Microsoft has published CVE-2026-40374 as a Microsoft Power Automate Desktop information disclosure vulnerability in its Security Update Guide, identifying the issue as a confirmed flaw in the desktop automation product rather than a speculative or third-party-only report. The sparse advisory matters because Power Automate Desktop sits in a dangerous middle ground: it is a low-code convenience layer that often has access to browsers, credentials prompts, business apps, file shares, and unattended workflows. An information disclosure bug in that setting may not look spectacular on a severity dashboard, but it can become the quiet connective tissue of a larger compromise. The story here is not simply that Microsoft has another CVE to patch; it is that desktop automation has become part of the Windows attack surface.
In practice, Power Automate Desktop often runs where valuable context lives. It may interact with ERP systems, internal web portals, Excel workbooks, SharePoint libraries, legacy desktop applications, browser sessions, and authentication prompts. A desktop flow is not just a macro with better branding; it can be a scripted bridge across systems that were never designed to talk to each other cleanly.
That is why an information disclosure vulnerability in this product deserves more attention than the phrase usually receives. Information disclosure can mean anything from a low-value metadata leak to exposure of tokens, hashes, local paths, configuration data, or sensitive business content. Microsoft’s public CVE wording does not, by itself, prove the worst case. But the class of product tells defenders where to look: at the boundary between user automation, identity, and application state.
The uncomfortable lesson is that automation tools inherit the privileges and mistakes of the people and systems they automate. When a flow can see a screen, read a field, submit a form, or trigger an action, the security model is no longer only about the application being automated. It is also about the automation layer itself.
The metric text attached to the advisory is also revealing. It describes confidence in the vulnerability’s existence and the credibility of the technical details, explaining that some vulnerabilities are publicized with only limited details while others are corroborated by research or confirmed by the vendor. In plain English, this is Microsoft and the scoring system reminding defenders that not every CVE arrives with a neat exploit recipe.
For IT teams, that ambiguity creates a familiar problem. Security leaders want to know whether a flaw is exploitable over the network, whether it requires user interaction, whether it affects unattended flows, whether it exposes secrets, and whether exploit code exists. Product owners want to know whether updating Power Automate Desktop will break production workflows. The advisory format rarely answers all of that on day one.
But waiting for perfect detail is usually the wrong instinct. The most important facts are already enough to justify action: the affected product is widely used in Windows environments, the impact category is confidentiality, and the vendor has assigned a CVE. In the hierarchy of operational security, that is sufficient to start inventory, testing, and staged remediation.
That distinction is frequently misleading. Modern attacks are built out of chains, and disclosure bugs often supply the missing link. A leaked token enables impersonation. A captured NTLM hash invites relay or cracking attempts. A file path discloses internal architecture. A configuration value points to a service account. A fragment of business data helps craft convincing phishing or fraud.
Power Automate Desktop makes that risk more interesting because flows are designed to reduce friction between systems. If a vulnerability exposes data from a tool that itself touches multiple applications, the information may have more strategic value than the same bug in a narrow utility. A leak from an automation layer can tell an attacker not just what a machine contains, but how an organization’s processes work.
That is especially relevant in environments that rely on robotic process automation for legacy systems. Those workflows often exist precisely because the underlying applications are old, brittle, or hard to integrate through supported APIs. The automation layer becomes a workaround for technical debt. Vulnerabilities in that layer can therefore expose the shape of the debt itself.
Microsoft’s own recent documentation around Power Automate Desktop and Windows credential dialogs shows how sensitive this territory has become. After Windows security updates released on and after January 13, 2026, Microsoft documented changes that restrict certain applications from autofilling credentials through CredentialUIBroker.exe. The consequence was that Power Automate Desktop could no longer interact correctly with some Windows credential dialogs, affecting automation scenarios that had previously worked.
That change was not the same thing as CVE-2026-40374, and it should not be conflated with it. But it illustrates the broader point: Windows is tightening the boundary around credential surfaces, and automation tools are feeling the pressure. What business users experience as a broken flow may be the visible side effect of a necessary security boundary being enforced.
This is the paradox of desktop automation in 2026. The more useful the tool becomes, the more likely it is to be near sensitive workflows. The more sensitive the workflow, the less acceptable it is for automation to behave like an invisible hand clicking through the user interface. Microsoft is trying to preserve the productivity win while reducing the blast radius, and CVE-2026-40374 is another reminder that this balance remains fragile.
