Microsoft’s long-standing prescription that users should routinely change their Windows passwords has finally been exposed for what security researchers and standards bodies have long argued: a low-value, usability-damaging relic that produces more problems than protection. The change in Microsoft’s guidance — removing periodic password-expiration from the Windows security baselines — formalizes a shift already present in modern authentication thinking and aligns Windows advice with NIST and earlier Microsoft research, even as it raises practical and compliance questions for administrators. rosoft.
Source: Mashable https://mashable.com/article/micros...p-h-13&utm_source=internal&utm_medium=onsite]
Background
What Microsoft actually changed
In a revision to the Windows security baseline for Windows 10 (and corresponding server guidance), Microsoft removed the baseline recommendation to enforce calendar-driven password expiry — describing periodic password expiration as “an ancient and obsolete mitigation of very low value.” That wording appears in Microsoft’s security-baseline discussion and has been repeated across industry coverage since the baseline was changed. The change means the company will no longer signal a fixed expiry interval as a recommended baseline for enterprise Group Policy settings; administrators still have the option to configure Maximum Password Age in their environments if policy or regulation requires it.This is not new — standards and research already moved here
The move mirrors advice from major standards bodies and research going back several years. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) explicitly advises that verifiers “SHOULD NOT require memorized secrets to be changed arbitrarily (e.g., periodically)” unless there is evidence of compromise — a change that appears in SP 800‑63B and its accompanying guidance. Microsoft’s own published research and guidance also recommended eliminating mandatory periodic resets years before the baseline update, arguing that forced rotation often drives predictable, weaker replacements and increases operational friction.Why the policy shift matters
Human factors make rotation counterproductive
Forced rotation assumes users will create new, strong, and uncorrelated secrets on schedule. Empirical evidence and usability research show the opposite: when asked to change passwords frequently, people tend to make small, predictable modifications (append a digit, increment a year), reuse variants, or write credentials down. Those behaviors shrink effective entropy and create patterns attackers can exploit. The result is routine resets that reduce security in practice while increasing help-desk load and user frustration.Technical and operational realities
Modern attack techniques — credential stuffing, large leaked-dataset lookups, and GPU-accelerated offline cracking — make short, guessable passwords dangerous regardless of how often they’re changed. Additionally, if a password is compromised, waiting for a scheduled expiry is the wrong incident response; organizations should detect and force resets on evidence of compromise rather than rely on a calendar. Microsoft’s baseline change emphasizes detection, banned-password screening, and multi-factor controls over rote expiration.The baseline vs. the product default
Importantly, removing an item from the security baseline is different from changing Windows defaults or removing a configuration option. The Windows product still exposes a Maximum password age setting; many Windows domain environments still show a default of 42 days in the Default Domain Policy. Microsoft’s baseline change simply withdraws the recommendation that auditors and admins treat scheduled rotation as a baseline best practice. Administrators must deliberately change Group Policy or Azure/Entra settings to alter behavior in their estate.What administrators should consider now
Priority compensating controls (the “what to do instead” list)
Removing periodic expiration only improves security if it’s paired with modern, stronger controls. Microsoft and NIST converge on the same set of compensations:- Multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all privileged accounts and recommended for users — favor phishing-resistant methods (FIDO2/passkeys, hardware tokens) over SMS.
- Banned‑password lists / breached-password screening at set/change time to block known weak or previously exposed secrets.
- Password managers and passphrases: encourage long, unique passphrases and permit paste to facilitate manager use.
- Anomaly detection and rapid response: monitoring for credential stuffing, impossible travel, and other anomalies, with automated forced resets on suspected compromise.
- Secrets management for non-human accounts: replace rotating service-account passwords with managed identities, vaults, or certificate-based authentication.
- Passwordless deployment where possible: accelerate Windows Hello for Business, passkeys, and FIDO2 adoption for users and admins.
A controlled migration plan (operational checklist)
- Inventory all accounts (human vs. non-human) and map policies that currently enforce periodic rotation.
- Identify regulatory or contractual requirements that still mandate periodic rotation and isolate systems that must comply.
- Implement banned-password screening and ensure new-password checks block commonly compromised credentials.
- Roll out MFA broadly, starting with privileged and externally accessible accounts; prefer hardware-backed or platform authenticators.
- Pilot “no automatic expiry” groups with robust monitoring and rollback plans before enterprise-wide rollout.
- Replace service-account rotation requirements with managed identities / secrets vaults and automate secret rotation where needed.
- Update policies, audit evidence, and documentation to reflect the risk-based rationale for the change.
