MakeUseOf's Afam Onyimadu reports that the October update reached his Windows 11 Pro machine on October 26, 2026. The headline is accurate in direction, but the details matter more than the drama. The October and November changes did not turn off network NTLM. They are two separate, narrower hardening steps on the way there. The real "off by default" moment is still undated.
Why a 30-year-old protocol is still running
Windows handles two kinds of sign-in. The first is the one you see: the password, PIN or Windows Hello prompt on the lock screen. The second happens later, when your PC has to vouch for you to a file server, printer or VPN gateway. NTLM is one of the protocols that handles that second sign-in.
Kerberos became Windows' preferred network authentication protocol in 2000. It's the stronger design: tickets expire and both sides can verify each other. But NTLM never went away because Kerberos has blind spots. Microsoft's January 29, 2026 roadmap on the Windows IT Pro Blog describes NTLM as a challenge-response protocol used "most often as a fallback when Kerberos is unavailable." The blog lists its weaknesses:
- No server authentication
- Vulnerable to replay, relay and pass-the-hash attacks
- Weak cryptography
- Little diagnostic or audit data until recently
Fallback happens more often than you might expect. Connect to a share by IP address instead of by name and Windows may not find the service identity Kerberos needs, so it quietly drops to NTLM. NTLM also wins when the client can't reach a domain controller, when local accounts are involved, and when an app has NTLM hard-coded.
Section summary: NTLM survived because Kerberos couldn't cover every case. Microsoft's plan is to fill those gaps first and only then change the default.
The Outlook example
Why does this matter for security? NTLM can't confirm that the server asking for credentials is legitimate. CVE-2023-23397, an Outlook vulnerability patched in 2023, shows the risk. MakeUseOf describes a crafted calendar item whose reminder sound pointed to an attacker-controlled server. When Outlook tried to fetch the sound, it sent the user's Net-NTLMv2 hash to that server without the user clicking anything. Attackers could relay that hash or try to crack it offline.
Keep the scope clear: the Outlook bug was patched in 2023, and the 2026 Windows updates are not a fix for it. It's useful background because it shows why Microsoft has stopped patching NTLM problems one by one and is changing the default instead.
The timeline: separate steps, not one switch
The MakeUseOf timeline is broadly correct, but it puts several different changes in one table. Here is how they line up with Microsoft's own documentation:
| When | What changes | What it is not |
|---|---|---|
| Windows 11 24H2 / Server 2025 | NTLMv1 protocol removed | Not the removal of NTLMv2 |
| October 13, 2026 (KB5066470) | NTLMv1-derived credentials blocked for single sign-on by default | Not a general NTLM block |
| November 10, 2026 (KB5135557) | Clients offer NTLM message signing by default | Does not disable NTLM |
| May 2027 | Servers require NTLM signing by default | Still not NTLM-off |
| Next major Windows Server and matching client releases | Network NTLM disabled by default | Not deletion: admins can re-enable it by policy |
Microsoft's roadmap says timelines and feature availability may change.
October: NTLMv1-derived SSO goes from Audit to Enforce
According to KB5066470, the October 13, 2026 security update covers Windows 11 versions 24H2, 25H2, 26H1 and 26H2, plus Windows Server 2025. The NTLMv1 protocol is already gone from these versions. However, leftover NTLMv1 cryptography is still used in some MS-CHAPv2 connections, including PEAP-MSCHAPv2 and EAP-MSCHAPv2 on domain-joined machines.
When the BlockNtlmv1SSO value under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0 is absent, Windows now behaves as if it were set to 1 (Enforce) instead of 0 (Audit). The update does not create the registry value. The change applies only when Credential Guard is disabled. With Credential Guard on, this behavior change doesn't apply, and Microsoft recommends Credential Guard anyway.
What breaks? Wi-Fi, Ethernet and VPN profiles that sign in automatically with your Windows password over MS-CHAPv2. Microsoft notes that typing the credentials manually still works in Enforce mode, which is a handy stopgap for a stranded laptop. Ordinary home Wi-Fi with a pre-shared key is not affected.
November: NTLM signing, phase one
KB5135557 is broader than the October change. It covers Windows 11 23H2 through 26H2, Windows 10 Enterprise LTSC 2021, and Windows Server 2016 through 2025. Microsoft ties it to CVE-2026-118737.
