can produce operational disruption in critical manufacturing contexts. The vendor — Rockwell Automation — published advisory SD1757 on October 14, 2025, detailing the issues, affected versions, and the corrected release. Public vulnerability entries and CVE aggregators have indexed the CVE identifiers and reproduced Rockwell’s technical summaries and scoring.
Executive summary of the technical findings
- Two vulnerabilities were identified and assigned CVE‑2025‑9177 and CVE‑2025‑9178.
- Both are denial‑of‑service (DoS) issues; neither is reported to allow confidentiality or integrity compromises in the published advisories, but availability is materially affected.
- Rockwell reports the affected firmware as 3.003 and prior, and a corrected firmware 3.011 and later has been released.
- CVSS scores published by the vendor and reflected in registries: CVSS v3.1 base 7.5 and CVSS v4 base 7.7 for each CVE, reflecting network‑accessible issues with low attack complexity and high availability impact.
- Mitigation guidance emphasizes upgrading to the corrected release and following standard ICS hardening practices such as network segmentation, firewalling, and minimizing internet exposure for control devices.
Anatomy of the vulnerabilities
CVE‑2025‑9177 — Web server resource exhaustion (CWE‑770)
This vulnerability stems from allocation of resources without limits or throttling in the web server component of the 1715 module. A high volume of HTTP(S) requests directed at the module’s web interface can cause the management service to crash, rendering the web UI unavailable until the device is power‑cycled. According to the vendor, I/O control and the adapter’s core communication functions are not impacted by this crash, but the management plane becomes inaccessible until physical or controlled recovery is performed. The vendor assigns CWE‑770 to this finding and rates the impact primarily to availability.Why this matters: many operators rely on the web UI for diagnostics, configuration, and for recovery actions that can speed incident response. Losing the management interface — even when I/O remains intact — slows troubleshooting, complicates maintenance windows, and can force unplanned on‑site interventions. The fact that a simple flood of requests can crash a management service emphasizes the importance of rate limiting and hardening web endpoints in OT devices.
CVE‑2025‑9178 — CIP stack out‑of‑bounds write (CWE‑787)
The second issue is an out‑of‑bounds write in the Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) handling code. Crafted EtherNet/IP/CIP payloads can trigger a condition that results in the adapter ceasing CIP communication. Rockwell’s advisory indicates a restart is required to recover CIP connectivity; in practical terms this can manifest as loss of CIP session traffic and I/O updates until the adapter is restarted, which may directly impact automation loops that depend on timely I/O. The vendor classifies this as CWE‑787.Why this matters: CIP is the backbone for many Rockwell devices’ I/O exchange. A temporary disruption in CIP means sensors and actuators may stop reporting or accepting commands until communication is restored. Unlike the web server crash, this issue can affect the operational control plane and therefore has a higher potential to cause production stoppages or safety‑critical conditions depending on the use case.
Impact and risk evaluation
Both CVEs were calculated with the same base scores under v3.1 and v4 scoring systems reflecting high availability impact and network attack vectors. The vendor’s published CVSS vectors indicate:- Attack Vector: Network (AV:N) — exploitation can occur over the network without local access.
- Attack Complexity: Low — an attacker does not need specialized conditions to trigger the flaw beyond the crafted traffic or request volume.
- Privileges Required: None — unauthenticated network access is sufficient.
- Confidentiality / Integrity: None — the published advisories do not claim data disclosure or modification potential.
- Availability: High — the vulnerabilities primarily degrade or interrupt service, causing crashes or loss of CIP communication requiring restart/power cycle.
Caveat about exploitation in the wild: at the time of the vendor advisory and initial registries, there were no confirmed public exploitation reports for these CVEs and Rockwell indicates the issues were discovered internally during testing. However, the public availability of the advisories and the low‑complexity network vector mean defenders should assume exploitation is feasible and prioritize remediation. Where there is no public exploit feed or EPSS score yet, treat that absence as lack of visibility, not a guarantee of safety.
Who and what is affected
- Affected product: 1715‑AENTR EtherNet/IP Adapter (1715 EtherNet/IP Comms Module).
- Affected versions: Version 3.003 and prior. Corrected in Version 3.011 and later.
- Sectors: Rockwell and CISA emphasize Critical Manufacturing as a sector using these devices broadly; the adapter is deployed worldwide in industrial environments.
Vendor response and remediation
Rockwell Automation released advisory SD1757 and provided a corrected firmware/software version 3.011 that addresses both CVEs. The vendor’s guidance states:- Upgrade to 1715 EtherNet/IP: Version 3.011 or later to remediate both vulnerabilities.
- For users unable to upgrade immediately, follow Rockwell’s security best practices and standard ICS mitigations until the upgrade can be scheduled.
Practical mitigation guidance and prioritized checklist
When an immediate firmware upgrade is not possible, implement the following prioritized measures to reduce exploit likelihood and operational impact. These are derived from Rockwell’s advisory content and broadly recommended ICS best practices:- Rapid inventory: Identify all deployed 1715‑AENTR modules and log firmware versions. Prioritize devices with internet‑facing exposure or adjacency to business networks.
- Apply network segmentation: Ensure control networks are behind firewalls and separate from enterprise networks; deny direct internet access to OT devices.
- Limit management plane exposure: Block or restrict access to the module’s web server (management interface) with ACLs, firewall rules, or jump hosts; only allow access from known administration stations.
- Rate‑limit and monitor: Where possible, implement network rate limiting and IDS/IPS rules to detect high volumes of HTTP requests or unusual CIP traffic patterns targeting the module. Configure alerts for anomalous request spikes.
