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Microsoft’s latest position is unambiguous: after an internal review and partner-assisted testing, the company reports it “found no connection” between the August 2025 Windows 11 security update and the series of SSD disappearances and failures circulating on social media — but the empirical picture remains messy, the community reproductions are real, and owners of NVMe storage still face practical risk until a clear, auditable fix lands from vendors or Microsoft.

Illustration of Windows 11 KB50563878 issue causing data corruption and NVMe SSD failure.Background / Overview​

In mid‑August 2025 Microsoft shipped the combined servicing-stack and cumulative update for Windows 11 24H2 (commonly tracked by community posts as KB5063878, with a related preview package KB5062660). Within days, community test benches and independent researchers reported a repeatable failure fingerprint: during sustained, large sequential writes — typically in the neighborhood of tens of gigabytes — some NVMe SSDs would become unresponsive, disappear from File Explorer/Device Manager/Disk Management, and in a subset of cases return with unreadable SMART/controller telemetry or remain inaccessible. Multiple independent outlets reproduced variations of this behavior and collated models and controller families implicated in field reports. (tomshardware.com, windowscentral.com)
The observable pattern reported by testers has three practical characteristics:
  • A sustained sequential write (examples: extracting a 50+ GB archive, installing a large game, or pushing a multi‑tens‑GB backup) that proceeds for some time and then abruptly fails.
  • The destination NVMe device disappears from the OS topology; vendor tools and SMART readers cannot always interrogate it afterward.
  • Reboot sometimes restores the device temporarily; in other reports the device remains inaccessible or files written during the event become truncated or corrupted. (tomshardware.com, bleepingcomputer.com)
These community reproductions were serious enough that Microsoft opened an investigation and asked affected users to provide telemetry via official channels, while SSD controller vendors — most prominently Phison — launched validation programs to reproduce and diagnose the fault. (bleepingcomputer.com, windowscentral.com)

What Microsoft actually said — and what it didn’t​

The statement and its limits​

Microsoft’s updated message in its service channels and Message Center states that after investigation it “found no connection between the August 2025 Windows security update and the types of hard drive failures reported on social media.” The company also said that internal telemetry and partner-assisted testing have not shown an increase in disk failures or file corruption attributable to the update, and that Microsoft Support had not received confirmed reports through official channels. (bleepingcomputer.com, support.microsoft.com)
That phrasing is important: Microsoft describes results from its telemetry and reproduction efforts, not an absolute denial that users experienced failures. The company explicitly committed to continued monitoring and investigating new reports, which is the operational posture you’d expect for a cross‑stack incident that can be rare and environment‑specific.

What Microsoft did not demonstrate publicly​

Microsoft did not publish a step‑by‑step post‑mortem tying specific telemetry traces to specific field reproductions, nor did it publish a list of drive firmware versions or controller SKUs conclusively excluded by its tests. For any event that occurs under constrained and specific workload parameters — sustained writes, high fill levels, particular drive firmware — the absence of a positive signal in platform telemetry does not necessarily falsify the field reproductions. It does, however, lower the likelihood that the update itself is the sole and universal cause of a deterministic, platform‑wide failure.

What vendors and labs found​

Phison: extensive tests, no repro​

Phison — a major NVMe controller designer whose silicon appears across a broad range of consumer and OEM SSD SKUs — published a summary of a large internal validation campaign. The company reported more than 4,500 cumulative testing hours and roughly 2,200 test cycles on drives flagged by the community, and said it could not reproduce the “vanishing SSD” behavior in its lab. Phison emphasized it had not received verified problem reports from manufacturing partners or customers and indicated it would continue to cooperate with industry partners while recommending general thermal mitigation measures (heatsinks) as a precaution for extended workloads. (tomshardware.com, windowscentral.com)
This is a crucial datapoint: a vendor that was named frequently in community lists ran a rigorous laboratory campaign and reported a null result. Laboratory non‑reproducibility raises two possible interpretations:
  • The failure requires a highly specific set of host conditions that Phison’s test matrix did not (or could not practically) replicate.
  • The community reproductions captured a cross‑stack interaction — a combination of host driver timing, specific firmware revisions, system BIOS/UEFI settings, thermal state, and particular workload sequences — so the behavior is not attributable to a single vendor’s controller code alone.
Both interpretations are plausible; neither eliminates the real‑world risk that some users experienced. (windowscentral.com, tomshardware.com)

