Siemens has republished an advisory confirming that several POWER METER models in the SICAM Q100 and Q200 families store SMTP credentials in cleartext — a design flaw that allows an authenticated local user to extract email account passwords from device storage or exported configuration files, tracked as CVE-2025-40752 and CVE-2025-40753 and scored at CVSS v4 6.8. mediate takeaway for asset owners and operators is stark: affected SICAM devices keep SMTP account passwords in plaintext, and those credentials can be read by anyone who already has local authentication to the device or access to exported configuration files. Siemens and CISA recommend prompt firmware upgrades to eliminate the cleartext storage and exported configuration issues, and emphasize standard industrial control system hardening measures such as network segmentation and minimized network exposure.
This advisory was r14, 2025 as a republication of Siemens ProductCERT advisory SSA‑529291; the notice reiterates vendor-supplied mitigations and highlights that, at the time of publication, no public exploitation of these specific vulnerabilities had been reported to CISA.
Operators should treat the advisory as both a patch mandate and an architectural prompt: reduce credential sprawl, centralize mail handling, encrypt backups, and harden access to device management. While no public exploitation of these specific CVEs was reported at the time of republication, the combination of plausible attack scenarios and broad field deployment argues for swift, prioritized action.
For full remediation details and the vendor advisory, consult the Siemens ProductCERT advisory referenced in the republication and follow the vendor instructions to verify firmware versions and update procedures.
Source: CISA Siemens SICAM Q100/Q200 | CISA
This advisory was r14, 2025 as a republication of Siemens ProductCERT advisory SSA‑529291; the notice reiterates vendor-supplied mitigations and highlights that, at the time of publication, no public exploitation of these specific vulnerabilities had been reported to CISA.
Background
Why SICAM Q-seriQ100 and Q200 product families are deployed broadly in energy distribution and utility environments for power metering and related operational telemetry. Devices in the field often operate in networks that span operational technology (OT) and, in some architectures, have limited separation from corporate or vendor management networks. The presence of plaintext credentials in devices that interact with external SMTP services elevates the risk profile beyond mere local misconfiguration: an exposed password can be used to relay email, harvest information, or pivot—depending on network reachability and trust relationships.
Executive summary of the advisory
- Vulnerability class
f Sensitive Information (CWE‑312)**. - CVEs: CVE‑2025‑40752 (password stored as plain text on device) and CVE‑2025‑40753 (password exported in configuration file).
- CVSS v4 base score: 6.8 (local attack vector; low attack complexity; confidentiality impact high).
- Impact: Authenticated local attacker or user with access to exported configuration can obtain SMTP credentials and misuse the device’s configured SMTP service.
- Immediate vendor remediations: Upgrade to SICAM Q100 V2.62 or later, and SICAM Q200 family V2.80 or later.
Technical details and analysis
What "cleartext storage" means in pract storage of credentials means the device writes or retains the SMTP username/password in an unencrypted or trivially reversible form on the device filesystem or in exported configuration artifacts. Attackers who can log into the device, extract configuration backups, or access local file stores can read these credentials directly rather than needing to bypass a cryptographic protection layer. The CWE‑312 classification underlines the weakness: sensitive secrets are stored without adequate confidentiality protections.
Two distinct attack vectors described by the advisory
- Stored plain text on device: The SMTP pashe device filesystem or device configuration in an unprotected form, enabling credential extraction by any authenticated local user.
- Exported config file leakage: The SMTP password is written into exported configuration files (for backup/transfer), whictional opportunity for credential exposure if configuration files are copied, transported, or shared insecurely.
CVSS v4 context and what the numbers mean
The CVSS v4 base score of 6.8 reflects a vulnerability that requires local access (not remotely exploitable over the internet alone), but which is easy to exploit for an attacker who already possesses local authentication or can obtain exported config files. The vector string indicates low attack complexity and significant confidentiality impact — stealing credentials can lead to information disclosure or misuse of the SMTP service. Administrators should weigh the score in light of their network layout: while devices may not be Internet-exposed, weak segmentation or vendor remote-management paths can raise practical exploitability.Affected product list and versions
Siemens identifies the affected devices and versions as:- POWER METER SICAM Q100 models (multiple SKUs): Versions 2.60ing 2.62.
