Microsoft’s Security Update Guide entry for CVE-2026-27926 identifies it as a Windows Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability, and the metadata you quoted is important because it speaks directly to Microsoft’s confidence in the existence of the flaw and the credibility of the technical details. In practical terms, that means Microsoft is signaling that this is not merely speculative research chatter; it is a vendor-tracked issue that defenders should treat as real until proven otherwise. The broader pattern around the Cloud Files mini filter driver is also consistent with prior Windows EoP disclosures, where kernel-adjacent bugs can move quickly from “interesting” to “must-patch” once they are confirmed and assigned. at is the sort of MSRC advisory language that matters most for risk triage: the exploitability details may be sparse, but the existence of the issue and the impact class are already strong enough to justify action. Microsoft’s Security Update Guide is specifically designed to expose this kind of information at scale, and the company has emphasized that CVE records can carry structured details such as vulnerability class, affected products, and confidence-related metadata for defenders.
In other words, the headline is simple, even if the technical internals are not: a local privilege-escalation path exists or is strongly believed to exist in the Cloud Files mini filter driver stack, and that is enough to make it a priority for patch inventorying, incident response planning, and endpoint hardening. The fact that Microsoft publishes these records through the Security Update Guide rather than treating them as informal guidance is itself a strong confirmation signal for enterprise defenders.
Windows has long relied on kernel-mode file-system and filter drivers to bridge the gap between user-facing file operations and lower-level storage mechanics. The Cloud Files mini filter driver sits in that world, mediating the behavior that makes cloud-backed files appear local to the operating system and applications. That architecture is convenient foplaces sensitive logic in a kernel-adjacent path where a bug can become a privilege boundary break instead of a mere application crash.
This is not Microsoft’s first experience with Cloud Files driver problems. The same driver family has appeared repeatedly in Windows privilege-escalation reporting over recent years, which suggests a recurring security hotspot rather than an isolated coding mistake. That history matters because recurring flaw families often indicate complex state management, deep interaction with filesystem metadata, and edge cases around placeholder objects, synchronization, and access control.
The reason these issues are operationally important is simple: an elevation-of-privilege flaw is often the second stage of a real-world compromise. Attackers may first gain a foothold through phishing, a browser exploit, weak credentials, or a service misconfiguration, and then use a kernel or driver bug to cross from low privilege into SYSTEM. That makes EoP vulnerabilities especially valuable in chained intrusion scenarios, because they turn an otherwise contained account compromise into full device takeover.
Microsoft’s modern security publishing model gives defenders multiple signals at once: a CVE identifier, a severity classification, a product list, and in some cases an indication of how confident the vendor is about the vulnerability’s existence and technical basis. That structured approach reflects a broader move toward transparency, including the adoption of machine-readable vulnerability data and more consistent advisory metadata.
In practice, that means the absence of a public exploit write-up does not equal low risk. Many Windows kernel and driver issues are intentionally described at a high level until patching and disclosure timing are safe, but the advisory still provides enough to drive operational response. For enterprises, the key question is no longer “Is there a fully published exploit?” but “Can this advisory be mapped to our estate, and can we patch before someone else finds a path?”
--- Confidence Signal Really Means
The most important part of your description is the phrase about the “degree of confidence in the existence of the vulnerability and the credibility of the known technical details.” That wording maps to a practical reality: Microsoft is telling defenders not just that a CVE exists, but how much faith to place in the supporting evidence. In security operations, that is extremely useful because it separates confirmed vendor knowledge from weaker, more tentative reports.
A high-confidence advisory usually implies the vendor has enough internal reproduction, triage, or corroboration to stand behind the claim. A lower-confidence one may reflect partial corroboration, incomplete root-cause detail, or information shared by researchers without a fully stable exploit narrative. The important nuance is that confidence is not the same thing as severity; a low-confidence issue can still be severe, and a high-confidence issue can still lack exploit code.
That distinction is especially important for kernel and driver flaws, where proof-of-concept code may never appear publicly even if the bug is real and dangerous. Attackers who already have local access do not need a polished public exploit to benefit from a confirmed privilege-escalation primitive. In that sense, certainty itself is part of the risk model.