Microsoft publishes Power Automate Desktop release information through its Power Platform documentation, with builds rolling out incrementally by region. As of mid-May 2026, the 2605 build is listed for worldwide availability around mid-May, with installer version 2.68.237.26118 and Microsoft Store version 11.2605.237.0. That release cadence means administrators need to think beyond the monthly Windows cumulative update.
The obvious instruction is to update. The practical instruction is more involved. Organizations need to know how Power Automate Desktop was installed, whether machines receive the Store version or the MSI installer, whether users can self-update, whether flows run attended or unattended, and whether automation agents in virtual desktops are aligned with the desktop client version.
Version drift is the enemy here. A finance department may have a handful of machines running critical flows. A help desk may have user-authored automations scattered across laptops. A developer may have an older build preserved to avoid breaking a fragile workflow. From an attacker’s perspective, those exceptions are not administrative trivia. They are the places where a patched vulnerability may remain alive.
The bill comes due when those automations become production infrastructure without receiving production governance. A desktop flow may begin as one analyst’s shortcut and end as a daily process that moves invoices, updates records, extracts customer data, or reconciles reports. If nobody formally owns it, nobody is quite sure who must test it after an update or assess it after a CVE.
CVE-2026-40374 is a useful forcing function because it asks a governance question disguised as a vulnerability notice. Who owns Power Automate Desktop in your environment? Is it the endpoint team because it is installed on Windows? Is it the Power Platform team because it belongs to Microsoft’s automation stack? Is it the business unit because it wrote the flow? Is it security because the CVE says “information disclosure”?
The answer cannot be “everyone,” because in practice that often means no one. Organizations that use Power Automate Desktop seriously need an owner for inventory, update policy, flow classification, credential handling, and incident response. Without that, even a medium-severity issue can create weeks of confusion.
This is where information disclosure becomes operationally meaningful. If a vulnerability exposes data from the wrong place at the wrong time, the attacker may learn how a workflow is stitched together. The value may not be the first leaked string. It may be the pattern: which systems are contacted, which accounts are involved, which files are staged locally, and which browser sessions are trusted.
For Windows enthusiasts and sysadmins, this should sound familiar. Many breaches do not begin with a single cinematic exploit. They begin with reconnaissance, misconfiguration, credential exposure, lateral movement, and patient assembly of context. A desktop automation tool can accidentally compress that context into a convenient package.
That does not mean Power Automate Desktop is uniquely reckless. The same pattern applies to scripting engines, RPA tools, browser extensions, remote management agents, and endpoint utilities. The difference is that Power Automate Desktop is approachable enough to spread widely and powerful enough to matter once it does.
But there is a rationale behind restraint. A richly detailed advisory can become a blueprint for attackers before enterprises have completed deployment. Microsoft has to serve two audiences at once: defenders who need enough information to act, and adversaries who would happily turn that information into working exploit logic.
The result is the familiar halfway document. It gives a product, an impact category, a CVE identifier, scoring metadata, and update guidance, but withholds the narrative defenders crave. That is not ideal, but it is also not unusual. The correct response is not to demand that every advisory become a reverse-engineering paper on publication day.
Instead, administrators should build processes that function under partial information. If a CVE affects a product with access to sensitive workflows, inventory it. If a patch is available, test it. If the product runs unattended processes, prioritize it. If the advisory says information disclosure, review what kinds of information the product can access in your environment. That is how security operations works when the map is incomplete.
Unattended automation is the sharper edge. These systems often run in predictable states, with stable access to applications and data sources. They may use machine pools, service accounts, virtual desktops, or dedicated automation hosts. If such a machine is exposed to a vulnerability that discloses sensitive information, the attacker’s potential reward may be higher than on a random user desktop.
Attended automation still matters. A flow running under a human user’s context may access exactly the information that user can access, which is often enough to cause harm. If the user belongs to finance, HR, operations, legal, engineering, or IT, “only the user’s context” may include highly sensitive data.
The most defensible approach is to classify flows by sensitivity. Flows that touch credentials, regulated data, privileged portals, customer records, financial systems, or administrative tools should be treated differently from flows that rename files or move screenshots. A CVE should not be the first moment an organization discovers which is which.