- POWER METER SICAM Q200 family: Versions 2.70 up to but not including 2.80.
Potential impact scenarios — how an attacker could abuse exposed SMTP credentials
- Relay abuse and reputation damage: Obtained SMTP credentials could be used to send spam or phi trusted-sounding address, damaging organizational reputation and potentially causing downstream security incidents.
- Phishing and social engineering: Attackers might send targeted emails to internal staff using a legitimate organizational address, increasing success rates for credential harvesting or fraudulent requests.
- Information exfiltration: If devices support sending operational alarms or logs via email, an attacker could configure or misuse SMTP settings to exfiltrate device data or copies of configuration files.
- Lateral movement: Credentials could be reused (if shared across systems) or leveraged as a stepping stone in environments where trust relationships exist between OT and IT systems.
- Detection resistance: Because email-based activity can look legitimate, malicious use of a device's SMTP capability may blend into normal traffic — especially risky in networks with lax monitoring of OT-originated email flows.
Mitigation and remediation steps (practical guidance)
Vendor-stated fixes (apply first where possible)
- Update SICAM Q100 devices to V2.62 or later.
- Update SICAM Q200 family devices to
Applying vendor-provided firmware that removes cleartext storage or changes how configuration exports are handled is the most direct remediation. Siemens explicitly lists these update targets in the advisory.
Compensating controls when immediate patching is impractical
- Rotate the SMTP account password after installing the fix — and again if any misconfigured device or exported config file has been publicly accessible.
- Limitrivileges: use a dedicated, scoped SMTP account with minimal rights and alerting-only permissions where possible.
- Block device-originated SMTP traffic at network egress points unless specifically required; require devices to use a central, monitored mail relay instead of direct external SMTP.
- Protect configuration backups: enforce encryption and strict access controls on exported configuration files, and ensure secure transfer practices (SFTP, secure USB handling policies).
- Segment networks: ensure SICAM devices are on isolated OT VLANs with strict ACLs to reduce the pool of users who can authenticate locally.
- Restrict local accounts and enforce role-based access: minimize the number of credentials that can log into the device and audit privileged local accounts.
- Monitor SMTP usage: enable logging on mail relays and monitor for unusual send volumes or unexpected recipients from device-originated addresses.
Detection and response checklist
- Inventory: Identify all SICAM Q100/Q200 devices and their firmware versions.
- Log review: Look for configuration export events, unusual logins, or unexpected outbound SMTP connections originating from metel audit: Confirm whether the SMTP account used by the device is unique and whether that credential is used elsewhere.
- File audits: Search for device configuration files in shared repositories and ensure no exported files with credentials are stored in accessible locations.
- Rotate credentials: Replace SMTP credentials and revoke any suspect accounts.
- Update firmware: Schedule and test vendor updates in a maintenance window and verify the fix prevents plaintext credential exposure.
Operational and programmatic considerations
Patch management in OT environments
Updating firmware on metering devices requires careful coordination: field devices may be part of distributed systems with uptime SLAs and physical access constraints. A pragmatld include:- Test bench validation of firmware updates before mass deployment.
- Staged rollout beginning with non-critical sites to validate operational behavior.
- Back-out plans and backups of configuration (ensuring backups do not reintroduce plaintext credentials).
- Communication plan with vendors and field technicians for any required procedural changes.
Vendor communications and long-term verification
- Confirm with vendor documentation whether the firmware updates also change how future configuration exports are produced (e.g., masking or encrypting sensitive fields).
- Request details from Siemens ProductCERT on the exact remediatithe update includes schema changes to configuration files. The published ProductCERT advisory and CSAF feed provide updated technical details for administrators to verify.
Policy and architecture recommendations (beyond immediate patching)
- Use centralized alerting and mail-relay architecture so devices never store or transmit credentials that are broadly usable. Centralization simplifies auditing and credential rotation.
- Implement credential vaulting for device accodevice integrations with a secrets manager or secure store) rather than embedding plaintext in device configuration.
