Microsoft’s latest position is unambiguous: after an internal review and partner-assisted testing, the company reports it “found no connection” between the August 2025 Windows 11 security update and the series of SSD disappearances and failures circulating on social media — but the empirical picture remains messy, the community reproductions are real, and owners of NVMe storage still face practical risk until a clear, auditable fix lands from vendors or Microsoft.
In mid‑August 2025 Microsoft shipped the combined servicing-stack and cumulative update for Windows 11 24H2 (commonly tracked by community posts as KB5063878, with a related preview package KB5062660). Within days, community test benches and independent researchers reported a repeatable failure fingerprint: during sustained, large sequential writes — typically in the neighborhood of tens of gigabytes — some NVMe SSDs would become unresponsive, disappear from File Explorer/Device Manager/Disk Management, and in a subset of cases return with unreadable SMART/controller telemetry or remain inaccessible. Multiple independent outlets reproduced variations of this behavior and collated models and controller families implicated in field reports. (tomshardware.com, windowscentral.com)
The observable pattern reported by testers has three practical characteristics:
That phrasing is important: Microsoft describes results from its telemetry and reproduction efforts, not an absolute denial that users experienced failures. The company explicitly committed to continued monitoring and investigating new reports, which is the operational posture you’d expect for a cross‑stack incident that can be rare and environment‑specific.
This is a crucial datapoint: a vendor that was named frequently in community lists ran a rigorous laboratory campaign and reported a null result. Laboratory non‑reproducibility raises two possible interpretations:
A recurring theme in these reproductions is that the failure appears workload‑dependent and conditional rather than immediate and universal. That makes it harder for single vendors to validate across all possible host stacks and use cases, and it complicates automated telemetry detection at platform scale.
If an OS update changes how memory buffers are allocated, or subtly alters the cadence of NVMe commands under heavy I/O, a controller FTL could reach an unexpected internal state (e.g., metadata corruption, command queue deadlock, or thermal‑related throttling that interacts with firmware recovery logic). Those kinds of interactions are notoriously hard to reproduce in a generic lab unless the lab’s test harness replicates exactly the same driver versions, host settings, firmware revisions, thermal profile, and write patterns.
Nevertheless, repeatable community reproductions and isolated, painful user outcomes mean the story is not closed from a practical risk perspective. For everyday users and IT teams, the right posture remains conservative: back up data, avoid high‑risk sustained writes on patched machines, inventory firmware and controller details, and wait for vendor‑validated firmware updates or Microsoft mitigations before resuming heavy sequential workloads at scale. The episode is a reminder that in modern computing, storage reliability is an ecosystem property — and cross‑stack cooperation, transparent post‑mortems, and disciplined update staging are the only durable defenses against these rare but high‑impact failures.
Source: Thurrott.com Microsoft: Windows 11 Not to Blame for Recent SSD Issues
Background / Overview
In mid‑August 2025 Microsoft shipped the combined servicing-stack and cumulative update for Windows 11 24H2 (commonly tracked by community posts as KB5063878, with a related preview package KB5062660). Within days, community test benches and independent researchers reported a repeatable failure fingerprint: during sustained, large sequential writes — typically in the neighborhood of tens of gigabytes — some NVMe SSDs would become unresponsive, disappear from File Explorer/Device Manager/Disk Management, and in a subset of cases return with unreadable SMART/controller telemetry or remain inaccessible. Multiple independent outlets reproduced variations of this behavior and collated models and controller families implicated in field reports. (tomshardware.com, windowscentral.com)The observable pattern reported by testers has three practical characteristics:
- A sustained sequential write (examples: extracting a 50+ GB archive, installing a large game, or pushing a multi‑tens‑GB backup) that proceeds for some time and then abruptly fails.
- The destination NVMe device disappears from the OS topology; vendor tools and SMART readers cannot always interrogate it afterward.