Compliance, audit, and governance implications
Auditors will notice change
Because security baselines are often used as audit checklists, removing password-expiration from Microsoft's baseline reduces the chance that organizations will be penalized for adopting modern mitigations. That said, some standards and contractual frameworks remain prescriptive (cardholder data environments, specific government regulations, or contractual SLAs). For regulated environments, the safe path is to document a risk-based decision and the compensating controls you implemented (MFA, banned-password screening, anomaly detection) and to obtain auditor or legal sign-off before changing rotation settings.Document the evidence and the metrics
Auditors respond to measurable controls. Prepare data demonstrating MFA adoption rates, banned-password rejections, reduced help-desk resets, and incident-detection telemetry to show that dropping calendar-driven rotation improved overall posture rather than weakened it. Provide a clear incident‑response playbook that triggers immediate password resets on confirmed compromise.Practical pitfalls and risks
Do not remove rotation in isolation
If organizations simply flip “never expire” without rolling out compensating controls, risk increases. Partial MFA deployment, a weak or absent banned-password screening, and legacy systems that cannot accept password managers all create gaps that attackers can exploit. A phased rollout and explicit pilot measurement are essential.Legacy and service accounts
Many legacy applications and scripted service accounts still assume password-rotation semantics. These accounts are often left in the dark when rotation policies change; replacing them with managed identities, secrets vaults, or certificate-based authentication is the safer long-term solution. Where rotation remains necessary, automate it with a secrets manager rather than rely on human-driven resets.MFA is necessary but not a panacea
MFA drastically reduces the value of stolen passwords, but real-world deployments can contain weaknesses. Recent research revealed an attacker technique that exploited lax rate-limiting and extended TOTP windows in a major cloud vendor’s MFA implementation; the flaw allowed high-probability brute-force attempts until vendor-side rate-limiting was tightened. That episode shows that MFA must be implemented and monitored correctly: enforce rate limits, alert on repeated failures, and prefer phishing-resistant authenticators. MFA must be configured and monitored — not treated as checkbox compliance.Numbers and technical specifics you need to know
- Default Windows Maximum Password Age (Default Domain Policy and many effective GPOs): 42 days. This remains a configurable Windows setting and will not change automatically when you adopt Microsoft’s baseline guidance. Administrators must explicitly modify Group Policy to adjust or disable expiration.
- NIST SP 800‑63B recommendation: do not force memorized secrets to be changed arbitrarily; force resets only on evidence of compromise. This is SHOULD NOT language in the standard and carries strong practical weight in modern identity management.
- Microsoft’s phrasing: in baseline guidance the company referred to periodic password expiration as an “ancient and obsolete mitigation of very low value,” and recommended modern mitigations instead of a calendar-driven policy. That language is explicit in Microsoft’s baseline discussion and has been widely reported since the baseline revision.
A critical appraisal: strengths and open questions
Strengths of Microsoft’s course correction
- Evidence-based policy: aligning baseline advice with research and NIST guidance reduces the risk of promoting controls that look secure on paper but reduce real-world security.
- Improved usability: fewer forced resets mean less help-desk churn, higher acceptance of stronger long-lived passphrases, and better willingness to adopt password managers.
- Audit clarity: removing an arbitrary baseline metric reduces the chance that auditors will penalize organizations which invested in stronger mitigations (MFA, banned-password screening) instead of calendar-based rotation.
Risks and remaining concerns
- Perception and compliance friction: auditors or regulators who expect rotation as a checkbox will need explicit risk documentation and new evidence; this can slow adoption.
- Partial deployments: organizations that do not complete the compensating controls rollout risk weakening their posture if they drop rotation prematurely.
- Legacy constraints: service accounts, older applications, and third-party integrations may require rotation semantics and will need remediation paths that can be costly or operationally complex.
- Overreliance on MFA: as recent MFA research shows, MFA implementations must be correctly configured and actively monitored; flawed implementations or weak factors (SMS, insecure OTP windows, missing rate limits) can undermine gains.
Tactical guidance for Windows administrators (step-by-step)
- Inventory & classify: map accounts and systems by risk profile (human, privileged, service, third‑party).
- Check regulatory obligations: identify systems that legally require rotation and keep rotation for them or document exceptions with legal/audit.
- Enable banned-password screening: deploy Microsoft Entra / Azure AD password protection or equivalent to block breached/weak passwords at creation time.
- Enforce strong multi-factor: require MFA for all high-value accounts; prefer FIDO2/passkeys and hardware tokens for privileged access.
- Pilot “no expiry”: select a low‑risk user group and disable scheduled expiry while monitoring sign-in anomalies and help-desk impact for a defined period.
- Migrate non-human secrets: move service-account credentials into a secrets vault and adopt managed identities where possible.
- Monitor & respond: create automated alerts for anomalous auth behavior and bake forced resets into the incieasure and report**: collect metrics (MFA adoption, banned-password rejections, suspicious sign‑ins, help‑desk tickets) and present to auditors to justify the risk-based change.
Conclusion
Microsoft’s decision to withdraw periodic password expiration from its Windows security baseline formalizes a broader, research-backed evolution in identity security: passwords are brittle, and calendar-driven rotation often worsens security and user experience. The guidance aligns Windows recommendations with NIST SP 800‑63B and longstanding Microsoft research, and it pushes administrators to implement stronger compensating controls — notably broad MFA adoption, banned-password screening, password managers, and secrets management. That said, the change is a policy pivot, not a magic bullet. The security win comes from doing the hard operational work: migrating legacy systems, enforcing strong and monitored MFA, preventing use of breached passwords, and maintaining rapid incident detection and response. Organizations that treat the baseline change as a roadmap for modernization — rather than an excuse to relax defenses — will improve both security and usability. Those that flip settings in isolation risk exposing gaps that attackers will exploit. The practical takeaway for Windows administrators is straightforward: stop celebrating the end of a nuisance policy; start treating identity protection as a layered, monitored, and measurable program.Source: Mashable https://mashable.com/article/micros...p-h-13&utm_source=internal&utm_medium=onsite]
