InfluxDB OSS CVE-2024-30896: Token Enumeration Risk and 2.8 Upgrade

InfluxDB OSS contains a business‑logic weakness — tracked as CVE‑2024‑30896 — that allowed an authorized user with an allAccess token in the same organization to enumerate and retrieve the administrative operator token, effectively enabling full administrative takeover of affected InfluxDB OSS instances. The problem affected InfluxDB OSS 2.x up through 2.7.11, was reported publicly in March 2024, and has been addressed by the vendor in the InfluxDB 2.8.0 release and related fixes.

Background / Overview​

InfluxDB implements multi‑organization tenancy in its 2.x OSS architecture. During normal operation, administrative/operator tokens are created to permit management and high‑privilege operations across the database instance. CVE‑2024‑30896 is not a memory‑safety bug or buffer overflow — it is a privilege/authorization design flaw: tokens with broad organization‑scoped privileges could be used to list and retrieve all authorization tokens located in that same organization (including operator tokens). The researcher demonstrated how the standard CLI and API tooling — for example, influx auth ls — could be used to enumerate raw tokens when the calling token held organization‑level read access to the authorizations resource. Key facts at a glance:

• Affected product: InfluxDB OSS 2.x up to and including 2.7.11. Other editions (InfluxDB 1.x, Enterprise, Cloud, Cloud Dedicated, Clustered) are not affected by this specific issue.
• Root cause: business logic / access‑control — organization‑scoped allAccess tokens could list and retrieve tokens indiscriminately.
• Exploitation prerequisites: attacker must possess a valid allAccess token created in the same organization that contains the operator token, and must be able to call the API or use the CLI.
• Vendor response: InfluxData changed behavior in the 2.8.0 release (and related work) — token hashing was introduced and the vendor indicated removal of token retrieval via the API for operator tokens in later releases; operators should upgrade to 2.8.0 or later.

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Technical breakdown​

How the flaw works​

The attacker path is simple and high‑impact because it leverages legitimate API functionality:

• An administrator creates or assigns an allAccess token to a user within an organization (for legitimate reasons such as automation or delegation).
• That allAccess token grants read:orgs/:orgID/authorizations rights, allowing listing of authorizations in the same org.
• The API/CLI list operation returns raw token identifiers and, in the vulnerable releases, the raw token values for authorizations present in the organization — including the operator token which carries administrative privileges.
• Once an adversary obtains the operator token, they can authenticate to the InfluxDB instance as an operator and perform any administrative operation, including destroying data, changing configuration, or creating new tokens (full Confidentiality/Integrity/Availability compromise).

This is a classic authorization‑design error rather than a memory corruption bug; the data is stored and accessible by design, but the rules that govern who can retrieve which tokens were insufficiently restrictive.

Demonstrated proof‑of‑concept​

The original report included a minimal proof‑of‑concept showing the influx auth ls output can be filtered to reveal operator tokens (the researcher also provided a small client script). That PoC — and subsequent community proof material — is publicly available and has been mirrored on exploit repositories. The presence of public proof reduces the window of “unknown exploitation” and means defenders should treat the issue as imminently exploitable wherever prerequisites are met.

Scope and severity​

Scanners and CVE aggregators assigned a high/critical severity to the issue (CVSS v3.1 base score commonly reported as 9.1), reflecting the fact that retrieving an operator token yields immediate and broad administrative access and that the attack is network‑accessible with low complexity given the necessary token. The vulnerability’s impact touches confidentiality, integrity, and availability concurrently.

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Exploitation scenarios and realistic risk models​

Insider / delegated access misuse (most likely)​

An administrator issues a legitimate allAccess token to a contractor, CI/CD automation, or developer and that token is used to interact with the organizer’s resources. If the token is created within the same organization that stores the operator token (the default organization is common), a malicious or compromised holder of that token can enumerate tokens and extract operator credentials. That scenario is low complexity and often realistic in development or multi‑tenant deployments with relaxed RBAC.

Compromised credential + lateral pivot​

An attacker who compromises an allAccess token (through phishing, token leakage from endpoint, or misconfigured automation) can use that token to retrieve the operator token and immediately expand control to the entire InfluxDB instance. This chain is particularly valuable to attackers because it converts a mid‑privilege compromise into full instance takeover.

Automation abuse​

CI/CD pipelines, deployment agents, or runbook scripts are frequently granted broad tokens for convenience. Where such automation runs within the same organization as operator tokens (or the default org), a single vulnerable script or container could be enough to exfiltrate operator credentials. This class of risk is high because automation tends to be persistent and widely distributed.