- Reboot sometimes restores the device temporarily; in other reports the device remains inaccessible or files written during the event become truncated or corrupted. (tomshardware.com, bleepingcomputer.com)
What Microsoft actually said — and what it didn’t
The statement and its limits
Microsoft’s updated message in its service channels and Message Center states that after investigation it “found no connection between the August 2025 Windows security update and the types of hard drive failures reported on social media.” The company also said that internal telemetry and partner-assisted testing have not shown an increase in disk failures or file corruption attributable to the update, and that Microsoft Support had not received confirmed reports through official channels. (bleepingcomputer.com, support.microsoft.com)That phrasing is important: Microsoft describes results from its telemetry and reproduction efforts, not an absolute denial that users experienced failures. The company explicitly committed to continued monitoring and investigating new reports, which is the operational posture you’d expect for a cross‑stack incident that can be rare and environment‑specific.
What Microsoft did not demonstrate publicly
Microsoft did not publish a step‑by‑step post‑mortem tying specific telemetry traces to specific field reproductions, nor did it publish a list of drive firmware versions or controller SKUs conclusively excluded by its tests. For any event that occurs under constrained and specific workload parameters — sustained writes, high fill levels, particular drive firmware — the absence of a positive signal in platform telemetry does not necessarily falsify the field reproductions. It does, however, lower the likelihood that the update itself is the sole and universal cause of a deterministic, platform‑wide failure.What vendors and labs found
Phison: extensive tests, no repro
Phison — a major NVMe controller designer whose silicon appears across a broad range of consumer and OEM SSD SKUs — published a summary of a large internal validation campaign. The company reported more than 4,500 cumulative testing hours and roughly 2,200 test cycles on drives flagged by the community, and said it could not reproduce the “vanishing SSD” behavior in its lab. Phison emphasized it had not received verified problem reports from manufacturing partners or customers and indicated it would continue to cooperate with industry partners while recommending general thermal mitigation measures (heatsinks) as a precaution for extended workloads. (tomshardware.com, windowscentral.com)This is a crucial datapoint: a vendor that was named frequently in community lists ran a rigorous laboratory campaign and reported a null result. Laboratory non‑reproducibility raises two possible interpretations:
- The failure requires a highly specific set of host conditions that Phison’s test matrix did not (or could not practically) replicate.
- The community reproductions captured a cross‑stack interaction — a combination of host driver timing, specific firmware revisions, system BIOS/UEFI settings, thermal state, and particular workload sequences — so the behavior is not attributable to a single vendor’s controller code alone.
Independent labs and community test benches
Multiple independent outlets and enthusiast labs (including Tom’s Hardware, Windows Central, and community testers such as the widely cited Nekorusukii tests) reproduced consistent failure fingerprints under heavy sequential writes, often pointing to thresholds in the ballpark of ~50–62 GB of continuous writes and a higher probability of failure when drives were ~50–60% or more full. These sources documented symptom sets and shared test recipes that other testers used to replicate failures.A recurring theme in these reproductions is that the failure appears workload‑dependent and conditional rather than immediate and universal. That makes it harder for single vendors to validate across all possible host stacks and use cases, and it complicates automated telemetry detection at platform scale.
Technical hypotheses — what could actually be happening
Cross‑stack timing and cache exhaustion
Modern NVMe SSDs are embedded systems that rely on interplay between host OS behavior, the NVMe driver stack (storport/standard NVMe driver), PCIe link integrity, controller firmware, the flash translation layer (FTL), and on‑board resources such as DRAM or Host Memory Buffer (HMB). A sustained large sequential write will stress controller caching and metadata paths; on DRAM‑less or HMB‑dependent designs, host allocation and timings become critical. Small host‑side timing changes can expose latent firmware bugs that are otherwise dormant.If an OS update changes how memory buffers are allocated, or subtly alters the cadence of NVMe commands under heavy I/O, a controller FTL could reach an unexpected internal state (e.g., metadata corruption, command queue deadlock, or thermal‑related throttling that interacts with firmware recovery logic). Those kinds of interactions are notoriously hard to reproduce in a generic lab unless the lab’s test harness replicates exactly the same driver versions, host settings, firmware revisions, thermal profile, and write patterns.
