France has chosen Scaleway, the French cloud provider owned by Iliad, to replace Microsoft Azure as host of its national Health Data Hub in 2026, turning a long-running privacy dispute into a concrete state-backed move away from US-controlled infrastructure. The decision, reported by outlets including Connexion France and Euronews and confirmed in Scaleway’s own announcement, is not merely a procurement swap. It is a signal that European governments are beginning to treat cloud dependency as a question of political power, not just technical capability. For Microsoft, Amazon, and Google, the uncomfortable lesson is that trust in hyperscale engineering no longer automatically translates into trust in hyperscale jurisdiction.
The Health Data Hub, formally the Plateforme des données de santé, was created in 2019 to make France’s enormous public health datasets more usable for research, analytics, and policy. Its ambition was technocratic and defensible: pool anonymised or pseudonymised health data, streamline approved access, and accelerate medical discovery. Its hosting choice, however, made it politically radioactive from the start.
Microsoft Azure was selected because, at the time, French officials argued that no domestic provider could match the required blend of scale, performance, security, and service maturity. That argument was familiar to anyone who has worked in enterprise IT over the past decade. When the workload is large, sensitive, and politically visible, the hyperscalers often win not because they are beloved, but because they are the least risky option on the engineering scorecard.
The problem is that France’s scorecard changed. The CNIL, France’s data protection authority, repeatedly raised concerns about the implications of hosting such sensitive public health infrastructure with a US company. The concern was not that Microsoft engineers were rifling through French patient records. It was that US law, including the Cloud Act and surveillance powers associated with FISA, could place a US provider under obligations that collide with European expectations about data protection and state autonomy.
That distinction matters. This is not a story about a breach, and treating it as one misses the point. It is a story about whether legal exposure can become a technical risk, and whether infrastructure can be considered sovereign if the ultimate corporate parent remains answerable to a foreign government.
Scaleway said in April 2026 that it had been designated as the future host of the Health Data Hub after a selection process involving more than 350 technical criteria, including security, resilience, performance, and the ability to operate at scale. That detail is important because sovereignty-only procurement is easy to mock. A government can always choose a local provider for political reasons; the harder claim is that the local provider can meet the operational burden.
The French state is effectively arguing that the European cloud market has matured enough to make the old justification for Microsoft less persuasive. That does not mean Scaleway has become Azure. It means the threshold for “good enough” has moved, and the political cost of foreign dependency has increased.
The revised tender process reportedly placed stronger emphasis on digital sovereignty, with Microsoft effectively pushed out of contention. That is the real pivot. France did not simply decide that Scaleway had better object storage or a more charming dashboard. It decided that sovereign control was itself part of the requirement, not an afterthought to be patched over with contractual clauses.
Microsoft’s problem is that capability is no longer sufficient. In sensitive public-sector workloads, the supplier’s legal geography is now part of the architecture. Azure can be technically excellent while still being politically unacceptable for certain datasets.
That is a difficult shift for US hyperscalers because it weakens one of their strongest sales arguments. For years, Microsoft, Amazon, and Google could say that their security operations, compliance tooling, and global infrastructure were so far ahead that choosing anyone else increased risk. France is now saying that risk has more than one dimension.
The irony is that hyperscalers helped create the conditions for this backlash. By absorbing more and more critical public infrastructure into globally standardised platforms, they made themselves indispensable. Once indispensable, they became geopolitical objects. The cloud stopped being a procurement category and became a dependency map.
The Health Data Hub is designed to support research, not commercial ad targeting or routine administrative snooping. Security specialists have noted that directly identifying information is removed, with data retained in anonymised or pseudonymised form for approved analysis. But anonymisation is not magic, and public trust depends on more than a statement that names have been removed.
France’s dilemma is the same one facing every advanced health system. Modern medicine needs data at scale. AI-assisted diagnostics, epidemiology, hospital planning, drug safety monitoring, and rare disease research all benefit from large, linked datasets. Yet the larger and more useful the dataset becomes, the more attractive and politically sensitive it is.