Independent labs and community test benches​

Multiple independent outlets and enthusiast labs (including Tom’s Hardware, Windows Central, and community testers such as the widely cited Nekorusukii tests) reproduced consistent failure fingerprints under heavy sequential writes, often pointing to thresholds in the ballpark of ~50–62 GB of continuous writes and a higher probability of failure when drives were ~50–60% or more full. These sources documented symptom sets and shared test recipes that other testers used to replicate failures.
A recurring theme in these reproductions is that the failure appears workload‑dependent and conditional rather than immediate and universal. That makes it harder for single vendors to validate across all possible host stacks and use cases, and it complicates automated telemetry detection at platform scale.

Technical hypotheses — what could actually be happening​

Cross‑stack timing and cache exhaustion​

Modern NVMe SSDs are embedded systems that rely on interplay between host OS behavior, the NVMe driver stack (storport/standard NVMe driver), PCIe link integrity, controller firmware, the flash translation layer (FTL), and on‑board resources such as DRAM or Host Memory Buffer (HMB). A sustained large sequential write will stress controller caching and metadata paths; on DRAM‑less or HMB‑dependent designs, host allocation and timings become critical. Small host‑side timing changes can expose latent firmware bugs that are otherwise dormant.
If an OS update changes how memory buffers are allocated, or subtly alters the cadence of NVMe commands under heavy I/O, a controller FTL could reach an unexpected internal state (e.g., metadata corruption, command queue deadlock, or thermal‑related throttling that interacts with firmware recovery logic). Those kinds of interactions are notoriously hard to reproduce in a generic lab unless the lab’s test harness replicates exactly the same driver versions, host settings, firmware revisions, thermal profile, and write patterns.

Thermal throttling and corner‑case failure modes​

Several vendors recommended thermal mitigation (heatsinks, better airflow) as a prudent precaution for high‑throughput workloads. Thermal throttling can change timing patterns and accelerate firmware state transitions. Phison suggested thermal measures while noting they’re not a fix for the reported issue; that recommendation is sensible as a defensive maneuver while deeper cross‑stack forensics proceed.

Firmware, HMB and DRAM‑less designs​

Past Windows 11 24H2 rollouts exposed HMB allocation issues in certain DRAM‑less designs, so the community and vendors naturally examined whether Host Memory Buffer interactions could be a vector again. DRAM‑less drives use host memory (HMB) for mapping tables and other runtime metadata, making them more sensitive to host allocation and timing changes. That makes HMB usage an obvious candidate for deeper forensic inspection in this episode.

Verifying the crucial claims — what we can and cannot confirm​

  • The existence of reproducible community test recipes that produced SSD disappearances under sustained writes is verifiable across multiple independent outlets and forum reconstructions. Multiple labs published step‑by‑step replications and collated lists of models that reproduced failures in their setups. This is verifiable.
  • Microsoft’s statement that it “found no connection” between the August security update and reported drive failures is an official claim published by the company’s channels and reported by multiple outlets. This is verifiable. (bleepingcomputer.com, support.microsoft.com)
  • Phison’s claim of “unable to reproduce” after 4,500 hours and 2,200 cycles is an official vendor statement and confirmed by multiple outlets. This is verifiable. (tomshardware.com, windowscentral.com)
  • The more dramatic field claims — that some drives were permanently bricked, or irrecoverable without vendor service — are partially verifiable but remain based primarily on isolated reports, user anecdotes, and small‑sample test benches. Vendors and Microsoft have not, to date, published a conclusive list of mass confirmed RMAs proving a systematic bricking wave tied to the update. Treat these extreme assertions with caution until vendors publish RMA counts and forensic analyses.
Where claims are unverifiable or lack cross‑validation from vendor telemetry and RMAs, they should be flagged as field reports rather than established causal facts. The absence of a vendor‑level confirmation of a mass bricking event is a meaningful counter‑signal to hyperbolic headlines.

