Microsoft used Build 2026 in San Francisco to position Windows 11 as a control plane for AI agents, previewing Microsoft Execution Containers, OpenClaw on Windows, and Project Solara as pieces of a broader agent-first computing strategy. That is not just another Copilot feature drop. It is Microsoft trying to redefine the operating system as the place where autonomous software is identified, confined, audited, and allowed to act. The Register’s mordant framing gets the mood right: the future being sold from the keynote stage is thrilling only if the security model arrives before the agents do.
The useful thing about this year’s Build rhetoric is not that Microsoft said “agentic” a lot. Everyone says “agentic” now, usually as a way to make automation sound less like automation and more like destiny. The useful thing is that Microsoft’s demos implicitly admitted that an AI agent is not a search box, not a sidebar, and not a productivity mascot. It is software that takes actions.
That changes the Windows conversation. A chatbot can hallucinate and embarrass you. An agent can hallucinate and delete a folder, exfiltrate a token, send the wrong document, install the wrong tool, or confidently click through a permission dialog it does not understand. Once software is allowed to perceive, decide, and operate across applications, it stops being a feature and starts behaving like a user.
That is why Microsoft Execution Containers matter more than the keynote gloss around them. MXC is Microsoft’s attempt to put a hard boundary around agents at the operating-system layer, rather than trusting every developer to implement bespoke guardrails in an app. The sales pitch is “agent safety.” The architectural claim is more important: Windows should be the enforcement point.
This is a belated but necessary turn. For the last two years, the AI industry has often treated safety as a model-quality problem, as if better alignment, better prompts, and better system messages could substitute for boring old access control. Windows, for all its legacy baggage, exists because boring old access control is what makes general-purpose computing survivable.
That mediation has always been imperfect on Windows. The platform’s long history of backward compatibility has trained generations of developers to expect broad filesystem access, registry access, background services, shell hooks, and increasingly elaborate ways to glue one program to another. That flexibility made Windows the default enterprise desktop. It also made Windows a very large attack surface.
Agents intensify the old tradeoff. A useful agent needs context, memory, credentials, files, application state, network access, and the ability to chain tasks. A safe agent needs to be denied most of that most of the time. The contradiction cannot be solved by another pop-up that users will click through at 4:55 p.m. on a Friday.
This is where the OS earns its keep. If an agent is effectively a non-human user, it needs an identity, a policy boundary, an execution environment, and logs that a human administrator can understand later. Those are not glamorous keynote concepts, but they are the difference between “AI assistant” and “unbounded automation running under your account.”
The industry’s favorite metaphor has been the co-worker. That metaphor is useful only if we extend it all the way. Co-workers do not get domain admin because they are enthusiastic. They get least-privilege access, conditional access, retention policies, device compliance checks, and a manager who can revoke their badge.
That is why the demo of OpenClaw being blocked from destructive behavior lands better than another polished assistant scenario. The danger is legible. An agent tries to do something it should not do, and the system says no. That is a more mature story than “the model understands your intent.”
Of course, demos are theater. The stage version of containment is always cleaner than the fleet version. Enterprise desktops are not pristine lab machines. They are full of old line-of-business apps, sync clients, browser extensions, VPN agents, endpoint tools, local admin exceptions, and “temporary” scripts that have survived three CIOs.
Still, the direction is right. Microsoft is not saying merely that OpenClaw should behave. It is saying that OpenClaw should be contained. That distinction is the beginning of an adult conversation about agentic computing.
The danger is not that every user will intentionally make a bad choice. The danger is that the interface will reduce complex authority to a vibe. “Allow this agent to help manage your files?” sounds helpful. “Allow this agent to read, classify, move, summarize, upload, and delete documents across synchronized folders while authenticated as you?” sounds rather different.
Windows already struggles with consent fatigue. User Account Control improved the post-XP security baseline, but it also trained many people to treat elevation prompts as speed bumps. Browser permission prompts created a similar habituation problem. Enterprise administrators know the pattern well: if the prompt blocks the task, the user wants the prompt gone.
Agents make that pattern more dangerous because their value proposition is delegation. A user is not granting an app a static permission; they are granting a decision-maker a zone of discretion. The interface needs to explain not only what the agent can access, but what it can decide to do when the user is not staring at the screen.
That is not a small design problem. It may be the central design problem of agentic Windows.
