Active Directory: using the Computer Object in ACLs instead of service accounts

[buermanjjr]

I want to understand if this pattern has been explored.
In an enterprise environment, if a service hosted on server A ("ssa") needs to interact with services on server B ("ssb") , it is required to create a "service account" that is configured to run ssa, with that service account then having to be configured in the appropriate acl on ssb. This has been the case for as long as I remember, and with this being copied thousands of times over, the management of these accounts and thier configured locations becomes monsterous. Thousands of PW's having to be reconfigured and tracked, not to mention access to those accounts to even BE managed...

We experimented: "what if we don't use a service account, and instead let ssa run as the local system account like it does by default?"
We then took the computer object ID of that server "serverA$" and applied it to the ssb ACL.... and it worked!

Is this considered an approved pattern over creating non human generic accounts? Why/not?

I hope that this has, because trying to communicate a "new" security idea around here... isn't easy.

 

[ChatGPT]

Your observation is spot on—when a service runs as Local System, it inherently uses the computer account (e.g. SERVERA$), and leveraging that identity in remote ACLs isn’t magic at all; it’s built right into how Windows handles authentication. In many cases, this technique can save you from the headache of managing thousands of separate service accounts and their password rotations. That said, while this “computer object” approach is technically valid and has been explored on various occasions, whether it’s “approved” depends on several factors in your environment.
For one, using the computer account means you’re tying the service’s identity to that particular machine. This reduces administrative overhead because the password for the computer object is automatically managed by Active Directory. However, it also means that if you ever need to move the service to a different server or have multiple services running on the same machine that require isolation from one another, it may introduce complications. In contrast, when you use dedicated service accounts—or better yet, Managed Service Accounts (MSAs or gMSAs)—you gain finer control over permissions and can separate different services’ privileges more deliberately.
There are a few additional considerations:
•  Granularity and Least Privilege: Dedicated service accounts allow you to finely gauge and restrict permissions to only what’s needed. When using the computer account, you might inadvertently assign broader access than necessary because the computer account may already carry inherent machine-level privileges.
•  Mobility and Scalability: The computer object approach works well when the service is firmly tied to a single host. If your service might migrate (or if you need load balancing across several hosts), you’ll likely need a different strategy, such as tailoring ACLs for a managed service account.
•  Audit and Compliance: Some regulatory frameworks or internal policies require clear separations between computer identities and non-human generic service accounts. Even though the computer account is maintained by AD, auditors might prefer dedicated accounts that clearly document the service’s access requirements.
In summary, yes—it is a pattern that has been experimented with and, in specific scenarios, may even be preferable because it leverages AD’s automatic management of computer accounts. However, many organizations lean toward using dedicated or managed service accounts to be able to enforce the principle of least privilege and to gain better auditability and flexibility if services need to change hosts over time.
Ultimately, if your environment is static (each service remains on its original host) and you’re comfortable with the inherent permissions of the machine account, this approach can be quite efficient. Otherwise, exploring MSAs or gMSAs might provide the best of both worlds: automation in credential management with the added benefit of granular control.
Hope this helps clarify the pros and cons of using computer objects in ACLs instead of generic service accounts. Happy administrating!

 

[buermanjjr]

Your observation is spot on—when a service runs as Local System, it inherently uses the computer account (e.g. SERVERA$), and leveraging that identity in remote ACLs isn’t magic at all; it’s built right into how Windows handles authentication. In many cases, this technique can save you from the headache of managing thousands of separate service accounts and their password rotations. That said, while this “computer object” approach is technically valid and has been explored on various occasions, whether it’s “approved” depends on several factors in your environment.
For one, using the computer account means you’re tying the service’s identity to that particular machine. This reduces administrative overhead because the password for the computer object is automatically managed by Active Directory. However, it also means that if you ever need to move the service to a different server or have multiple services running on the same machine that require isolation from one another, it may introduce complications. In contrast, when you use dedicated service accounts—or better yet, Managed Service Accounts (MSAs or gMSAs)—you gain finer control over permissions and can separate different services’ privileges more deliberately.
There are a few additional considerations:
•  Granularity and Least Privilege: Dedicated service accounts allow you to finely gauge and restrict permissions to only what’s needed. When using the computer account, you might inadvertently assign broader access than necessary because the computer account may already carry inherent machine-level privileges.
•  Mobility and Scalability: The computer object approach works well when the service is firmly tied to a single host. If your service might migrate (or if you need load balancing across several hosts), you’ll likely need a different strategy, such as tailoring ACLs for a managed service account.
•  Audit and Compliance: Some regulatory frameworks or internal policies require clear separations between computer identities and non-human generic service accounts. Even though the computer account is maintained by AD, auditors might prefer dedicated accounts that clearly document the service’s access requirements.
In summary, yes—it is a pattern that has been experimented with and, in specific scenarios, may even be preferable because it leverages AD’s automatic management of computer accounts. However, many organizations lean toward using dedicated or managed service accounts to be able to enforce the principle of least privilege and to gain better auditability and flexibility if services need to change hosts over time.
Ultimately, if your environment is static (each service remains on its original host) and you’re comfortable with the inherent permissions of the machine account, this approach can be quite efficient. Otherwise, exploring MSAs or gMSAs might provide the best of both worlds: automation in credential management with the added benefit of granular control.
Hope this helps clarify the pros and cons of using computer objects in ACLs instead of generic service accounts. Happy administrating!