Practical guidance for users and IT teams — immediate steps​

The evidence and vendor guidance converge on a conservative, risk‑management posture while the investigation continues.
  • Back up critical data now. The simplest and most effective defense against any storage regression is an up‑to‑date backup strategy (image‑level backups, cloud sync, or off‑device archives). Non‑negotiable.
  • Avoid sustained, single‑session sequential writes on recently patched systems (e.g., copying or extracting very large archives, installing massive game updates, cloning drives) until your SSD vendor and Microsoft confirm mitigation. Community reproductions clustered near ~50 GB continuous writes and higher risk when drives were >50–60% full, so be especially cautious where those conditions apply.
  • Identify your SSD controller and firmware version. Use vendor utilities (Samsung Magician, WD Dashboard, Crucial Storage Executive, etc.) or nvme-cli/smartctl to capture model, firmware, and SMART telemetry. If your SSD vendor publishes a firmware advisory, follow it — but only apply firmware updates from official vendor tools and after backing up data.
  • For fleet and business environments: stage KB deployment. Pause mass deployment of the August cumulative on representative systems until SSD vendors confirm compatibility, or run the update in a limited pilot ring that includes the same range of storage devices used in production workloads. Document baseline telemetry and pre‑update images for forensic recovery if needed.
  • If you experience a disappearance/corruption event: power down the machine (to avoid further writes), preserve logs (Event Viewer, NVMe vendor logs), and contact vendor support for coordinated recovery. Imaging the drive before attempting repairs can preserve forensic evidence.

The information risk: misinformation and forged advisories​

This episode also revealed an information‑hazard problem: forged or unauthenticated advisories circulated in some channels, including false memos that wrongly pinned blame to specific controllers. Vendors publicly warned that not all circulated documents were authentic. That misinformation amplified fear and complicated triage, and it underscores why IT teams should rely on official vendor channels for firmware advisories and RMA instructions.

Longer‑term implications for Windows servicing and storage co‑engineering​

This incident is a practical demonstration of a recurring truth in modern PC engineering: storage reliability is a co‑engineered problem. Small changes in the OS or drivers can expose latent firmware bugs on a tiny fraction of deployed hardware, producing high‑impact, low‑frequency failures that are difficult to detect in broad telemetry but very real when they hit. The operational lessons are clear:
  • OS vendors should continue to improve telemetry hooks and targeted, opt‑in diagnostic capture so they can tie platform events to controller‑level telemetry without risking user privacy or performance.
  • SSD vendors need broader, publicly auditable regression test matrices that include heavy sequential write stress tests across representative host driver/firmware combinations.
  • Organizations should expand update staging to include representative storage hardware and heavy‑I/O workloads in their ring testing.
All three actors (Microsoft, controller vendors such as Phison, and SSD OEMs) have a role in publishing clear, SKU‑level guidance when incidents like this occur. The faster that matrixed information is published, the lower the overall risk to end users and enterprise fleets.

Assessment: strengths, weaknesses and open questions​

Notable strengths in the current handling​

  • Microsoft and major controller vendors engaged quickly and publicly, collecting telemetry and performing extensive internal testing. That rapid, transparent engagement reduces the odds of a quiet, unresolved problem escalating. (bleepingcomputer.com, windowscentral.com)
  • Community researchers and independent labs provided reproducible recipes and data that elevated this beyond anecdote and forced vendor attention. That kind of public triage is an important quality‑assurance complement to vendor labs.

Principal weaknesses and risks​

  • The absence of a public, auditable post‑mortem tying field reproductions to platform telemetry or a firmware root cause leaves users with uncertainty. Microsoft’s null finding reduces the plausibility of a universal OS‑level regression but does not prove all field reports are false.
  • Vendors’ inability to reproduce in lab (even after thousands of hours) is reassuring but also highlights the real possibility of rare edge‑case failures that escape typical QA matrices. Those rare failures are the ones that produce the most anxiety because they are both catastrophic and difficult to contain.

Open technical questions that still need answers​

  • Which exact combinations of controller firmware, SSD OEM firmware, host driver version, BIOS/UEFI settings, and workload sequences reproduce the failure reliably in a vendor lab?
  • Were any firmware regressions shipped in particular retail SKUs that correlate with the field reports?
  • What specific telemetry signatures (e.g., NVMe command timeouts, PCIe resets, FTL error counters) precede the disappearance, and can Microsoft instrument those metrics in a privacy‑safe way to improve signal detection?
Until vendors publish SKU‑level affected lists or Microsoft releases a detailed correlation analysis, these questions will remain active forensic lines of inquiry.