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Vendor response and timeline​

InfluxData engaged with the issue: the researcher opened issue #24797 on the official repository in March 2024; the vendor implemented changes and included security‑oriented improvements in the 2.8.0 release line. The 2.8.0 release introduced an optional token hashing mechanism and other token handling changes; InfluxData has also indicated plans to remove the ability to retrieve tokens via API in future releases to close this class of privilege enumeration. Operators are advised to adopt the vendor‑recommended upgrade path and to follow the vendor’s guidance when enabling token hashing due to the schema migration implications. Important operational note about token hashing (InfluxDB 2.8.0):

• 2.8.0 introduces --use-hashed-tokens which stores API tokens as hashes on disk.
• Enabling token hashing upgrades the BoltDB schema and will cause unhashed tokens to be converted; downgrading from a hashed state to earlier versions can destroy tokens and require recreation. Operators must follow the published two‑step upgrade process (upgrade first, then enable hashing) and plan token rotations and client updates accordingly.

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Immediate mitigation and remediation (what to do now)​

If you operate InfluxDB OSS 2.x, treat this as high‑priority because the prerequisites (a privileged token in the same org) are commonly satisfied in real environments.

• Upgrade
• Upgrade affected instances to InfluxDB 2.8.0 or later as soon as possible. This release contains fixes and token‑handling features that address the root cause. If you cannot upgrade immediately, apply the compensating controls below.
• Rotate operator tokens and high‑privilege credentials
• Immediately rotate operator tokens (and any long‑lived tokens with broad privileges) on all potentially affected servers. Treat tokens created prior to the vendor fix as compromised if the token was present in the default organization with accessible allAccess tokens.
• Restrict organization membership and token issuance
• Avoid creating or storing operator tokens in the default organization. Move operator/admin tokens to a dedicated organization with minimal membership.
• Do not grant read:orgs/:orgID/authorizations to users who do not need it.
• Audit who can create allAccess tokens and limit issuance to a small set of trusted accounts.
• Audit and revoke suspicious tokens
• Run a complete list of authorizations and audit the owners and creation timestamps. Search for unexpected allAccess tokens or new tokens created around suspicious times and revoke them.
• Example diagnostic: list authorizations via the CLI/API and inspect scopes for write:/orgs or other operator‑level scopes (do not run untrusted PoC code against production systems).
• Short‑term network and access controls
• Restrict access to the InfluxDB API endpoint to trusted management subnets or VPN access.
• Enforce IP allow‑lists for administrative actions and require strong authentication for any token creation flows.
• Rotate and reconfigure automation
• Identify CI/CD and automation tokens that run in the default org; rotate those tokens and reconfigure automation to use least‑privilege tokens bound to non‑operator organizations.
• Plan token hashing carefully
• When planning to enable token hashing in 2.8.0, follow vendor instructions exactly: upgrade the binary first, validate, then enable hashing and understand the irreversible effects on downgrade. Coordinate token recreation with clients before enabling hashing.

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Detection and threat hunting​

Use multiple telemetry sources to search for signs of token enumeration or unauthorized admin activity.

• Audit logs
• Look for auth ls‑style calls or API requests to list authorizations originating from non‑admin principals.
• Search for new authorizations, especially operator tokens, created outside maintenance windows.
• CLI and API artifacts
• Examine command history and CI/CD job logs for influx auth ls or similar enumeration commands.
• Check for scripts or containers that call influx auth ls -t <token> or use the client SDK to call authorizations endpoints.
• Token usage patterns
• Correlate token usage with unexpected administrative API calls (token creation, bucket deletion, configuration changes).
• Monitor for tokens that suddenly make calls across multiple organizations or perform operator actions.
• Host and network telemetry
• On nodes running automation with management tokens, check network flows for unexpected connections to external locations — token exfiltration often manifests as outbound HTTPs to attacker‑controlled hosts.
• If suspicious items are found, treat the instance as compromised, isolate, and rotate tokens. Guidance on rotating secrets, validating images, and restricting egress are standard containment steps.

Hunting checklist (short):

• Export and review influx auth ls output for all organizations and correlate token owners.
• Identify allAccess tokens with membership in the same org as operator tokens.
• Revoke tokens that are excessive, stale, or created unexpectedly.
• Review audit trails for POST /api/v2/authorizations and GET /api/v2/authorizations events.

