Urgent Patch for ProGauge MagLink LX: Stop Remote Access to Tank Gauges

Dover Fueling Solutions’ ProGauge MagLink family is at the center of a critical industrial‑control security alert that should be on every fuel‑site operator’s incident response checklist today: the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) published a high‑severity advisory describing remotely exploitable flaws in ProGauge MagLink consoles and Dover has issued firmware updates to remediate the issues. The practical risk is straightforward and serious — remote attackers with network access can manipulate or fully compromise tank‑gauge consoles that feed data into fueling operations, with consequences ranging from denial of service to full device takeover. (cisa.gov)

Background / Overview​

The affected product family — the ProGauge MagLink LX series — is widely deployed at retail and commercial fueling sites worldwide. These consoles monitor product levels, detect water in fuel, and provide critical telemetry for fuel‑management systems. The consoles in question include:

• ProGauge MagLink LX 4
• ProGauge MagLink LX Plus
• ProGauge MagLink LX Ultimate

Dover Fueling Solutions has documented hardware and software details for these consoles and markets the MagLink LX Ultimate as a next‑generation console with expanded connectivity and touchscreen capabilities. (doverfuelingsolutions.com)
CISA’s public advisory (ICSA‑25‑168‑05, published June 17, 2025) describes a missing‑authentication vulnerability in the ProGauge MagLink LX consoles that allows unauthenticated access to a hidden communication interface. CISA emphasizes the remote exploitability and low attack complexity of the issue, which is why the vulnerability received critical CVSS ratings and urgent vendor remediation guidance. (cisa.gov)

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What CISA found: technical summary and scope​

A compact technical synopsis​

CISA reports that MagLink LX consoles expose an undocumented and unauthenticated Target Communication Framework (TCF) interface on a specific TCP port. Because the interface lacks authentication controls, an attacker able to reach that port can:

• Create, modify, or delete files on the device;
• Potentially achieve remote code execution or persistent compromise of the console;
• Manipulate monitoring data or disable safety‑relevant telemetry.

CISA assigned the flaw CVE‑2025‑5310 and calculated high severity under both CVSS v3 and v4 frameworks; the agency stresses that exploitation is network‑accessible and requires no user interaction. (cisa.gov)

Affected firmware versions and remediation​

CISA and Dover both identify the same affected firmware ranges and remediation versions:

• ProGauge MagLink LX 4 and ProGauge MagLink LX Plus: versions prior to 4.20.3 are vulnerable; update to 4.20.3 or later.
• ProGauge MagLink LX Ultimate: versions prior to 5.20.3 are vulnerable; update to 5.20.3 or later.

Dover’s product pages and release channels host firmware images and vendor guidance for applying patches; CISA reiterates the vendor’s update recommendations as the primary remediation step. (cisa.gov)

Attribution and reporting​

CISA’s public advisory credits researcher Souvik Kandar of Microsec for reporting the issue. Some third‑party coverage and vulnerability aggregators also track CVE‑2025‑5310 and re‑publish the advisory details. Where public attributions conflict in secondary sources, operators should treat the CISA advisory as authoritative and prioritize its technical guidance. (cisa.gov)

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Why this matters: risk scenarios and operational impact​

These consoles sit at a critical junction between sensors (tank probes, leak detection) and operational systems (POS, inventory systems, back office). A compromised MagLink LX console can therefore be more than a localized nuisance:

• Data manipulation and fraud: altering tank level or water‑in‑fuel readings can hide theft, enable inaccurate resupply decisions, or mask leaking tanks.
• Operational disruption / DoS: deleting or corrupting console files or configurations can stop telemetry and force manual interventions, causing lost sales and potentially unsafe conditions.
• Supply chain / cascade effects: corrupted telemetry may propagate inaccurate levels into site management and logistics systems, triggering erroneous fuel orders or automated actions.
• Persistence and lateral movement: a remote compromise of a console connected to store networks can be a beachhead for lateral movement into management or payment systems if segmentation is weak.