That matters for hardening. Automation hosts should not be dumping grounds for convenience. They should have controlled software installation, monitored update status, constrained network access, protected secrets, logging, and clear ownership. If a flow requires access to a sensitive application, that access should be deliberate and reviewable, not inherited from a user account nobody wants to disturb.
The same goes for local storage. Desktop automations often create temporary files, logs, screenshots, exports, and intermediate artifacts. An information disclosure vulnerability may be more damaging if the machine is already littered with sensitive leftovers. Reducing residue is not glamorous, but it is one of the most practical ways to shrink the impact of disclosure-class bugs.
This is also a good moment to revisit whether a desktop flow should exist at all. Some workflows belong in APIs, managed connectors, Azure services, or server-side jobs with clearer identity boundaries. Desktop automation is valuable, but it should not become the permanent architecture for processes that handle crown-jewel data.
Next comes update testing. Power Automate Desktop updates can affect flows, especially those that depend on UI selectors, browser behavior, credential prompts, or legacy application quirks. Security teams may want immediate deployment, while business owners worry about broken automations. Both concerns are legitimate; the answer is not delay, but disciplined rings and rapid validation.
Security teams should also review logs and telemetry around automation hosts. There is no public indication, from the sparse advisory alone, that CVE-2026-40374 is being exploited in the wild. Still, a confidentiality bug in a workflow product justifies a look at unusual file access, unexpected network connections, odd child processes, failed flow runs, and changes to automation behavior around the time of disclosure.
Finally, organizations should document the decision. If Power Automate Desktop is patched everywhere, record it. If a business unit delays because a flow is fragile, record the exception and set an expiration date. Shadow exceptions are how small CVEs become long-lived exposure.
That is the daily reality of Windows security now. The attack surface is not only the kernel, the browser, Office, Exchange, or Remote Desktop. It is also the connective tissue: sync clients, agents, management extensions, automation tools, identity brokers, plug-ins, and convenience layers that make work move faster.
The lesson is not to panic over every information disclosure advisory. It is to stop treating automation as harmless simply because it was created with a friendly recorder and a low-code interface. If a tool can move data between systems, it deserves the same seriousness as any other integration point.
Source: MSRC Security Update Guide - Microsoft Security Response Center
Microsoft’s Low-Code Workhorse Is Now Security-Critical Infrastructure
Power Automate Desktop used to be easy to categorize as a productivity tool. It recorded clicks, scraped windows, moved data between apps, and gave business users a way to automate repetitive tasks without waiting for a developer. That framing is now too small for what the product does inside many organizations.In practice, Power Automate Desktop often runs where valuable context lives. It may interact with ERP systems, internal web portals, Excel workbooks, SharePoint libraries, legacy desktop applications, browser sessions, and authentication prompts. A desktop flow is not just a macro with better branding; it can be a scripted bridge across systems that were never designed to talk to each other cleanly.
That is why an information disclosure vulnerability in this product deserves more attention than the phrase usually receives. Information disclosure can mean anything from a low-value metadata leak to exposure of tokens, hashes, local paths, configuration data, or sensitive business content. Microsoft’s public CVE wording does not, by itself, prove the worst case. But the class of product tells defenders where to look: at the boundary between user automation, identity, and application state.
The uncomfortable lesson is that automation tools inherit the privileges and mistakes of the people and systems they automate. When a flow can see a screen, read a field, submit a form, or trigger an action, the security model is no longer only about the application being automated. It is also about the automation layer itself.
The Advisory Says Less Than Administrators Want, But Enough To Act
The user-facing description for CVE-2026-40374 is brief: Microsoft Power Automate Desktop has an information disclosure vulnerability. Microsoft’s Security Update Guide entry is the authoritative publication point, and the vulnerability’s existence is acknowledged by the vendor. That acknowledgment matters because it moves the issue out of the realm of rumor and into the patch-management queue.The metric text attached to the advisory is also revealing. It describes confidence in the vulnerability’s existence and the credibility of the technical details, explaining that some vulnerabilities are publicized with only limited details while others are corroborated by research or confirmed by the vendor. In plain English, this is Microsoft and the scoring system reminding defenders that not every CVE arrives with a neat exploit recipe.
For IT teams, that ambiguity creates a familiar problem. Security leaders want to know whether a flaw is exploitable over the network, whether it requires user interaction, whether it affects unattended flows, whether it exposes secrets, and whether exploit code exists. Product owners want to know whether updating Power Automate Desktop will break production workflows. The advisory format rarely answers all of that on day one.