Microsoft’s repeated need to patch issues in this space over the last several years suggests a broader design challenge. Once a component is responsible for translating cloud-backed placeholders into local-appearing files, the attack surface includes object lifetime errors, privilege-check mistakes, path confusion, and race conditions. Those are exactly the classes of flaws that tend to survive unit testing and only emerge under adversarial pressure.
The Cloud Files driver is also likely to be exercised on systems that actively use OneDrive or other sync ecosystems, which broadens exposure beyond niche server roles. In modern Windows estates, file sync features are not optional “extra” components for many users; they are integral to daily workflow. That increases the number of machines that might carry the vulnerable driver and complicates segmentation-based risk reduction.
Enterprise environments also have to contend with the fact that local escalation is often enough for ransomware operators and hands-on-keyboard intruders to accelerate an intrusion. Once an attacker achieves administrative or SYSTEM-level access, they can disable security tools, dump credentials, tamper with logging, and stage lateral movement. A “local” bug is therefore only local in the narrowest sense; its consequences are often network-wide.
The second step is to align the CVE with the correct servicing channel. Microsoft patch guidance often differs across client and server SKUs, and not every advisory maps to a uniform remediation path. Defenders should avoid blanket assumptions and verify the specific update lineage before declaring an estate clean.
A good governance model also includes exception expiration dates. Too many organizations approve “temporary” deferrals that quietly become permanent. For a Windows driver issue with system-level impact, exceptions should be narrow, documented, and revalidated on a fixed schedule.
The Cloud Files driver also intersects with everyday productivity tools. Users who rely on OneDrive-style synchronization and placeholder files are exactly the people most likely to have the component installed and active. So while the vulnerability is technical, its reach is broad enough to matter across student laptops, home PCs, and small-business systems alike.
This is also why automatic updating matters so much. Microsoft’s own security publishing model assumes many Windows systems will receive protections through built-in update channels, and that is especially important when the issue sits inside a core OS component. The consumer takeaway is blunt: apply the patch promptly and do not wait for public exploit demonstrations.
The CVE-2026-27926 entry should be read in that context. Microsoft is not merely stating that a bug exists; it is also helping the ecosystem normalize how much certainty, evidence, and remediation detail is attached to each record. That is a quiet but important shift in the economics of patching, because it reduces ambiguity for organizations that manage thousands or millions of endpoints.
That approach is especially visible in kernel and driver issues, where public discussion often trails vendor confirmation. By the time researchers can fully explain the root cause, many organizations have already used the advisory metadata to patch. That is arguably the right tradeoff for a broad platform like Windows, where a slower disclosure could leave millions of machines exposed longer than necessary.
That matters because the market often reacts more strongly to vulnerabilities with plausible chainability than to those that look exotic but are hard to exploit. Security teams know that local EoPs are frequently the capstone in real intrusions, especially when malware families already have post-exploitation modules waiting in the toolbox. In that sense, this kind of vulnerability has disproportionate operational value to attackers.
It is also relevant that Microsoft’s cloud- and storage-adjacent components are increasingly central to daily Windows workflows. The more integrated the platform becomes, the more a driver-level mistake can undermine both endpoint security and user trust. This is why the ongoing stream of Windows filter-driver CVEs is worth watching as a systemic trend, not just as isolated patch items.
The advisory also creates an opportunity for security teams to refine their EoP response playbooks. A kernel-driver issue is a good forcing function for better local-admin reduction, stronger endpoint telemetry, and tighter emergency patch pipelines. In that sense, a bad vulnerability can still drive good hygiene.
A second concern is disclosure lag. Even when Microsoft has patched the issue, environments with slow update cadences, unsupported builds, or complex application dependencies can remain exposed for weeks or months. The longer the gap between vendor patch and fleet-wide deployment, the more time threat actors have to reverse-engineer the fix or weaponize related primitives.
The second thing to watch is whether security researchers or exploit trackers start tying the issue to a more specific bug class. With Cloud Files driver vulnerabilities, public understanding often matures in stages: initial confirmation, then rough exploitability analysis, and eventually detailed research. Until that happens, the safest assumption is that the flaw is real, local, and valuable to attackers even if the public details are still thin.
Source: MSRC Security Update Guide - Microsoft Security Response Center
In other words, the headline is simple, even if the technical internals are not: a local privilege-escalation path exists or is strongly believed to exist in the Cloud Files mini filter driver stack, and that is enough to make it a priority for patch inventorying, incident response planning, and endpoint hardening. The fact that Microsoft publishes these records through the Security Update Guide rather than treating them as informal guidance is itself a strong confirmation signal for enterprise defenders.