Thermal throttling and corner‑case failure modes
Several vendors recommended thermal mitigation (heatsinks, better airflow) as a prudent precaution for high‑throughput workloads. Thermal throttling can change timing patterns and accelerate firmware state transitions. Phison suggested thermal measures while noting they’re not a fix for the reported issue; that recommendation is sensible as a defensive maneuver while deeper cross‑stack forensics proceed.Firmware, HMB and DRAM‑less designs
Past Windows 11 24H2 rollouts exposed HMB allocation issues in certain DRAM‑less designs, so the community and vendors naturally examined whether Host Memory Buffer interactions could be a vector again. DRAM‑less drives use host memory (HMB) for mapping tables and other runtime metadata, making them more sensitive to host allocation and timing changes. That makes HMB usage an obvious candidate for deeper forensic inspection in this episode.Verifying the crucial claims — what we can and cannot confirm
- The existence of reproducible community test recipes that produced SSD disappearances under sustained writes is verifiable across multiple independent outlets and forum reconstructions. Multiple labs published step‑by‑step replications and collated lists of models that reproduced failures in their setups. This is verifiable.
- Microsoft’s statement that it “found no connection” between the August security update and reported drive failures is an official claim published by the company’s channels and reported by multiple outlets. This is verifiable. (bleepingcomputer.com, support.microsoft.com)
- Phison’s claim of “unable to reproduce” after 4,500 hours and 2,200 cycles is an official vendor statement and confirmed by multiple outlets. This is verifiable. (tomshardware.com, windowscentral.com)
- The more dramatic field claims — that some drives were permanently bricked, or irrecoverable without vendor service — are partially verifiable but remain based primarily on isolated reports, user anecdotes, and small‑sample test benches. Vendors and Microsoft have not, to date, published a conclusive list of mass confirmed RMAs proving a systematic bricking wave tied to the update. Treat these extreme assertions with caution until vendors publish RMA counts and forensic analyses.
Practical guidance for users and IT teams — immediate steps
The evidence and vendor guidance converge on a conservative, risk‑management posture while the investigation continues.- Back up critical data now. The simplest and most effective defense against any storage regression is an up‑to‑date backup strategy (image‑level backups, cloud sync, or off‑device archives). Non‑negotiable.
- Avoid sustained, single‑session sequential writes on recently patched systems (e.g., copying or extracting very large archives, installing massive game updates, cloning drives) until your SSD vendor and Microsoft confirm mitigation. Community reproductions clustered near ~50 GB continuous writes and higher risk when drives were >50–60% full, so be especially cautious where those conditions apply.
- Identify your SSD controller and firmware version. Use vendor utilities (Samsung Magician, WD Dashboard, Crucial Storage Executive, etc.) or nvme-cli/smartctl to capture model, firmware, and SMART telemetry. If your SSD vendor publishes a firmware advisory, follow it — but only apply firmware updates from official vendor tools and after backing up data.
- For fleet and business environments: stage KB deployment. Pause mass deployment of the August cumulative on representative systems until SSD vendors confirm compatibility, or run the update in a limited pilot ring that includes the same range of storage devices used in production workloads. Document baseline telemetry and pre‑update images for forensic recovery if needed.
- If you experience a disappearance/corruption event: power down the machine (to avoid further writes), preserve logs (Event Viewer, NVMe vendor logs), and contact vendor support for coordinated recovery. Imaging the drive before attempting repairs can preserve forensic evidence.