That is why the hosting question became a proxy for a bigger argument. If a state cannot credibly say who controls the infrastructure beneath its health research platform, then every later assurance about access governance, anonymisation, and public benefit starts from a weaker position.
Doctolib is not the Health Data Hub. It is a private company providing scheduling and health-service workflow tools, not a state-run research platform. But for ordinary patients, the difference may feel academic. If the app through which they book consultations, exchange documents, and interact with doctors depends on AWS, then US-linked cloud infrastructure remains embedded in the practical experience of French healthcare.
The company has argued that domestic and European alternatives do not yet match the scale and reliability of US hyperscalers. That is a serious argument, not a dodge. Reliability in healthcare systems is not a branding exercise; outages have real consequences, and replacing a mature cloud backend is expensive, risky, and operationally disruptive.
Still, Doctolib now faces a more awkward political environment. Once the French government can say that its flagship health data platform is moving away from Microsoft, private actors will find it harder to defend indefinite reliance on AWS as an unavoidable fact of life. The state has changed the benchmark.
S3NS exists because the market wants the impossible: Google-like cloud services with French-sovereign assurances. Similar models across Europe try to combine hyperscaler technology with local operational control, local companies, and compliance frameworks designed to reduce exposure to foreign law. These arrangements are not meaningless, but neither are they the same as a fully independent European cloud stack.
This is where the debate gets uncomfortable for purists. A sovereign cloud that cannot provide modern services will not win critical workloads. A hyperscaler cloud wrapped in local paperwork may not satisfy regulators or citizens who worry about extraterritorial law. Between those poles lies the actual enterprise market, where architecture diagrams are full of compromises.
For sysadmins and IT leaders, the lesson is pragmatic. Sovereignty is not a binary switch. It is a set of decisions about identity, encryption keys, support access, subcontractors, operational control, metadata, telemetry, incident response, and legal compulsion. The logo on the invoice matters, but it is not the whole story.
These moves can look symbolic, and sometimes they are. Replacing a default search engine or recommending a messaging app is much easier than rebuilding a healthcare platform, a productivity suite, or a hyperscale cloud ecosystem. But symbols matter when they reveal the direction of procurement pressure.
The recent compromise of a Tchap account, reported in France and addressed by DINUM, is another reminder that sovereignty does not automatically equal security. A French-built or French-hosted service can still be misconfigured, phished, attacked, or poorly adopted. National origin is not a patch management strategy.
That cuts both ways. US vendors should not be dismissed as unsafe merely because they are American, and European vendors should not be treated as safe merely because they are European. The real policy challenge is to avoid replacing one lazy assumption with another.
For European officials, the uncomfortable question is what happens when a friendly foreign jurisdiction becomes less predictable. Cloud contracts are written for continuity, but public-sector trust is built on assumptions about rule of law, alliance stability, and institutional restraint. When those assumptions wobble, infrastructure dependency starts to look like leverage.
US companies are caught in the middle. Microsoft, Amazon, and Google can promise encryption, regional data residency, contractual safeguards, transparency reports, and legal challenges to overbroad government demands. But they cannot credibly promise that US law will never matter, because they do not control US law.
That is the core asymmetry. European governments can regulate how data is processed in Europe, but they cannot repeal the legal obligations of US-headquartered companies. The Health Data Hub decision is France choosing to reduce that exposure rather than manage it indefinitely.
This is where cloud sovereignty collides with cloud convenience. The very services that make hyperscalers attractive — managed databases, analytics platforms, identity hooks, serverless runtimes, machine learning tooling — also make exits harder. A VM can move. A mature data platform built around proprietary managed services moves with more scars.
France’s decision will therefore be watched not only by privacy advocates but by enterprise architects. If the migration is smooth, it strengthens the case that European alternatives can handle strategic workloads. If it stumbles, hyperscalers will quietly remind customers why they were chosen in the first place.
