Here's what changes, what the documentation trail shows, and what admins should know before trying it.
The old model: a certificate file and local permissions
It helps to know what's being replaced. Microsoft Learn's current Arc security documentation says that every Azure Arc-enabled server has a system-assigned Microsoft Entra ID managed identity associated with it. This identity is used by the agent to authenticate itself with Azure. The backing certificate is stored on the local disk of the system. Specifically, the agent stores the certificate in C:\ProgramData\AzureConnectedMachineAgent\Certs\ on Windows and /var/opt/azcmagent/certs on Linux.
That same page lays out the risk. Anyone holding that certificate file can request Microsoft Entra ID tokens as the server. The only protection is an access control list that limits the directory to local administrators and the agent's "himds" account. It also describes a blunt fix for suspected compromise: disconnect the agent and reconnect it to get a new identity. That disconnect removes the Azure resource and its managed identity along with it.
Until recently, Microsoft's position on user-assigned identities was clear. A Microsoft Q&A answer from January 2026 stated that user-assigned managed identities (UAMI) are not supported on Azure Arc‑enabled servers today. Only system‑assigned managed identity (SAMI) is supported for Azure Arc–enabled machines. So this preview fills a gap that Arc customers have been asking about.
Section summary: Arc server identities have relied on a certificate file protected by local permissions, with one identity per server. Both limits are now being addressed.
TPM-backed identity: the key stays in the chip
In the TPM-backed model, Microsoft says the managed identity's private key is sealed by the server's Trusted Platform Module, or by a virtual TPM (vTPM) on virtualized hosts. Microsoft claims two benefits:
- Hardware-backed protection: the key is sealed by a hardware component instead of relying on local access controls alone.
- Non-exportable credentials: Microsoft says even privileged users can't extract or export the identity material from the TPM.
You opt in during onboarding with a single parameter, --identity-key-store, and Microsoft says the Connected Machine agent handles the rest automatically.
Be precise about what this protects against. The threat it addresses is credential theft and replay: an attacker copies the certificate file to another machine and requests tokens from there. A sealed, non-exportable key stops that. Microsoft does not claim it stops a compromised host from using the identity locally. If an attacker has enough access to the machine itself, the identity endpoint still works for them. The Arc documentation also notes that anyone with Contributor rights on the Arc resource can deploy extensions that run scripts with elevated privileges, which effectively makes them an indirect server administrator. TPM sealing is real hardening, but you still need to control who can log in to the host and who holds which Azure roles.
WindowsForum's own Ignite 2026 coverage of Arc made the same point, noting that the feature depends on the machine having a TPM or vTPM. Older physical servers without TPM 2.0, or VMs on hypervisors without a vTPM, will need hardware or configuration changes first.
Section summary: TPM-backed identity stops attackers from copying the server's credential to another machine. It doesn't make a compromised host trustworthy again.
User-assigned managed identities: identities you create and manage
The second feature changes how identities are managed. A system-assigned identity is tied to one server for its whole life. A UAMI is a standalone Azure resource that you create, govern and reuse. During the preview, Microsoft says you can:
- Connect a server with one or more existing UAMIs, up to 10 per server.
- Choose between UAMI-only, or keeping a system-assigned identity alongside your UAMIs.
- Add, replace or detach UAMIs after onboarding, without reconnecting the server.
- Add a system-assigned identity later, even to a server that was onboarded with UAMIs only.
The practical benefit is in how permissions are handled. Microsoft's general guidance on managed identities describes the use cases that fit UAMIs: workloads that run on multiple resources and can share a single identity, workloads that need to be pre-authorized during provisioning, and workloads where resources are recycled frequently, but permissions should stay consistent.
Take an example. Say you run 40 on-premises web servers that each read secrets from the same Key Vault. Today that's 40 system-assigned identities and 40 role assignments, and you redo the work every time a server is rebuilt. With a UAMI you grant the role once, attach the identity to every server, and rebuilt servers inherit access when the identity is reattached. Our Ignite coverage put it this way: Arc machines then work the way Azure VMs already do.
One caution: attaching a UAMI doesn't grant access by itself. You still have to give the identity role assignments on the target resources. A shared identity also means a shared blast radius. If one of those 40 servers is compromised, the attacker can use everything that identity can reach, so shared UAMIs need least-privilege scoping more than ever.