Can you recommend any resources that reference using the computer object acl approach and their findings?

 

[ChatGPT]

While there isn’t a plethora of formal whitepapers or Microsoft-endorsed guidelines dedicated solely to using computer objects in ACLs as a substitute for traditional service accounts, you can piece together a good understanding by looking at several related resources that dive into the underlying principles and best practices. Here are a few recommendations that should help:
• Microsoft’s Documentation on Service Accounts and Managed Service Accounts:
Microsoft’s official docs on service accounts (including Managed Service Accounts and gMSAs) offer insight into how Windows automatically manages accounts for services. Although these articles are primarily geared toward helping administrators choose between service accounts and gMSAs for better security and manageability, they provide a solid background on how Windows handles account credentials—including the Local System account, which operates using the computer account. You can search for topics like “Service Accounts Overview” or “Managed Service Accounts” on docs.microsoft.com.
• Windows Internals by Mark Russinovich, David Solomon, and Alex Ionescu:
This classic text offers a deep dive into how Windows manages security contexts, including the authentication and token mechanisms used by the Local System account. Understanding these details gives context as to why, under certain conditions, a computer object (like SERVERA$) can effectively serve to authenticate a service without needing a separate service account.
• Community Discussions and Forum Threads:
Many administrators have shared their experiences on various tech forums (including Windows Forum, TechNet, and Spiceworks) about leveraging computer objects in ACLs. For instance, discussions on this very Windows Forum thread—as well as similar threads on TechNet—highlight real-world scenarios, pros and cons, and operational nuances of using the computer account in place of dedicated service accounts. Using search queries like “computer account ACL service account alternative” within those communities should yield additional case-studies and experimental findings.
These resources—while not always directly targeting the “computer object ACL” pattern—collectively cover the fundamental security architecture that makes the approach viable, along with practical insights from administrators who have tried it in the field. If you find or come across any detailed case studies or whitepapers specifically addressing this pattern, they would make a welcome addition to the community’s best practices. Happy reading and administrating!

 

[buermanjjr]

While there isn’t a plethora of formal whitepapers or Microsoft-endorsed guidelines dedicated solely to using computer objects in ACLs as a substitute for traditional service accounts, you can piece together a good understanding by looking at several related resources that dive into the underlying principles and best practices. Here are a few recommendations that should help:
• Microsoft’s Documentation on Service Accounts and Managed Service Accounts:
Microsoft’s official docs on service accounts (including Managed Service Accounts and gMSAs) offer insight into how Windows automatically manages accounts for services. Although these articles are primarily geared toward helping administrators choose between service accounts and gMSAs for better security and manageability, they provide a solid background on how Windows handles account credentials—including the Local System account, which operates using the computer account. You can search for topics like “Service Accounts Overview” or “Managed Service Accounts” on docs.microsoft.com.
• Windows Internals by Mark Russinovich, David Solomon, and Alex Ionescu:
This classic text offers a deep dive into how Windows manages security contexts, including the authentication and token mechanisms used by the Local System account. Understanding these details gives context as to why, under certain conditions, a computer object (like SERVERA$) can effectively serve to authenticate a service without needing a separate service account.
• Community Discussions and Forum Threads:
Many administrators have shared their experiences on various tech forums (including Windows Forum, TechNet, and Spiceworks) about leveraging computer objects in ACLs. For instance, discussions on this very Windows Forum thread—as well as similar threads on TechNet—highlight real-world scenarios, pros and cons, and operational nuances of using the computer account in place of dedicated service accounts. Using search queries like “computer account ACL service account alternative” within those communities should yield additional case-studies and experimental findings.
These resources—while not always directly targeting the “computer object ACL” pattern—collectively cover the fundamental security architecture that makes the approach viable, along with practical insights from administrators who have tried it in the field. If you find or come across any detailed case studies or whitepapers specifically addressing this pattern, they would make a welcome addition to the community’s best practices. Happy reading and administrating!

Thank you!

 

[ChatGPT]

You're welcome! I'm glad you found the information helpful. If you have any more questions or need further details on this topic—or anything else—just let me know. Happy administrating!