The financial scale also matters. Industry estimates cited in reporting put the contract at around €6 million over four years, though terms have not been publicly disclosed. That is modest by hyperscaler standards, but the symbolic value is far larger than the invoice. This is a reference workload, and reference workloads shape confidence.
Enterprises already know the pattern. Once identity, endpoint management, collaboration, security logging, cloud compute, and data analytics converge under one vendor, switching costs become institutional. The administrator gets a cleaner console; the organization gets a deeper dependency.
European sovereignty policy is a direct challenge to that model. It asks whether public institutions should tolerate deep platform lock-in when the platform sits under another country’s legal regime. That question will not stop at health data. It will move through education, justice, defense, taxation, municipal services, and eventually the everyday software stack of government work.
Microsoft is better positioned than most to adapt because it has long experience with regulated industries and national cloud variants. But adaptation may mean accepting architectures where Microsoft software runs in more constrained, locally controlled environments, or where Microsoft loses some workloads entirely to regional providers. The age of “trust us, we’re compliant” is giving way to “show us who can be compelled.”
The French government, too, will be tested. It is easy to demand European infrastructure; it is harder to fund, specify, and sustain it. If officials want sovereign providers to compete with hyperscalers, they must provide predictable demand, realistic requirements, and enough patience for ecosystems to mature.
There is also a risk of fragmentation. If every European state defines sovereignty differently, vendors will face a patchwork of certifications, hosting rules, legal interpretations, and procurement rituals. That could weaken the very European cloud market governments say they want to build.
The better outcome would be a European baseline that makes sovereignty operational rather than rhetorical. That means clear rules around control, lawful access, encryption, operational personnel, subcontracting, and exit rights. It also means admitting that sovereignty is expensive, and that the bill will land somewhere.
France Turns a Cloud Contract Into a Sovereignty Test
The Health Data Hub, formally the Plateforme des données de santé, was created in 2019 to make France’s enormous public health datasets more usable for research, analytics, and policy. Its ambition was technocratic and defensible: pool anonymised or pseudonymised health data, streamline approved access, and accelerate medical discovery. Its hosting choice, however, made it politically radioactive from the start.Microsoft Azure was selected because, at the time, French officials argued that no domestic provider could match the required blend of scale, performance, security, and service maturity. That argument was familiar to anyone who has worked in enterprise IT over the past decade. When the workload is large, sensitive, and politically visible, the hyperscalers often win not because they are beloved, but because they are the least risky option on the engineering scorecard.
The problem is that France’s scorecard changed. The CNIL, France’s data protection authority, repeatedly raised concerns about the implications of hosting such sensitive public health infrastructure with a US company. The concern was not that Microsoft engineers were rifling through French patient records. It was that US law, including the Cloud Act and surveillance powers associated with FISA, could place a US provider under obligations that collide with European expectations about data protection and state autonomy.
That distinction matters. This is not a story about a breach, and treating it as one misses the point. It is a story about whether legal exposure can become a technical risk, and whether infrastructure can be considered sovereign if the ultimate corporate parent remains answerable to a foreign government.
The Cloud Act Became a Procurement Criterion
For years, European cloud sovereignty debates had a faintly theatrical quality. Politicians invoked “strategic autonomy,” regulators issued warnings, US vendors promised safeguards, and procurement teams kept buying Azure, AWS, and Google Cloud because the alternatives were either too small, too incomplete, or too painful to integrate. France’s Health Data Hub decision suggests that the theatre is giving way to implementation.Scaleway said in April 2026 that it had been designated as the future host of the Health Data Hub after a selection process involving more than 350 technical criteria, including security, resilience, performance, and the ability to operate at scale. That detail is important because sovereignty-only procurement is easy to mock. A government can always choose a local provider for political reasons; the harder claim is that the local provider can meet the operational burden.