On one level, it is pragmatic. Lightweight, low-power, purpose-built agent devices do not need the full Windows desktop stack. If the future includes badges, desk companions, ambient devices, and enterprise peripherals designed around agents rather than apps, Microsoft needs a platform that hardware partners can ship without hauling the entire Windows legacy estate behind it.
On another level, Solara is an admission that Windows is both Microsoft’s advantage and its constraint. Windows has the enterprise footprint, the developer ecosystem, the management plumbing, and the institutional credibility to become an agent control plane. It also has decades of assumptions that were not designed for autonomous systems.
The important question is whether Solara becomes an extension of Windows governance or a parallel island with friendlier hardware economics. If agents move fluidly between a Windows workstation, an Android-based edge device, Microsoft 365, and cloud services, then identity and policy must follow them. Otherwise, the agentic platform becomes another fragmentation layer with better branding.
Microsoft’s best version of this strategy is not “Windows everywhere.” It is “Windows-grade control everywhere Microsoft expects agents to act.” That is a subtler ambition, and a harder one.
Those hardware visions are not identical, but they rhyme. Both assume that AI workloads will move closer to the user. Both assume that the PC, phone, wearable, and edge device boundaries will blur. Both assume that models and agents will need more privileged access to context than traditional apps ever had.
That is the optimistic version. The darker version is that “local AI” becomes a privacy slogan while the actual experience is stitched together from telemetry, cloud inference, device sensors, enterprise identity, and opaque service integrations. A local model can still be part of a surveillance architecture. An on-device agent can still be a compliance nightmare.
Microsoft’s role is therefore unusually consequential. If Windows becomes the place where local AI gets governed, then the platform can make agentic computing less reckless. If Windows becomes merely the place where every vendor’s agent asks for more access, then the platform becomes an accelerant.
This is why the keynote language matters less than the defaults. Hardware vendors can sell capability. Microsoft has to sell trust.
If Microsoft wants enterprises to accept agents on Windows, MXC cannot be a developer curiosity. It has to show up in the tools administrators already use. It has to integrate with Entra ID, Intune, Defender, Purview, audit logs, conditional access, and whatever third-party security stack the organization has accumulated. It has to be visible when something goes wrong and quiet when nothing does.
The hardest part will be causality. When a human makes a mistake, organizations can usually reconstruct the chain: user clicked link, macro ran, token stolen, mailbox accessed. With agents, the chain may include model output, tool invocation, plugin behavior, retrieved context, policy decisions, and another agent’s response. Audit logs that say “agent performed action” will not be enough.
Administrators will need to know what the agent was allowed to see, what it actually saw, what instruction caused the action, which policy permitted it, and whether the user explicitly authorized the workflow or merely installed something that later acted on their behalf. That is a tall order. It is also the price of making agents enterprise software rather than executive-demo software.
The obvious comparison is macros. Microsoft Office macros were transformative, useful, and catastrophically abused. The lesson was not that automation should never exist. The lesson was that automation embedded in trusted workflows becomes security-critical the moment it scales.
That is smart. The AI developer ecosystem has been drifting toward Linux servers, macOS laptops, browser-based tools, and cloud notebooks. Windows remains enormous, but enormity is not the same as developer momentum. If agentic software is the next platform wave, Microsoft cannot afford Windows to be merely compatible.
But the compliance bill arrives with the opportunity. Developers building agents will increasingly be asked to declare containment requirements, justify access, design least-privilege workflows, and produce logs that security teams can inspect. The old desktop habit of asking for broad user-context access will age badly.
This could be healthy. Software has often externalized risk onto users and administrators. A policy-driven containment model forces developers to describe what their agent actually needs. The discipline of writing that down may reveal that many “agentic” features are really just over-privileged scripts wearing a language-model mask.
The better Windows becomes at enforcing these declarations, the more painful sloppy design will become. That is not a bug. It is the point.
This is where Microsoft has an opportunity to distinguish itself from the ambient hype cycle. The company has made plenty of AI promises that deserve skepticism. But it also knows, from painful experience, what happens when insecure defaults meet enormous deployment scale. Windows security has been shaped by worms, botnets, ransomware, macro malware, credential theft, and decades of enterprise compromise.
That history is not flattering, but it is valuable. A company that has been repeatedly punished by the consequences of platform openness may be better positioned than a pure AI startup to understand that guardrails cannot be ornamental. The OS has to say no.