- Secure remote access: If remote access is required, use well‑managed VPNs or jump hosts with multi‑factor authentication; avoid exposing management ports to untrusted networks. Remember that VPNs must be kept current and endpoints must be hardened.
- Incident playbooks: Prepare a recovery playbook for web server and CIP disruptions that includes safe restart procedures, power‑cycle plans, and communication protocols for operations and safety teams. Test the playbook in a controlled environment.
- Logging and detection: Increase OT logging fidelity and forward relevant logs to monitoring systems. If possible, deploy network traffic capture on the OT segment to enable forensic investigation if an incident is suspected.
- Inventory all 1715‑AENTR modules and document firmware versions.
- Isolate any module that is internet‑exposed or reachable via less‑trusted networks.
- Schedule and test upgrade to 3.011 in a sandbox/test rig.
- Deploy upgrade to production per change control; validate operation and CIP connectivity.
- Re‑enable management access with tightened ACLs and active monitoring.
Attack scenarios and operational hazards
- Management denial: An attacker or benign misconfiguration that triggers a high request volume can crash the web UI, delaying diagnostics. While I/O might remain intact for CVE‑2025‑9177, the administrative friction increases MTTR (mean time to repair) and risks cascading missteps during recovery.
- CIP disruption: Crafted CIP payloads exploiting CVE‑2025‑9178 can silence CIP traffic, causing sensors and actuators to stop updating. That can lead to process upsets, safeties tripping, or production interruptions depending on control architectures. Restart is required to restore communications.
- Lateral movement risk amplification: Even if these CVEs alone do not deliver code execution, an attacker who can reliably cause availability failures may combine them with other footholds to increase operational disruption or mask other activities. Segmentation, monitoring, and minimizing exposure remain critical.
Why this matters for Windows‑centric operations teams
Many ICS engineering workstations and engineering tools used to manage Rockwell devices run on Windows platforms. Network segmentation errors, misconfigured remote access, or unmanaged engineering hosts can permit an attacker from the enterprise side to reach EtherNet/IP devices. The operational intersection — Windows endpoints plus OT devices — means IT security teams must coordinate closely with OT teams on patching, segmentation, and monitoring. The Rockwell advisory reinforces this by recommending layered defenses and minimizing network exposure for control system devices.Verification and cross‑checks
Key facts and numbers in this article were verified against:- Rockwell Automation’s security advisory SD1757, which lists affected product, affected and corrected versions, CWE classifications, and CVSS scoring.
- Public CVE/aggregator entries that reproduce Rockwell’s technical summary and scoring (CVE aggregators including CVE registries and security trackers). These entries confirm CVE identifiers, dates, and the CVSS v4/v3.1 scoring presented by Rockwell. Where possible, the vendor’s advisory was used as the primary authoritative source.
- Internal advisories, analyst summaries, and ICS community discussions included in the uploaded advisory material provided to this review, which emphasize CISA and vendor recommended mitigations for ICS devices. These community materials help frame operational guidance and defense‑in‑depth priorities.
Strengths and limitations of the vendor and public response
Strengths
- Timely disclosure: Rockwell published a coordinated advisory and produced corrected firmware in the same advisory cycle, enabling operators to remediate quickly when maintenance windows permit.
- Clear, conservative impact reporting: the vendor’s advisory distinguishes management‑plane from I/O impacts and provides explicit recovery steps (restart/power cycle), which reduces ambiguity for operations teams.
Limitations and risks
- No workaround: Rockwell reports no workaround beyond upgrading and applying security best practices; that leaves some operators reliant on compensating controls until upgrades are scheduled.
- Operational friction: firmware upgrades in ICS environments require careful validation; large fleets and complex compatibility matrices mean delays are common, prolonging exposure windows.
- Limited public exploit visibility: while no confirmed public exploitation was reported at advisory time, the low attack complexity and network exposure make it likely that motivated adversaries could weaponize the flaws; absence of public PoC should not be interpreted as low risk.
Practical recommendations for WindowsForum readers managing OT assets
- Treat these CVEs as operationally urgent for any 1715‑AENTR devices on your network. Inventory and prioritize upgrades to firmware 3.011.
- Coordinate IT and OT teams: ensure Windows engineering workstations that access OT devices are patched, access is controlled, and privileged credentials are restricted.
- Harden management access: place administration interfaces behind jump hosts or bastion servers, implement MFA where possible for administrative accounts, and strictly limit source IPs permitted to connect.
- Monitor for anomalous traffic: deploy detection rules for high volumes of HTTP requests targeting device management ports and for malformed or unexpected CIP payloads on EtherNet/IP segments. Log and retain capture for post‑incident analysis.
Conclusion
The Rockwell 1715 EtherNet/IP vulnerabilities CVE‑2025‑9177 and CVE‑2025‑9178 are a timely reminder that even management interfaces and protocol stacks in field devices must be engineered and maintained with the same security rigor applied to enterprise‑grade systems. The combination of network accessibility, low attack complexity, and tangible availability impacts means these issues should be prioritized by asset owners and security teams alike. Rockwell’s firmware update to 3.011 is the definitive remediation; where upgrade timing is constrained, robust segmentation, strict management access controls, and active monitoring are essential stopgaps to reduce operational risk.Organizations that observe suspicious activity or otherwise require coordination on incident response should follow established internal reporting processes and consider notifying appropriate national cyber authorities to support cross‑industry correlation and response. Where claim verification or detailed technical testing is required, consult vendor documentation and maintain an auditable change management record for any firmware or configuration changes made in response to these advisories.
Source: CISA Rockwell Automation 1715 EtherNet/IP Comms Module | CISA