Practical checklist — what readers should do now​

  • Back up important data off the device immediately.
  • Avoid large, single‑session writes (game installs, archive extractions, cloning) on systems that recently installed KB5063878/KB5062660.
  • Record your SSD model and firmware version and, if possible, export SMART data to a safe location.
  • Monitor official vendor and Microsoft support pages for firmware advisories or mitigation guidance.
  • For fleets, stage Windows updates carefully and ensure storage‑heavy workloads are included in pilot tests.
  • If you experience a failure, preserve evidence: do not write to the drive, collect logs, take photos of any vendor error codes, and open coordinated support tickets with both Microsoft and the SSD vendor.

Conclusion​

Microsoft’s public conclusion — that its August 2025 security update shows no detectable connection to the SSD failures reported on social media — is a significant and material statement that reduces the plausibility of a systemic, deterministic OS‑caused bricking event. Phison’s inability to reproduce after extensive internal testing is a corroborating vendor signal that the issue, if real, is rare and environment‑dependent rather than an across‑the‑board catastrophe. (bleepingcomputer.com, tomshardware.com)
Nevertheless, repeatable community reproductions and isolated, painful user outcomes mean the story is not closed from a practical risk perspective. For everyday users and IT teams, the right posture remains conservative: back up data, avoid high‑risk sustained writes on patched machines, inventory firmware and controller details, and wait for vendor‑validated firmware updates or Microsoft mitigations before resuming heavy sequential workloads at scale. The episode is a reminder that in modern computing, storage reliability is an ecosystem property — and cross‑stack cooperation, transparent post‑mortems, and disciplined update staging are the only durable defenses against these rare but high‑impact failures.

Source: Thurrott.com Microsoft: Windows 11 Not to Blame for Recent SSD Issues
 

Microsoft and a leading SSD controller vendor have pushed back on viral claims that a recent Windows 11 update “bricked” NVMe drives — after industry tests and Microsoft telemetry showed no reproducible, platform‑wide hardware failure, but the episode still leaves unanswered forensic questions and concrete steps users and IT teams should take now.

Two technicians monitor complex dashboards in a blue-tinted data center.Background / overview​

In mid‑August 2025 Microsoft shipped the regular Patch Tuesday cumulative update tracked by the community as KB5063878 for Windows 11 (24H2). Within days a handful of hobbyist test benches and forum posts reported NVMe drives disappearing during heavy, sustained writes — an alarming symptom that can lead to truncated files or, in rare reports, inaccessible volumes. Microsoft opened an investigation and asked affected customers to submit telemetry and diagnostic packages while working with storage partners to reproduce the issue.
Phison, the NAND/controller company that appeared most often in early community lists, publicly reported a major internal validation campaign. The vendor said it executed more than 4,500 cumulative testing hours and roughly 2,200 test cycles across drives reported by community testers and was unable to reproduce the reported failures. Following that work, Microsoft updated its internal advisory to report that, after its investigation, it had “found no connection between the August 2025 Windows security update and the types of hard drive failures reported on social media.”

What users saw: the failure fingerprint​

The reproducible pattern described by testers​

Independent testers converged on a concise operational envelope that made the reports technically plausible and therefore urgent:
  • The workload was a sustained, sequential write — examples include extracting a 50+ GB archive, installing a multi‑tens‑GB game, or copying large backup images.
  • The target SSD was typically partially full (community benches repeatedly cited ~50–60% used).
  • Mid‑write, the drive could stop responding to the OS, disappear from File Explorer/Device Manager/Disk Management, and return unreadable SMART or vendor telemetry.
  • In many cases a reboot re‑enumerated the device; in a minority of reports, the drive remained inaccessible and required vendor tools or RMA‑level recovery.
Those hands‑on reproducible results — published with logs and step‑by‑step recipes by multiple independent benches — are why vendors treated the issue seriously and launched formal lab campaigns.

Which hardware was named in early reports​

A variety of consumer SSDs and controller families were cited by testers and forum collations. Phison controllers appeared frequently in early lists alongside other vendors (InnoGrit, Maxio), and both DRAM‑equipped and DRAM‑less (HMB) designs were reported in anecdotal collections. Importantly, community lists were not a controlled sample: they were self‑selected, workload‑specific and leaned toward gaming/test benches that stress high write throughput.