The catch is that “no” is bad for demos. It interrupts the magic. It forces the presenter to acknowledge limits, policy, configuration, and the possibility that the system should refuse the user’s apparent request. In a keynote culture built around inevitability, refusal is almost subversive.
Yet refusal is exactly what users need. An agentic Windows that never blocks an agent is not helpful. It is haunted.
A local agent with broad permissions can still index private files, infer sensitive relationships, create new metadata, and pass context to services when a workflow requires it. A cloud agent with narrow permissions and strong auditability may, in some cases, be easier to govern than a local agent running wild under a user account. The real issue is control.
This is why the operating-system layer matters again. Users and administrators need a comprehensible way to decide what an agent can access, when it can access it, and whether it can carry information from one context into another. “On device” is not enough. “Under policy” is the phrase that matters.
The same goes for enterprise data. A company may accept an agent summarizing a local folder but reject the same agent correlating that folder with HR records, customer emails, and source code. The danger is often not a single access event. It is the composition of access across domains.
Agents are powerful precisely because they compose. Security has to compose faster.
Consumers may experience this as feature creep. Sysadmins may experience it as another management surface. Developers may experience it as a new set of APIs and constraints. Security teams may experience it as both a threat and a relief, depending on whether Microsoft’s containment model proves enforceable.
The biggest risk is that Microsoft tries to make agents feel inevitable before it makes them accountable. Windows users have already lived through enough “you will love this integration” moments to be wary. Copilot buttons, Start menu promotions, cloud nudges, account requirements, and Edge persistence have taught many users that Microsoft’s definition of helpful can be aggressive.
Agentic computing raises the stakes. A recommendation can be ignored. An autonomous action has to be governed. If Microsoft blurs that line, it will burn trust quickly.
The better path is slower and less cinematic: make agents inspectable, revocable, scoped, logged, and boringly manageable. The future of AI on Windows depends on boring more than Microsoft’s keynotes will ever admit.
The shift will not arrive as a single migration. It will arrive through developer tools, Microsoft 365 integrations, Windows previews, OEM devices, security baselines, and third-party software that quietly adds agentic workflows. By the time the word “agent” disappears from the marketing copy, the architecture will already be part of the environment.
Microsoft Has Stopped Pretending Agents Are Just Chatbots
The useful thing about this year’s Build rhetoric is not that Microsoft said “agentic” a lot. Everyone says “agentic” now, usually as a way to make automation sound less like automation and more like destiny. The useful thing is that Microsoft’s demos implicitly admitted that an AI agent is not a search box, not a sidebar, and not a productivity mascot. It is software that takes actions.That changes the Windows conversation. A chatbot can hallucinate and embarrass you. An agent can hallucinate and delete a folder, exfiltrate a token, send the wrong document, install the wrong tool, or confidently click through a permission dialog it does not understand. Once software is allowed to perceive, decide, and operate across applications, it stops being a feature and starts behaving like a user.
That is why Microsoft Execution Containers matter more than the keynote gloss around them. MXC is Microsoft’s attempt to put a hard boundary around agents at the operating-system layer, rather than trusting every developer to implement bespoke guardrails in an app. The sales pitch is “agent safety.” The architectural claim is more important: Windows should be the enforcement point.
This is a belated but necessary turn. For the last two years, the AI industry has often treated safety as a model-quality problem, as if better alignment, better prompts, and better system messages could substitute for boring old access control. Windows, for all its legacy baggage, exists because boring old access control is what makes general-purpose computing survivable.
The Operating System Was Always the Missing AI Product
The Register’s sharpest point is that Microsoft appears to have rediscovered what an operating system is for. The OS is not merely a launchpad for apps or a compatibility layer for drivers. It is the mediator between code and consequences.That mediation has always been imperfect on Windows. The platform’s long history of backward compatibility has trained generations of developers to expect broad filesystem access, registry access, background services, shell hooks, and increasingly elaborate ways to glue one program to another. That flexibility made Windows the default enterprise desktop. It also made Windows a very large attack surface.
Agents intensify the old tradeoff. A useful agent needs context, memory, credentials, files, application state, network access, and the ability to chain tasks. A safe agent needs to be denied most of that most of the time. The contradiction cannot be solved by another pop-up that users will click through at 4:55 p.m. on a Friday.