The French state is effectively arguing that the European cloud market has matured enough to make the old justification for Microsoft less persuasive. That does not mean Scaleway has become Azure. It means the threshold for “good enough” has moved, and the political cost of foreign dependency has increased.
The revised tender process reportedly placed stronger emphasis on digital sovereignty, with Microsoft effectively pushed out of contention. That is the real pivot. France did not simply decide that Scaleway had better object storage or a more charming dashboard. It decided that sovereign control was itself part of the requirement, not an afterthought to be patched over with contractual clauses.
Microsoft Did Not Lose Because Azure Failed
There is a temptation, especially in platform wars, to read every lost contract as a product failure. That would be too simple here. Azure remains one of the world’s most capable cloud platforms, and the original case for using it was not absurd. For a national health data platform, uptime, auditability, access controls, encryption, identity integration, and managed data services are not decorative features; they are the difference between a usable research platform and a compliance museum.Microsoft’s problem is that capability is no longer sufficient. In sensitive public-sector workloads, the supplier’s legal geography is now part of the architecture. Azure can be technically excellent while still being politically unacceptable for certain datasets.
That is a difficult shift for US hyperscalers because it weakens one of their strongest sales arguments. For years, Microsoft, Amazon, and Google could say that their security operations, compliance tooling, and global infrastructure were so far ahead that choosing anyone else increased risk. France is now saying that risk has more than one dimension.
The irony is that hyperscalers helped create the conditions for this backlash. By absorbing more and more critical public infrastructure into globally standardised platforms, they made themselves indispensable. Once indispensable, they became geopolitical objects. The cloud stopped being a procurement category and became a dependency map.
Health Data Is the Worst Possible Place to Test Political Trust
Health data carries a different emotional and regulatory charge from ordinary public-sector data. A tax record or vehicle registration can be sensitive; a medical history can be intimate in a way that resists abstraction. Even when identifiers are stripped out, large health datasets remain politically explosive because reidentification risk, linkage risk, and secondary-use concerns never fully disappear.The Health Data Hub is designed to support research, not commercial ad targeting or routine administrative snooping. Security specialists have noted that directly identifying information is removed, with data retained in anonymised or pseudonymised form for approved analysis. But anonymisation is not magic, and public trust depends on more than a statement that names have been removed.
France’s dilemma is the same one facing every advanced health system. Modern medicine needs data at scale. AI-assisted diagnostics, epidemiology, hospital planning, drug safety monitoring, and rare disease research all benefit from large, linked datasets. Yet the larger and more useful the dataset becomes, the more attractive and politically sensitive it is.
That is why the hosting question became a proxy for a bigger argument. If a state cannot credibly say who controls the infrastructure beneath its health research platform, then every later assurance about access governance, anonymisation, and public benefit starts from a weaker position.
Doctolib Shows the State Can Move Faster Than the Market
The Health Data Hub decision also casts a harsher light on Doctolib, France’s dominant medical appointment platform. According to the reporting summarized by Connexion France, Doctolib holds data relating to around 50 million people and roughly 500,000 healthcare professionals. Its infrastructure relies on Amazon Web Services, putting it inside the same sovereignty debate that pushed Microsoft out of the national platform.Doctolib is not the Health Data Hub. It is a private company providing scheduling and health-service workflow tools, not a state-run research platform. But for ordinary patients, the difference may feel academic. If the app through which they book consultations, exchange documents, and interact with doctors depends on AWS, then US-linked cloud infrastructure remains embedded in the practical experience of French healthcare.
The company has argued that domestic and European alternatives do not yet match the scale and reliability of US hyperscalers. That is a serious argument, not a dodge. Reliability in healthcare systems is not a branding exercise; outages have real consequences, and replacing a mature cloud backend is expensive, risky, and operationally disruptive.
Still, Doctolib now faces a more awkward political environment. Once the French government can say that its flagship health data platform is moving away from Microsoft, private actors will find it harder to defend indefinite reliance on AWS as an unavoidable fact of life. The state has changed the benchmark.