But waiting for perfect detail is usually the wrong instinct. The most important facts are already enough to justify action: the affected product is widely used in Windows environments, the impact category is confidentiality, and the vendor has assigned a CVE. In the hierarchy of operational security, that is sufficient to start inventory, testing, and staged remediation.
“Information Disclosure” Is Not A Synonym For “Low Risk”
Security teams have learned to flinch at remote code execution and elevation-of-privilege bugs. Information disclosure, by contrast, often lands with a softer thud. It sounds passive, almost bureaucratic, as if the attacker merely learns something rather than gains something.That distinction is frequently misleading. Modern attacks are built out of chains, and disclosure bugs often supply the missing link. A leaked token enables impersonation. A captured NTLM hash invites relay or cracking attempts. A file path discloses internal architecture. A configuration value points to a service account. A fragment of business data helps craft convincing phishing or fraud.
Power Automate Desktop makes that risk more interesting because flows are designed to reduce friction between systems. If a vulnerability exposes data from a tool that itself touches multiple applications, the information may have more strategic value than the same bug in a narrow utility. A leak from an automation layer can tell an attacker not just what a machine contains, but how an organization’s processes work.
That is especially relevant in environments that rely on robotic process automation for legacy systems. Those workflows often exist precisely because the underlying applications are old, brittle, or hard to integrate through supported APIs. The automation layer becomes a workaround for technical debt. Vulnerabilities in that layer can therefore expose the shape of the debt itself.
Desktop Automation Has A Credential Problem It Cannot Wish Away
Power Automate Desktop’s security story is inseparable from credentials. The product may not be a password manager, but real-world flows frequently interact with sign-in pages, Windows credential prompts, browser sessions, service portals, and applications that were never designed for unattended automation. That puts the tool close to authentication even when the official architecture tries to keep secrets properly bounded.Microsoft’s own recent documentation around Power Automate Desktop and Windows credential dialogs shows how sensitive this territory has become. After Windows security updates released on and after January 13, 2026, Microsoft documented changes that restrict certain applications from autofilling credentials through CredentialUIBroker.exe. The consequence was that Power Automate Desktop could no longer interact correctly with some Windows credential dialogs, affecting automation scenarios that had previously worked.
That change was not the same thing as CVE-2026-40374, and it should not be conflated with it. But it illustrates the broader point: Windows is tightening the boundary around credential surfaces, and automation tools are feeling the pressure. What business users experience as a broken flow may be the visible side effect of a necessary security boundary being enforced.
This is the paradox of desktop automation in 2026. The more useful the tool becomes, the more likely it is to be near sensitive workflows. The more sensitive the workflow, the less acceptable it is for automation to behave like an invisible hand clicking through the user interface. Microsoft is trying to preserve the productivity win while reducing the blast radius, and CVE-2026-40374 is another reminder that this balance remains fragile.
Patch Management Is Harder When The Product Updates Like An App, Not An OS
Windows administrators understand Patch Tuesday. They may not enjoy it, but they have tooling, language, and rituals for it: rings, pilot groups, WSUS, Intune, compliance reports, maintenance windows, rollback plans. Power Automate Desktop complicates that mental model because it behaves partly like a Windows application, partly like a cloud-connected platform component, and partly like an operational dependency for business processes.Microsoft publishes Power Automate Desktop release information through its Power Platform documentation, with builds rolling out incrementally by region. As of mid-May 2026, the 2605 build is listed for worldwide availability around mid-May, with installer version 2.68.237.26118 and Microsoft Store version 11.2605.237.0. That release cadence means administrators need to think beyond the monthly Windows cumulative update.
The obvious instruction is to update. The practical instruction is more involved. Organizations need to know how Power Automate Desktop was installed, whether machines receive the Store version or the MSI installer, whether users can self-update, whether flows run attended or unattended, and whether automation agents in virtual desktops are aligned with the desktop client version.
Version drift is the enemy here. A finance department may have a handful of machines running critical flows. A help desk may have user-authored automations scattered across laptops. A developer may have an older build preserved to avoid breaking a fragile workflow. From an attacker’s perspective, those exceptions are not administrative trivia. They are the places where a patched vulnerability may remain alive.