This is where the OS earns its keep. If an agent is effectively a non-human user, it needs an identity, a policy boundary, an execution environment, and logs that a human administrator can understand later. Those are not glamorous keynote concepts, but they are the difference between “AI assistant” and “unbounded automation running under your account.”
The industry’s favorite metaphor has been the co-worker. That metaphor is useful only if we extend it all the way. Co-workers do not get domain admin because they are enthusiastic. They get least-privilege access, conditional access, retention policies, device compliance checks, and a manager who can revoke their badge.
OpenClaw Is the Perfect Demo Because It Makes the Risk Obvious
OpenClaw’s role in the Build story is not accidental. A framework designed to carry out multi-step workflows across tools is exactly the sort of agent that exposes the weakness of soft guardrails. It needs to touch real things. It needs to operate inside a live environment. And if it goes wrong, the damage is not theoretical.That is why the demo of OpenClaw being blocked from destructive behavior lands better than another polished assistant scenario. The danger is legible. An agent tries to do something it should not do, and the system says no. That is a more mature story than “the model understands your intent.”
Of course, demos are theater. The stage version of containment is always cleaner than the fleet version. Enterprise desktops are not pristine lab machines. They are full of old line-of-business apps, sync clients, browser extensions, VPN agents, endpoint tools, local admin exceptions, and “temporary” scripts that have survived three CIOs.
Still, the direction is right. Microsoft is not saying merely that OpenClaw should behave. It is saying that OpenClaw should be contained. That distinction is the beginning of an adult conversation about agentic computing.
The Permission Dialog Is Not Ready for This Job
The consumer version of this future is much uglier. Mobile operating systems taught users to accept permissions in exchange for functionality, but even that model is creaking. People routinely grant photo, location, microphone, contacts, notification, and background privileges without understanding the long-term implication. Now imagine the same pattern applied to an agent that can reason across services.The danger is not that every user will intentionally make a bad choice. The danger is that the interface will reduce complex authority to a vibe. “Allow this agent to help manage your files?” sounds helpful. “Allow this agent to read, classify, move, summarize, upload, and delete documents across synchronized folders while authenticated as you?” sounds rather different.
Windows already struggles with consent fatigue. User Account Control improved the post-XP security baseline, but it also trained many people to treat elevation prompts as speed bumps. Browser permission prompts created a similar habituation problem. Enterprise administrators know the pattern well: if the prompt blocks the task, the user wants the prompt gone.
Agents make that pattern more dangerous because their value proposition is delegation. A user is not granting an app a static permission; they are granting a decision-maker a zone of discretion. The interface needs to explain not only what the agent can access, but what it can decide to do when the user is not staring at the screen.
That is not a small design problem. It may be the central design problem of agentic Windows.
Project Solara Shows Microsoft Looking Beyond the PC Without Escaping Windows’ Burden
Project Solara complicates the story because it is not simply Windows with more AI. Microsoft is describing an agent-first device platform that spans edge, cloud, and dedicated hardware, with the Microsoft Device Ecosystem Platform built on Android Open Source Project foundations rather than classic Windows. That detail matters.On one level, it is pragmatic. Lightweight, low-power, purpose-built agent devices do not need the full Windows desktop stack. If the future includes badges, desk companions, ambient devices, and enterprise peripherals designed around agents rather than apps, Microsoft needs a platform that hardware partners can ship without hauling the entire Windows legacy estate behind it.
On another level, Solara is an admission that Windows is both Microsoft’s advantage and its constraint. Windows has the enterprise footprint, the developer ecosystem, the management plumbing, and the institutional credibility to become an agent control plane. It also has decades of assumptions that were not designed for autonomous systems.
The important question is whether Solara becomes an extension of Windows governance or a parallel island with friendlier hardware economics. If agents move fluidly between a Windows workstation, an Android-based edge device, Microsoft 365, and cloud services, then identity and policy must follow them. Otherwise, the agentic platform becomes another fragmentation layer with better branding.
Microsoft’s best version of this strategy is not “Windows everywhere.” It is “Windows-grade control everywhere Microsoft expects agents to act.” That is a subtler ambition, and a harder one.