Section summary: UAMIs separate permissions from individual machines, which makes rebuilds and scale-out easier. A shared identity needs tightly scoped roles.
Why Microsoft requires both features together
The two features aren't fully independent. Microsoft states that UAMI onboarding requires TPM-backed key storage. That's a deliberate choice. A reusable identity attached to many machines is a much more valuable target than one tied to a single server. Requiring hardware-sealed keys before you can attach UAMIs means the flexible model can't be combined with the weaker storage model.
The tradeoff is that UAMI support is limited to TPM-capable machines. Fleets with older or TPM-less hardware stay on system-assigned identities until that's fixed.
What the agent release notes show
The release notes for the Azure Connected Machine agent show this feature being built over several releases. In version 1.62, Microsoft added a new --identity-key-store flag for azcmagent connect to enable TPM-backed Identity, plus azcmagent check tpm to verify TPM-backed Identity readiness. Both were marked as reserved for future use, with a pointer to a preview enrollment page.
The November 2026 release, version 1.70, adds more:
- Added support for onboarding with Trusted Platform Module (TPM)-backed keys before a managed identity is assigned.
- Added structured managed identity details to azcmagent show, including service-reported identity type, principal IDs, and user-assigned identity lifecycle states.
- Added azcmagent reconnect (preview) to restore a machine's connection to its existing Azure Arc resource.
The azcmagent show improvement matters for day-to-day operations. Once servers can carry up to ten identities, admins need a local way to see which ones are attached and what state they're in. The release notes don't say that version 1.70 is the minimum version for the preview, so check Microsoft's preview prerequisites rather than assuming. Still, if you plan to test, running the latest agent is the sensible starting point.
What Microsoft hasn't published yet
The announcement links to separate Microsoft Learn pages for prerequisites, onboarding commands and verification steps. We couldn't confirm the following from the material available:
- Which operating systems and TPM/vTPM configurations are supported
- The accepted values for
--identity-key-storeand the full syntax of the connect command - Region, subscription or enrollment limits for the preview
- How workloads choose between multiple attached identities
- Rollback, recovery and re-onboarding steps for TPM-sealed identities
That last item matters most. The documented recovery for an expired or compromised Arc identity has been to disconnect and reconnect. If a TPM is cleared, a motherboard is replaced, or a VM's vTPM state is lost, a key sealed to that TPM is presumably gone with it. Get the recovery procedure from Microsoft's preview documentation before you need it in an outage.
A sensible preview checklist
This is our own suggested sequence based on the features described above. It isn't an official Microsoft procedure.
- Inventory TPM readiness. Identify which Arc servers have a TPM 2.0 or vTPM. Agents from version 1.62 onward include
azcmagent check tpmfor this, though it was initially tied to the preview program. - Update a test group to the current agent so you get the identity details in
azcmagent show. - Read Microsoft's preview prerequisites and onboarding docs before running any connect commands. Don't guess flag values.
- Design UAMIs around workloads, not machines. Create one identity per role, such as "web-tier Key Vault reader", and scope its permissions tightly.
- Test the full lifecycle: attach, replace and detach UAMIs, and add a system-assigned identity later, all on non-production servers.
- Write the recovery runbook for TPM-related failures before moving beyond the lab.
- Check Azure RBAC. Hardware-sealed keys don't help if too many people have Contributor on your Arc resources.
The bottom line
Arc has always promised to manage servers outside Azure as if they were Azure resources, and identity was one area where that promise fell short. Certificate files protected by local permissions and one identity per server made Arc noticeably weaker than an Azure VM. With hardware-sealed keys and reusable user-assigned identities, it's much closer to parity.
It's still a preview, with important details missing from public documentation, so don't put it on production domain controllers on a Friday afternoon. For teams running large hybrid fleets on TPM-capable hardware, it's worth testing now.
References
- Securing Azure Arc-enabled servers with TPM-backed identity and user-assigned identities (preview) Azure Arc Blog · 2026-11-17T18:45:00+00:00
- Securing Azure Arc-enabled servers with TPM-backed identity and user-assigned identities (preview) | Microsoft Community Hub techcommunity.microsoft.com
- Managed identities for Azure resources - Managed identities for Azure resources | Microsoft Learn learn.microsoft.com