Starting November 10, 2026, clients offer real NTLM signing (NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_SIGN, HMAC-MD5 with an established session key) on non-anonymous connections. Before this, many apps got the legacy ALWAYS_SIGN mode, which Microsoft describes as a zero-filled placeholder with no cryptographic protection. Servers still accept both signed and unsigned clients for now. In May 2027, servers are scheduled to reject unsigned clients, which will see SEC_E_UNSUPPORTED_FUNCTION (0x80090302).
Two new registry values sit at the same MSV1_0 path:
ClientAllowUnsignedNtlm:0(default) offers signing.1stops offering it and is meant only as a temporary compatibility measure.ServerRequireNtlmSign:0(default) accepts both.1rejects unsigned clients, and Microsoft recommends it once auditing shows you're ready.
Neither value needs a restart. Anonymous (null-session) and guest connections are exempt. Kerberos is unaffected.
Section summary: October tightened one narrow, Wi-Fi/VPN-adjacent path. November started a two-step signing rollout to make NTLM relay attacks harder. Neither date turned NTLM off.
Where the Kerberos replacements stand
MakeUseOf says it couldn't confirm whether the promised Kerberos fixes have shipped. Here is what's on record. Microsoft's IT Pro Blog announced on June 2, 2026 that IAKerb and LocalKDC were coming to client and server public preview for Windows Insiders in the Canary Channel. In that preview, IAKerb will be enabled by default, LocalKDC will be disabled by default, and both features will be configurable through registry keys.
The two features fill different gaps:
- IAKerb lets Kerberos work through the target service when the client has no line of sight to a domain controller.
- LocalKDC is a lightweight KDC embedded in Windows that issues Kerberos tickets for local accounts, which matters for workgroups, standalone servers and small offices.
Microsoft's more recent "Retiring NTLM" FAQ still says the current target for default disablement is the next major release of Server and Client (subject to change), and interim milestones (IAKerb and LocalKDC, enhanced auditing, blocking policies) will roll out ahead of that date. It also says that NTLM is being disabled by default, not removed outright, and the underlying code will remain in Windows for a period after default disablement so administrators can re-enable it via policy.
The evidence shows an Insider preview and a second-half-2026 target. It does not show general availability for these features on production builds. Plan around that gap.
What to check, depending on who you are
Home users: You're very unlikely to notice any of this. Settings > System > About shows your Windows version, and Windows Update history shows whether the November update is installed. Those checks can't tell you whether a network uses MS-CHAPv2.
Work or school device users: If Wi-Fi or VPN stops connecting automatically after October's update, try entering your credentials manually. Then contact IT rather than editing the registry yourself.
Admins, roughly in this order:
- Look for blocked SSO. In Event Viewer, open
Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational. Event 4024 is an audit warning and Event 4025 means Windows blocked an NTLMv1-derived SSO attempt. A quick check:Get-WinEvent -LogName "Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational" | Where-Object Id -in 4024,4025 - Fix it properly. Move Wi-Fi, Ethernet and VPN authentication from MS-CHAPv2 to certificate-based methods, or enable Credential Guard where the hardware supports it. Setting
BlockNtlmv1SSO=0is a temporary, scoped exception, not a fix. - Check signing readiness before May 2027. Review Events 4022 (client) and 4023 (server). Don't filter by severity, because signed and unsigned connections both log as Warning. Check the flags instead: a connection is ready when Negotiated Flags include
0x10(SIGN) and0x40000000(KEY_EXCH) and Session Key Status is Present. Microsoft notes these events require NTLM enhanced auditing on Windows Server 2019 or later. - Inventory NTLM use and test NTLM-off configurations in non-production. Pilot IAKerb and LocalKDC there before relying on them.
The bottom line
Microsoft is moving carefully here. It's using audit modes, registry exceptions, phased enforcement and a final default that can still be reversed by policy. That patience is reasonable for a protocol buried this deep in enterprise networks. The downside is that it's easy to read "it's already switching off" as "I'm already protected." You're not, until Kerberos can cover all your NTLM fallback cases and your servers actually require signing.
Use the time before May 2027 to audit NTLM use and fix what you find.
References
- Windows is about to switch off a login system it has relied on for 30 years MakeUseOf · 2026-11-18T21:01:17+00:00
- NTLM signing security improvements in Windows | Microsoft Support support.microsoft.com
- Advancing Windows security: Disabling NTLM by default - Windows IT Pro Blog techcommunity.microsoft.com