Qualcomm and Nvidia Are Selling the Same Future From Different Ends
The Computex backdrop matters because Microsoft is not alone in this race. Nvidia wants local AI to become a reason to buy new boxes, new GPUs, and new developer workstations. Qualcomm wants always-available, power-efficient, connectivity-rich AI experiences that make the device feel less like a machine and more like a sensing layer.Those hardware visions are not identical, but they rhyme. Both assume that AI workloads will move closer to the user. Both assume that the PC, phone, wearable, and edge device boundaries will blur. Both assume that models and agents will need more privileged access to context than traditional apps ever had.
That is the optimistic version. The darker version is that “local AI” becomes a privacy slogan while the actual experience is stitched together from telemetry, cloud inference, device sensors, enterprise identity, and opaque service integrations. A local model can still be part of a surveillance architecture. An on-device agent can still be a compliance nightmare.
Microsoft’s role is therefore unusually consequential. If Windows becomes the place where local AI gets governed, then the platform can make agentic computing less reckless. If Windows becomes merely the place where every vendor’s agent asks for more access, then the platform becomes an accelerant.
This is why the keynote language matters less than the defaults. Hardware vendors can sell capability. Microsoft has to sell trust.
Enterprise IT Will Judge the Architecture, Not the Anthem
For sysadmins, the agentic platform is not a philosophical issue. It is a ticket queue waiting to happen. Every autonomous workflow becomes a question about identity, privilege, logging, data residency, retention, endpoint security, and incident response.If Microsoft wants enterprises to accept agents on Windows, MXC cannot be a developer curiosity. It has to show up in the tools administrators already use. It has to integrate with Entra ID, Intune, Defender, Purview, audit logs, conditional access, and whatever third-party security stack the organization has accumulated. It has to be visible when something goes wrong and quiet when nothing does.
The hardest part will be causality. When a human makes a mistake, organizations can usually reconstruct the chain: user clicked link, macro ran, token stolen, mailbox accessed. With agents, the chain may include model output, tool invocation, plugin behavior, retrieved context, policy decisions, and another agent’s response. Audit logs that say “agent performed action” will not be enough.
Administrators will need to know what the agent was allowed to see, what it actually saw, what instruction caused the action, which policy permitted it, and whether the user explicitly authorized the workflow or merely installed something that later acted on their behalf. That is a tall order. It is also the price of making agents enterprise software rather than executive-demo software.
The obvious comparison is macros. Microsoft Office macros were transformative, useful, and catastrophically abused. The lesson was not that automation should never exist. The lesson was that automation embedded in trusted workflows becomes security-critical the moment it scales.
Developers Are Being Offered Power With a Compliance Bill Attached
Developers will hear a different message from Build: Windows wants to be a serious platform for agent development again. That includes local AI infrastructure, improved command-line tooling, package-management friendliness, WSL-era developer ergonomics, and now a sandboxing story for agents. Microsoft is trying to make Windows feel less like the corporate desktop you target reluctantly and more like the machine where AI-native software is built.That is smart. The AI developer ecosystem has been drifting toward Linux servers, macOS laptops, browser-based tools, and cloud notebooks. Windows remains enormous, but enormity is not the same as developer momentum. If agentic software is the next platform wave, Microsoft cannot afford Windows to be merely compatible.
But the compliance bill arrives with the opportunity. Developers building agents will increasingly be asked to declare containment requirements, justify access, design least-privilege workflows, and produce logs that security teams can inspect. The old desktop habit of asking for broad user-context access will age badly.
This could be healthy. Software has often externalized risk onto users and administrators. A policy-driven containment model forces developers to describe what their agent actually needs. The discipline of writing that down may reveal that many “agentic” features are really just over-privileged scripts wearing a language-model mask.
The better Windows becomes at enforcing these declarations, the more painful sloppy design will become. That is not a bug. It is the point.
Security Theater Will Not Survive Contact With Autonomous Software
The AI industry has a habit of presenting safety as a polished layer on top of danger. A model card, a reassuring demo, a red-team blog post, a dashboard, a trust center page — all useful, none sufficient. Agents require something more primitive: containment that works even when the agent is wrong.This is where Microsoft has an opportunity to distinguish itself from the ambient hype cycle. The company has made plenty of AI promises that deserve skepticism. But it also knows, from painful experience, what happens when insecure defaults meet enormous deployment scale. Windows security has been shaped by worms, botnets, ransomware, macro malware, credential theft, and decades of enterprise compromise.
