Keeper Security’s new Forcefield lands as a direct countermeasure to one of the fastest-growing attack vectors on Windows endpoints: memory-based credential theft and in-memory “infostealer” malware that scrapes browsers, extensions and running apps for secrets.
Memory-based attacks have surged in frequency and impact over recent years as adversaries shift from noisy, disk-resident malware toward fileless techniques that live in process memory. Security telemetry and industry reports show a marked increase in malware families that target credential stores, browser memory and runtime tokens — often using process injection, reflective loaders and direct memory reads to extract secrets without writing artifacts to disk. This trend has pushed vendors to rethink endpoint protection beyond signature and disk-scanning models toward techniques that defend runtime memory and execution.
Keeper Security enters this space with Forcefield, a kernel-level endpoint product it markets as a real-time memory-protection layer for Windows that prevents unauthorized processes from reading the memory of protected applications. Keeper positions Forcefield as a targeted shield for browsers, password-manager components and its own suite of apps — claiming a lightweight kernel driver that enforces selective memory access controls while preserving system performance and compatibility.
Note on verifiability: Keeper’s press materials, product pages and documentation consistently describe the same technical model (kernel driver, process validation, protected app lists and MSI deployment). However, there is a minor inconsistency in some public-facing materials about exact OS compatibility (some pages list Windows 11 x64/ARM64 specifically while other pages reference "Windows 10+"). IT teams should validate supported OS builds and edition requirements directly with Keeper prior to broad roll-out.
What matters to defenders is not the claim of being first, but measurable effectiveness, compatibility with existing stacks, low false-positive rates, robust telemetry and secure update/signing practices. Independent third-party testing (red-team, AV-comparatives-style evaluations or MITRE ATT&CK evaluations) and transparent documentation are critical to building confidence.
At the same time, kernel-mode protection requires careful adoption: validate compatibility, demand rigorous signing and update guarantees, and pair the product with solid telemetry, incident response and multifactor authentication to avoid a false sense of security. Treat Keeper’s marketing claims as starting points for validation: insist on lab tests, pilot deployments and clear operational playbooks before declaring Forcefield a permanent platform addition.
For Windows shops seeking to harden secrets at runtime, Forcefield deserves attention — but like all endpoint controls, it must be evaluated in the context of a layered security architecture, operational maturity, and the real-world constraints of drivers, signing and system compatibility.
Source: SiliconANGLE Keeper Security debuts Forcefield to block memory-based attacks on Windows - SiliconANGLE
Background
Memory-based attacks have surged in frequency and impact over recent years as adversaries shift from noisy, disk-resident malware toward fileless techniques that live in process memory. Security telemetry and industry reports show a marked increase in malware families that target credential stores, browser memory and runtime tokens — often using process injection, reflective loaders and direct memory reads to extract secrets without writing artifacts to disk. This trend has pushed vendors to rethink endpoint protection beyond signature and disk-scanning models toward techniques that defend runtime memory and execution.Keeper Security enters this space with Forcefield, a kernel-level endpoint product it markets as a real-time memory-protection layer for Windows that prevents unauthorized processes from reading the memory of protected applications. Keeper positions Forcefield as a targeted shield for browsers, password-manager components and its own suite of apps — claiming a lightweight kernel driver that enforces selective memory access controls while preserving system performance and compatibility.
Overview: what Forcefield claims to do
Forcefield is presented as an add-on to Keeper’s desktop clients or as a standalone MSI. The product’s core technical claims are:- Kernel-level protection: a lightweight kernel driver that mediates memory access to selected application processes.
- Selective memory restriction: unauthorized processes attempting to read protected application memory are blocked, while trusted system processes and the protected apps themselves continue to operate.
- Smart process validation: a runtime decision engine that differentiates trusted from untrusted processes in real time.
- Minimal performance impact: designed to run silently in the background without perceptible overhead.