Windows has long relied on kernel-mode file-system and filter drivers to bridge the gap between user-facing file operations and lower-level storage mechanics. The Cloud Files mini filter driver sits in that world, mediating the behavior that makes cloud-backed files appear local to the operating system and applications. That architecture is convenient foplaces sensitive logic in a kernel-adjacent path where a bug can become a privilege boundary break instead of a mere application crash.This is not Microsoft’s first experience with Cloud Files driver problems. The same driver family has appeared repeatedly in Windows privilege-escalation reporting over recent years, which suggests a recurring security hotspot rather than an isolated coding mistake. That history matters because recurring flaw families often indicate complex state management, deep interaction with filesystem metadata, and edge cases around placeholder objects, synchronization, and access control.
The reason these issues are operationally important is simple: an elevation-of-privilege flaw is often the second stage of a real-world compromise. Attackers may first gain a foothold through phishing, a browser exploit, weak credentials, or a service misconfiguration, and then use a kernel or driver bug to cross from low privilege into SYSTEM. That makes EoP vulnerabilities especially valuable in chained intrusion scenarios, because they turn an otherwise contained account compromise into full device takeover.
Microsoft’s modern security publishing model gives defenders multiple signals at once: a CVE identifier, a severity classification, a product list, and in some cases an indication of how confident the vendor is about the vulnerability’s existence and technical basis. That structured approach reflects a broader move toward transparency, including the adoption of machine-readable vulnerability data and more consistent advisory metadata.
In practice, that means the absence of a public exploit write-up does not equal low risk. Many Windows kernel and driver issues are intentionally described at a high level until patching and disclosure timing are safe, but the advisory still provides enough to drive operational response. For enterprises, the key question is no longer “Is there a fully published exploit?” but “Can this advisory be mapped to our estate, and can we patch before someone else finds a path?”
Why Cloud Files ke-backed file integration is a deceptively complex area because it blends storage, synchronization, file virtualization, and user expectations about transparency. A bug in that stack can expose race conditions, improper object lifetime handling, or access-control mismatches that are hard to reason about in user mode, let alone in kernel mode. That complexity is exactly why filter drivers are frequent sources of privilege escalation.
The security implication is that the more “helpful” the system becomes at emulating local files from remote storage, the more opportunities there are for state confusion. When a component like cldflt.sys is participating in file opens, placeholder materialization, and sync semantics, the attack surface extends beyond a simple filesystem lookup. That makes the Cloud Files path particularly attractive to local attackers hunting for kernel trust boundary mistakes.--- Confidence Signal Really Means
The most important part of your description is the phrase about the “degree of confidence in the existence of the vulnerability and the credibility of the known technical details.” That wording maps to a practical reality: Microsoft is telling defenders not just that a CVE exists, but how much faith to place in the supporting evidence. In security operations, that is extremely useful because it separates confirmed vendor knowledge from weaker, more tentative reports.
A high-confidence advisory usually implies the vendor has enough internal reproduction, triage, or corroboration to stand behind the claim. A lower-confidence one may reflect partial corroboration, incomplete root-cause detail, or information shared by researchers without a fully stable exploit narrative. The important nuance is that confidence is not the same thing as severity; a low-confidence issue can still be severe, and a high-confidence issue can still lack exploit code.
Confidence vs. exploitability
Defenders often conflate these two ideas, but they serve different purposes. Confidence tells you how certain the vulnerability record is, while exploitability tells you how easy it may be to weaponize. A vendor can be highly confident that a bug exists while still withholding the exact trigger details, and that still warrants urgent patch planning.That distinction is especially important for kernel and driver flaws, where proof-of-concept code may never appear publicly even if the bug is real and dangerous. Attackers who already have local access do not need a polished public exploit to benefit from a confirmed privilege-escalation primitive. In that sense, certainty itself is part of the risk model.
Why the metadata matters to SOC teams
For a security operations center, the confidence signal helps decide whether to escalate a ticket immediately or wait for more validation. It also helps separate actionable vendor intelligence from noisy third-party chatter, which can be especially useful when multiple CVEs in the same driver family are appearing in a short period. When Microsoft speaks plainly through the Security Update Guide, defenders can line up patching, detection, and exception handling more quickly.- High confidence means the issue is opgh to drive patching.