That history is not flattering, but it is valuable. A company that has been repeatedly punished by the consequences of platform openness may be better positioned than a pure AI startup to understand that guardrails cannot be ornamental. The OS has to say no.
The catch is that “no” is bad for demos. It interrupts the magic. It forces the presenter to acknowledge limits, policy, configuration, and the possibility that the system should refuse the user’s apparent request. In a keynote culture built around inevitability, refusal is almost subversive.
Yet refusal is exactly what users need. An agentic Windows that never blocks an agent is not helpful. It is haunted.
The Privacy Argument Is About Control, Not Just Location
Local AI has become a shorthand for privacy, and the shorthand is only partly earned. Running a model on the device can reduce data exposure, improve latency, and keep some workflows away from centralized inference services. But privacy is not a property of silicon location alone.A local agent with broad permissions can still index private files, infer sensitive relationships, create new metadata, and pass context to services when a workflow requires it. A cloud agent with narrow permissions and strong auditability may, in some cases, be easier to govern than a local agent running wild under a user account. The real issue is control.
This is why the operating-system layer matters again. Users and administrators need a comprehensible way to decide what an agent can access, when it can access it, and whether it can carry information from one context into another. “On device” is not enough. “Under policy” is the phrase that matters.
The same goes for enterprise data. A company may accept an agent summarizing a local folder but reject the same agent correlating that folder with HR records, customer emails, and source code. The danger is often not a single access event. It is the composition of access across domains.
Agents are powerful precisely because they compose. Security has to compose faster.
Windows 11 Becomes the Test Case for Agentic Trust
Windows 11 is now in an awkward but fascinating position. It is still the familiar desktop OS that must run games, spreadsheets, IDEs, printers, VPN clients, and weird utilities from 2014. It is also being asked to become a substrate for autonomous, policy-contained, AI-driven workflows. Those two identities will not always cooperate.Consumers may experience this as feature creep. Sysadmins may experience it as another management surface. Developers may experience it as a new set of APIs and constraints. Security teams may experience it as both a threat and a relief, depending on whether Microsoft’s containment model proves enforceable.
The biggest risk is that Microsoft tries to make agents feel inevitable before it makes them accountable. Windows users have already lived through enough “you will love this integration” moments to be wary. Copilot buttons, Start menu promotions, cloud nudges, account requirements, and Edge persistence have taught many users that Microsoft’s definition of helpful can be aggressive.
Agentic computing raises the stakes. A recommendation can be ignored. An autonomous action has to be governed. If Microsoft blurs that line, it will burn trust quickly.
The better path is slower and less cinematic: make agents inspectable, revocable, scoped, logged, and boringly manageable. The future of AI on Windows depends on boring more than Microsoft’s keynotes will ever admit.
The Build 2026 Signal Windows Admins Should Not Ignore
The practical lesson from Build 2026 is not that every Windows shop should rush to deploy agents. It is that Microsoft is laying the foundations for a world in which agents are treated as first-class actors on managed devices. That means administrators should start thinking about agent policy the way they once had to start thinking about mobile device management, SaaS identity, and endpoint detection.The shift will not arrive as a single migration. It will arrive through developer tools, Microsoft 365 integrations, Windows previews, OEM devices, security baselines, and third-party software that quietly adds agentic workflows. By the time the word “agent” disappears from the marketing copy, the architecture will already be part of the environment.
- Microsoft is positioning Windows 11 as a place where AI agents can be contained and governed, not merely launched.
- Microsoft Execution Containers are important because they move agent safety toward OS-enforced policy instead of app-level promises.
- OpenClaw’s Windows demo matters because it shows the kind of destructive action that agent containment must prevent in ordinary environments.
- Project Solara suggests Microsoft’s agent strategy extends beyond the PC, but it also makes identity and policy consistency more urgent.
- Enterprises should evaluate agent platforms by permissions, auditability, revocation, and integration with existing management tools, not by demo fluency.
- Users should be skeptical of any agent that asks for broad access without a clear explanation of what it can do, when it can do it, and how to turn it off.
References
- Primary source: The Register
Published: Mon, 08 Jun 2026 08:30:00 GMT
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www.tomsguide.com - Official source: blogs.windows.com
Build 2026: Furthering Windows as the trusted platform for development
Build is one of our favorite moments each year - a chance to connect with the global developer community and share what we’ve been building. Over the past year, we have connected with many developers pushing the boundaries of what’s possible on
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