- Broad compatibility: support for mainstream browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Brave, Opera, Vivaldi) and Keeper’s own components; declared support for Windows 11 (x64 and ARM64) and, in some product documentation, Windows 10+.
Note on verifiability: Keeper’s press materials, product pages and documentation consistently describe the same technical model (kernel driver, process validation, protected app lists and MSI deployment). However, there is a minor inconsistency in some public-facing materials about exact OS compatibility (some pages list Windows 11 x64/ARM64 specifically while other pages reference "Windows 10+"). IT teams should validate supported OS builds and edition requirements directly with Keeper prior to broad roll-out.
How Forcefield works — technical breakdown
Kernel driver mediation
Forcefield installs a kernel-mode driver that intercepts or monitors attempts by one process to access another process’s memory. On Windows, processes running under the same user account or with sufficient privileges can use documented APIs (and undocumented techniques) to open handles to other processes and read their virtual memory regions. By inserting a kernel-level enforcement point, Forcefield aims to block low-privilege and non-approved processes from reading memory regions belonging to protected apps.Process validation and allowlisting
According to Keeper’s documentation, Forcefield uses a smart process validation routine to distinguish trusted processes from untrusted ones. The enforcement model appears selective rather than binary: normal OS components and explicitly trusted processes continue to function, while processes that are unknown or flagged as untrusted are prevented from reading the protected memory regions.Protected surfaces
Keeper emphasizes protection for browsers (because browser processes and extensions frequently host session tokens and stored credentials) as well as password manager components (desktop app, web vault, extensions). This addresses one of the practical attack paths infostealers and stealers exploit: reading browser memory to harvest autofill contents, session cookies, passkeys, and extension-held secrets.Performance and deployment
Keeper claims Forcefield is lightweight and imposes negligible overhead. The product supports both activation from within Keeper Desktop and standalone MSI-based deployment for managed fleets, aligning with common enterprise distribution channels (Intune, Group Policy, RMM).How Forcefield compares and where it fits in the Windows security stack
Forcefield is deliberately positioned as an additional, prevention-first control that complements — rather than replaces — existing security measures. To evaluate the product fairly, it’s useful to compare it to the key platform and vendor controls administrators already have available.Existing Windows controls (brief)
- Credential Guard / VBS (Virtualization-based Security): virtualization isolates LSASS and some secrets to reduce credential-dumping risk. Credential Guard requires hardware and firmware support and is not enabled by default in all editions or configurations.
- Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules and Defender features: ASR rules can block certain classes of behavior (for example, blocking tools from dumping LSASS) and Defender includes memory-scanning engines and behavioral heuristics. Microsoft has been moving to harden defaults for credential theft-related rules.
- EDR/XDR products: modern EDRs have runtime behavioral detection and remediation, but many detections are reactive or rely on heuristic analysis of suspicious behaviors rather than explicit memory-access enforcement.
- Application control (WDAC/AppLocker) and allowlisting can restrict which binaries run, reducing some risk vectors but not eliminating in-memory scraping executed by permitted binaries or child processes.
Where Forcefield sits
Forcefield’s differentiator is that it enforces access control on process memory itself rather than relying solely on detection or virtualization. That means, in principle, even non-file-based, non-instrumented attacks that run as user processes and can call ReadProcessMemory or equivalent should be prevented from extracting secrets from protected processes. Practically, this model complements:- VBS/Credential Guard by adding protection at the application level (beyond LSASS isolation).
- EDRs by providing a prevention control rather than only detection and post-facto remediation.
- App control: Forcefield focuses on runtime memory containment rather than binary allowlisting.
Strengths and where Keeper’s messaging is strongest
- Addresses a clear and growing threat: memory scraping and infostealers have increased in prevalence; targeted protections for runtime secrets are a logical response.
- Specific, pragmatic coverage: by focusing on browsers and password-manager components — where credentials and tokens are concentrated — Forcefield targets high-value attack surfaces.