- Low detail does not mean low importance.
- Kernel-adjacent bugs deserve faster triage than ordinary app-layer defects.
- Local EoP issues often become the second stage of broader intrusions.
- Patch timing matters more than theoretical exploit elegance.
- Asset inventory becomes the deciding factor in remediation speed.
Why the Cloud Files Mini Filter Driver Is a High-Value Target
The Cloud Files mini filter driver is valuable to attackers precisely because it is positioned where Windows has to trust a great deal of behavior across user and kernel boundaries. Drivers in this category often perform validation, state tracking, and object management that are difficult to harden perfectly. That makes them a durable source of escalation opportunities when the code interacts with untrusted inputs.Microsoft’s repeated need to patch issues in this space over the last several years suggests a broader design challenge. Once a component is responsible for translating cloud-backed placeholders into local-appearing files, the attack surface includes object lifetime errors, privilege-check mistakes, path confusion, and race conditions. Those are exactly the classes of flaws that tend to survive unit testing and only emerge under adversarial pressure.
Kernel trust boundaries are unforgiving
Kernel bugs are unforgiving because the boundary they cross is the entire difference between ordinary user activity and system control. An attacker who can exploit a driver bug may gain read/write access to protected memory, bypass security controls, or manipulate security-relevant objects in ways user-mode code cannot. That is why local EoP issues routinely appear near the top of enterprise patch priorities.The Cloud Files driver is also likely to be exercised on systems that actively use OneDrive or other sync ecosystems, which broadens exposure beyond niche server roles. In modern Windows estates, file sync features are not optional “extra” components for many users; they are integral to daily workflow. That increases the number of machines that might carry the vulnerable driver and complicates segmentation-based risk reduction.
Historical pattern of recurring driver flaws
Recent reporting around similar Cloud Files flaws has repeatedly described privilege-escalation bugs in the same family of code. Even when the exact CVE number or root cause differs, the pattern is a familiar one: a local attacker, a driver abuse primitive, and a eges. That recurrence is a warning sign that defenders should treat the category as structurally sensitive rather than merely incident-specific.- Kernel trust is the real prize for an attacker.
- Recurring bug families often reveal hard-to-secure code paths.
- Cloud sync integration increases the practical exposure surface.
- Local footholds are common enough that EoP matters.
- Driver abuse can lead directly to SYSTEM-level compromise.
Enterprise Impact: What Admins Need to Prioritize
For enterprises, the immediate problem is not the name of the CVE; it is the combination of local privilege escalation and a Windows component widely deployed across endpoints. If the advisory is real and patchable, then the operational task is to determine which builds, editions, and configurations include the affected driver and how quickly they can be remediated. Microsoft’s advisory structure is designed to support exactly that kind of mapping.Enterprise environments also have to contend with the fact that local escalation is often enough for ransomware operators and hands-on-keyboard intruders to accelerate an intrusion. Once an attacker achieves administrative or SYSTEM-level access, they can disable security tools, dump credentials, tamper with logging, and stage lateral movement. A “local” bug is therefore only local in the narrowest sense; its consequences are often network-wide.
Inventory and exposure mapping
The first step is to identify which endpoints actually load the Cloud Files mini filter driver and which Windows versions are in scope. That sounds obvious, but it is often where patch programs lose time because asset inventories lag behind real deployments. Cloud-sync usage, laptop populations, and remote worker fleets can make the vulnerable surface much larger than expected.The second step is to align the CVE with the correct servicing channel. Microsoft patch guidance often differs across client and server SKUs, and not every advisory maps to a uniform remediation path. Defenders should avoid blanket assumptions and verify the specific update lineage before declaring an estate clean.
Patch governance and exception handling
Organizations that rely on change windows need to treat kernel EoP issues as security exceptions, not ordinary maintenance. That means accelerated deployment rings, shorter approval cycles, and an explicit rollback plan if a patch causes compatibility friction. Delayed patching may be acceptable for a UI bug; it is far harder to justify for a kernel privilege-escalation flaw.A good governance model also includes exception expiration dates. Too many organizations approve “temporary” deferrals that quietly become permanent. For a Windows driver issue with system-level impact, exceptions should be narrow, documented, and revalidated on a fixed schedule.
