Illustration of a laptop using biometric login and a security key to securely access a cloud account across devices.
Windows asks you to set up a PIN, and a short PIN can still beat a long password for signing in to your PC. The reason isn't the number of possible combinations. It is how Windows Hello is built.

MakeUseOf's explainer on this topic is mostly right about the security model. Microsoft's own documentation, covered below, backs up the core argument and also adds some qualifications the original skips.

Illustration of a laptop using biometric login and a security key to securely access a cloud account across devices. The core idea: a PIN is a local key, not a short password​

In Windows Hello for Business, the PIN is tied to one device, stays local, and unlocks a protected authentication key instead of traveling to a server. Microsoft's FAQ describes the difference this way: the PIN is local to the device and is not stored on a server.

Setup works like this:

  1. Windows Hello creates a public and private key pair on your device.
  2. The public key is registered with the identity provider, such as your Microsoft account or Entra ID.
  3. The private key stays on the PC.
  4. When you sign in, your PIN (or face or fingerprint) releases the private key. The key signs a challenge, and the server checks the signature.

Microsoft's developer documentation says a Hello configuration is unique to a specific user and device. The documentation adds that it doesn't sync across devices. If you want Hello on three PCs, you set it up on all three.

That is why Microsoft's FAQ says someone who gets your PIN would also need your device. A leaked online password works from anywhere, but a leaked PIN works only on the PC where it was set up.

"But a password has more combinations"​

That's true, and Microsoft's FAQ addresses it directly. The claim that a PIN is stronger than a password isn't about the entropy of the PIN itself. It is about the difference between a reusable shared secret, the password, and a local secret that unlocks a hardware-protected key.

Security writers have drawn the same conclusion. MSEndpointMgr's write-up says the PIN's strength shouldn't be judged by length or complexity like a password. Its argument is that the security comes from the architecture of the TPM plus the key.

Microsoft also says a Hello PIN can run from 4 to 127 characters. Numbers are the default, and Microsoft's support page says you can enable letters and symbols. So "a four- or six-digit PIN" is a common choice, not a limit.

What the TPM adds, and where it stops​

A Trusted Platform Module is a security chip. Microsoft's documentation says Hello uses onboard TPM hardware wherever possible to generate, store and process keys. The TPM protects against PIN brute-force attacks. It also adds a layer of protection after an account lockout.

Two caveats the original article glosses over:

  • Hello doesn't strictly require a TPM. Microsoft's developer documentation says that without a TPM chip, the private key is encrypted and protected by software. Microsoft recommends TPM hardware wherever feasible. The strongest claims here apply to TPM-backed devices.
  • A TPM lockout means a PIN reset. When the TPM has locked the key material, the user must reset the PIN. Microsoft notes that resetting removes the keys and certificates encrypted with the old key material.

How hard is guessing?​

For TPM 2.0 systems, Microsoft's TPM fundamentals page says Windows configures the TPM to lock after 32 authorization failures. It then forgets one failure every 10 minutes. That is the general TPM 2.0 anti-hammering behavior.

I wouldn't read that as the exact retry schedule for every sign-in screen. The Windows Hello for Business documentation describes its own prompts and lockout behavior, which can differ by environment and policy. Treat the 32-and-10-minutes figures as TPM background, not a promise about what you'll see after a few wrong PIN attempts.

Stolen PIN, stolen laptop​

The PIN isn't magic. Microsoft's FAQ describes the theft scenario plainly. To compromise a TPM-protected Hello credential, an attacker needs physical access to the device. They then have to guess the PIN or spoof your biometrics, and do it before the TPM's anti-hammering protection locks things down.

That makes shoulder-surfing the realistic risk. Someone who watches you type your PIN and then steals the laptop is a real problem. Microsoft's guidance for organizations worried about this is to use the trusted signal unlock feature. It doesn't recommend making the PIN more complex.

Does Windows really "require" a PIN or a Microsoft account?​

Here the source article overreaches. It says you're required to create a PIN and that Microsoft requires a Microsoft account during Windows 11 setup.