- Enterprise deployment model: MSI installers and Group Policy/Intune compatibility suit large-scale rollouts, helping security teams adopt the control in managed environments quickly.
- User-friendly controls: a toggle in a desktop client lowers support friction for non-technical users or small teams.
- Complementary to platform features: Forcefield appears designed to sit alongside existing Microsoft hardening features rather than trying to supplant them.
Risks, caveats and the practical trade-offs of kernel-level memory protection
While Forcefield’s prevention-first model is attractive, kernel-mode memory enforcement carries inherent trade-offs and operational considerations that security teams must evaluate.1. Kernel drivers increase the attack surface
Installing a new kernel-mode driver necessarily expands the kernel attack surface. Kernel drivers run at the highest privilege level; vulnerabilities or logic flaws in a driver can lead to system crashes, privilege escalation, or new avenues for exploitation. Best-practice guidance from platform vendors urges caution: confirm a kernel driver is strictly necessary, minimize kernel code complexity and follow driver security frameworks.2. Compatibility and stability issues
Kernel components sometimes conflict with other low-level software (anti-cheat, hypervisors, VPN drivers, hardware monitoring utilities) and can be implicated in Blue Screens or application incompatibility. Memory-integrity features, virtualization layers and signed driver policies in Windows 11 make compatibility testing essential before broad deployment.3. Signed-driver and trust implications
To load a kernel driver in production Windows systems with Secure Boot and driver signing enforcement, vendors must use proper code-signing and certification channels. Signed drivers can be abused in the wild, and threat actors have previously acquired or abused signing infrastructure. Enterprises should ask vendors about their signing process, WHQL/partner program participation and update distribution (Windows Update versus vendor channels).4. Possible bypasses and trusted-process abuse
Any protection that exempts trusted system processes creates an operational requirement: how accurately can the product identify and maintain trust lists? Attackers often use living-off-the-land techniques and legitimate signed processes to perform malicious actions. If a trusted process is coerced into performing malicious memory reads (for example, via script or plugin misuse), enforcement that solely allows certain binaries could be bypassed.5. False sense of security
No single control is a silver bullet. Memory protection reduces one attack vector but does not address credential capture via keyloggers, screen capture, phishing, or remote browser-based session takeover. Teams must not substitute Forcefield for layered controls such as MFA, credential hygiene, EDR monitoring, and platform hardening.6. Marketing claims vs. competitive landscape
Keeper describes Forcefield as industry-first, a strong marketing claim that warrants scrutiny. Multiple security vendors have released runtime or memory-focused protections in recent seasons — from detection-centric runtime memory scanning to prevention-oriented runtime memory protection prototypes and commercial products. Buyers should treat “first” claims as marketing and verify comparative capabilities with independent tests.Practical deployment guidance — what IT should ask and test
Enterprises evaluating Forcefield should follow a disciplined validation process. Below are recommended questions and a deployment checklist.Questions to ask Keeper (or any vendor offering kernel-level memory protection)
- Which exact Windows versions and builds are supported (including editions and minimum OS patch levels)? Are Windows 10 and Windows 11 both fully supported, and does ARM64 support match x64 functionality?
- Is the kernel driver signed via Microsoft partner/WHQL programs? What certificate is used and how is driver integrity protected?
- How does Forcefield identify and validate trusted processes? Is there an allowlist, heuristics, or external telemetry integration?
- What telemetry and logs are generated when Forcefield blocks an access attempt? How does this integrate with SIEM and EDR?
- What are documented compatibility issues (anti-cheat, virtualization, low-level hardware drivers) and known mitigations or allowlists?
- How are updates to the kernel driver delivered? Do updates require reboots, and is there a secure update mechanism?
- Has Keeper published independent lab tests or third-party evaluations? Are there reproducible tests for enterprise validation?
- What is the rollback process if Forcefield causes instability on a host?
Deployment checklist (recommended phased approach)
- Inventory & scope: identify target device classes (e.g., user workstations, developer machines, privileged admin systems) and high-risk groups (remote workers, contractors).