Practical enterprise actions
- Identify all Windows endpoints with cloud-sync integrations.
- Verify whether the Cloud Files mini filter driver is present and actively used.
- Map affected builds to Microsoft’s published update guidance.
- Accelerate deployment to high-risk groups first, especially privileged users and laptops.
- Review local admin rights and remove unnecessary elevation paths.
- Monitor for unusual driver-related crashes, service anomalies, or privilege-abuse telemetry.
Consumer Impact: Why Individual Users Should Care Too
Consumers may not think in terms of kernel drivers, but they absolutely feel the consequences when one goes wrong. A successful privilege escalation can let malware disable security software, implant persistence, or take over a personal machine even if the original infection came from something as mundane as a malicious download or a poisoned browser session. That makes this a household-risk issue as much as an enterprise one.The Cloud Files driver also intersects with everyday productivity tools. Users who rely on OneDrive-style synchronization and placeholder files are exactly the people most likely to have the component installed and active. So while the vulnerability is technical, its reach is broad enough to matter across student laptops, home PCs, and small-business systems alike.
Consumer threat model
Home users often assume that local attacks are unlikely because they are “not a server.” In reality, consumer devices are frequently compromised through drive-by downloads, fake installers, macros, browser exploits, or malicious extensions, after which privilege escalation becomes the next step. A driver EoP flaw is the kind of bug that turns a nuisance into a full compromise.This is also why automatic updating matters so much. Microsoft’s own security publishing model assumes many Windows systems will receive protections through built-in update channels, and that is especially important when the issue sits inside a core OS component. The consumer takeaway is blunt: apply the patch promptly and do not wait for public exploit demonstrations.
What to do at home
- Keep Windows Update enabled.
- Reboot if a security update is pending.
- Avoid running daily work from an administrator account.
- Treat unexpected sync-driver crashes as worth investigating.
- Don’t defer security updates for cosmetic reasons.
- Back up important data before major patch cycles.
How This Fits Into Microsoft’s Broader Vulnerability Strategy
Microsoft’s Security Update Guide has become more than a patch list; it is now a structured security telemetry surface for customers, researchers, and defenders. The company has been steadily expanding how much data it publishes, including more transparency around CWE classification and machine-readable advisory formats. That trend matters because defenders need scalable tooling, not just prose annorosoft.com]The CVE-2026-27926 entry should be read in that context. Microsoft is not merely stating that a bug exists; it is also helping the ecosystem normalize how much certainty, evidence, and remediation detail is attached to each record. That is a quiet but important shift in the economics of patching, because it reduces ambiguity for organizations that manage thousands or millions of endpoints.
Transparency without overexposure
There is always a balancing act between disclosure and operational safety. Too much technical detail can aid attackers, while too little can leave defenders unsure how serious an issue really is. Microsoft’s current model tries to split the difference by publishing enough metadata to support action, but not necessarily enough internal root-cause detail to turn the advisory into a blueprint.That approach is especially visible in kernel and driver issues, where public discussion often trails vendor confirmation. By the time researchers can fully explain the root cause, many organizations have already used the advisory metadata to patch. That is arguably the right tradeoff for a broad platform like Windows, where a slower disclosure could leave millions of machines exposed longer than necessary.
Why the confidence field is part of the strategy
The confidence signal is more than a footnote. It helps separate “known and actionable” from “possible but not yet fully established,” which is critical in a world where every major patch cycle includes dozens of CVEs. For defenders, that allows triage to focus on the fixes that are both credible and operationally dangerous, rather than spending equal time on every line item.- Structured CVE metadata reduces ambiguity.
- Machine-readable advisories improve enterprise automation.
- CWE transparency helps with trend analysis.
- Confidence fields support patch prioritization.
- Selective disclosure protects users without starving defenders.
Comparative Risk: How This Stacks Up Against Other Windows EoPs
Windows administrators are used to elevation-of-privilege issues, but not all EoPs are created equal. Some are low-complexity user-interface bugs; others are kernel or driver flaws that can reliably hand an attacker SYSTEM. The Cloud Files mini filter driver belongs in the latter category if the Microsoft advisory is anything like earlier disclosures in this family.That matters because the market often reacts more strongly to vulnerabilities with plausible chainability than to those that look exotic but are hard to exploit. Security teams know that local EoPs are frequently the capstone in real intrusions, especially when malware families already have post-exploitation modules waiting in the toolbox. In that sense, this kind of vulnerability has disproportionate operational value to attackers.