Hybrid Sovereignty Is the Compromise Everyone Pretends Not to Like
The most likely near-term future is not a clean break with US technology. It is a messy hybrid model in which European providers host the most sensitive workloads, US-linked cloud services remain embedded in less sensitive or harder-to-migrate layers, and vendors wrap the whole arrangement in sovereignty language. Doctolib’s reported movement of some data toward S3NS, the Thales-Google joint venture, fits that pattern.S3NS exists because the market wants the impossible: Google-like cloud services with French-sovereign assurances. Similar models across Europe try to combine hyperscaler technology with local operational control, local companies, and compliance frameworks designed to reduce exposure to foreign law. These arrangements are not meaningless, but neither are they the same as a fully independent European cloud stack.
This is where the debate gets uncomfortable for purists. A sovereign cloud that cannot provide modern services will not win critical workloads. A hyperscaler cloud wrapped in local paperwork may not satisfy regulators or citizens who worry about extraterritorial law. Between those poles lies the actual enterprise market, where architecture diagrams are full of compromises.
For sysadmins and IT leaders, the lesson is pragmatic. Sovereignty is not a binary switch. It is a set of decisions about identity, encryption keys, support access, subcontractors, operational control, metadata, telemetry, incident response, and legal compulsion. The logo on the invoice matters, but it is not the whole story.
Europe’s Software Dependence Is Wider Than the Cloud
The French health data fight lands amid a broader European reassessment of US technology dependence. The European Parliament has moved thousands of internal systems from Google search to Qwant, even as critics note that Qwant has historically relied in part on Microsoft’s Bing infrastructure. France has promoted Olvid, a French encrypted messaging app, as an alternative to US-owned messaging platforms such as WhatsApp.These moves can look symbolic, and sometimes they are. Replacing a default search engine or recommending a messaging app is much easier than rebuilding a healthcare platform, a productivity suite, or a hyperscale cloud ecosystem. But symbols matter when they reveal the direction of procurement pressure.
The recent compromise of a Tchap account, reported in France and addressed by DINUM, is another reminder that sovereignty does not automatically equal security. A French-built or French-hosted service can still be misconfigured, phished, attacked, or poorly adopted. National origin is not a patch management strategy.
That cuts both ways. US vendors should not be dismissed as unsafe merely because they are American, and European vendors should not be treated as safe merely because they are European. The real policy challenge is to avoid replacing one lazy assumption with another.
Washington’s Politics Made Europe’s Risk Models Less Abstract
The sovereignty debate has gained urgency because the geopolitical context has darkened. The second Trump presidency, the prominence of Robert F. Kennedy Jr. in US health policy, and US sanctions against International Criminal Court judges have all sharpened European fears about dependence on American-controlled infrastructure. Whether every fear is technically well-founded is almost beside the point; procurement risk models are shaped by political expectations, not just legal memos.For European officials, the uncomfortable question is what happens when a friendly foreign jurisdiction becomes less predictable. Cloud contracts are written for continuity, but public-sector trust is built on assumptions about rule of law, alliance stability, and institutional restraint. When those assumptions wobble, infrastructure dependency starts to look like leverage.
US companies are caught in the middle. Microsoft, Amazon, and Google can promise encryption, regional data residency, contractual safeguards, transparency reports, and legal challenges to overbroad government demands. But they cannot credibly promise that US law will never matter, because they do not control US law.
That is the core asymmetry. European governments can regulate how data is processed in Europe, but they cannot repeal the legal obligations of US-headquartered companies. The Health Data Hub decision is France choosing to reduce that exposure rather than manage it indefinitely.
The Engineering Bill Is Coming Due
Moving a national platform from Azure to Scaleway is not a press release; it is an engineering program. Data pipelines must be audited, dependencies mapped, identity and access controls reworked, monitoring rebuilt, security controls revalidated, and researchers kept productive through the transition. The more deeply a platform used managed Azure services, the more painful portability becomes.This is where cloud sovereignty collides with cloud convenience. The very services that make hyperscalers attractive — managed databases, analytics platforms, identity hooks, serverless runtimes, machine learning tooling — also make exits harder. A VM can move. A mature data platform built around proprietary managed services moves with more scars.