Microsoft's support pages are more measured:

  • They describe PIN, face and fingerprint as sign-in options under Windows Hello. They present these as available options, not a universal setup rule.
  • Microsoft's account-switching page says you might have opted to use a local account instead of a Microsoft account when you initially set up your device. (This is paraphrased from the support page, not from the search results above.)
  • The same page also says Microsoft recommends a Microsoft account over a local account for signing in to Windows.

It is fair to say Windows setup strongly nudges you toward a Microsoft account and Hello. "Required in every case" isn't something Microsoft's documentation supports. In managed environments, an admin can also set policy that prompts for Hello during Autopilot or initial setup.

One detail does support the original article. Microsoft's developer documentation says Hello needs either a Microsoft Entra ID account or a Microsoft account connected in Windows settings. Setting up Hello is tied to one of those accounts.

Why a Microsoft account password is the riskier choice​

If you sign in to Windows with your Microsoft account password, that password is the same one used for Outlook, OneDrive, Xbox and other services. Microsoft's support page lists those services as part of the Microsoft account.

A PIN is separate. Microsoft's support note says the PIN you use to access your device is different from your Microsoft account password, and different devices can have different PINs. Knowing the PIN doesn't give someone your account from another machine.

Local account passwords: separate, but not equivalent​

A local account stays on one PC and doesn't need internet access to sign in. Microsoft says its settings, files and applications are limited to that device. That keeps your PC sign-in separate from your Microsoft account.

It doesn't give you Hello's key protection, though. Microsoft's FAQ says Windows doesn't link local passwords to the TPM, so PINs are considered more secure than local passwords. That is a comparison of mechanisms. It doesn't mean a local account is insecure by default.

Practical steps​

To set up or manage Hello: open Settings, go to Accounts, then Sign-in options. Microsoft lists three choices:

  • Facial recognition, which needs a Hello-compatible camera.
  • Fingerprint recognition, which needs a fingerprint reader.
  • PIN.

Pick one, select Set up, and follow the prompts. If your hardware has no compatible camera or reader, Microsoft notes you can buy a USB option.

If you forget your PIN:

  • With a Microsoft account, use the "I forgot my PIN" option on the sign-in screen, or in Settings under Accounts, Sign-in options.
  • With a local account, that sign-in screen option isn't available. Sign in with your password, then reset the PIN in Settings under Sign-in options.

To change your PIN: in Settings, go to Accounts, Sign-in options, select PIN (Windows Hello), then Change PIN. You must enter the old PIN first.

Hardware advice:

  • Check that your PC has a working TPM. TPM 2.0 is the baseline Microsoft's guidance centers on.
  • Don't reuse your PIN as a password anywhere else.
  • Think about how visible your typing is in public places.

A note for IT admins​

For managed fleets, Windows Hello for Business is the relevant product. A TechRepublic piece makes a point worth repeating: the question isn't whether Hello is turned on, but whether the deployment uses TPM-backed keys, enterprise enrollment and policies that block weaker fallback paths. That is the article's own framing. I haven't independently verified every policy detail.

Microsoft's FAQ also warns about a legacy option, the "convenience PIN." It still uses a password behind the scenes: the PIN just unlocks a cached password. It isn't supported for authenticating Microsoft Entra user accounts. New deployments should use Windows Hello for Business instead.

If you ever reset the Hello container with certutil -deletehellocontainer, Microsoft warns that on current Windows 11 builds it also clears passkeys stored on that device. Set up an alternative sign-in first.

Related change in Windows 11​

Microsoft's Hello support page says that starting in November 2026, and rolling out by January 2027, a PIN entry option will appear next to Face or Fingerprint when those don't recognize you right away. You'll be able to use whichever works first.

Bottom line​

A Hello PIN is safer than a password for signing in to your PC because of what sits behind it: a device-bound key, protected by hardware where available, with a secret that never leaves the machine. MakeUseOf has the central argument right. Its absolute statements about setup, Microsoft accounts and local accounts are looser than Microsoft's documentation, and the TPM guarantees depend on having a TPM.

 

References

  1. Microsoft wants you to use a PIN instead of a password for a reason MakeUseOf 2026-11-18T18:30:17+00:00
  2. Why a Windows Hello PIN Beats a Password for Enterprise Security - TechRepublic techrepublic.com
  3. Windows Hello for Business Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) | Microsoft Learn learn.microsoft.com