CISA’s characterization — remote exploitability with low attack complexity — makes these scenarios practical for opportunistic attackers, automated scanners, or targeted campaigns. The need for physical remediation in certain outcomes (for example, when a device must be power‑cycled or physically serviced) increases mean time to recovery and raises overall cost to operators. (cisa.gov)

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Breakdown of the vulnerability classes mentioned (general guidance)​

In the briefing material you provided, three distinct weakness classes were listed: integer overflow/wraparound, use of hard‑coded cryptographic keys, and use of weak credentials. Those classes each have well‑known operational and attack implications; they are summarized here so operators can understand the threat model and detection priorities. Note that CISA’s publicly published advisory for CVE‑2025‑5310 focuses on the missing authentication (undocumented, unauthenticated interface) issue — the following CWE explanations are general remediation guidance and should be cross‑checked against your vendor’s specific release notes and device telemetry. (cisa.gov)

Integer overflow / Unix time handling (CWE‑190)​

• What it is: code that assumes a time value (Unix epoch seconds, for example) fits an expected integer range may fail when the value wraps or overflows, producing unexpected negative values, truncated times, or logic errors.
• Operational impact: authentication and time‑based token checks can break if the device misinterprets system time; logging and scheduled jobs may fail, potentially creating denial‑of‑service or replay vulnerabilities.
• Detection and mitigation: log irregularities in authentication failures after time changes; enforce strong input validation and range checks on time values and timestamps.

Hard‑coded cryptographic keys (CWE‑321)​

• What it is: embedding a secret (signing key, symmetric key, password) into firmware makes that secret extractable from device images or memory dumps.
• Operational impact: an attacker with the signing key can forge authentication tokens or decrypt sensitive traffic and fully bypass device authentication.
• Detection and mitigation: rotate keys, adopt per‑device unique keys, store keys in secure elements or vaults, and monitor for token anomalies.

Weak / immutable default credentials (CWE‑1391)​

• What it is: devices shipped with default administrative credentials that cannot be changed through the device UI or standard administration channels.
• Operational impact: once default credentials are known (they often are posted publicly), any device exposed to reachable networks becomes trivially compromised.
• Detection and mitigation: ensure all deployed devices can accept and enforce credential changes, use unique per‑device credentials during commissioning, and disallow default accounts in production networks.

If your internal inventory or the vendor release notes show any of these classes present on a given firmware build, treat them as high priority for remediation or compensating controls. Where the vendor has published specific patches that address these root causes, validate via checksums and vendor release notes before rolling into production. (doverfuelingsolutions.com)

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What the vendor and CISA recommend — concise action items​

Both Dover and CISA offer an immediate remediation path: update the console firmware to the vendor‑released fixed versions and adopt network hardening. Operational steps should be taken in a careful, staged manner in OT contexts to avoid unplanned downtime.
Immediate tactical steps:

• Inventory: Identify every ProGauge MagLink console and record its model and firmware version.
• Patch: Apply vendor‑supplied firmware updates — MagLink LX 4 / Plus → 4.20.3+; MagLink LX Ultimate → 5.20.3+ — using vendor instructions and signed firmware images. Verify successful update and device health post‑patch. (cisa.gov)
• Network isolation: Ensure consoles are not directly reachable from the public internet; place them behind segmented OT firewalls and restrict management interfaces to trusted jump hosts or a bastion network. (cisa.gov)
• Access controls: Block unused network ports and log/alert on unexpected inbound connections to console management ports (including the TCF port CISA identified).
• Monitor & Audit: Increase logging of authentication activity and configuration changes; monitor for anomalous file operations and sudden changes to time, certificates, or key material.
• Change management: Apply patches during controlled maintenance windows, perform impact analysis, test in lab environments where possible, and document rollback steps.

Longer‑term strategic items:

• Replace any device that cannot be upgraded or hardened.
• Implement unique per‑device credentials and keys for all new deployments.
• Use network segmentation architectures that enforce “deny‑by‑default” policies between OT and IT environments.
• Conduct regular OT penetration testing and inventory reconciliation.

CISA’s advisory and Dover’s update guidance are the authoritative sources for patch versions and immediate mitigations; follow their instructions and maintain a documented change control process. (cisa.gov)

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Detection, incident response, and recovery tips​

Detection:

• Prioritize logs that show unexpected connections to the TCF port or file‑system write/delete operations originating from non‑trusted hosts.
• Watch for spikes in authentication failures or previously unseen management‑protocol traffic.
• Correlate console telemetry gaps with upstream reporting or double‑check with on‑site sensors if telemetry ceases.

Containment:

• If a console is suspected of compromise, isolate it from the network immediately and preserve forensic images of the device (disk and memory) if feasible.
• Use network ACLs to block external reachability and restrict access to a secure jumper host for remediation.

Eradication & recovery:

• Reimage or apply vendor firmware updates from verified images.
• Rotate any cryptographic keys or credentials that may have been present on the affected device.
• Validate integrity of logs and telemetry streams after restoration and perform a root‑cause analysis.

Reporting and information sharing:

• Follow internal reporting procedures and notify your vendor support contact for tailored remediation assistance.
• If you observe malicious activity, report it to national cybersecurity authorities and trusted information‑sharing organizations for tracking and correlation.