The information risk: misinformation and forged advisories
This episode also revealed an information‑hazard problem: forged or unauthenticated advisories circulated in some channels, including false memos that wrongly pinned blame to specific controllers. Vendors publicly warned that not all circulated documents were authentic. That misinformation amplified fear and complicated triage, and it underscores why IT teams should rely on official vendor channels for firmware advisories and RMA instructions.Longer‑term implications for Windows servicing and storage co‑engineering
This incident is a practical demonstration of a recurring truth in modern PC engineering: storage reliability is a co‑engineered problem. Small changes in the OS or drivers can expose latent firmware bugs on a tiny fraction of deployed hardware, producing high‑impact, low‑frequency failures that are difficult to detect in broad telemetry but very real when they hit. The operational lessons are clear:- OS vendors should continue to improve telemetry hooks and targeted, opt‑in diagnostic capture so they can tie platform events to controller‑level telemetry without risking user privacy or performance.
- SSD vendors need broader, publicly auditable regression test matrices that include heavy sequential write stress tests across representative host driver/firmware combinations.
- Organizations should expand update staging to include representative storage hardware and heavy‑I/O workloads in their ring testing.
Assessment: strengths, weaknesses and open questions
Notable strengths in the current handling
- Microsoft and major controller vendors engaged quickly and publicly, collecting telemetry and performing extensive internal testing. That rapid, transparent engagement reduces the odds of a quiet, unresolved problem escalating. (bleepingcomputer.com, windowscentral.com)
- Community researchers and independent labs provided reproducible recipes and data that elevated this beyond anecdote and forced vendor attention. That kind of public triage is an important quality‑assurance complement to vendor labs.
Principal weaknesses and risks
- The absence of a public, auditable post‑mortem tying field reproductions to platform telemetry or a firmware root cause leaves users with uncertainty. Microsoft’s null finding reduces the plausibility of a universal OS‑level regression but does not prove all field reports are false.
- Vendors’ inability to reproduce in lab (even after thousands of hours) is reassuring but also highlights the real possibility of rare edge‑case failures that escape typical QA matrices. Those rare failures are the ones that produce the most anxiety because they are both catastrophic and difficult to contain.
Open technical questions that still need answers
- Which exact combinations of controller firmware, SSD OEM firmware, host driver version, BIOS/UEFI settings, and workload sequences reproduce the failure reliably in a vendor lab?
- Were any firmware regressions shipped in particular retail SKUs that correlate with the field reports?
- What specific telemetry signatures (e.g., NVMe command timeouts, PCIe resets, FTL error counters) precede the disappearance, and can Microsoft instrument those metrics in a privacy‑safe way to improve signal detection?
Practical checklist — what readers should do now
- Back up important data off the device immediately.
- Avoid large, single‑session writes (game installs, archive extractions, cloning) on systems that recently installed KB5063878/KB5062660.
- Record your SSD model and firmware version and, if possible, export SMART data to a safe location.
- Monitor official vendor and Microsoft support pages for firmware advisories or mitigation guidance.
- For fleets, stage Windows updates carefully and ensure storage‑heavy workloads are included in pilot tests.
- If you experience a failure, preserve evidence: do not write to the drive, collect logs, take photos of any vendor error codes, and open coordinated support tickets with both Microsoft and the SSD vendor.
Conclusion
Microsoft’s public conclusion — that its August 2025 security update shows no detectable connection to the SSD failures reported on social media — is a significant and material statement that reduces the plausibility of a systemic, deterministic OS‑caused bricking event. Phison’s inability to reproduce after extensive internal testing is a corroborating vendor signal that the issue, if real, is rare and environment‑dependent rather than an across‑the‑board catastrophe. (bleepingcomputer.com, tomshardware.com)Nevertheless, repeatable community reproductions and isolated, painful user outcomes mean the story is not closed from a practical risk perspective. For everyday users and IT teams, the right posture remains conservative: back up data, avoid high‑risk sustained writes on patched machines, inventory firmware and controller details, and wait for vendor‑validated firmware updates or Microsoft mitigations before resuming heavy sequential workloads at scale. The episode is a reminder that in modern computing, storage reliability is an ecosystem property — and cross‑stack cooperation, transparent post‑mortems, and disciplined update staging are the only durable defenses against these rare but high‑impact failures.
Source: Thurrott.com Microsoft: Windows 11 Not to Blame for Recent SSD Issues