France’s decision will therefore be watched not only by privacy advocates but by enterprise architects. If the migration is smooth, it strengthens the case that European alternatives can handle strategic workloads. If it stumbles, hyperscalers will quietly remind customers why they were chosen in the first place.
The financial scale also matters. Industry estimates cited in reporting put the contract at around €6 million over four years, though terms have not been publicly disclosed. That is modest by hyperscaler standards, but the symbolic value is far larger than the invoice. This is a reference workload, and reference workloads shape confidence.
The Windows World Should Read This as a Platform Warning
For WindowsForum readers, this story is not only about French healthcare or Azure politics. It is about the future of Microsoft’s public-sector cloud business in jurisdictions that increasingly want technical excellence without US legal exposure. Microsoft has spent years making Azure, Microsoft 365, Entra ID, Defender, and Windows management tooling feel like a unified administrative universe. That integration is powerful, but it also concentrates dependency.Enterprises already know the pattern. Once identity, endpoint management, collaboration, security logging, cloud compute, and data analytics converge under one vendor, switching costs become institutional. The administrator gets a cleaner console; the organization gets a deeper dependency.
European sovereignty policy is a direct challenge to that model. It asks whether public institutions should tolerate deep platform lock-in when the platform sits under another country’s legal regime. That question will not stop at health data. It will move through education, justice, defense, taxation, municipal services, and eventually the everyday software stack of government work.
Microsoft is better positioned than most to adapt because it has long experience with regulated industries and national cloud variants. But adaptation may mean accepting architectures where Microsoft software runs in more constrained, locally controlled environments, or where Microsoft loses some workloads entirely to regional providers. The age of “trust us, we’re compliant” is giving way to “show us who can be compelled.”
France’s Scaleway Bet Will Be Judged by Operations, Not Rhetoric
The next phase belongs to implementation. Scaleway must prove that it can deliver not just sovereign branding but boring excellence: uptime, support responsiveness, audit trails, performance consistency, incident handling, and a developer experience that does not make researchers long for the old Azure environment. Sovereignty that slows medical research will struggle to retain political support.The French government, too, will be tested. It is easy to demand European infrastructure; it is harder to fund, specify, and sustain it. If officials want sovereign providers to compete with hyperscalers, they must provide predictable demand, realistic requirements, and enough patience for ecosystems to mature.
There is also a risk of fragmentation. If every European state defines sovereignty differently, vendors will face a patchwork of certifications, hosting rules, legal interpretations, and procurement rituals. That could weaken the very European cloud market governments say they want to build.
The better outcome would be a European baseline that makes sovereignty operational rather than rhetorical. That means clear rules around control, lawful access, encryption, operational personnel, subcontracting, and exit rights. It also means admitting that sovereignty is expensive, and that the bill will land somewhere.
The Real Message Hidden in France’s Cloud Exit
France’s move is concrete enough to matter but limited enough to avoid triumphalism. The Health Data Hub is leaving Microsoft Azure for Scaleway, but French healthcare remains entangled with US-linked technology through Doctolib, AWS, Google-adjacent arrangements, productivity software, developer tooling, and countless hospital systems. This is not independence day. It is the beginning of a harder procurement era.- France has turned digital sovereignty from a political slogan into a hosting requirement for one of its most sensitive health data platforms.
- Microsoft’s loss reflects legal and geopolitical exposure more than a simple failure of Azure’s technical capabilities.
- Doctolib’s continued reliance on AWS shows that private healthcare infrastructure may lag behind state sovereignty goals.
- European cloud providers now have a rare opportunity to prove that sovereign infrastructure can meet real operational demands.
- US hyperscalers will remain deeply embedded in Europe, but their role in critical public workloads will face more explicit legal and political tests.