Why local doesn’t mean low priority
A local bug can be more dangerous than a remote one if it gives attackers durable control after an initial foothold. That is especially true on laptops, developer workstations, and admin endpoints, where user privileges and sensitive credentials may already be concentrated. The Cloud Files driver therefore deserves to be treated as a high-value escalation primitive, not a narrow compatibility issue.It is also relevant that Microsoft’s cloud- and storage-adjacent components are increasingly central to daily Windows workflows. The more integrated the platform becomes, the more a driver-level mistake can undermine both endpoint security and user trust. This is why the ongoing stream of Windows filter-driver CVEs is worth watching as a systemic trend, not just as isolated patch items.
Market and ecosystem implications
For managed security providers, this is another reminder that patch compliance metrics should be tied to privilege-impact categories, not just raw CVE counts. For endpoint vendors, it is a nudge to ensure driver telemetry and exploit-mitigation coverage can spot abuse in the local escalation phase. For Microsoft, it reinforces the value of the advisory infrastructure it has spent several years improving.- Kernel EoPs usually outrank ordinary app bugs.
- Chainable flaws are especially attractive to attackers.
- Privilege boundaries are where enterprise risk concentrates.
- Patch metrics should reflect impact, not just volume.
Strengths and Opportunities
Microsoft’s handling of this issue appears to benefit from a more mature advisory ecosystem than Windows had a few years ago. The combination of a CVE record, product mapping, and confidence signal gives defenders a much clearer operational starting point than vague monthly bulletins ever did. That structure is a real strength, especially for large estates that need to automate patch decisions at scale.The advisory also creates an opportunity for security teams to refine their EoP response playbooks. A kernel-driver issue is a good forcing function for better local-admin reduction, stronger endpoint telemetry, and tighter emergency patch pipelines. In that sense, a bad vulnerability can still drive good hygiene.
- Better patch prioritization by privilege impact.
- Improved automation around Microsoft advisory intake.
- Stronger local-admin reduction initiatives.
- More disciplined exception management.
- Better incident-response playbooks for post-compromise escalation.
- Increased attention to cloud-sync driver telemetry.
- Greater use of structured CVE metadata in governance reporting.
Risks and Concerns
The biggest concern is that a high-confidence kernel-adjacent issue may still be underappreciated outside dedicated security teams. Users and even some administrators often underestimate local privilege escalation because the bug does not sound remote or Internet-facing. That is a dangerous mistake, because attackers frequently need only one foothold to make such flaws decisive.A second concern is disclosure lag. Even when Microsoft has patched the issue, environments with slow update cadences, unsupported builds, or complex application dependencies can remain exposed for weeks or months. The longer the gap between vendor patch and fleet-wide deployment, the more time threat actors have to reverse-engineer the fix or weaponize related primitives.
- Patch deferrals can become de facto exposure windows.
- Local privilege escalation is often misclassified as low urgency.
- Legacy or unsupported Windows builds may lag behind.
- Cloud sync usage broadens the real attack surface.
- Kernel bugs can be chained with other access vectors.
- Sparse technical detail can delay internal urgency.
- Incomplete inventories can hide vulnerable endpoints.
Looking Ahead
The most important thing to watch next is how Microsoft’s own record evolves. If the advisory gains more detail, a CVSS score, or a revised confidence note, that will tell defenders a lot about how stable the vendor’s understanding has become. It will also help determine whether this remains a “patch now, analyze later” event or becomes a more deeply documented vulnerability family.The second thing to watch is whether security researchers or exploit trackers start tying the issue to a more specific bug class. With Cloud Files driver vulnerabilities, public understanding often matures in stages: initial confirmation, then rough exploitability analysis, and eventually detailed research. Until that happens, the safest assumption is that the flaw is real, local, and valuable to attackers even if the public details are still thin.
What defenders should monitor
- Updates to Microsoft’s advisory text or confidence metadata.
- Patch availability across client and server SKUs.
- Any public proof-of-concept or exploit chaining discussion.
- Endpoint telemetry for unusual driver behavior or elevation attempts.
- Reports of related Cloud Files issues in subsequent Patch Tuesday cycles.
Source: MSRC Security Update Guide - Microsoft Security Response Center
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