Microsoft’s response — posture, limits and public language​

Microsoft followed a standard incident response path: attempt internal reproduction, correlate across telemetry from millions of endpoints, solicit feedback and diagnostic packages from affected users, and engage hardware partners for partner‑assisted testing. After that work the company updated a Message Center/service advisory to say it had not found evidence linking the August 2025 security update (KB5063878) to the reported drive failures. Microsoft also said its support teams had not received confirmed cases through official channels during the investigation window.
Two practical takeaways from Microsoft’s statement are worth emphasizing:
  • Microsoft relied on fleet telemetry and lab repro attempts; that approach is the right one for detecting platform‑wide regressions but can miss rare, environment‑specific edge cases that only arise under a precise combination of firmware, host drivers, thermal state, and workload timing.
  • Microsoft invited affected users to provide Feedback Hub packages and contact support for forensic triage; it did not publish a full joint forensic post‑mortem tying host traces to controller telemetry in the public domain.

Phison’s investigation: what they tested and what they reported​

Phison’s public summary — repeated by multiple outlets and vendor channels — states the company was alerted on August 18, 2025, then executed an intensive validation campaign covering thousands of cumulative hours and thousands of test cycles. Phison concluded that it was unable to reproduce the vanishing‑drive symptoms and that no partners or enterprise customers reported similar failures during the testing window. The company also encouraged best practices for thermal management (heatsinks) on performance drives while continuing to monitor the situation.
That kind of lab work is meaningful: it demonstrates diligence and scale. But lab non‑reproducibility is not the same as absolute proof of absence. Validation matrices have limits — they may not cover the precise BIOS/firmware/driver/thermal timing a community bench accidentally hit.

Separating fact from noise: what we verified and what remains murky​

The public record for this episode supports several clear, cross‑checked facts:
  • The Windows 11 cumulative released in August 2025 that was associated with the reports is KB5063878 (OS Build 26100.4946). Microsoft’s KB page and multiple mainstream outlets identify that package.
  • Microsoft publicly stated that, after investigation, it found no connection between that August 2025 security update and the types of hard‑drive failures circulating on social media.
  • Phison reported ~4,500 cumulative testing hours and ~2,200 test cycles on drives flagged by community posts and said it could not reproduce the problem. That number appears consistently across vendor and trade reporting. (neowin.net, guru3d.com)
  • Community reproducible tests identified a practical failure envelope (sustained writes of tens of GB; drives >~50–60% used) and produced real, repeatable symptoms on specific benches. Those labs and forum threads remain an important signal. (tomshardware.com, pupuweb.com)
Where the record is weaker and requires caution:
  • Public, auditable forensic logs that correlate host‑side traces (Windows kernel NVMe stack, driver timestamps, OS memory maps) with controller telemetry (SMART, vendor diagnostic traces) have not been widely published by either Microsoft or a neutral third party. That gap makes definitive root‑cause attribution difficult to confirm in public.
  • A small number of field reports described permanent data loss or drives that failed to re‑enumerate after restart; those cases deserve individual vendor RMA and forensic attention even if they appear to be rare.

Correcting the record: a note about KB numbers and some media misreporting​

Not every summary circulating online used consistent KB numbers or dates. For example, a recent news item referenced KB5041587 and a subsequent KB5042615 as the offending patch and the fix respectively; that numbering does not align with Microsoft’s August 2025 cumulative (KB5063878) nor with Microsoft’s public KB index. KB5041587 is an older preview update from August 2024 and is not the August 2025 cumulative that multiple outlets and Microsoft reference in this incident. A follow‑up KB number reported in some stories (KB5042615) does not appear in Microsoft’s public August 2025 servicing notes or the usual KB index for this event. These discrepancies are important: readers should treat such numeric claims cautiously and cross‑check against Microsoft’s official update history.
Because KB numbers and dates are precise and consequential, any recommendation to uninstall or re‑install a KB should be based on the specific KB ID shown in Windows Update > Update history on the affected machine and validated against Microsoft’s KB pages.