The Business Case For Automation Has Outrun The Governance Model
Low-code and no-code tools were sold, in part, as a way to let business units move faster than central IT. That was not a bad idea. Many organizations have decades of process sludge that cannot be cleared by filing another ticket with an overstretched development team. Giving users automation tools can produce real gains.The bill comes due when those automations become production infrastructure without receiving production governance. A desktop flow may begin as one analyst’s shortcut and end as a daily process that moves invoices, updates records, extracts customer data, or reconciles reports. If nobody formally owns it, nobody is quite sure who must test it after an update or assess it after a CVE.
CVE-2026-40374 is a useful forcing function because it asks a governance question disguised as a vulnerability notice. Who owns Power Automate Desktop in your environment? Is it the endpoint team because it is installed on Windows? Is it the Power Platform team because it belongs to Microsoft’s automation stack? Is it the business unit because it wrote the flow? Is it security because the CVE says “information disclosure”?
The answer cannot be “everyone,” because in practice that often means no one. Organizations that use Power Automate Desktop seriously need an owner for inventory, update policy, flow classification, credential handling, and incident response. Without that, even a medium-severity issue can create weeks of confusion.
Attackers Do Not Need Your Automation To Be Elegant
One of the more dangerous assumptions about Power Automate Desktop is that only sophisticated, well-designed flows matter. In reality, messy automation may be more interesting to attackers. A brittle flow that depends on visible UI state, copied clipboard contents, hardcoded paths, temporary files, or human workarounds can reveal more than a cleanly engineered integration.This is where information disclosure becomes operationally meaningful. If a vulnerability exposes data from the wrong place at the wrong time, the attacker may learn how a workflow is stitched together. The value may not be the first leaked string. It may be the pattern: which systems are contacted, which accounts are involved, which files are staged locally, and which browser sessions are trusted.
For Windows enthusiasts and sysadmins, this should sound familiar. Many breaches do not begin with a single cinematic exploit. They begin with reconnaissance, misconfiguration, credential exposure, lateral movement, and patient assembly of context. A desktop automation tool can accidentally compress that context into a convenient package.
That does not mean Power Automate Desktop is uniquely reckless. The same pattern applies to scripting engines, RPA tools, browser extensions, remote management agents, and endpoint utilities. The difference is that Power Automate Desktop is approachable enough to spread widely and powerful enough to matter once it does.
Microsoft’s Silence On Exploit Detail Is A Security Feature And A Frustration
Vendors routinely publish CVEs with limited technical detail, especially when the vulnerability is newly disclosed and patch adoption is still developing. Defenders complain about the vagueness, often with good reason. It is difficult to prioritize a vulnerability when the public description does not say exactly what can leak, under what conditions, or how exploitation works.But there is a rationale behind restraint. A richly detailed advisory can become a blueprint for attackers before enterprises have completed deployment. Microsoft has to serve two audiences at once: defenders who need enough information to act, and adversaries who would happily turn that information into working exploit logic.
The result is the familiar halfway document. It gives a product, an impact category, a CVE identifier, scoring metadata, and update guidance, but withholds the narrative defenders crave. That is not ideal, but it is also not unusual. The correct response is not to demand that every advisory become a reverse-engineering paper on publication day.
Instead, administrators should build processes that function under partial information. If a CVE affects a product with access to sensitive workflows, inventory it. If a patch is available, test it. If the product runs unattended processes, prioritize it. If the advisory says information disclosure, review what kinds of information the product can access in your environment. That is how security operations works when the map is incomplete.
The Practical Risk Depends On Where The Flows Live
For a home user experimenting with a few desktop automations, CVE-2026-40374 is likely a straightforward update prompt. For an enterprise with unattended flows running on dedicated machines, the calculus changes. The same product can represent a convenience feature in one environment and a business-critical integration layer in another.Unattended automation is the sharper edge. These systems often run in predictable states, with stable access to applications and data sources. They may use machine pools, service accounts, virtual desktops, or dedicated automation hosts. If such a machine is exposed to a vulnerability that discloses sensitive information, the attacker’s potential reward may be higher than on a random user desktop.
Attended automation still matters. A flow running under a human user’s context may access exactly the information that user can access, which is often enough to cause harm. If the user belongs to finance, HR, operations, legal, engineering, or IT, “only the user’s context” may include highly sensitive data.