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Operational guidance and hardening (longer term)​

• Adopt least privilege everywhere:
• Use scoped tokens for automation and bind tokens to the narrowest set of resources required.
• Eliminate routine use of allAccess tokens wherever possible.
• Organizational separation:
• Use a dedicated organization for operator/admin tokens and only add a minimal set of trusted users. Make that org inaccessible to development automation and contractors.
• Shorter token lifetimes and rotation automation:
• Reduce token TTLs and automate rotation so that leaked tokens have a limited window of usability. Integrate rotation into CI/CD and secret management workflows.
• Centralize secret management:
• Store operator credentials in a secrets manager (vault, cloud KMS) with strict access controls and short lived credentials for human/admin workflows.
• Monitoring & runbooks:
• Create a specific incident response playbook for token compromise: isolate, rotate, verify backups, and re‑issue tokens. Maintain a playbook to validate service integrity after operator rotation.
• Upgrades and testbeds:
• Maintain a staging environment that mirrors production for upgrade testing. Because 2.8.0’s token hashing changes DB schema and affects downgrade semantics, practice the upgrade/enable hashing workflow in staging before rolling to production.

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Vendor stance, implementation choices, and tradeoffs​

InfluxData’s position — as reflected in issue discussion and release notes — is that the organizations feature and token enumeration behavior originated from a design choice that prioritized operational transparency for admins. The vendor has made clear it regards the behavior as a poor design choice in the security context and moved to change it: 2.8.0 introduced token hashing and other token handling changes, and subsequent changes removed or limited the ability to retrieve raw tokens via API calls. Those fixes reduce the risk of direct token recovery via standard APIs, but they do not remove the need for RBAC hygiene, network controls, and token rotation. Tradeoffs to consider:

• Token hashing increases storage security but introduces an operational cost: enabling hashing alters the BoltDB schema and requires careful planning because downgrades after hashing can result in token loss unless operators recreate tokens and client configurations are updated first.
• Eliminating token retrieval via API reduces one attack surface but does not remove risk from insiders or already‑compromised high‑privilege tokens. Defense‑in‑depth is still required.

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Known public exploitations and disclosure status​

Public exploit code and PoCs were published by the original researcher and mirrored on public exploit repositories. At a minimum there are public proof artifacts and exploit scripts that weaponize the token enumeration path; this elevates the urgency for patching and rotation. Treat public PoC presence as evidence that remote exploitation is feasible in practice where prerequisites are met.

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Incident response checklist (practical)​

• If you operate affected versions (≤ 2.7.11):
• Immediately upgrade to InfluxDB 2.8.0 or later where possible.
• Rotate operator tokens and any administrative tokens issued prior to the fix.
• Revoke all allAccess tokens that are unnecessary; re‑issue scoped tokens with least privilege.
• Audit access logs and CI/CD traces for token enumeration or unusual token use.
• If token compromise is confirmed, isolate the instance, perform forensic capture of logs, and review backup integrity before recovery.
• Reconfigure organization membership so that admin/operator tokens are stored in a minimal‑membership org.
• Consider additional monitoring rules and egress restrictions to detect token exfiltration.

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Strengths, weaknesses, and final risk assessment​

Strengths:

• The vulnerability was reported responsibly and tracked; InfluxData responded with code and a release that materially reduces the attack surface by introducing token hashing and by planning removal of token retrieval APIs.
• Public advisories and CVE entries provide clear version mappings for operators to make patch decisions.

Weaknesses / residual risks:

• Many production environments run long‑lived tokens and automation which make immediate token rotation and least‑privilege enforcement operationally challenging.
• Token hashing is a schema‑level change that requires careful upgrade/downgrade planning; mistakes can disrupt clients or force token recreation.
• Where organizations rely on default org membership and broad allAccess tokens for convenience, the blast radius of compromise is large.

Risk assessment:

• For any environment that uses allAccess tokens in the default organization (or otherwise co‑locates high‑privilege tokens and frequently used developer/automation tokens), the risk is critical: an adversary with a single compromised allAccess token in the same org can escalate to full instance takeover. Operators should treat this CVE as high priority and remediate accordingly.

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Conclusion​

CVE‑2024‑30896 is a concrete example of how token management and tenant‑scoped privilege semantics can create severe exposure when design choices permit enumeration of high‑privilege credentials. The fix path is straightforward but operationally impactful: upgrade to InfluxDB 2.8.0 (and plan the careful rollout of token hashing), rotate all operator and high‑privilege tokens, tighten organization membership and RBAC, and harden automation to use least‑privilege, short‑lived tokens. Because public proof‑of‑concepts exist, the defensive window has narrowed: apply the vendor update and execute an immediate token‑rotation and audit campaign without delay.

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Important operational reminders:

• Do not enable token hashing in production without testing the upgrade and rollback procedures in staging; enabling hashing is irreversible for tokens on downgrade.
• Assume any premigration operator token was exposed if allAccess tokens were present in the same organization; rotate accordingly.
• Harden your token issuance workflows so that developer and automation tokens are created in non‑operator organizations or with constrained privileges.

(End of article)

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Source: MSRC Security Update Guide - Microsoft Security Response Center