Technical plausibility: how an OS update can expose a controller bug​

Host‑side updates can change memory allocation, timing, IO‑stack behaviour, caching semantics, or NVMe driver paths — all of which can expose latent firmware bugs in SSD controllers. The modern storage stack is complex and timing‑sensitive: a change in how the OS handles write buffering or the size and cadence of submission queue entries can exercise uncommon controller state machines. Historically similar incidents (including prior HMB allocation issues in Windows 11 builds) show that a host change can surface firmware edge cases that were dormant under earlier host behaviour. (windowsforum.com, tomshardware.com)
This is why reproduction recipes matter: repeated, independent benches showing the same symptom under a narrow workload make the event credible even if large‑scale telemetry doesn’t show a spike. It’s equally why vendors need correlated host + controller traces to conclude root cause.

Practical guidance — what to do if you’re worried or impacted​

These are pragmatic, prioritized steps for users and IT teams to reduce risk and collect evidence if you see a problem.
  • Keep current backups. If you rely on a machine for critical work, assume any storage anomaly could lead to data loss and back up immediately.
  • If you observe a drive vanish mid‑write:
  • Do not immediately power‑cycle the machine repeatedly; preserve the device and collect logs if possible.
  • Collect Windows logs (Event Viewer > System/Application) and vendor SMART/diagnostic dumps with the drive maker’s tools.
  • Submit a Feedback Hub package and open a support case with the drive vendor — provide exact step‑by‑step reproduction notes.
  • If you want to avoid exposure while the investigation continues:
  • Pause automatic Windows Update on production systems and stage the August 2025 cumulative in a pilot ring that includes heavy‑I/O workloads.
  • Avoid large single‑session writes to drives that are >50–60% full (e.g., avoid installing large game updates or extracting giant archives on those drives until you’ve tested).
  • For administrators:
  • Use pilot rings and representative workloads (including sustained sequential writes) before broad rollout.
  • Demand reproducible test recipes and firmware/BIOS lists from vendors when troubleshooting storage regressions.
  • If you want to uninstall KB5063878 (consumer guidance):
  • Follow documented uninstall steps in Settings > Update history > Uninstall updates — and plan to pause updates until the environment is validated. Guides and walkthroughs for uninstalling KB5063878 were posted by specialist outlets and community sites during this incident.

Assessment: what vendors did well, and what still needs fixing​

Strengths
  • Rapid, public vendor engagement and large‑scale lab campaigns (Phison’s thousands of test hours) are meaningful and lowered the likelihood of a mass, update‑driven hardware catastrophe.
  • Microsoft used fleet telemetry and a standard feedback pipeline to triage reports and collect data centrally.
Gaps / Risks
  • The absence of a public, jointly published post‑mortem with correlated host traces and controller logs leaves lingering forensic uncertainty. Industry users and admins need auditable test recipes and trace artifacts that can be re‑run and independently verified.
  • Online amplification — influencer videos, anonymous collations, and a circulated fake controller‑list document — complicated triage and may have distracted attention from careful forensic exchange. Vendors must plan for both the technical and communications dimensions of incidents like this.

Bottom line: calm, but cautious​

The best current public evidence points to a limited, environment‑specific problem rather than a universal Windows‑driven “bricking” of SSDs. Microsoft’s telemetry‑based review and Phison’s exhaustive lab campaign both lower the probability of a platform‑wide regression. That said, the episode demonstrates two important realities:
  • Rare, workload‑specific failures still happen in complex ecosystems where firmware, platform firmware (BIOS), drivers and OS updates interact.
  • Until a full, auditable joint post‑mortem is published, a small number of users who experienced significant failures deserve careful vendor RMA and forensic support.
Practical discipline — up‑to‑date backups, staged updates, and conservative handling of heavy writes on near‑full drives — remains the single best risk‑management posture for both consumers and IT organizations. (tomshardware.com, neowin.net)

This is a developing story. The core technical claims in this feature have been cross‑checked against Microsoft’s KB listing for the August 12, 2025 cumulative (KB5063878), multiple independent specialist outlets that reported Microsoft’s service advisory, and Phison’s public testing statements; where single‑article or local claims used different KB numbers or fix IDs we flagged those as unverified and recommended readers validate KB IDs against Microsoft’s official update history before taking corrective action. (support.microsoft.com, bleepingcomputer.com, tomshardware.com)

Source: thedailyjagran.com Microsoft Clarifies Windows 11 Update Did Not Brick SSDs
 

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