The most defensible approach is to classify flows by sensitivity. Flows that touch credentials, regulated data, privileged portals, customer records, financial systems, or administrative tools should be treated differently from flows that rename files or move screenshots. A CVE should not be the first moment an organization discovers which is which.
Windows Admins Should Treat Automation Hosts Like Tiered Assets
The traditional endpoint-security model tends to divide machines into servers and clients, privileged and ordinary, managed and unmanaged. Automation hosts blur those categories. A Windows client running unattended business automation may not look like a server in Active Directory, but operationally it may function like one.That matters for hardening. Automation hosts should not be dumping grounds for convenience. They should have controlled software installation, monitored update status, constrained network access, protected secrets, logging, and clear ownership. If a flow requires access to a sensitive application, that access should be deliberate and reviewable, not inherited from a user account nobody wants to disturb.
The same goes for local storage. Desktop automations often create temporary files, logs, screenshots, exports, and intermediate artifacts. An information disclosure vulnerability may be more damaging if the machine is already littered with sensitive leftovers. Reducing residue is not glamorous, but it is one of the most practical ways to shrink the impact of disclosure-class bugs.
This is also a good moment to revisit whether a desktop flow should exist at all. Some workflows belong in APIs, managed connectors, Azure services, or server-side jobs with clearer identity boundaries. Desktop automation is valuable, but it should not become the permanent architecture for processes that handle crown-jewel data.
The Patch Is Only The Beginning Of The Work
The right operational response starts with version discovery. Administrators should identify where Power Automate Desktop is installed, which build is present, and whether the installation path uses the Store or installer channel. In mixed estates, this alone may reveal more sprawl than expected.Next comes update testing. Power Automate Desktop updates can affect flows, especially those that depend on UI selectors, browser behavior, credential prompts, or legacy application quirks. Security teams may want immediate deployment, while business owners worry about broken automations. Both concerns are legitimate; the answer is not delay, but disciplined rings and rapid validation.
Security teams should also review logs and telemetry around automation hosts. There is no public indication, from the sparse advisory alone, that CVE-2026-40374 is being exploited in the wild. Still, a confidentiality bug in a workflow product justifies a look at unusual file access, unexpected network connections, odd child processes, failed flow runs, and changes to automation behavior around the time of disclosure.
Finally, organizations should document the decision. If Power Automate Desktop is patched everywhere, record it. If a business unit delays because a flow is fragile, record the exception and set an expiration date. Shadow exceptions are how small CVEs become long-lived exposure.
The Useful Lesson From CVE-2026-40374 Is Boring By Design
CVE-2026-40374 does not need to be a blockbuster to be important. In fact, its value as a security story lies in its ordinariness. A mainstream Microsoft productivity-adjacent tool has a confidentiality flaw, public details are limited, and administrators must translate that into action across a messy estate.That is the daily reality of Windows security now. The attack surface is not only the kernel, the browser, Office, Exchange, or Remote Desktop. It is also the connective tissue: sync clients, agents, management extensions, automation tools, identity brokers, plug-ins, and convenience layers that make work move faster.
The lesson is not to panic over every information disclosure advisory. It is to stop treating automation as harmless simply because it was created with a friendly recorder and a low-code interface. If a tool can move data between systems, it deserves the same seriousness as any other integration point.
The Automation Layer Deserves A Security Inventory Of Its Own
The most useful near-term response to CVE-2026-40374 is not a meeting about CVSS semantics. It is an inventory of where Power Automate Desktop lives, what it touches, and how quickly it can be updated without breaking the business. The CVE is a prompt to make that map before the next, more urgent advisory arrives.- Organizations should confirm which endpoints and automation hosts have Power Automate Desktop installed and whether they are running a current build.
- Administrators should prioritize machines that run unattended flows or handle sensitive business data, because those systems carry more operational risk than casual user desktops.
- Security teams should review whether flows interact with credentials, privileged portals, regulated data, temporary exports, or local files that could magnify an information disclosure flaw.
- Power Platform owners and endpoint teams should agree on a single patching and exception process, rather than assuming the other group owns the product.
- Flow owners should test critical automations after updating, especially flows that depend on browsers, UI selectors, credential prompts, or legacy desktop applications.
- Longer term, organizations should migrate high-value workflows away from fragile desktop automation when supported APIs or managed connectors can provide cleaner security boundaries.
Source: MSRC Security Update Guide - Microsoft Security Response Center