- For IT leaders, exit planning, portability, encryption control, and jurisdictional risk are becoming board-level architecture concerns.
References
- Primary source: The Connexion
Published: 2026-07-06T04:00:12.804218
France cuts Microsoft role in health data hosting over digital sovereignty concerns
France is moving its health data platform away from Microsoft as digital sovereignty concerns grow over US cloud laws. The switch raises fresh questions about Doctolib, AWS and control of sensitive medical data in France.www.connexionfrance.com - Related coverage: scaleway.com
Scaleway selected to support France's Health Data Hub in its transition to a sovereign cloud | Scaleway
A project designed to strengthen secure access to health data and accelerate its use for research and innovation.www.scaleway.com - Related coverage: euronews.com
France moves public health data from Microsoft to French cloud provider | Euronews
After several years of controversy, France’s health data platform is set to leave Microsoft’s cloud for its homegrown company Scaleway.www.euronews.com - Related coverage: fr.euronews.com
La France transfère les données de santé publique de Microsoft vers un cloud français | Euronews
La plateforme française des données de santé quitte le cloud de Microsoft pour le fournisseur national Scalewayfr.euronews.com - Related coverage: cnil.fr
Le Conseil d’État demande au Health Data Hub des garanties supplémentaires pour limiter le risque de transfert vers les États-Unis
Dans son ordonnance du 13 octobre 2020, le Conseil d’État reconnaît l’existence d’un risque de transfert de données issues du Health Data Hub vers les États-Unis et demande des garanties supplémentaires. La CNIL conseillera les autorités publiques sur les mesures appropriées et veillera, pour...www.cnil.fr
- Related coverage: incyber.org
Le Health Data Hub quitte Microsoft Azure pour Scaleway - INCYBER NEWS
Sept ans après un choix jugé controversé, les données de santé des Français vont enfin être hébergées par un acteur souverain.
incyber.org
- Related coverage: ru.euronews.com
Франция переносит данные здравоохранения с Microsoft на французского облачного провайдера | Евронью́с
После нескольких лет споров французская платформа медицинских данных переедет с облака Microsoft на отечественный сервис Scaleway.ru.euronews.com - Related coverage: channelnews.fr
Scaleway choisi pour héberger le Health Data Hub dans un cloud souverain - ChannelNews
La Plateforme des données de santé (PDS), plus connue sous le nom de Health Data Hub, a retenu Scaleway, la filiale cloud d'Iliad, comme futur hébergeurwww.channelnews.fr - Related coverage: entrevue.fr
Health Data Hub: Scaleway chosen, the State regains control over the health data cloud – Interview
Things are finally moving on an issue that has poisoned the atmosphere of public digital services for years.entrevue.fr - Related coverage: esim.report
Scaleway selected to replace Microsoft at France Health Data Hub - eSIM Report
TL;DR: Scaleway has been selected as the new cloud partner for France's Health Data Hub platform. Scaleway will replace Microsoft on the Health Data Hub, also k...www.esim.report - Related coverage: journaldugeek.com
La France quitte Microsoft et fait confiance à Scaleway pour le Health Data Hub
Changement de cap pour le Health Data Hub français. Le gouvernement a finalement décidé de confier l’hébergement de la plateforme à un acteur hexagonal, avec en ligne de mire la sécurité des données et une indépendance numérique loin de Microsoft.
www.journaldugeek.com
- Related coverage: it-connect.fr
La France remplace Microsoft par Scaleway pour héberger les données de santé
Ce jeudi 23 avril 2026, l'information a été officialisée : Scaleway a décroché le contrat associé au Health Data Hub et va remplacer Microsoft.www.it-connect.fr - Related coverage: bgnes.com
France Pulls Millions of Citizens’ Health Data From Microsoft in Push for Digital Sovereignty | BGNES
The move follows Europe’s effort to reduce strategic dependence on US cloud and software providers.www.bgnes.com