- Enforce strict change-control and separation-of-duty policies for exporting and handling device configuration files.
- Harden access to device management consoles, limit local maintenance accounts, and enforce multifactor authentication (MFA) on any connected management workstations.
- Regularly validate firmware integrity and verify that device backups are encrypted at rest and in transit.
Detection technologies and monitoring tactics
- Network flow monitoring: Deploy egress filtering and flow analysis to detect unauthorized SMTP connections from OT subnets.
- SIEM correlation: Create detections for spikes in mail volumes, mail sent to new external domains, and configuration-export events from device IPs. integrity: Where possible, monitor device file systems for unexpected configuration changes or unplanned exports.
- Mail-relay logging: Correlate message senders with device inventories to spot anomalies and potential credential misuse quickly.
Risk evaluation — who should worry most?
- Utilities and energy operators with large fleets of SICAM devices or environments where OT and IT touchpoints are permitted should treat these flaws as high-priority. The value of SMTP credentials goes beyond simple information disclosure: they can enable social engineering, data exfiltration, and repu- Organizations relying on vendors or contractors who might export device configurations for maintenance should emphasize secure handling of exported files and insist on encrypted backups.
- Environments with weak segmentation or remote-management access for field devices should consider immediate network controls to limit who can authenticate locally to SICAM devices.
Strengths and limitations of the advisory and vendor response
Strengths
- Siemens ProductCERT disclosed the issue and supplied targeted firmware updates (V2.62 for Q100, V2.80 for Q200) — the correct, vendor-supplied remediation is available for affected versions.
- The advisory provides clear technical classification (CWE‑312) and assigns CVEs for each vecttors prioritize and document remediation.
- CISA’s republication increases visibility in the critical infrastructure community and reiterates standard ICS hardening guidance.
Limitations and residual risks
- The vulnerability requires local access, but local in OT environments is not always limited to on‑site staff. Remote management channels, third-party service connectivity, and insufficient segmentation can effectively increase the attacker population.
- Not all operators patch immediately; legacy fleets and expensive field maintenance cycles mean many derable firmware for months or years.
- The advisory notes no publicly reported exploitation at publication time, but absence of evidence is not evidence of absence; credential harvesting and stealthy misuse in industrial contexts are often underreported. This advisory should be treated as proactive risk mitigation rather than reactive response.
Practical playbook for the next 30 days (recommended immediate actions)
- Inventory: Map all SICAM Q100 and Q200 devices and capture firmware versions.
- Isolate: If any devices are running the vulnerable versions, determine if temporary network segmentation or egress filtering can be applied to restrict SMTP or remote access.
- Patch plan: Schedule firmware updates (V2.62 for Q100, V2.80 for Q200) ows; test on a non-production unit first.
- Rotate credentials: Replace SMTP passwords and revoke any credentials discovered in exported configs or known backups.
- Audit exports: Find and secure any exported configuration files; ensure they are deleted from insecure storage and replaced with properly encrypted backups.
- Monitor: Enable or increase monitoring of SMTP activity originating from device subnets and track for anomalous behavior.
Closing analysis — balancing operational continuity with security
Storing credentials in plaintext on industrial devices remains a recurring class of vulnerability in OT ecosystems. The SICAM Q100/Q200 advisory is notable because it pairs a relatively common weakness (plaintext secrets) with real operational use-cases (device-originated email for alarms), creating a credible abuse path for attackers who already have local acceted configs. The remedy is straightforward — apply vendor firmware that removes or mitigates the weakness — but achieving that remedy safely and promptly demands careful OT change management.Operators should treat the advisory as both a patch mandate and an architectural prompt: reduce credential sprawl, centralize mail handling, encrypt backups, and harden access to device management. While no public exploitation of these specific CVEs was reported at the time of republication, the combination of plausible attack scenarios and broad field deployment argues for swift, prioritized action.
For full remediation details and the vendor advisory, consult the Siemens ProductCERT advisory referenced in the republication and follow the vendor instructions to verify firmware versions and update procedures.
Source: CISA Siemens SICAM Q100/Q200 | CISA