- Lab validation: deploy in a controlled test lab with representative hardware, drivers and enterprise apps. Verify stability, performance and compatibility with virtualization features (VBS, Hyper-V) and security stack (EDR, AV).
- Functional testing: run known memory-scraping tool tests in an isolated environment to validate that Forcefield blocks expected behaviors. Test false-positive scenarios with legitimate diagnostic tools.
- Telemetry integration: confirm Forcefield events are forwarded to central logging and SIEM, and that triage/alerting workflows are in place.
- Pilot rollout: roll out to a limited user group (10–100 endpoints) and monitor for incidents, user support tickets and compatibility issues for several weeks.
- Gradual expansion: expand to broader groups with updated baselines, making adjustments to allow/deny lists and deployment automation (Intune/Group Policy).
- Operationalize: bake Forcefield checks into vulnerability management, endpoint baseline audits and incident response playbooks.
Operational recommendations and monitoring
- Log everything: memory-access denials are forensic gold. Ensure denials are exported to your SIEM with process metadata, parent process lineage, hashes and user context.
- Align with EDR: coordinate Forcefield’s prevention signals with your EDR so alerts are actionable and correlated with process creation and network activity.
- Patch and sign vigilance: maintain an up-to-date inventory of kernel drivers; ensure your driver allowlist and Windows code-integrity policies are consistent.
- Test recovery and rollback: confirm silent uninstallers or emergency removal procedures are available to restore systems if conflicts occur.
- Train SOC analysts: blocked memory reads will create a new alert class — define triage criteria to distinguish benign tooling from active exploitation attempts.
Reading between the lines: marketing claims and real-world impact
Keeper’s Forcefield makes an intuitive and necessary pitch: protect runtime memory where attackers increasingly operate. The marketing message — “first-of-its-kind” — should be evaluated with healthy skepticism. Independent vendors and several security startups and established EPP/XDR vendors have announced runtime/memory-focused defenses in recent years, some using user-mode runtime monitoring and others using prevention techniques. Forcefield’s explicit kernel-mode enforcement is a strong engineering decision that differentiates its model; but it is not the only technical approach to mitigate in-memory threats.What matters to defenders is not the claim of being first, but measurable effectiveness, compatibility with existing stacks, low false-positive rates, robust telemetry and secure update/signing practices. Independent third-party testing (red-team, AV-comparatives-style evaluations or MITRE ATT&CK evaluations) and transparent documentation are critical to building confidence.
Final assessment: who should consider Forcefield?
- Security teams protecting large numbers of knowledge workers, developers, and high-risk web-facing staff should evaluate Forcefield as part of a defense-in-depth strategy.
- Organizations that rely heavily on browser sessions, extension-based authentication or password-manager integrations will find targeted memory protection attractive.
- Highly regulated industries with strong data-protection requirements may benefit from an extra prevention layer that reduces exposure from credential theft.
Conclusion
Forcefield is a significant tactical move by Keeper Security into a higher-impact, prevention-first area of endpoint defense. Its kernel-level memory controls address a concrete and escalating threat class — runtime credential and secret extraction — and it offers practical deployment paths for both individual and enterprise customers.At the same time, kernel-mode protection requires careful adoption: validate compatibility, demand rigorous signing and update guarantees, and pair the product with solid telemetry, incident response and multifactor authentication to avoid a false sense of security. Treat Keeper’s marketing claims as starting points for validation: insist on lab tests, pilot deployments and clear operational playbooks before declaring Forcefield a permanent platform addition.
For Windows shops seeking to harden secrets at runtime, Forcefield deserves attention — but like all endpoint controls, it must be evaluated in the context of a layered security architecture, operational maturity, and the real-world constraints of drivers, signing and system compatibility.
Source: SiliconANGLE Keeper Security debuts Forcefield to block memory-based attacks on Windows - SiliconANGLE