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Reconciling conflicting or unverifiable claims​

The material supplied earlier included several CVE identifiers and vulnerability descriptions that are not consistent with the CISA advisory that is publicly available at the time of verification. The most authoritative public record for this family of issues at the moment is CISA’s ICSA‑25‑168‑05 advisory (June 17, 2025) and the vendor guidance recommending firmware updates to 4.20.3/5.20.3. (cisa.gov)
Some external vulnerability trackers or analyst write‑ups may reference additional CVEs or related weakness classes (for instance, integer overflow or hard‑coded keys). Where a claim cannot be corroborated by either the vendor’s release notes or a trusted national vulnerability repository (NVD/CISA), treat that claim as unverified until the vendor or an authoritative registry publishes confirmed details. When an advisory differs between sources, prioritize the vendor‑issued patch notes together with the CISA advisory for operational decisions. (cvedetails.com)

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Critical analysis — strengths of the response and remaining risks​

Strengths

• Vendor responsiveness: Dover issued firmware updates and published product pages that let operators access corrective firmware. That is the strongest and fastest mitigator for this class of remote‑exploitable flaws. (doverfuelingsolutions.com)
• Clear guidance from CISA: The advisory provides explicit affected versions and prescriptive mitigations (patch, isolate, monitor), which removes ambiguity for operators and helps prioritize remediation in critical infrastructure contexts. (cisa.gov)
• Remediation is practical: Updating firmware to the versions specified addresses the root cause in most reported cases; patching therefore yields high risk reduction.

Remaining and systemic risks

• Exposure through weak segmentation: Operators that still permit console management access from corporate or public networks remain at material risk even after initial alerts due to lingering misconfigurations elsewhere in the environment. (cisa.gov)
• Patching friction in OT environments: Many fueling sites operate under strict uptime and safety constraints; applying firmware patches requires testing and coordination, leaving a window of exposure for large fleets.
• Supply‑chain and credential issues: If a device’s firmware or backup image includes hard‑coded secrets or immutable default credentials (a risk class frequently seen in embedded devices), attackers may obtain persistent control even after piecemeal remediation unless those secrets are rotated or the device replaced.
• Telemetry tampering not easily visible: Attackers who can alter tank readings can hide a range of malicious behaviors; detection requires cross‑validation across independent sensors and reconciliation with sales and delivery records.

Operators should therefore treat firmware patching as necessary but not sufficient: combine patching with segmentation, credential hygiene, key rotation, and operational monitoring to obtain a durable reduction of risk. (cisa.gov)

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Practical checklist for Windows‑centric IT/OT teams (step‑by‑step)​

• Immediately run an inventory query for endpoints named MagLink or with known MAC/OUI identifiers and log their firmware versions.
• For each device running a vulnerable firmware version:
• Schedule a maintenance window and apply 4.20.3 (LX 4 / Plus) or 5.20.3 (Ultimate) per Dover’s instructions. Verify checksums on downloaded firmware. (doverfuelingsolutions.com)
• Verify after update that the TCF port is no longer accepting unauthenticated requests or has the vendor‑designed access controls in place.
• Harden the network path:
• Block inbound access to console management ports at the edge firewalls.
• Move all console management to an isolated OT management VLAN with strict ACLs and MFA‑protected jump hosts.
• Rotate credentials and keys if the device supports it; if not, consider immediate replacement planning.
• Enable centralized logging (Syslog/Collector) for device management events and configure alerts on file write/delete events and unexpected reboot/power cycles.
• Perform a controlled test of incident response: simulate loss of console telemetry and validate fallback procedures (manual readings, local alarms, alternate reporting).
• Document every step for compliance and insurance purposes; keep a firmware rollback plan in case of unforeseen side effects.

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Closing assessment and final recommendations​

The CISA advisory and vendor updates represent a timely, actionable disclosure that should be treated as high priority by fueling operators and the IT/OT teams that support them. Apply vendor firmware updates (4.20.3 and 5.20.3 where applicable) without delay, but do so within the structured change control practices required for OT assets. Simultaneously, implement network segmentation, restrict access to management interfaces, rotate secrets where possible, and beef up monitoring so that detection and response are rapid.
Wherever secondary reports or third‑party summaries introduce different CVE identifiers or additional technical findings, treat those as claims to be validated against vendor release notes and trusted registries (CISA, NVD). The authoritative path for operational decisions is:

• vendor release notes + signed firmware images, and
• the official CISA advisory for high‑level risk and mitigations. (cisa.gov)

Immediate action, layered defenses, and disciplined change control will materially reduce the risk these vulnerabilities pose to fueling operations and transportation‑sector supply chains.

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Source: CISA Dover Fueling Solutions ProGauge MagLink LX4 Devices | CISA